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Abstract 
While the antidiscrimination laws of the European Union (EU) and the 
United States of America (US) seek to prohibit pregnancy discrimination in the 
workplace, their approach to the problem has historically differed. US law has been 
defined by an ‘equal treatment’ approach. The contrasting EU laws reflect a holistic 
approach that seeks substantive equality by combining equal treatment with ‘special 
treatment’ measures, complemented by the strategy of gender mainstreaming. 
This thesis sets out to examine the extent to which US antidiscrimination law 
is shifting towards a more holistic approach that seeks greater substantive equality 
for pregnant workers. This examination is carried out on two levels: firstly, this 
thesis will comparatively study the two distinct models of equality that exist to 
address sex discrimination in the EU and the US, with a view to highlighting 
differences and similarities, and the availability of alternative measures, or serious 
limitations in their approach to pregnancy discrimination.  
Secondly, this thesis examines the antidiscrimination legislation that has been 
adopted and proposed on the national and state levels in the US, in order to draw 
attention to the increasing number of measures providing paid leave and workplace 
accommodations for pregnant workers, and imposing a duty to promote or achieve 
substantive equality. This examination is undertaken against a background of the 
distinct historical, legal, and conceptual context against which EU and US sex 
discrimination law has been adopted, and the discursive debate of feminist legal 
theorists regarding the role of law in both subordinating women, and in helping to 
end their inequality. EU and US law is studied in this wider context, because they 
have all been influential upon its development and provide a framework for 
assessing how far the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is converging with that 
of the EU.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Justice isn’t about some abstract legal theory, or footnote in a casebook 
– it’s about how our laws affect the daily realities of people’s lives: their 
ability to make a living and care for their families and achieve their 
goals.1  
 
Pregnancy remains a source of workplace discrimination in the European Union 
(EU) and the United States of America (US), despite the passage of several decades 
since the enactment of legislation specifically designed to forbid it. In the United 
Kingdom (UK), it is estimated that 30,000 pregnant workers are illegally forced out of 
their jobs each year.2The concern is such that the UK government has tasked its Equality 
and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) with carrying out a £1 million investigation 
into discrimination against pregnant women, considering both its impact on their 
families and the national economy.3 
The problem of pregnancy discrimination is not unique to one member state in 
the EU. A 2009 report by the EU Commission to the Council and Parliament on the 
application of Directive 2002/73/EC (Equal Treatment Directive), declared that ‘less 
favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or maternity leave... is still 
widespread in many states.’4The problem is also not unique to Europe. Statistics 
produced by the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), indicate a 
similar prevalence of workplace discrimination. Between 1997 and 2011, 70,417 
pregnant women filed complaints of being illegally discriminated against in the 
                                                 
1 President Obama, Remarks of President Barack Obama on the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act 
bill signing, January 29, 2009 (2009). 
2 EOC, Greater Expectations: Final Report of the EOC’s investigation into discrimination against new 
and expectant mothers in the workplace (ISBN: 1 84206 160 6, June 2005). 
3 E. Dugan, ‘Government launches probe into maternity discrimination at work after surge in complaints’ 
The Independent (London, Monday 04 November 2013) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/government-launches-probe-into-maternity-discrimination-at-work-after-surge-in-complaints-
8919959.html> accessed 19/6/2014 EHRC, ‘Commission tackles pregnancy discrimination’ (EHRC, 4 
Nov 2013)  <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/news/2013/november/commission-tackles-pregnancy-
discrimination/> accessed 5/12/2013.  
4 Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Report on the 
application of Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 September 2002 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, COM (2009) 409 final 5. 
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workplace. Concern with this growing problem and the issue of private employers 
forcing women ‘onto unpaid leave after being denied accommodations routinely 
provided to similarly situated employees,’ has led the EEOC to declare its intent to 
target illegal pregnancy discrimination.5   
It is against this background that this thesis examines pregnancy discrimination 
in comparative perspective by looking closely at EU and US law. The objective is to 
provide a better understanding of the EU and US approaches to pregnancy 
discrimination and to contribute to an ongoing debate. To fulfil this objective, this thesis 
will comparatively study the two distinct models of equality that exist to address 
discrimination in the EU and the US, discussing their similarities and differences, and 
investigating the possibilities for future development. In doing so, this study will reveal 
an overarching US national model of equality consisting of a ‘rights-based’ equal 
treatment approach to pregnancy discrimination that is supplemented by state and local 
laws and Presidential Executive Orders that provide additional rights and strategies. The 
contrasting EU model of equality is a holistic ‘dual track’ approach to ending 
discrimination, seeking greater equality by combining equal treatment with special 
treatment measures for pregnant and breastfeeding workers, and women on maternity 
leave, complemented by the transformative strategy of ‘gender mainstreaming.’  
On the basis of this study, this thesis proposes that while there are significant 
differences of detail, profound similarities between EU law and US law are emerging 
with respect to the legal approach taken to tackling the problem of pregnancy 
discrimination. Close examination of the substantive law of the US reveals an increasing 
number of measures providing for job protected paid leave, workplace accommodations, 
and gender mainstreaming, which taken together suggest that the trajectories of EU and 
US pregnancy discrimination law may not be as different as traditionally believed.6 
Indeed, from these similarities may be deduced a common belief that a mandate of equal 
treatment is inadequate to address the inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion suffered 
by pregnant and breastfeeding women and women on maternity leave, and that 
                                                 
5 EEOC, ‘Strategic Enforcement ‘Plan’ (2012) <http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep_public_draft.cfm> 
accessed 3/12/2013. 
6 See the academic arguments discussed in, Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Trajectories of European and 
American Antidiscrimination Law’ (2012) 60 Am J Comp L 2, 3. 
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additional ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law measures are integral to achieving greater substantive 
equality between women and men. This comparative study presents legal evidence for 
the similarities and differences between EU and US law, and proposes that there is 
evidence of an emerging legal convergence with the EU approach to ending pregnancy 
discrimination, albeit in a rather ad hoc and limited fashion. 
I Originality and significance of the research. 
The originality and significance of this research lies in the fact that although 
there is a vast body of feminist legal theory devoted to considering this issue of gender 
discrimination there is an important gap in the literature, with regard to a discussion of 
the role that the US state legislatures play in moving the national gender equality agenda 
forward.7The literature discussing the specific issue of pregnancy discrimination in the 
US, while significant, is remarkable for its extremely divisive debate regarding the need 
for what are variously described as ‘equal treatment’ or ‘special treatment’ measures, as 
addressed in the works of Siegel, Ginsburg, Williams, MacKinnon, Kay, Pedriana, 
Kenney, and others.8Chapter 6 highlights how this divisive debate has affected the 
equality measures that Congress has been willing to propose and adopt nationally. In 
contrast, some individual state and local legislatures have enacted broader equality 
measures prohibiting discrimination and mandating, or supporting the provision of 
pregnancy leave, maternity leave, family leave, and workplace accommodations. 
Although there is a significant amount of social science research discussing the outcome 
of equality measures enacted in specific US states, such as California, there is a lack of 
academic comparison and discussion of all the measures enacted by the state legislatures 
                                                 
7 See: Chapter 2. 
8 See: NS Siegel and RB Siegel, ‘Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination’ (2010) 59 Duke LJ 771; W.W. Williams, ‘Equality’s Riddle: 
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate’ (1984-1985) 13 Rev L & Social Change 
325; JC Williams, ‘Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and Work 
Thirty Years After the PDA’ (2009) 21 Yale JL & Feminism 79; JC Williams and ES Westfall, 
‘Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of Carers in the 
Workplace’ (2006) 13 Duke J Gender L & Pol’y 31; Catharine A MacKinnon, Sex Equality (2 edn, New 
York: Foundation Press 2007); Catharine A MacKinnon, ‘Substantive Equality: A Perspective’ (2011-
2012) Minn L Rev 1; N Pedriana, ‘Discrimination By Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978’ (2009) 21 Yale JL & Feminism 1; SJ Kenney, ‘Pregnancy 
Discrimination: Toward Substantive Equality’ (1995) 10 Wis Women’s LJ 351. 
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relating to pregnancy, breastfeeding, and maternity leave.9This thesis seeks to place 
itself within this space, seeking to consider, contrast, and compare not only EU and US 
national equality measures, but also US state measures applicable to this category of 
workers. An in depth and systematic comparison of the equality measures on these 
different levels is important to answering the central question posed as to whether the 
trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is shifting towards an approach that seeks 
greater substantive equality between women and men.   
Furthermore, academic discussion of gender mainstreaming in the US has been 
relatively non-existent, because of an erroneous belief that this equality tool has yet to 
be adopted, as illustrated by Sylvia Walby’s assertion that ‘The US is noteworthy for the 
absence of gender mainstreaming among its gender equality policies.’10Instead, the 
existing research and literature discussing the strategy of ‘gender mainstreaming,’ is 
notable for its focus on implementation efforts within the individual member states of 
the EU and in international development aid, as seen in the works of Stratigaki, Mazey, 
Verloo, Beveridge, Rubery, Rees, Squires and Walby.11In this regard, this thesis makes 
an original contribution through its discussion of the lessons that EU implementation 
efforts hold for the US, and with the assertion that with Executive Order No. 13506, 
establishing the Whitehouse Council on Women and Girls, President Obama has 
adopted the gender mainstreaming strategy domestically.12 
                                                 
9 See, for example Eileen Applebaum and Ruth Milkman, Leaves That Pay: Employer and Worker 
Experiences with Paid Family Leave in California (CEPR, 2011); Mayer Rossin-Slater, CJ Ruhm and J 
Waldfogel, The Effects of California’s Paid Family Leave Programme on Mothers’ Leave-Taking and 
Subsequent Labor Market Outcomes (NBER Working Paper 17715, 2011); R Milkman and E Appelbaum, 
‘Paid family leave in California: New research findings’ (2004) The State of California labor 45.  
10 Mark Dawson, ‘Three waves of new governance in the European Union’ (2011) 36 ELRev 208, 80 
11 M. Stratigaki, ‘Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action’ (2005) 12 EJWS 165; S Mazey, ‘The 
European Union and women’s rights: from the Europeanization of national agendas to the nationalization 
of a European agenda?’ (1998) 5 JEPP 131; M. Verloo, ‘Another velvet revolution? Gender 
mainstreaming and the politics of implementation’ [Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen 
Vienna] IWM Working Paper No 5/2001 Vienna; J Rubery, ‘Gender mainstreaming and gender equality 
in the EU: the impact of the EU employment strategy’ (2002) 33 ILJ 500; F Beveridge, ‘Building against 
the past: The impact of mainstreaming on EU gender law and policy’ [2007] ELRev 193; Theresa Rees, 
‘Reflections on the uneven development of gender mainstreaming in Europe’ (2005) 7 Int Feminist Jnl of 
Politics 555; Judith Squires, ‘Is Mainstreaming Transformative? Theorizing mainstreaming in the context 
of Diversity and Deliberation’ (2005) 12 Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and 
Society 366; Sylvia Walby, ‘Gender mainstreaming: Productive tensions in theory and practice’ (2005) 12 
Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 321. 
12 Executive Order 13506 of March 11, 2009 Establishing a White House Council on Women And Girls, 
74 FR 11271. 
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Ultimately, what this thesis will provide is an up to date evaluation of measures 
intended to address the issue of pregnancy discrimination in the EU and the US. This 
evaluation will present evidence of an emerging shift in the trajectory of US 
antidiscrimination law, moving beyond an equal treatment rights based approach, 
towards one that provides some preference to pregnant workers, and imposes a duty to 
promote or achieve gender equality. It will also highlight the difference between law’s 
promise and its performance, for as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once said, ‘The law 
tends to declare rights. It does not deliver them.’13Such a study could prove important in 
light of the limitations of legislating to resolve a seemingly intractable problem of 
discrimination, and underscore the role that gender mainstreaming plays in ending 
structural inequalities for women.  
II Research questions 
In order to provide a better understanding of the EU and US approaches to 
tackling pregnancy discrimination, this thesis poses several research questions. The 
central question posed is as follows: Is the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law 
shifting away from a purely formal equality approach to addressing pregnancy 
discrimination, towards a more holistic approach that seeks greater substantive equality, 
and imposes a duty to promote or achieve equality? In order to answer this overarching 
question, a number of ancillary research questions need to be addressed. In particular, 
what is the historical, legal, and contextual background against which EU and US 
antidiscrimination law has been enacted? How does this affect the equality measures 
they adopt to address pregnancy discrimination, and the possibilities for future 
development?  
 First, however, what is meant by ‘discrimination’ and ‘equality’ in the EU and 
the US needs to be clarified. These are complex and multifaceted concepts that have 
been the subject of intense academic debate. While the following account is largely 
                                                 
13 Martin Luther Dr. King, ‘The Time for Freedom Has Come;’ This belief, Dr. King asserts, illuminates 
the motivations of today’s young Negroes--and their extraordinary willingness to fill jails as if they were 
honour classes. ‘The New York Times, Magazine (NY, September 10, 1961) SM25 
<http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=FB0D14FB395F147A93C2A81782D85F458685F9> 
accessed 3/12/2013 
 19 
reconstructive, drawing on the works citied, where the discussion departs from those 
views, it is my own elaboration and refinement.  
a The meaning of ‘discrimination.’  
 In the context of employment, ‘discrimination’ has a distinct and defined 
meaning. It is the action of treating someone differently or less favourably for some 
reason. As such, discrimination has a negative connotation, as being ‘the allocation of a 
generalized characteristic to an identifiable group.’14Both the US and the EU, seek to 
prohibit discrimination in private employment through statutory measures. More 
specifically, in the US, a combination of the US Constitution and several national laws 
make it illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, colour, religion, 
national origin, sex, pregnancy, disability, age, or genetic information. Under EU law, 
both Treaty provisions and Employment Equality Directives contain similar proscriptive 
provisions.  
Two variants of discrimination in employment are recognised by the US and the 
EU. They are ‘direct discrimination,’ or ‘disparate treatment,’ as it is termed in the US, 
and ‘ indirect discrimination,’ or ‘disparate impact,’ as it is termed in the US. Direct/ 
disparate treatment discrimination is less favourable treatment ‘on grounds of,’ ‘on the 
basis of, ‘or ‘because of’ sex,’ and it refers to an intentional act of discrimination in 
employment, such as the refusal to employ, or the dismissal of a woman because she is 
pregnant. While intentional discrimination is prohibited in the US by statute and the US 
Constitution, the latter only prohibits discrimination by governmental actors, and does 
not protect against indirect discrimination/disparate impact. In a nutshell, indirect 
discrimination/disparate impact theory is focused on policies that have the effect of 
perpetuating disadvantage, with no requirement of bias, or intent on the part of the 
employer. This includes, for example, height, weight, and literacy requirements that 
operate as an artificial barrier to employment. The concept was initially judicially 
created in the ground-breaking US case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and subsequently 
                                                 
14 Malcolm Sargeant, Discrimination law (Pearson Longman 2004) 11. 
 20 
transplanted to the EU, but its current form is statutory in both the EU and the US.15It 
could be thought that because indirect discrimination/disparate impact theory does not 
require bias it begins where intentional discrimination ends.16 However, the reality is, as 
the discussion in Chapters 3 and 5 will reveal, there are exemptions, and defences to 
discriminatory practices that employers may rely upon, as well as proof burdens that 
must be met before any claim of discrimination can succeed. This is to say that the 
prohibition of discrimination is not absolute. Indeed, intentional discrimination is 
permissible in the EU if the occupational activity necessitates the employment of a 
person of a particular sex by reason of their nature or the context in which they are 
carried out, provided its ‘objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
proportionate.’17Similarly, in the US, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains an 
affirmative defence to sex-based discrimination, where sex is considered to be a ‘bona 
fide occupational qualification’ (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the operation of the 
business or enterprise.18Additionally, indirect discrimination is defendable in the EU 
where the employer’s ‘provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.’19Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA) provides employers with the 
defence that, ‘the practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.’20 
Notwithstanding these similarities, this close study found that the concept of 
indirect/disparate impact discrimination has been differently applied in the EU and the 
US. This difference arises from the special rights accorded to pregnant workers in the 
EU, and the lack thereof in the US. In particular, the express provision of paid leave and 
workplace accommodations to EU workers has created less need to rely on the concept 
                                                 
15 Griggs v. Duke Power Co 401 US 424 (1971). Also: Article 2 (1) (b) in Directive 2006/54/EC of the 
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to secure equality than exists in the US. Instead, as the discussion in Chapter 3 will 
reveal, the EU variant of the US paradigm of indirect discrimination is focused on 
invalidating other workplace policies based upon unexamined assumptions and 
stereotypes that disproportionately impact women, especially atypical workers. 
b The meaning of ‘equality.’ 
Intense academic debate has made clear that there is no single legal, theoretical 
definition of equality in the EU or the US. Sandra Fredman explains the lack of 
definition best when she states that the concept of equality is ‘a contested notion with 
many different interpretations.’21Niall Crowley concurs by saying that ‘Equality is a 
contested concept,’22while Mark Bell calls it ‘an open textured concept, with alternative 
and competing visions of what it should entail.’23 It should not be surprising, therefore, 
that the concept of equality has been criticized by Peter Westen as ‘an empty vessel with 
no substantive moral content of its own.’24 Criticisms aside, legal concepts of equality in 
the EU and the US are informed by three distinct ‘visions.’ These visions are formal 
equality, substantive equality, and equality as diversity or dignity, and 
inclusion.25Understanding these different visions is important for our examination of the 
limitations of legislation designed to address pregnancy discrimination. An overview of 
each vision follows.  
c Formal equality 
It is generally accepted that the vision of formal equality originates with the first 
part of the Aristotelian paradigm of treating likes alike. ‘Things (and persons) that are 
alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in 
proportion to their unalikeness.’26The liberal conception of formal equality is one of 
                                                 
21 See: S Fredman, Discrimination law (OUP 2002) 1. 
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consistency, uniformity, and assimilation—a like must be treated alike, for ‘equality of 
treatment is predicated on the principle that justice inheres in consistency.’27The focus 
for formal equality therefore, is the procedure, or the rule to be followed and not the 
outcome. This is to say that formal equality is ‘preoccupied with procedural fairness 
rather than with the results of a given treatment.’28It is predicated on the idea that entry, 
participation, and advancement in the workplace should be available to everyone, and 
that merit, rather than irrelevant characteristics, should be the basis for such.   
It is the formal equality vision that is the touchstone of antidiscrimination efforts 
in the EU and the US. Transcribed into law, formal equality is non-discrimination. 
Where ‘the first principle of legal equality has been same treatment based on relevant 
empirical sameness, equivalence, symmetry with a relevant comparator, 29it is based 
upon the argument that ‘ unequal treatment is wrong in principle and inefficient in 
practice.30Formal equality for men and women mandates that as they are similarly 
situated, they should have the same rights and opportunities. In an employment context, 
this vision of equality requires an employer to exclude irrelevant characteristics from a 
decision-making process. This means that an employer must be blind to specifically 
enumerated characteristics, including pregnancy. This is to say that sex-based 
differences are always irrelevant, unless as noted above, there is some permissible 
‘justification’ for different treatment of comparable situations.  
Having outlined the vision of formal equality, it is now important to address its 
limitations. Academics have highlighted two clear limitations. The first is that as the 
vision is a simplistic promise of consistency in treatment, employer practices are not 
required to change for the better. With specific regard to pregnancy, the requirement is 
only that employers treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees who 
are similarly situated with respect to their ability to work. Formal equality is 
disinterested in whether or not employers provide employees with fringe benefits, and as 
Catherine Barnard and Bob Hepple observe, there can be a ‘levelling up,’ or a ‘levelling 
                                                 
27 Fredman (n 21) 2. 
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down,’ by their provision to both men and women, or the deprivation thereof.31 
Consequently, some important thinkers have concluded that laws seeking formal 
equality have had a marginal impact on the behaviour of employers towards pregnant 
workers.32The study of EU and US law in this thesis supports this conclusion, revealing 
that in the absence of a clear mandate to level up; there is a tendency to level down the 
benefits available pregnant workers and women on maternity leave. For instance, the 
discussion in Chapter 4 reveals that in their laws providing for an allowance to women 
on pregnancy and maternity leave, the majority of EU member states have elected to 
provide only an amount that is the same as that received by workers on sick leave, rather 
than full pay, as permitted by EU law. Similarly, a discussion of US federal case law in 
Chapter 5 reveals that formal equality as embodied in US antidiscrimination law means 
that employers may deny pregnant workers a workplace accommodation, or leave, and 
that their employment may be terminated, so long as similarly situated non-pregnant 
workers are not given a benefit that the pregnant worker is denied. The reality, as Hugh 
Collins observes, is that formal equality permits employers to engage in a ‘race to the 
bottom,’ rather than a race to the top in their treatment of employees.33  
The second limitation of the formal equality vision is the subject of a great deal 
of feminist legal criticism, which is discussed in depth in Chapter 2 and throughout this 
thesis. Much of this criticism is directed at the comparative nature of formal equality, 
which derives its source and its limits from the treatment of others. In the case of sex 
discrimination, the comparator is the ‘male norm’ against which the treatment of a 
woman is to be judged. Consequently, critics observe that formal equality requires 
assimilation and that women conform to the male norm in order to obtain the benefit of 
legislative provisions. This is to say that for a woman to be able to claim the benefit of 
formal equality protections, she has to obscure any differences.34As Fredman observes, 
the comparator ‘is at the core of the legal formula.’35This means that a woman is only 
                                                 
31 Catherine Barnard and B Hepple, ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59 CLJ 562, 563. 
32 Herma Hill Kay, ‘Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy’ (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s LJ 1; 
W.W. Williams, ‘Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment ’Debate’ (n 
8); RB Siegel, ‘You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy 
Discrimination in Hibbs’ (2006) 58 Stan L Rev 1871.  
33 Collins (n 30) 45. 
34 See: Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, Law and social change (2nd edn, SAGE 2010). 
35 Fredman (n 21). 
 24 
treated equally if she can conform.36Here lies the crux of the problem of using a formal 
equality vision in seeking to address pregnancy discrimination. Pregnancy cannot be 
gender neutralized. As there is no actual comparator, there is no discrimination.37Thus, 
pregnancy creates a conundrum for the formal equality vision, which Barnard and Rapp 
aptly describe as a ‘unique, analytical wrinkle.’38As the discussion in subsequent 
Chapters will show, originally, courts in the US and the UK sought to resolve this 
problem by using the hypothetical ‘sick man’ as a comparator. Only by assimilating 
pregnancy to sickness could pregnancy be compared to the male norm.39Under this 
contorted analysis, pregnancy is considered a temporary illness, like any other. It 
follows therefore that under such comparison a pregnant worker’s employment can be 
terminated, for if the pregnant worker’s condition impacts her ability to work, she is 
deemed sick, and as a sick worker, she is subject to workplace rules, including dismissal 
for excessive absences.  
It is the need for assimilation that has led Fineman to conclude that ‘formal 
equality is a flawed and poorly articulated objective.’40She is not alone in her criticisms. 
While acknowledging that ‘entrenched discrimination would persist unless it was 
prohibited by law,’ some feminists consider formal equality an inadequate vision, on the 
basis that it does nothing to change existing societal structures that perpetuate 
discrimination.41Fredman writes that ‘experience has shown that equal treatment can in 
practice perpetuate inequalities.’42Similarly, Collins observes that, ‘we know that equal 
treatment will in practice not ensure equality of opportunity,’43and MacKinnon 
concludes that formal equality merely ‘reinforces and reproduces social inequality.’44For 
these critics, the central failing of formal equality is that as, ‘It rests on the assumption 
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that we can separate stereotypes from true differences—it fails to recognize that sex 
differences are socially constructed.’45As a result, MacKinnon concludes formal 
equality is a tool that is, ‘impotent, even regressive.’46 
These criticisms of the formal vision of equality are valuable. They draw our 
attention to the real limitations of legislation seeking to address pregnancy 
discrimination using an equal treatment mandate. As the results of this study will show, 
it is this mandate that underpinned initial efforts in the EU and the US, and continues in 
some fashion today, despite the fact that its application to pregnancy and maternity has 
significant limitations. It is these limitations that have ignited support for a substantive 
vision of equality, which will now be discussed. 
d Substantive equality 
There is a clear distinction between the formal equality vision and the 
substantive equality vision. Where formal equality is concerned with procedure, 
substantive equality is concerned with results and effect. Where formal equality seeks 
symmetry and ignores difference, substantive equality seeks to recognize difference. 
Substantive equality depends not simply on having the formal right to participate, but on 
having the actual ability and resources to exercise that right. Substantive equality is 
predicated on the understanding that participation in the workplace does not necessarily 
lead to a more egalitarian workplace. As Sandra Fredman explains:  
Substantive equality transcends equal treatment, recognizing that 
treating people alike despite pre-existing disadvantages or 
discrimination can simply perpetuate inequality.47 
Ultimately, the goal that substantive equality seeks is to ensure that laws, 
policies, and practices are not discriminatory in effect. It does not provide any guarantee 
that members of a particular group will achieve equality of results, only that they will 
have the opportunity. In other words, the vision of substantive equality does not displace 
the role of individual merit and initiative. As Peter Westen explains, ‘opportunity is 
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something less than a guarantee, [but] it is something more than a mere possibility.’48 
Often, the goal of substantive equality has been explained by academics using metaphor. 
Sandra Fredman, in her book, Discrimination Law, which must be regarded as one of 
the most significant contributions to the literature on this subject, uses the metaphor of a 
race to explain that by providing equal opportunities, the aim is to ‘equalize the starting 
point, so that all participants can compete on the same terms.’49By equalizing the 
starting point, all have the opportunity to achieve the same outcomes.50This ‘implies the 
adoption of strategies designed to deal with the underlying barriers to equal 
participation.’51This vision recognizes that specific obstacles hinder the attainment of 
full workplace participation, and that the obstacles may differ from one opportunity to 
another.52In terms of pregnancy and maternity, the obstacles have been well documented 
and include the inequality of household labour, the lack of workplace accommodation of 
temporary limitations imposed by pregnancy and lactation, the lack of fully paid job 
protected leave, the availability of flexible hours, and affordable, high quality 
childcare.53In this regard, substantive equality requires that rules take account of 
differences, in order to eliminate the disadvantages caused to women. This gives rise to 
the questions as to what differences should be recognized and how they should be taken 
into account.54It is uncontroversial to say that while the EU and the US recognize the 
difference that pregnancy makes in their antidiscrimination legislation, their legislative 
support for special rights for pregnant workers has traditionally differed. What is 
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controversial, and what the results of this research seek to suggest is that this difference 
is eroding, to some degree.  
The foregoing suggestion is not to be construed as a blanket conclusion that the 
‘equality of opportunity’ vision is a silver bullet to workplace discrimination. Indeed, it 
would be naive to think all discrimination could be ended, whatever vision is adopted. 
This suggestion also does not ignore the fact that the ‘equality of opportunity’ vision has 
been subject to broad criticism in the academic literature, mainly on the basis of not 
doing enough to transform the workplace. Critics argue that to be effective, substantive 
equality requires equality of results or outcome, rather than equality of opportunity. This 
strand of opinion holds that there is a need for equalizing where people end up.55Among 
these critics is Fredman, who argues that ‘the aim of equality is not consistency of 
treatment, but fairness in the resulting distribution of benefits,’56and that ‘inequality of 
treatment might be necessary to achieve a fairer allocation in the final result.’57This 
criticism of ‘equality of opportunity’ rests on the argument that removing obstacles for a 
class of subjects will lead to equal opportunity among the members of the class only if 
they have identical circumstances, and the same means to confront the obstacles, and the 
same obstacles to confront.58As Bob Hepple, another heavyweight academic observes, 
‘one is not supplying genuine equality of opportunity if one applies an unchallenged 
criterion of merit, to people who have been deprived of the opportunity to acquire 
merit.’59 Consequently, ‘equality of outcome... measured across the broad spectrum of 
resources, occupations, and roles—has to be taken as a key measure of equality of 
opportunity.’60Under this vision of equality: 
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 The spread of women or minorities in a category should reflect their 
proportions in the workplace or the population as a whole. Thus, there is 
no need for proof of an intervening ‘discriminatory’ factor to trigger 
action.61 
The lack of proportional representation under this vision operates much like the 
presumption of negligence afforded by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the law of 
tort.62Proof of discrimination is not required. This vision views equality through 
numbers and would require reverse discrimination and allow preferential treatment for 
women, the use of targets or quotas, and employment decisions based upon irrelevant 
criteria of sex, where women are under-represented in the workplace.  
While it will become apparent in this thesis that ‘equality of results’ is not the 
substantive vision of equality that informs the EU and US approaches to gender 
discrimination, evidence will be presented to suggest an increasing consideration by the 
EU of targets and mandates to address the underrepresentation of women, where other 
equality efforts have fallen flat. In particular, where data indicates that men are 
disproportionately represented on the boards of publically traded companies and in 
elected office; there is evidence of a move away from a formal equality vision, towards 
a more transformative approach, which this vision of equality encapsulates.63 
e Human dignity, diversity, and inclusion. 
With this third vision of equality, ‘non-discrimination is one aspect... of a wider 
principle of equality based on tolerance and respect for other human beings.’64This 
vision of equality underpins the Canadian, Greek, and Belgian Constitutions, as well as 
German Basic Law and the Northern Ireland Act.65And, as Fredman observes: 
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The primacy of individual dignity and worth as a foundation for equality 
rights is expressed in a number of constitutions, notably constituting the 
first article of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights proclaimed 
in Nice in December 2000.66 
 This vision focuses on the dignity, autonomy, and worth of individuals. As 
described by Niall Crowley, this vision is focused on equality of condition, requiring the 
removal of economic and political barriers that contribute to economic development. It 
requires elimination of disadvantage and protection of dignity.67Collins further clarifies 
the vision as one that is focused on social inclusion, where the goal of social inclusion 
does not depend upon a comparison with a man or some other privileged group. Rather, 
‘social inclusion is an aim or principle of justice.’68As set out in the founding principle 
contained in Article 2, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU): 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.69  
In effect, this vision of equality seeks a move away from the notion of 
‘corrective’ or individual justice, to ‘distributive’ or group-based justice.70This requires 
narrowly defined concepts to be abandoned in favour of strategies, including positive 
action measures, gender mainstreaming, and positive obligations. The lynchpin of this 
vision of equality involves the move away from merely legislating negative duties to 
avoid discrimination, towards imposing positive duties and obligations to promote 
equality and inclusion. For instance, in the EU, Consideration 2 in the preamble to the 
Recast Directive 2006/54/EC expressly references the ‘positive obligation to promote 
equality between women and men.’ As such, it exemplifies what Hepple calls ‘fourth’ 
generation’ equality laws, which form part of a comprehensive effort to tackle 
discrimination and achieve ‘transformative’ equality.71This transformative equality 
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involves a move away from the complaint led model of equality, based on individual 
rights, towards one in which governmental authorities have a duty to alter practices and 
structures.72Hepple calls this an ‘inclusive, proactive approach‘ to ensure protection for 
dignity and increased participation in society.73Crowley argues that such a vision 
‘stimulates a proactive, planned, and systematic approach to equality.’74Fredman adds 
that this ‘fourth generation’ of equality laws, is essential ‘not just to address previous 
disadvantage, but to achieve an equal distribution of social goods.’75  
Despite its intellectual attraction, the dignity vision of equality is also not 
without its detractors or limitations. Jeremy Waldron, in an excellent lecture addressing 
the question, What do Philosophers have against Dignity? discusses the many 
objections to the concept; including that, it is ‘overused and meaningless’ ‘squishy,’ and 
‘hopelessly vague.’ Notably, these are many of the same criticisms levied at the concept 
of equality. While I do not necessarily agree with Waldron that ‘sometimes clarity and 
determinacy are overrated,’ I do think that competing definitions are less important than 
the broad array of equality measures this particular vision endorses. 76This is not to 
ignore the fact that, as the vision focuses largely on ‘soft law’ strategies, there are 
problems with enforcement, as the discussion later in this Chapter will highlight. 
Certainly, the strategy of gender mainstreaming makes clear that negative rights are 
stronger than positive duties. An example of gender mainstreaming and these problems 
are found in the ‘public sector equality duty’ (PSED) contained in the UK’s Equality 
Act 2010 (EA), a short discussion of which is appropriate.77 
The EA mandates UK governmental authorities have ‘due regard’ to the need to 
eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations 
between different people when carrying out their activities.78However, the duty does not 
create a privately enforceable legal right. Instead, enforcement of the PSED is achieved 
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through an application for judicial review. A close review of the case law reveals that in 
the absence of any legislative clarification, the UK courts are left to determine the 
substance and rigour required by the ‘due regard’ standard.79The result has been an 
approach that holds that so long as the public sector’s procedure is not a ‘cosmetic 
exercise,’ and there has been a detailed and comprehensive analysis of how the probable 
adverse effects may be mitigated, Courts defer to the judgement of the body.80In effect: 
‘Due regard’ is the regard that is appropriate, in all the particular 
circumstances in which the public authority concerned is carrying out its 
function as a public authority. The weight to be given to the 
countervailing factors is a matter for the public authority concerned 
rather than the Court, unless the assessment by the public authority is 
unreasonable or irrational.81 
Based upon the results of this review, this thesis concludes that although the 
PSED clearly represents a new generation of anti-discrimination legislation that has no 
real correlative in the US, the lack of legislative clarification serves to circumscribe its 
role in addressing gender discrimination generally and pregnancy discrimination 
specifically. This is because, in the cases that have come before them, the UK courts 
have generally interpreted the PSED to be procedural rather than substantive in its 
mandate.82In light of which, the duty has been fairly criticized by Fredman as being ‘too 
deferent and too narrowly cast to further equality standards effectively.’83  
III Terminology  
In addition to the conceptual underpinnings of EU and US antidiscrimination 
law, some key terms are utilized throughout this thesis, including ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, 
positive/affirmative action, gender mainstreaming and holism. Here, these terms are 
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defined and explored, in order to lay the foundation for their consideration in subsequent 
Chapters.  
a Hard and soft law. 
In comparing and contrasting EU and the US antidiscrimination law, a 
distinction is sought to be made throughout this thesis between those measures defined 
as ‘hard law,’ and those defined as ‘soft’ law. The term ‘hard law’ refers to: 
 Legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise 
through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that 
delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.84 
Historically, ‘soft law’ has been defined by stating what it is not. That it is not 
usually legally binding upon those to whom it is addressed, as it lacks legal sanctions.  
More recent literature, and in particular, the work of Linda Senden has clarified the 
concept with regard to soft law in the context of the European Union. Drawing on the 
work of Francis Snyder, Senden notes that there are three core elements to EU soft law. 
These are rules of conduct that have no legally binding force, but have practical effects, 
or impact upon behaviour. One the basis of these elements, Senden proposes a definition 
of soft law as: 
The rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not 
been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have 
certain indirect legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce 
practical effects.85 
Other academics also reject a binary divide in favour of defining ‘soft law’ as an 
‘umbrella concept,’ wherein governments are not necessarily faced with a binary choice, 
but rather with ‘choices arrayed along a continuum.’86These choices are highlighted by 
the fact that soft law measures are not required to be in any particular form, and include, 
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but are not limited to, non-binding agreements, action plans, best practices, 
communications, notices, guidelines, principles, targets, benchmarking, 
recommendations, opinions and strategies. As this list illustrates, soft law instruments 
are varied and constitute ‘a richly kaleidoscopic variety of forms.’ 87  
A further distinction by which ‘soft law’ is often defined in the academic 
literature is that unlike hard law, which is ‘precise, clear, and unambiguous,’ soft law is 
often vague in the obligations that it imposes.88This vagueness contributes to its 
attractiveness to the actors. In situations in which ‘hard’ law can, ‘constrain the 
techniques of dispute settlement and negotiation, soft law offers, ‘a rational adaptation 
to uncertainty.’89Soft law offers both flexibility, due to its ability to be amended more 
easily, and the opportunity to reach some agreement in circumstances where total 
agreement would be impossible. As Abbott and Snidal observe, soft law ‘facilitates 
compromise,’ where the form of soft law chosen reflects the problem sought to be 
resolved.90Indeed, the results of this research reveal that soft law is increasingly being 
used as a tool to move equality forward in the EU and the US, in circumstances in which 
objections to governmental intrusion into the employer/employee relationship, feminist 
concerns, and/or economic considerations weigh heavily against the further enactment 
of antidiscrimination legislation. In such a milieu, soft law constitutes regulatory 
sensitivity and awareness that there are situations in which hard law measures are not 
politically feasible, or attainable. This is particularly true of the US, where it is 
suggested that the adoption of gender mainstreaming via Executive Order reflects 
sensitivity to Congressional objection to social legislation.   
 Soft law also reflects institutional awareness of limits to the ‘equality’ that hard 
law can achieve. The reality, as Fredman observes, is that ‘three decades of anti-
discrimination legislation have not been able to address deep-seated discriminatory 
structures.’91While her observation was made with regard to EU law, it is equally 
applicable to US law. Faced with the lacuna that hard law has left, and that any 
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89 ibid 444. 
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prohibition against pregnancy discrimination has been ineffective in resolving, the 
results of this study suggest that EU and US policy-makers are increasingly relying upon 
soft law measures, in an effort to address this pernicious issue and continue the 
momentum for parity. It may also be deduced that soft law measures serve as 
recognition that while the state is primarily responsible for ending discrimination and 
ensuring the health and safety of pregnant workers, it cannot be completely successful 
when it acts alone. Collaboration is essential for overcoming the limitations of an 
environment hostile to change, and is fundamental to creating a national concern for 
achieving equality. As Joanne Conaghan has observed, ‘The path to equality through 
law is narrow and uneven.’92 
b Positive/Affirmative Action 
As positive/affirmative action is a key strategy in both the EU and US models of 
equality, it is comparatively discussed in this thesis, and its role, if any, in helping to 
address the inequalities suffered by pregnant workers is explored. Here, terminology is 
explained and similarities and differences are introduced.  
 Positive action, as it is called in the EU, is termed affirmative action in the US, 
and refers to a remedial strategy, which is designed to provide ‘preferential treatment’ 
for specific groups as a remedy for past discrimination and achieve equality of 
opportunity. In the EU, both primary and secondary legislation expressly confers 
permission for gender based positive action by the EU institutions and the member 
states. Article 141(4) EC was revised in the Amsterdam Treaty to institutionalize 
positive action and gender mainstreaming, as part of EU gender policy.93Furthermore, 
Article 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that: 
The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption 
of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-
represented sex.94 
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Finally, Article 3 of the Equality Directive (Recast) provides that: 
 The Member States may maintain or adopt measures within the 
meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring 
full equality in practice between men and women in working life.95 
In the US, gender-based affirmative action measures in employment are also 
constitutionally and statutorily permissible. They may be court ordered as a remedial 
measure, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, or required by 
Presidential Order where an employer is a government contractor. They may also be 
voluntarily adopted by private employers as an ‘affirmative action plan.’96A close 
review of positive and affirmative action in Chapters 3 and 5 reveals that while there is a 
significant difference in support and broader legal basis for the strategy in the EU 
compared to the US, there are also some unexpected similarities. It is suggested that 
these similarities operate to render the strategy less effective in addressing the 
workplace inequalities suffered by women. Here, these similarities are briefly 
introduced as part of the terminology used in this thesis. 
The first and chief similarity is that the strategy does not permit employers in the 
EU or the US to simply hire or promote more women in order to achieve gender balance 
in the workplace. As the strategy seeks equality of opportunity, not of results, general 
quotas and targets are impermissible. In the US, the voluntary use of ‘class based’ 
remedies is generally not permissible.97 Likewise, the EU Equal Treatment Directive 
prohibits a system of strict targets and quotas.98  
A second similarity is the lack of any express definition or clarification of the 
strategy in EU and US legislation. As a result, their highest courts have been left to 
determine the permissible boundaries of voluntary action, and the resulting confusion 
                                                 
95 Recast Directive (n 15). 
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has had a direct impact upon the willingness of governments and private employers to 
rely on the strategy to advance gender equality.  
A final similarity is the temporal quality of the strategy as a tool for advancing 
equality. The EU institutions and the US Supreme Court have declared that 
positive/affirmative action is a short-term strategy for achieving greater substantive 
equality. This is to say that it is anticipated that the strategy will have achieved its goal 
by a date certain. 
Ultimately, the results of this study suggest that the temporal quality of the 
strategy, coupled with the confusion and divisive debate surrounding its use, particularly 
in the US, render it a less attractive measure for advancing gender equality than gender 
mainstreaming. 
c Gender mainstreaming.   
In this thesis the strategy of gender mainstreaming is underscored for its 
potential in achieving transformative change, and enabling the US, in particular, to 
transcend the divide between civil and political rights, and social and economic rights, 
as well as the public/private sphere divide that epitomizes its antidiscrimination 
measures for this category of workers.99 
There are two conventional definitions of gender mainstreaming. That is, either 
the definition of the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) agreed 
conclusions 1997/2: 
The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any 
planned action, including legislation, policies, or programmes, in all 
areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as 
men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes 
in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men 
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve gender equality,100 
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Alternatively, the definition of the Group of Specialists of the Council of Europe, 
that: 
Gender mainstreaming is the organization, improvement, development 
and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective 
is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages by the actors 
normally involved in policy-making.101 
This thesis considers and acknowledges the significant discursive debate 
surrounding definitional problems and problems in approaches and implementation, and 
challenges to the strategy in the EU. Nevertheless, it is asserted that the benefits of the 
strategy outweigh any limitations and pitfalls, making definitional preciseness less 
important than the transformation the strategy promises. From a pragmatic standpoint, 
the importance of the strategy for the US lies in the fact that it is a far less controversial 
means of achieving gender equality than the adoption of affirmative action measures, 
while being similarly focused on group based/collective disadvantage.102That being said, 
this thesis recognizes that gender mainstreaming cannot, and should not replace existing 
legal rights, and is not a standalone strategy. Rather, as a soft law measure, gender 
mainstreaming is a complementary strategy that can forge a middle course. It requires 
policy-makers and implementers not to accept that existing policy, or the policy being 
advanced or considered is in effect gender-neutral, or free of bias towards the male 
norm. As such, it offers an additional tool with which to address the seemingly 
intractable problem of pregnancy discrimination.  
d Reconciliation measures 
Reconciliation refers to the EU soft law strategy that encourages EU member 
States to adopt measures to enable men and women to balance the conflicting demands 
of work, private life, and caring responsibilities, which in turn, increase labour market 
participation rates and birth rates. While the measures, including the provision of 
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childcare, paid leave, and flexible working arrangements have been the subject of 
extensive  criticism, debate and reformulation in the EU, their adoption has become the 
focus of recent national policy efforts in the US,  as discussed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7.103 
e Holism 
The initial objective of this study was to investigate how the EU and the US had 
approached the problem of pregnancy discrimination in such seemingly different ways. 
However, on examining closely the substantive law, it emerged that that the US 
approach is gradually converging with the EU approach, within the limits of its unique 
legal and conceptual barriers. The increasing number of US measures providing for 
workplace accommodation, job protected paid leave, and gender mainstreaming, 
indicate a move away from a traditional ‘rights based’ approach, seeking only formal 
equality, and towards the EU approach, which recognizes the difference that pregnancy 
makes. From this convergence may be deduced a common understanding that as the 
workplace does not exist in a vacuum, addressing discrimination in one forum, without 
considering the impact of issues, including the household division of labour, the costs 
and availability of child and dependent care, and the need to balance the competing 
demands of work and family life, will render inadequate any single response to the 
problem. Rather, what is required, and what this research seeks to suggest is emerging is 
a broader and more holistic approach to a seemingly intractable problem. What is meant 
by a holistic approach requires some elaboration.  
Holism is an approach most commonly associated with biology and 
medicine.104The term was ‘coined in 1926, from the Greek holos (whole), by the South 
African statesman general Jan Smuts. As an approach that considers the whole person, 
rather than individual parts, it counteracts ‘the cold precision of scientific 
medicine.’105In treating a patient, Hippocrates, more than 2300 years ago emphasized 
that: 
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Physicians must consider the whole man to diagnose and treat properly 
health care problems... That the well-being of a person is influenced by 
social and environmental as well as physiological changes, and that the 
art and science of medicine include consideration of all these factors.106 
In medicine, holism is not only an approach that emphasizes treating the whole 
patient rather than just the affected parts, it also defines alternative approaches to 
healthcare and ‘alternative’ healers, including, but also not limited to, psychotherapy, 
hypnosis, massage therapy, herbal medicine, homeopathy, oriental medicine, and 
environmental medicine.107This holistic approach has expanded to areas beyond science 
and medicine, to encompass education and law. For instance, in environmental law, 
holism holds that the interconnectivity of all parts of the ecosystem must be understood, 
in order to comprehend any individual part.108Holism is also used to describe non-
litigious approaches to settling disputes, including mediation, arbitration, and 
conciliation, as provided for in the areas of environmental law, family law, domestic 
relations, corporate governance, discrimination and criminal justice, in both the US and 
EU member state countries.109As in medicine, holism seeks to bring alternative 
approaches to conflict resolution, and while there are ‘holistic lawyers,’110‘holistic law’ 
does not exist.111Rather, holism is an approach wherein the emphasis is using a non-
litigious means for reaching a solution that works for all parties, rather than one 
individual. Additionally, it is forward looking, rather than focused on past events. 
Applying holism to the problem of pregnancy discrimination, it is suggested that 
four elements must exist before a policy approach may be considered to be truly holistic. 
These elements are as follows: 
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1. The problem of pregnancy discrimination is considered within the wider 
context of gender equality; 
2. There is collaboration between government and non-government 
stakeholders, with the purpose of informing policy and creating greater 
support for governmental initiatives; 
3. There exists a combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law initiatives that go 
beyond a prohibition of discrimination, to include measures designed to 
actively advance substantive equality and impose a duty to promote 
equality of opportunity;   
4. The approach to pregnancy discrimination is forward-looking, in the 
sense that there is active reconsideration and redirection of policy efforts 
where evaluations, reports, and studies suggest that tweaking is necessary 
to achieve greater substantive equality between women and men. 
On the basis of this research, this thesis proposes that there is evidence that such 
an approach exists in the EU, and that the US is moving slowly towards a more holistic 
approach in its attempts to tackle the problem of pregnancy discrimination. More 
specifically, a close review of EU and US antidiscrimination law in the following 
Chapters will reveal an increasing number of measures designed to address pregnancy 
discrimination that form part of a larger goal of achieving greater substantive equality 
between women and men, where the prohibition of discrimination is supplemented by 
the provision of rights specific to pregnant, breastfeeding workers and women on 
maternity leave,  positive/affirmative action measures, gender mainstreaming, and other 
measures that impose a duty upon governmental actors to advance equality, while also 
emphasizing the role that men play in achieving equality.  
IV Overview of the Chapters. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, using the experiences of 
five employees at a hypothetical manufacturing company located in the state of 
Mississippi (Benmore, Inc.), the US approach to ending pregnancy discrimination is 
introduced and contrasted with the treatment afforded to workers at a hypothetical 
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manufacturing company (Widget Co.), located in an EU member state (the UK). Each of 
the five examples reveals the acute loophole in US national legislation seeking to 
prohibit discrimination and achieve substantive equality for a particular segment of 
workers, while also suggesting the availability of additional equality measures to 
address the problem presented.  
Chapter 2 also presents the comparative methodology and theoretical framework 
used to consider this specific issue of discrimination. One of the main goals of this 
comparative study is explanatory: to better understand EU and US substantive law 
seeking to address pregnancy discrimination, to consider their historical, legal, and 
conceptual backgrounds, and to bring to the fore feminist concerns relating to the 
provision of what are described by some as ‘special’ rights to address the inequality, 
disadvantage, and exclusion suffered by pregnant workers. These rights generally refer 
to the provision of job protected paid leave and workplace accommodations.  
Another goal of this comparative study is to draw lessons from EU experience 
with these measures and with the strategy of gender mainstreaming, and to consider the 
future development of EU and US antidiscrimination law. 
Having laid the foundation for an in-depth examination of the EU and US 
models of equality, the subsequent five Chapters undertake the central discussion of this 
thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the EU model of equality. Chapter 3 sets forth the 
historical context in which EU antidiscrimination law has developed, which is then 
followed by an examination of its substantive provisions. In this discussion, evidence 
will be presented that seeks to show that by carving out ‘special rights’ from ‘equal 
treatment’ legislation, combined with positive action measures and the soft law strategy 
of gender mainstreaming, the EU strives for a proactive and holistic approach to tackling 
discrimination and seeks to do more than merely addressing discriminatory acts, ex post 
facto. Chapter 4 continues the discussion with a detailed and critical analysis of the EU 
model in practice, revealing the gap between the substantive equality that EU law seeks 
to achieve for pregnant workers and equality in fact. This Chapter also addresses 
feminist criticisms of an equality policy focused overwhelmingly on women and 
presents evidence that the EU has responded to the limitations of its equality model by 
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redirecting its policy efforts, and seeking to include men more fully in the equality 
equation. 
In Chapter 5, 6, and 7, the discussion turns to the US model of equality. The 
central purpose of these Chapters is to provide compelling evidence of developments on 
the national and state level that suggest the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is 
shifting away from a purely individual rights-based approach to addressing pregnancy 
discrimination, towards a more holistic approach that seeks greater substantive equality, 
and imposes a duty to promote or achieve equality. Chapter 5 begins the discussion by 
presenting the national equality model against which this shift is taking place. Following 
on from this, federal court jurisprudence is used to illustrate the US model in practice, 
revealing the limited rights afforded by a national Constitution that has no explicit 
guarantee of sex equality, and national legislation that fails consider pregnancy as sui 
generis, or the shortcomings of workplace design. The Chapter then closes with a 
discussion of several national measures offering a right to unpaid leave and workplace 
accommodations, and with the suggestion that these patchwork protections offer 
evidence that the US is moving towards a more holistic approach to achieving equality 
for pregnant workers, albeit slowly.   
Chapter 6 seeks to explain, justify, and elaborate upon these developments, 
focusing on the state measures adopted to address pregnancy discrimination. Chapter 6 
also follows on from the discussion of the differences between EU and US 
antidiscrimination law outlined in earlier Chapters, revealing why legal and conceptual 
barriers prohibit the US model of equality from ever completely converging with that of 
the EU, even if it were desired. The discussion will reveal that the US Constitution 
presents a legal barrier to the adoption of mandatory leave, but not to job protected, paid 
leave, workplace accommodations, or gender mainstreaming. It will also reveal that 
adherence to the concept of formal equality presents a significant barrier to the adoption 
of measures that recognize the difference that pregnancy makes to women’s careers, but 
more so at the national, than at the state level. Finally, an in depth and rigorous critical 
comparison is undertaken of the equality measures enacted and, or proposed by the 
legislatures of the fifty US states and Washington D.C. These measures are considered 
for their ability to broaden the rights and protections afforded by national law and for 
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their limitations compared to EU’s Pregnant Workers Directive.112While finding the 
state measures are not as expansive as their EU cousins, this Chapter concludes that they 
signal a shift in the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law. This conclusion is bolstered 
by the bold and novel assertion made in Chapter 7, that gender mainstreaming has 
become a US domestic equality strategy. In what is a key Chapter, it is asserted that with 
President Obama’s issuance of Executive Order No. 13506 in 2009, ‘Establishing a 
Whitehouse Council on Women and Girls,’ the US has adopted the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming domestically.113Advancing evidence in support of this claim and 
considering lessons from EU experience with the strategy, the Order is explored in 
depth, and an original assessment is made of the implementation efforts taken to date, 
and of the Order’s overall likelihood of success in moving the trajectory of US towards 
greater substantive equality for women generally and pregnant workers specifically.  
Chapter 8 will provide a conclusion to this thesis and answer the primary and 
ancillary research questions. 
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Chapter 2: Problem, Theory, and Method 
Outdated models of work structure and culture act as barriers to success 
and economic security for millions of working people in America.114 
I Introduction 
A primary aim of this Chapter is to illustrate in comparative detail several 
aspects of the EU and US models for gender equality. Using the experiences of five 
employees at a hypothetical manufacturing company located in the state of Mississippi 
(Benmore, Inc.), the US ‘equal rights’ based approach to ending pregnancy 
discrimination is introduced and contrasted with the ‘special rights’ afforded by EU law 
to workers at a hypothetical manufacturing company (Widget Co.), located in an EU 
member state (the UK). Each of these examples will reveal an acute loophole in US 
legislation seeking to prohibit pregnancy discrimination, while also suggesting the 
availability of additional equality measures for addressing this problem. 
Then, in Part III, the concerns of feminist legal theorists are presented because of 
their key role in highlighting how anti-discrimination measures help overcome, or 
contribute to the disadvantage of women. This discussion will lay a foundation for the 
examination and evaluation of EU law undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4, which reveals 
that while EU ‘special treatment’ measures are not without gender negative effects, 
these effects do not include job loss. In the fourth Part of this Chapter, the comparative 
methodology used to examine the problem of pregnancy discrimination is discussed and 
the reasons for using this method are outlined. In particular, the debate surrounding the 
concepts of legal ‘transplants’ and ‘convergence’ is addressed, because the results of 
this study serve to suggest the trajectory of US anti-discrimination law is shifting and 
converging with that of the EU, albeit on a limited basis and at an ad hoc level.   
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II Contrasting legal rights. 
 There are three good reasons for setting out hypothetical examples at the 
beginning of this thesis. First, these examples will serve to catalogue some of the real or 
potential disadvantages faced by women who are either pregnant, seeking to become 
pregnant, or who wish to continue to breastfeed their child upon a return to work. 
Secondly, they will reveal how differently these disadvantages are addressed by US and 
EU antidiscrimination law. In doing so, they serve to show that government is not a 
passive actor; rather its policies serve to encourage or discourage equality in the 
workplace.115Finally, the hypothetical examples will highlight potential areas for further 
development of US and EU antidiscrimination law.  
a Five employees and different treatment. 
Benmore, Inc. (Benmore) is a small company. It has eighteen employees and is 
located in the US state of Mississippi. Mary Smith has worked as an accountant for 
Benmore for eleven years. Her annual performance reviews have always been listed as 
‘above satisfactory’ and declare her to be, ‘a valuable and valued employee.’ Lately, she 
has had a problem with absenteeism. She has had twenty unexcused absences in the last 
four months; twelve occurred after she became pregnant and were due to severe 
morning sickness. Mary received two written warnings prior to the last two absences 
and Benmore terminated her employment, two days after her last absence. 
Another employee, Karen Jones works in the shipping department of Benmore. 
At the time she was hired, she signed a form indicating that she could bear the 
occasional strain that the job required, and specifically indicated that she could tolerate 
the occasional bending, twisting, climbing, squatting, crouching, and balancing that the 
position necessitated. Jones understood that her job could require her to use a dolly to 
push or pull goods weighing up to 68 kilograms. After two years of working at 
Benmore, Karen Jones notified the company that she was pregnant and that her 
obstetrician had signed a letter that restricted her to ‘light work/duty and to lifting no 
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more than 11 kilograms.’ She requested that her supervisor transfer her to a ‘light-duty’ 
assignment for the duration of her pregnancy. The supervisor informed Jones that 
Benmore had a policy of limiting light-duty assignments to employees who had suffered 
job-related injuries, and that he had no work for her to do. Karen Jones stayed at home. 
Two weeks later, Karen Jones’ employment was terminated. 
 Carol King has worked as an administrative secretary in the quality control 
department of Benmore for four years. She has been undergoing in-vitro fertilization 
treatment (IVF), in the hopes of conceiving a child.116King had previously received 
approval for, and taken a six-week leave of absence for the treatment. The procedure 
was not successful and King requested another leave of absence, to occur in three 
months. At the time of King’s second request, Benmore was undergoing a 
reorganization effort and had decided to consolidate the quality control department with 
the returns department. Benmore was planning to retain only one of the two 
administrative secretaries serving those departments. King was informed by her 
manager that her employment was to be terminated and that it was best, ‘in light of her 
health condition.’ 
 Janet Mbu has worked for Benmore for three years as an account representative. 
Janet received approval for and took a six week unpaid leave of absence to have her 
baby. However, Janet suffered complications from a difficult birth and did not return to 
work. She did not notify Benmore of her need of further leave and her employment was 
terminated for failure to return to work, or failure to obtain an extension of her leave of 
absence.  
 A fifth employee of the company, May Prentice, returned to work at Benmore 
after giving birth, four-weeks earlier. She requested and received accommodation to 
pump breast milk during her one-hour lunch break each day. May decided that she could 
not wait until lunchtime to pump breast milk and began to take two short additional 
breaks in the morning and one in the afternoon, in order to pump milk. She continued to 
take her one-hour lunch break and did not inform, nor request from Human Resources a 
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different accommodation. Her employment was terminated for unauthorized absences 
from the work floor. 
b US and EU antidiscrimination law. 
Having highlighted several real or potential disadvantages faced by women in 
the US workplace, the ensuing discussion will reveal that these situations would have 
required a different response had these women been employees of Widget Co., a 
company in the UK, which is an EU member state. Furthermore, had the treatment by 
the employer not been different, the likelihood of success of an action for redress against 
their former employer would have been greater. This is because infertility treatment, 
pregnancy, childbirth, related medical conditions, and breastfeeding in the workplace, 
are addressed differently by EU law. The crux of the difference is that the US model of 
equality emphasizes equal treatment whereas the EU model of equality combines equal 
treatment with protective measures, complemented by the soft law strategy of gender 
mainstreaming.  
In the US, the most current national law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination is 
contained in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), an amendment to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).117It requires that:  
Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including 
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programmes, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. 
Declared ‘a sweeping bill of rights for employees of childbearing age,’ at the 
time of its adoption in 1978, the PDA is applicable to private employers of 15, or more 
employees, making it the central measure affording legal rights to the women working at 
Benmore.118 
 The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), is a separate national law that 
mandates the provision of 12 weeks of unpaid family and medical leave for eligible 
                                                 
117 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 US Code Chapter 21 Sec. 701 (k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
(PDA). 
118 See: Jane Bryan Quinn, ‘Legislation Protects Pregnant Employees’ The Washington Post (DC, 
November 27, 1978) D 10 <lexis/nexis> accessed 24/2/2014.  
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employees in workplaces of more than 50 employees.119Additionally, the 2010 
amendments to the Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act (FLSA), requires employers of 50 or 
more employees to provide unpaid, reasonable break time to express breast milk for one 
year after a child’s birth, as well as ‘a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from 
view and free from intrusion from co-workers and the public,’ to be used by female 
employees to express milk.120 
As Benmore is a workplace of less than 50 employees, the mandates of the PDA 
apply, but the provisions of the FMLA and the FLSA do not. Moreover, even though the 
PDA applies, its mandate is formal equality. This means that Benmore is not required to 
take steps to make it easier for women to work. Recalling from the discussion of 
equality concepts in Chapter 1, a requirement of formal equality means that, ‘employers 
can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected, but non-pregnant 
employees.’121 
In contrast, the Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC (ETD), and the Pregnant 
Workers Directive 92/85/EEC (PWD) provide minimum standards of treatment for this 
category of workers in the EU.122These minimum standards offer protection from 
dismissal from the beginning of pregnancy until the end of maternity leave, and mandate 
workplace accommodation and job-protected paid leave for illness and maternity. As the 
UK is a member state of the EU, it has transposed the provisions of these Directives into 
national law, which is found in Chapter 2, Section 18 of the Equality Act 2010, and its 
supplemental Regulations.  
But, what is the effect of these legal differences for Mary, Karen, Carol, Janet, 
and May? As employees in the US, they can bring individual actions alleging 
                                                 
119 Family and Medical Leave Act 1993, 29 USCS 28 (FMLA). 
120 Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 207) (FLSA). Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Public Law 111-148, Section 4207. As of March 23, 2010 amended section 7 (ACA). 
121 Troupe v. May Department Stores Co 20 F 3d 734 (7th Cir1994), at 738; See also: Victoria Serednyj v. 
Beverly Healthcare, LLC. 656 F3d 540 (7th Cir 2011) 548. 
122 See: Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and 
working conditions [1976] OJ 1976 L39/40 (Equal Treatment Directive), as amended by Council 
Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending 
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions 
[2002] OJ L269/15, as repealed by Recast Directive (n 15). The Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112). 
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discrimination by their employer contrary, to Title VII. However, as the following 
discussion will show, their likelihood of success is questionable, if not unlikely.       
c Mary Smith 
The PDA does not protect Mary Smith from being discharged from work 
because of absenteeism, even where her absences are due to complications of 
pregnancy. Unless Mary can establish that Benmore overlooks the absences of non-
pregnant employees and treats pregnant employees differently, she will be unable to 
establish a claim under the PDA.123Mary is without her job and likely without any 
redress from Benmore.   
Had Mary been an employee in Widget Co., in the UK, when she informed her 
employer of her pregnancy, her situation would likely have been different. Article 10 of 
the PWD prohibits the dismissal of pregnant workers and workers on maternity leave, 
other than in exceptional circumstances, unconnected with their pregnancy or maternity 
leave. The fact that Mary was dismissed for absenteeism pursuant to the same rule that 
applied to both male and female employees, is irrelevant. In the case of a pregnant 
worker, there can be no comparator, not even a sick one. The position of a pregnant 
worker who is unfit for work through pregnancy-related illness cannot be considered the 
same as that of a male employee who is ill and absent through incapacity for the same 
period of time.124This is in view of: 
The harmful effects which the risk of dismissal may have on the physical 
and mental state of women who are pregnant, women who have recently 
given birth or women who are breastfeeding, including the particularly 
serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to 
terminate their pregnancy.125 
Mary Smith, working in the UK, would have redress under Section 18 of the 
Equality Act 2010, in the event of dismissal from her employment. However, if Mary 
had repeated periods of sick leave, that occurred after her return from authorised leave, 
                                                 
123 See: Dormeyer (n 39) and Armindo v Padlocker, Inc. 209 F3d 1319 (2000). See also: Lisa Mershon v. 
Woodbourne Family Practice, LLC. Civil Action No 06-00253, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 4957, (ED Pa May 
30, 2006). 
124 Case C-394/96 Mary Brown v Rentokil Limited [1998] ECR I-4185, para 31. 
125 Case C-32/93 Webb v. EMO Cargo (UK.) Ltd. [1994] ECR I-3567, 746, para 21.  
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and not attributable to pregnancy or confinement, she could be lawfully dismissed from 
her employment. So long as Widget Co. could show that sick leave would lead to the 
dismissal of a male worker in the same circumstances.126As discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4, protection is temporally limited under the PWD, in that it is afforded from the 
beginning of pregnancy until the end of maternity leave. 
Here, some initial commentary on the protections afforded to Mary by EU law is 
warranted, which the discussion in Part III and in subsequent Chapters will address more 
fully. In light of the fact that statistics suggest that as many as 90% of all pregnant 
women experience some nausea, while one-third actually vomit due to this condition, 
which usually begins at 4-6 weeks after conception and continues until approximately 
the sixteenth week of gestation, few would be expected to argue that a right to leave 
provides a practical solution to dismissal for absenteeism due to severe morning 
sickness.127However, the problem with a leave right, or protection against dismissal that  
feminists, academics and others have highlighted, is that when this right is limited to 
women it reinforces gender stereotypes and deters employers from hiring women of 
childbearing age.128Indeed, the results of a recent survey of 500 managers by the law 
firm Slater and Gordon, certainly lends support to these observations. In that survey, a 
third of managers stated that they preferred to employ a man in his 20s or 30s rather 
than a woman, for fear of maternity leave.129However, while a better solution may be 
legislation providing for shared ‘maternity’ leave, as has been adopted in many EU 
member states, the reality is that unless men actually take leave, the legislation will do 
little to change existing stereotypes. It will also do little to address the fact that morning 
                                                 
126 See: Case C-179/88 Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark (Union of Clerical and 
Commercial Employees) (for Hertz) v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Danish Employers Association) (for 
Aldi Marked K/S)] [1990] ECR I -3979, as mentioned by Case C-232/09 Dita Danosa v. LKB Lizings SIA 
[2011] 2 CMR 2; ECJ (2nd Chamber). 
127 U. Maryland Medical Centre, ‘Morning Sickness’ (U Maryland, 2014).  
<http://umm.edu/health/medical/pregnancy/staying-healthy-during-pregnancy/morning-sickness> 
accessed 17/11/2014  
128 See, for example: A Morris, ‘Which is it you want—equality or maternity leave?’ (2006) 14 Fem LS 
87. 
129 Press Association, ‘40% of managers avoid hiring young women to get around maternity leave’ The 
Guardian (London, 11 August 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/aug/12/managers-avoid-
hiring-younger-women-maternity-leave> accessed 17/11/2014. 
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sickness is a condition unique to pregnant women, which no amount of gender neutrality 
can address. 
d Janet Mbu 
For Janet Mbu, failure to return upon exhaustion of approved leave could result 
in lawful dismissal under the PDA, and under the FMLA, if Benmore were a covered 
workplace.130While failure to return could also result in lawful dismissal in the UK, 
there is an important difference in the length of maternity leave available to Janet, and 
other workers like her. A brief comparison of US and EU antidiscrimination law will 
make this point more graphically. 
The PDA does not require Benmore, or any other employer to grant maternity 
leave, or to reinstate an employee after maternity leave.131In fact, even if Benmore 
voluntarily provided maternity leave, it could lawfully have replaced Janet while she 
was on leave, for business need, if it had a written policy of not guaranteeing 
reinstatement.132As stated in the opinion of Circuit Judge Greenburg, in Re Carnegie 
Centre Associates, ‘the PDA is a shield against discrimination, not a sword in the hands 
of a pregnant employee.’133   
In contrast, were Janet Mbu employed in the UK by Widget Co., she would be 
entitled to paid maternity leave beyond the 6 weeks of unpaid leave authorized by 
Benmore, and beyond the 14 week mandatory minimum laid down by Article 8 (1) of 
the PWD. In fact, under UK law, Janet would be entitled to up to 52 weeks of Statutory 
Maternity leave, of which, up to 39 weeks may be paid.134The first 6 weeks of leave are 
paid at a rate equivalent to 90% of Janet’s average weekly earnings (AWE), before tax. 
Thereafter, the remaining 33 weeks are paid at a rate of £138.18 or 90% of Janet’s 
                                                 
130 See: Grace v Adtran, Inc. 470 Fed Appx 812 (11th Cir 2012); Sheila Morrisey v. Symbol Technologies, 
Inc 910 FSupp 117 (EDNY 1996). 
131 See: In Re: Carnegie Center Associates; Deborah Rhett v. Carnegie Center Associates 129 F3d 290 
(3d Cir 1997) 297. 
132 See: Soreo-Yasher v. First Office Management 926 F Supp 646 (ND Ohio 1996).  
133 Carnegie (n 131) 297.  
134 The Statutory Maternity Pay, Social Security (Maternity Allowance) and Social Security (Overlapping 
Benefits) (Amendment) Regulations 2006. 
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AWE, whichever is lower.135Moreover, Widget Co. could not override EU law with a 
written reinstatement policy. Therefore, if Janet had returned to work at Widget Co. 
after exhaustion of her 26 weeks of what is termed ‘Ordinary Maternity Leave,’ she 
would have been legally entitled to return to her position as an account representative. 
However, if she had continued on what is termed, ‘Additional Maternity Leave,’ beyond 
26 weeks, and up to 52 weeks, Widget Co. could have replaced her, but would have 
been required to offer her a similar position in the company. Only if Janet either refused 
the similar position, or failed to return to work after the exhaustion of her 52 weeks of 
leave, could Widget Co. lawfully consider her actions as amounting to a resignation. 
This is so, even if Janet’s failure to return to work after 52 weeks was due to a medical 
condition arising out of pregnancy or childbirth.136  
The legal differences outlined above are important because they highlight the 
role that job protected paid leave plays in helping to offset the workplace difficulties that 
pregnancy and childbirth create. They also serve to illustrate the role played by EU 
member state legislatures in providing broader rights than mandated by EU law. A 
detailed survey of US law in Chapters 5 and 6 will reveal that US state legislatures are 
similarly imbued with the power to enact broader rights for pregnant workers than those 
provided by Congress. The results of this survey will suggest that these powers have 
been extremely important for progress in addressing discrimination in the US, as they 
have provided an additional forum in which to enact antidiscrimination laws seeking 
substantive rather than formal equality. 
e Karen Jones 
Karen Jones will likely have no greater success than Mary or Janet in her suit 
against Benmore. First, because federal judicial interpretation of the PDA is that the 
statute does not require pregnant workers receive ‘special treatment,‘ only the same 
treatment. Secondly, because Benmore will argue that it has articulated a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for its actions, based neither on sex, nor on pregnancy. 
                                                 
135 HM Government, ‘Statutory Maternity Pay and Leave: employer guide’ (Gov.UK).  
<https://www.gov.uk/employers-maternity-pay-leave> accessed 12/3/15 
136 Brown v Rentokil (n 124), para 26. 
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Benmore has a policy to provide light duties only to those employees who have suffered 
an occupational injury.137Unless Karen can show that any other employee with a non-
job-related disability received different treatment than her, or that the explanation given 
by Benmore was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination, as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, her claim will likely be dismissed. 
If Karen had been an employee at Widget Co. in the UK, she would have been 
entitled to different and arguably better treatment. The PWD is concerned with health 
and safety and provides for different treatment for women in any of the listed 
situations.138In some circumstances, it requires a risk analysis to determine whether an 
adjustment in working conditions or hours is required, or is feasible. If not feasible, the 
pregnant worker is granted paid leave. In accordance with these mandates, the UK has 
adopted measures that would have entitled Karen, when her doctor placed her on 
restricted duties, to request that she be given either an adjustment, or the opportunity to 
go on paid leave.139The fact that she was not suffering from an occupational injury 
would not have been a valid ground to deny her request for light duties.  
 As stated previously, the only national law providing a right of up to twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave in the US is the FMLA. Karen would be unable to take advantage 
of the provisions of the FMLA, as it is inapplicable to workplaces of less than 50 
employees. Unfortunately, Mississippi, the state in which Benmore is located has not 
chosen to enact a separate leave provision upon which Karen and her co-workers may 
rely. This last point is particularly important, as it serves to highlight the role of state 
legislatures in addressing the lacuna in national law. While the majority of US states 
have not enacted legislation providing job protected paid leave and workplace 
accommodations to women who are pregnant or breastfeeding, the evidence presented in 
Chapter 6 reveals that an increasing number are choosing to do so.  
                                                 
137 See: Young v United Parcel Service, Inc. 707 F3d 437 (4th Cir 2013). See: Chapters 5 and 6, for a 
discussion of the conflict between the US federal courts on the issue of workplace practices, and the role 
of US State legislatures in enacting measures mandating employer accommodation of pregnancy. 
138 See the discussion in, S Fredman, ‘European Community discrimination law: a critique’ (1992) 21 ILJ 
119; S Fredman, ‘A difference with distinction: pregnancy and parenthood reassessed’ (1994) 110 LQR 
106. 
139 See: The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations Order 1999, SI 1999/3242 (amended 
by SI 2006/48).  
 54 
f Carol King 
The situation of Carol King is different from that of her co-workers at Benmore. 
At the time of her employment termination, Carol was not pregnant, or on maternity 
leave, or breastfeeding. Carol had been diagnosed with infertility and had been 
undergoing in IVF, in the hopes of becoming pregnant. Before embarking on a 
consideration of the legality of Carol’s termination, a brief comparison of reproductive 
health care provision in the US and the EU is appropriate, because until 2014, the US 
insurance market was not standardized and certain medical services could lawfully be 
excluded from coverage, so long as they were excluded for both sexes. This means that 
at the time of Carol’s employment, Benmore insurance policy could have lawfully 
excluded coverage for her IVF treatment under its employee health benefits plan, so 
long as both male and female infertility treatments were excluded. IVF would not have 
presented an issue for Carol, if she had been working at Widget Co. in the UK, as EU 
workers are entitled to state provided health care, which includes IVF. Importantly, now, 
because of the changes wrought to federal law by the new Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), IVF treatment may no longer be excluded from most US 
insurance plans.140In Chapter 5, I argue that because of this, and other changes that help 
to address the disadvantage, inequality, and exclusion suffered by women in the 
workplace, the Act has the potential to advance substantive equality beyond that 
achieved by the PDA and the FMLA. I also argue that these changes are part of other 
promising developments on the national, state, and local level in the US that signal a 
shift in the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law, from a purely formal equality 
approach to tackling pregnancy discrimination, towards a more holistic one that seeks to 
achieve greater substantive equality.141 
Turning to Carol’s dismissal, it can be said that Carol has a cause of action for 
sex discrimination, whether or not she is a worker in the US or in UK, so long a she can 
establish that her dismissal was based on the fact that she had undergone IVF treatment.  
                                                 
140 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148, Section 4207. NB: As the Act is not 
retroactive, its provisions would not have helped Carol. 
141 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, as amended by An Act to 
restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 42 USCA § 12101 
(2008). See Chapter 1 for a definition of holism.  
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Under US law, while infertility is acknowledged to be a gender-neutral condition, IVF 
treatment is a surgical procedure that is exclusively performed on women.142Therefore, 
employees terminated for taking time off to undergo IVF will always be women. 
Consequently, Carol has a valid claim of sex discrimination against Benmore. As was 
the case in Hall v. Nalco, Benmore can be said to have terminated Carol’s employment, 
‘not for the gender-neutral condition of infertility, but rather for the gender-specific 
quality of childbearing capacity.’143 
Under EU law, pregnancy begins when there has been the implantation of 
fertilised ova into the woman’s uterus.144For Carol, as this had not occurred at the time 
of her dismissal/termination from employment, she could not rely on the PWD in a 
claim for wrongful dismissal against Widget Co. She could, however rely on the ETD,  
as ‘dismissal of a female worker essentially because she is undergoing that important 
stage of in vitro fertilisation treatment constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of 
sex.’145Carol should be aware however, that the period of protection is a closely defined 
and limited period within which dismissal may constitute sex discrimination.146Carol 
should also be aware that while under the UK Equality Act 2010 Statutory Code of 
Practice, she does not a have statutory right to time off in order to undergo IVF, but 
once pregnant, she is entitled to time off for antenatal care.147 
g May Prentice 
May Prentice was also not pregnant at the time of her dismissal. Under the 
circumstances, Benmore would likely assert that as it treated May no differently than it 
treated any other employee who took breaks for personal reasons there was no disparate 
treatment on the basis of sex, under Title VII.148Such an assertion would be supported 
                                                 
142 See: Hall v Nalco Company 534 F 3d 644 (7th Cir 2008) 649. 
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by several federal court judgments, which make clear that lactation is not a ‘condition 
related to pregnancy,’ but is a condition related to breastfeeding, and breastfeeding 
discrimination does not constitute gender discrimination under US national law. For it to 
be afforded protected status under Title VII, the Courts have stated that ‘it is Congress 
alone that may do so.’149Congress has responded with the ACA, which amended Section 
7 of the FLSA in 2010.150However, as Benmore is not an employer of more than 50 
employees, the provisions of the FLSA, requiring reasonable break time and a place for 
nursing mothers are not applicable to May. 
In summary, May Prentice cannot seek redress against Benmore using federal 
law. Nor can she can rely upon the specific provisions of Mississippi state law for 
protection. Enacted in 2006, prior to the FLSA, the Mississippi Code prohibits 
discrimination against nursing mothers, providing that ‘no employer shall prohibit an 
employee from expressing breast milk during any meal period or other break period 
provided by the employer.’151Arguably, as May was not prohibited from using her break 
time to express breast milk, and sought no further accommodation from her employer, 
any claim of discrimination under the state statute would likely fail. Of note too, is the 
fact that the Code places the burden upon the employee to ensure that this limited 
workplace accommodation is afforded to her. This stands in direct contrast to EU law, 
where the burden is more properly placed upon the employer, and where the termination 
of a worker on the grounds of breastfeeding, or prohibiting an employee from 
breastfeeding, or exercising a right to leave for breastfeeding constitutes unlawful sex 
discrimination, rather than an unfair labour practice.152The importance of this distinction 
lay in the remedies afforded to an employee, as discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Furthermore, a specific risk assessment would have been required once May 
provided written notification to the UK Widget Co. that she was breastfeeding.153If risks 
were identified, Widget Co. would have been required to take all reasonably practicable 
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measures to remove, reduce, or control the risk. If there were significant risks that could 
not be removed, then steps would have been taken in order to remove May from any 
significant health and safety risk identified. These steps include temporary alterations to 
working conditions, such as breaks to express milk, or shorter shifts.  
h Inadequate responses. 
If the hypothetical examples discussed above were at all clear, a central point 
will have thus far emerged: the right of women to equal treatment in the US workplace 
results in disadvantages that do not exist in the EU. However, before advancing the 
assertion that the protection afforded by EU law is the solution to these disadvantages, 
some sophisticated arguments must be considered, which suggest that while different or 
‘special treatment’ measures address one area of inequality in the workplace, they also 
serve to perpetuate the gender stereotype of women as child bearers and child carers. 
These arguments form part of a large body of feminist legal theory, to which the 
discussion in this third Part now turns. 
III Feminist legal theory. 
Equality arguments... are stepping stones, not destinations, in the 
struggle for women’s human rights.154 
This thesis cannot hope to provide a better understanding of EU and US 
pregnancy discrimination law without engaging with the discursive debate of feminist 
legal theorists regarding the role of law in both subordinating women, and in helping to 
end their inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion. Feminist legal theorists have produced 
a vast amount of literature in which they have sought to identify and expose the overt 
and covert sources of oppression and exclusion in laws related to women. Naturally, this 
literature has considered the difference that pregnancy makes in the workplace, and 
then, having asked what Katherine Bartlett calls ‘the woman question,’ or ‘the question 
of the excluded,’ these theorists have suggested ways in which law’s failings may be 
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corrected.155This thesis will address this discursive debate, particularly as it relates to the 
provision of what many feminists refer to as ‘special’ treatment measures, including 
workplace accommodations and maternity leave. In doing so, it will be revealed that this 
debate is chiefly defined by deep and trenchant arguments, which on one side hold that 
special measures are necessary to advance substantive equality, and on the other side 
argue that such measures have a tendency to reinforce gender stereotypes and 
institutionalize motherhood. The evidence presented in this research will also reveal that 
while there is a significant gap between the substantive equality sought and the reality of 
what EU ‘special treatment’ measures have achieved thus far, these measures have 
served to end certain workplace disadvantages for pregnant women that remain largely 
unaddressed in the US.    
However, before engaging in the debate, it will be helpful to explain here what is 
meant by the term feminist legal theory (FLT), and to outline the theoretical arguments 
of feminists. This explanation begins with an acknowledgement that although FLT is not 
one theory and there is no authoritative articulation of feminism there are some general 
statements that can be made, which will aid our understanding.156First, it can be said that 
FLT is a critical approach to studying the relationship between gender and the law.157It 
‘presents a theory of gender and challenges the assumptions of gender-neutrality and 
objectivity in received disciplinary knowledge.’158By considering and analysing law as 
‘male,’ FLT highlights how law is unjust and has contributed to the subordination of 
women. In so doing, it generates debate about the nature of oppression and exclusion of 
women, and the necessary means to tackle it. Consequently FLT may generally be said 
to have a ‘common commitment to analysing the cause and nature of women’s 
oppression and disadvantage, law’s contribution to that disadvantage, and use of legal 
means to improve women’s position.’159However, this ‘common commitment’ has not 
translated into agreement of how best to address the disadvantages, inequality, and 
exclusion suffered by pregnant workers in the US. This is because there is ‘multifaceted 
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theoretical disagreement about what forms women’s exclusion takes and how to correct 
it...’160The severity of these disagreements has led some commentators to conclude that 
‘feminism has become a victim of polarization.’161The results of this research support 
such a conclusion, and show that disagreements have been sufficiently entrenched as to 
affect the types of anti-discrimination measures proposed and, or adopted by the US 
Congress. As US Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in her 
dissent in Coleman v. Court of Appeals, the provision of protective measures for 
pregnant workers has ‘sharply divided women’s rights advocates.‘162  
Having outlined what FLT is, this section will now explore the multiple forms of 
feminist thought and multiple ‘waves,’ or stages of feminism, which have resulted in 
differences of approach to addressing gender discrimination generally, and pregnancy 
discrimination in particular. This exploration is undertaken in the knowledge that as the 
research and scholarly discourse on the subject of feminism and feminist legal theory is 
both rich and broad, amounting to a ‘diverse, contradictory, and internally contested 
field of scholarly activity,’ what is offered below can only be an examination of basic 
concepts and theories.163  
a Waves of feminism—first and second.  
Scales writes that ‘feminism has a tumultuous history, complex contested 
meanings, and conflicted constituencies.’164The history of feminism is also often 
described in terms of different ‘stages,’ ‘generations,’ or ‘waves,’ referring both to its 
theoretical development as an academic discipline, and to the activities of a political 
movement. While the use of such metaphors has been criticised by writers and scholars 
as producing antagonism and antipathy, they are nonetheless useful to explain the 
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evolution of feminism.165Therefore, in this thesis, the term ‘wave’ is utilized to explain 
and contrast the different stages and ages of feminism, beginning with a discussion of 
the first and second waves. 
The touchstone of the ‘first wave’ in feminism in the US and in Europe is 
generally described by the political activism of the suffragists in the 1800s, advocating 
voting rights for women.166The ‘second wave’ of feminism signifies the progress of 
feminism from the first stage, which occurred predominantly in the US, beginning in the 
late 1960s. The legal feminism of this period ‘involved challenging the exclusion of 
women from equal opportunities of all sorts,’ and was defined by legal study and legal 
reform.167Much of this reform has been attributed to women entering law school and the 
legal profession in significant numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, having a mantra of 
reform.168These second wave feminists also had a motto declaring that ‘the personal is 
political,’ which referred to the use of conscious-raising efforts made by political action 
groups seeking legal rights.169These efforts were intended to highlight the fact that as, 
‘women’s problems are not hers individually but those of women as a whole, they 
cannot be addressed except as a whole.’170Indeed, it was during this ‘second wave’ of 
feminism that key civil rights legislation in the US and anti-discrimination measures in 
the EU were adopted. In the US, this included The Equal Pay Act of 1963, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and The 
Educational Amendments of 1972.171In the EU, antidiscrimination provisions included 
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the Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for 
men and women, 172Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976, on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access 
to employment, vocational training, promotion and working conditions, 173and Council 
Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security.174This 
second-stage of feminism was also clearly defined by the rise of the legal theories of 
‘liberal feminism,’ ‘radical feminism’ and ‘difference feminism.’175As Davies observes, 
liberal feminism ‘is historically the most influential and recognizable form of 
feminism.’176It demands that women have equal legal and political rights with men. 
Therefore, it may be said that the ‘overriding goal of liberal feminism has always been 
the application of liberal principles to women as well as men.... that laws should not 
grant to women fewer rights than they allow to men.’177It was because of the political 
activities of liberal feminists seeking formal equality during second wave feminism that 
monumental equal rights legislation was adopted in the US. These achievements led 
various writers to extol the ‘success’ of feminism in advancing the interests of women, 
and to conclude that ‘shifting the legal spotlight onto women has resulted in significant 
political gains.’178 
However, other writers have been openly critical of the gains of liberal feminists. 
Their criticisms are founded on an assertion that ‘the equality standard did change, but 
the world didn’t, except for the privileged few, 179and ‘victories were narrower than the 
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intentions of the larger movement.’180These criticisms form part of a large body of FLT, 
wherein there is: 
Disagreement on whether second-stage feminism has succeeded, or 
failed, is alive, or dead, or merely sleeping, or is in statis, crisis, or 
disarray, or is a positive or negative force in society.181 
 Radical feminist, Catherine MacKinnon is ‘widely recognized as one of the 
outstanding voices of feminist legal scholarship.’182She argues that US equality laws 
have been inadequate, and in some cases actually operate to disadvantage women. She 
observes that formal equality merely reinforces and reproduces social and structural 
inequalities, and concludes that it is a tool that is, ‘impotent, even regressive.’183In 
MacKinnon’s opinion, feminism fails to accurately understand that law institutionalizes 
male power and that division of power is the focus of women’s oppression.184For 
MacKinnon, equality laws ‘view women’s situation from the standpoint of male 
dominance,’ and assume that women are socially equal to men, which they are 
not.185She concludes that despite ‘trying to change the status of women by law and 
every other available means,’ feminism has failed.186This is a hard judgement to pass on 
the efforts of feminism. Arguably, the problem for pregnant workers is not so much that 
feminism has failed; it is that its task is not yet finished.  
Regardless, MacKinnon is not alone in her criticisms. While US ‘difference 
feminists’ also criticise the achievements of liberal feminist law reform, they offer 
another perspective, and one which most closely resembles the approach taken by the 
EU institutions in addressing pregnancy discrimination. Difference feminists accept that 
‘the assimilationist view of equality’ (equal rights) embodied in antidiscrimination law 
has been effective in combating sex discrimination, but note that this has only occurred 
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‘where the two groups being compared are not different in any relevant way.’187 
Consequently, difference feminists reject the liberal feminist call for ‘gender neutral’ 
laws and demand that law recognize ‘gendered reality.’188Asserting the uniqueness of 
pregnancy, difference feminists support measures providing for different treatment, ‘as a 
way of ensuring that women will be equal to men with respect to their overall 
employment opportunities.’189  
Unsurprisingly, as liberal, radical, and difference feminism highlight different 
sources of women’s oppression, their focus for legal reform has been different. As a 
close study of the FMLA in Chapters 5 and 6 will reveal, the drive for formal equality 
directly affected the adoption of a national maternity leave law, arguably because, as 
Joan Williams concludes, ‘assimilation feminists may well be stronger in the United 
States than anywhere else in the world.’190In contrast, and as Kenney has observed: 
British and EU feminists have not shown the same attachment as US 
feminists to the equal treatment model of feminism for both institutional 
and ideological reasons... they have always embraced some forms of 
special treatment....191 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it could be concluded that second wave 
feminism is largely defined by the passage of equal rights legislation and its internal 
theoretical disagreements, but, as the following section seeks to explain, it is also 
defined by the criticisms of so-called ‘post-feminists.’ 
b Post-feminism 
The term ‘post feminism’ warrants glossing. Although post-feminism became a 
‘buzzword’ of the UK and US popular media in the 1990s, its meaning is contested, 
resulting in some semantic confusion. This confusion is illustrated by the research of 
Genz and Brabon, which identifies at least three competing meanings, with two of them 
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being diametrically opposed.192First, they note that some writers interpret the term ‘post’ 
to connote the death, or passing of feminism. While, others hold that it denotes only an 
ongoing transformation of feminism. The third, and they argue, ‘more problematic’ 
interpretation, is that it signifies feminism is stuck in a middle ground, with a trajectory 
that is ‘bewilderingly uncertain.’193In conclusion, the authors argue that any attempt to 
fix a meaning to post-feminism, ‘looks futile and even misguided,’ and they prefer to 
understand the term as a ‘junction between a number of often competing discourses and 
interests.’194Martha Chamallas calls these competing discourses ‘antifeminist criticism,’ 
and suggests that there were at least ‘three distinct genres’ of antifeminist criticism’ 
proliferating in the 1990s.195She argues that the first genre used evolutionary biology to 
explain and justify the existence of gender inequality. The second genre claimed an 
excessive focus by feminists on the victimization of women, and the third and final 
genre argued that women had achieved equality.196Whatever the genre chosen, these 
post feminists appear to share a common theme, which ignores the gender wage gap and 
the particular obstacles that pregnancy and childbirth present to working women, and 
assert that the goals of feminism have been achieved, to the extent that they can ever be 
achieved.  
According to Heywood and Drake, these post-feminists were ‘a group of young 
conservative feminists who explicitly defined themselves against and criticized 
feminists of the second wave.’ As such, they were ‘antifeminists’ who viewed feminism 
as a historical artefact, a ‘dirty word’ and feminism as ‘women’s worst enemy.’197These 
antifeminist views are exemplified in the writings of journalist Caitlin Flanagan, who 
asserts that equal rights and opportunities brought a ‘prescription for unhappiness’ for 
the modern woman. Waxing nostalgic for the time before second-wave feminism 
emerged as a political movement, Flanagan considers the choices brought by feminism 
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to have torn women away from marriage, family, and running a household.198While not 
asserting that women were, or are better off in the home, the scholarly writings of 
Christina Hoff Sommers, Katie Roiphe, and Camille Paglia, also argue that second wave 
feminism has failed women.199More accurately, Sommers argues that some feminists 
have caused feminism to take a ‘wrong turn.’ Rejecting the idea that women are 
oppressed, or that men and women are essentially the same, Sommers argues that the 
‘major battles of American women for equal treatment have been fought and won.’ 
Labelling MacKinnon, Faludi and others ‘gender feminists’ and ‘gender war eccentrics,’ 
she criticises them for taking what she argues to be a dim view of men and for overly 
stating the victim status of women.200Much of this vituperative discourse against second 
wave feminism is captured in Susan Faludi’s landmark book, ‘Backlash: The 
Undeclared War Against American Women,’ in which she argues that: 
The antifeminist backlash has been set off not by women’s achievement of 
full equality but by the increased possibility that they might win. A pre-
emptive strike stops women long before they reach the finishing line.201 
 Ultimately, post-feminism has proclaimed a ‘female crisis’ that is being laid at 
the door of a feminist movement that has gone too far. Fuelled by media representations 
of women, this post-feminist discourse proclaims that feminism has resulted in all 
manner of ailments for women, including infertility, and mental health issues.202As 
Genz observes, ‘feminism was blamed both for doing not enough and for doing too 
much’ to change the lives of women.203  
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c Third wave. 
A belief that feminism has achieved its goal serves to distinguish post-feminists 
from the ‘third wave’ feminists discussed here. While this ‘third wave’ of feminist legal 
theory is also heralded as beginning in the early 1990s, the feminists of this stage are 
generationally defined. 204Heywood and Drake observe that these feminists are those, 
‘whose birthdates fall between 1963 and 1974.’205Similarly, Baumgardner and Richards 
calls these feminists, ‘younger women [who] grew up in a feminist influenced 
time’206While acknowledging that ‘third wave’ feminism is another ‘contestable 
signifier,’ there are arguably several dominant strands that help explain this body of 
FLT.207First, as noted above, the literature suggests that this new iteration of feminism is 
dominated by a generational demographic of younger feminists, but it is also defined by 
the ‘challenge by women of color to white feminists and the racism within the second 
wave.’208Rebecca Walker is credited with having begun this new wave of feminism 
when she distinguished herself from post-feminists in 1992, by stating that she was ‘sick 
of the way women are being ‘negated, violated, devalued, ignored.’209Writing that she 
sought to translate her awareness into action, she intoned that ‘I am not a post-feminist 
feminist. I am the Third Wave.’210The third wave feminism espoused by Walker was 
intended to represent a continuity of feminist legal theory, while also demanding 
recognition of diversity. Thus, where second wave feminism was thought to claim a 
universal experience for women, it was criticised for focusing only on the experiences of 
a privileged few. Third wave feminism sought to respond to this perceived failure of 
second wave feminism to recognise that gender is only one source of identity. In 
particular, the defining work of Kimberley Crenshaw argued that black women have 
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often been marginalized in second wave feminist scholarship.211Likewise, bell hooks’ 
influential book, ‘Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism’ observed that the 
feminist movement had failed to address race and class.212Overall, the hope of third- 
wave feminists was that feminism ‘no longer ascribes to a policy of assimilation, but 
wants to be multicultural.’213 
Secondly, this new wave of feminism appears to have grown out of the desert of 
disillusion that first appeared in the writings of the post-feminists discussed above. But, 
unlike the post-feminists, these third stage feminists believe that the fight for equality 
and liberation is not over.  
Thirdly, with this new iteration, there is both continuity and disunity in 
feminism. This is to say that while feminists of the third stage have continued to build 
upon the developments of the second stage, there is also generational rivalry. These 
younger feminists criticize second-wave feminists, for being ‘ethnocentric and overly 
concerned with imposing similarity upon women’s difference.’214In general, they object 
to the homogeneity and common identity of a ‘united sisterhood’ propounded by second 
wave feminists. They observe that not all women are white, Western, heterosexual, 
middle class, or able-bodied. They also accuse second wave feminists of ‘Puritanism 
and of imposing their sexual morality on other feminists and society-at-large.’215As a 
result, Gilmore concludes, ‘Third wave feminists are demanding attention to their 
individuality, complexities, and contradictions.’216  
In a sense, third wave feminism is ‘more global in its analysis’ than the second 
wave.217Arguably, much of this global analysis is due to the influence of gay, lesbian, 
and queer studies, which posit that gender and sexuality are fluid categories and demand 
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FLT understand these identities.218As Snyder’s review of third-wave literature observes, 
‘Third‐wavers want their own version of feminism that addresses their different societal 
contexts and the particular set of challenges they face.’219Nevertheless, like their 
forebears, third wave feminists have been criticised, both for ‘overstating their 
distinctiveness’ from second wave feminists, and for ‘being overly defensive.’ They 
have also been lauded for their efforts, and for using a ‘different set of tactics for 
achieving those goals.’220 
d A fourth wave? 
It is debatable whether feminism has entered a new ‘fourth wave.’ If it has, then 
it is said to be defined by technology and by the age of the women claiming to be 
feminists. Identified as a generation of women between their teen years and early 
twenties who use the internet to ‘build a strong, popular, reactive movement online,’221 
these women are defined by their public demonstrations, protests, and individualized 
campaigns. They are the ‘cyber feminists’ who are involved in local and global politics, 
who use technology to make feminism a collective and global project. They use the 
internet to connect women and men, of all ages to issues of social justice, demonstrating 
against media sexism, domestic violence, and rape, and campaigning for equal pay, 
maternity leave, affordable childcare, and abortion rights.222   
Arguably, this is not a ‘fourth wave’ of feminism, but merely evidence of the 
ongoing struggle for gender equality, which has been joined by yet another generation of 
women experiencing, or responding to the continuing inequalities faced by women, 
whether at home, or abroad. In my view, even their use of the internet to plan and 
organize campaigns and demonstrations can be viewed as merely a continuation of ‘the 
personal is political’ consciousness-raising efforts utilized by second wave feminists, 
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rather than any distinct feature of fourth wave feminism. This suggestion is supported by 
the fact that in 1998, second wave feminist Ellen Messer-Davidow argued strongly for 
academic feminism to reconnect with national and local feminism through networking 
and technology.223And, Hawthorn and Klein noted in 1999, that ‘Every campaign 
feminists ever thought of is present on the Internet.’224One could conclude therefore that 
while technology has made feminist consciousness-raising and campaign efforts easier, 
faster, and cheaper, especially in the hands of a technology savvy generation; its use has 
not been the brainchild of the fourth wave. Nor has its use ended the divide within FLT, 
for as Cochran observes, within this fourth wave, ‘There are, of course, differences of 
opinion when it comes to which subjects feminism should be addressing.’225 
e Feminist legal theory and pregnancy discrimination. 
This overview of FLT has served to illustrate its complexities, and to highlight 
the fact that while there may be a ‘common cause’ for the improving the status and 
wellbeing of women, there is a clear divergence among feminists as to the measures 
necessary to achieve these goals. The evidence presented in this thesis will suggest that 
this divergence is strongest at the national level in the US, where the arguments of 
liberal feminists have historically held sway, directly affecting the antidiscrimination 
measures Congress has been willing to propose and or adopt. One possible reason for 
the strong role that liberal feminists play in the national discourse is an acute 
understanding that law can sometimes be a double-edged sword or ‘Trojan horse’ for 
women. Research has shown that much of feminist law reform has failed to achieve 
lasting change.226It has also shown that: 
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Legal rights do not operate in a vacuum where only law rules. The 
enactment and impact of rights are dependent upon and influenced by the 
wider political, social, and cultural contexts. 227 
  Consequently, some feminists, including Carol Smart, argue against advancing 
law reform and legal rights as a means to improve the status of women, holding that 
such an approach has been a dangerous focus for feminism, because one ‘cannot predict 
the outcome of any individual law reform.’228Smart argues that the problem with using 
rights as part of a feminist strategy is that, ‘Legal rights do not resolve problems. Rather 
they transpose the problem into one that is defined as having a legal solution.’229Arguing 
that legal rights leave power relations intact, that individualized rights mean that few 
women benefit, and also observing that men can use rights as a much as women, Smart 
concludes that the ‘use of law is hazardous.’ She also concludes that ‘feminist ‘legal 
theory’ is immobilized by the failure of feminism to affect law, and the failure of law to 
transform the quality of women’s lives.’230In response, it is offered that while law may 
be hazardous and its results are not always predictable, these are poor reasons for not 
addressing the inequality that a lack of maternity leave or workplace accommodation 
cause. Indeed, a puzzling feature of US feminism  as it relates to national equality 
measures for pregnant workers is its focus on theory, rather than on the adoption of 
practical measures for improving the daily lives of women, especially as ‘law is a place 
where theory and speculation end and action begins.’231The results of this research 
suggest that an adherence to the belief that US ‘feminist practice needs to be theorized 
and reflective, in order to ensure political interventions are well-targeted,’ has hurt 
pregnant workers and the families they support, rather than help.232This is to say that 
while US feminist theorizing could result in the adoption of national legislation uniquely 
positioned to advance substantive equality for pregnant workers, its role in the 
enactment of the FMLA serves to suggest otherwise. There, the role of liberal feminists 
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in preventing the passage of maternity leave legislation helped delay the Act’s passage 
by more than a decade.233  
IV Comparative Method 
As the hypothetical examples discussed in Part II served to indicate, the research 
method chosen for this study is comparative method. While intense debate surrounds the 
nature and value of comparative method, a review of the literature suggests that there 
are multiple reasons for researchers to use this approach in the study of law, including 
to: 
 Inform policy; 
 Identify common policy objectives; 
 Evaluate solutions proposed to deal with common problems; 
 Draw lessons about best practices; 
 Assess the transferability of policies between societies.234     
While all of these reasons are relevant to this research, an evaluation of EU 
solutions to pregnancy discrimination, and an assessment of their ‘transferability’ to the 
US are arguably the most important reasons to use comparative method in this study. I 
will address these two reasons in turn. 
a Evaluate solutions. 
Linda Hantrais writes that, ‘it is not unusual for researchers to look to other 
countries, both for examples of how best to respond to the challenges they are facing 
and for ways of avoiding mistakes made elsewhere.’235Curran adds that comparative 
method is valuable, because of its potential to identify solutions to what is a common 
problem, and for ‘sharpening, deepening, and expanding the lens through which one 
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perceives law.’236Watson goes further, and argues that ‘borrowing from another system 
is the most common form of legal change.237If these academics are correct, then 
utilizing a comparative approach in this research can help to identify other (not 
necessarily preferable) solutions to the problem of pregnancy discrimination. The results 
of a comparison of supranational, national, and local antidiscrimination laws can 
provide policy-makers with what Örücü refers to as ‘a pool of models from which to 
choose’ to tackle a seemingly intractable problem.238It can also provide ‘a new 
perspective’ and a better understanding of the EU and US approaches to pregnancy 
discrimination. 239  
However, for any of these results to occur, the solutions revealed from the 
comparison undertaken in this thesis must be closely evaluated, in order to determine 
their ability to help tackle the problem of pregnancy discrimination. In this evaluation, 
the concerns raised by feminist legal theorists outlined in Part III above, as to the role of 
law in either helping to end discrimination, or entrenching gender stereotypes are 
valuable. In particular, the critical lens of liberal feminists aids an assessment of whether 
the disadvantages that paid leave and workplace accommodation measures help to 
alleviate are outweighed by the negative stereotypes they reinforce, and to consider 
whether more gender-neutral measures that encourage men to share more equally in care 
giving can lessen these stereotypes.    
Once EU solutions are evaluated, the question arises as to whether these 
solutions are transferable to the US. This question suggests a second important reason 
for using comparative method in this research, which is addressed below. 
b Assess transferability. 
A second important reason for using comparative method in this research is to 
assess the transferability of EU solutions to the US. That is, of course, if one believes 
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that there can be legal transfers, or, as Alan Watson calls them, ‘legal transplants.’ Alan 
Watson believes there can be, and defines legal transplants as the ‘moving of a rule or a 
system of law from one country to another or one people to another.’240Legrand 
disagrees, and argues that ‘rules cannot travel.’241He asserts that ‘rules are the product of 
divergent and conflicting interests in societies’ and as a rule crosses boundaries, they 
undergo a change. In asking the question of what is transplanted, Legrand says that a 
rule does not retain the essential characteristics of the home institution, but becomes 
something different. Accordingly, he says ‘legal transplants are impossible.’242 
However, as Nelken observes, Legrand’s thesis is correct only if ‘by “legal 
transplants,” we mean the attempt to use laws and legal institutions to reproduce 
identical meanings and effects in different cultures.’243This is not the aim of this thesis, 
nor would it be possible, in light of the unique mandates set by the US Constitution.244  
Nor is it supported by Watson, who agrees that ‘a rule once transplanted is different in 
its new home.’245He suggests that often what is transplanted is an idea, rather than a 
rule.246Rather than a transplant of EU antidiscrimination law to the US, the results of 
this thesis suggest the transplant of an ‘idea.’ The idea is of a more holistic substantive 
equality approach to ending pregnancy discrimination, as discussed in the Introduction 
to this thesis, which requires the adoption of practical measures and soft law strategies 
specifically designed to make the workplace more inclusive, while also addressing the 
needs of both women and men for a balance between work, private life, and caring 
responsibilities. Indeed, the results of this research suggest that such an approach is 
slowly taking root in the US.  
Furthermore, it may also be that what the results of this research suggest is more 
properly termed a ‘legal convergence’ of the US approach with the EU holistic approach 
to discrimination and equality, rather than a’ legal transplant.’ This convergence is in 
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keeping with the research of David Clark, who suggests that ‘legal convergence’ can 
result from ‘similar social and cultural developments in Europe and America.’247 
Certainly, similar developments were illustrated by the statistics outlined in the 
Introductory Chapter. They are also illustrated by President Obama’s remarks made the 
White House Summit on Working Families in 2014, concerning the need for Congress 
to pass laws supporting a balance between work and families. Noting that ‘there is only 
one developed country in the world that does not offer paid maternity leave, and that is 
us,’ President Obama stated that: 
Family leave, childcare, workplace flexibility, a decent wage—these are 
not frills, they are basic needs... They should be part of our bottom line 
as a society.248 
The assertion of similar developments does not ignore the different context 
against which EU and US antidiscrimination laws have been adopted, and against which 
an evaluation of transferability must be made. Distinct features exist in the US, which 
operate to render some legal solutions, even if preferable, not necessarily transferable.249 
The EU antidiscrimination measures examined in this thesis cannot simply be borrowed 
by the US without ‘investigation into whether the rules are the best possible or even 
appropriate.’250As Rose observes, ‘desirability does not guarantee 
practicality.’251Indeed, the results of this research suggest the legal provision of job 
protected, paid leave, and workplace accommodations are ‘desirable’ equality measures 
that the US could and should adopt nationally. In contrast, the supremacy of the US 
Constitution renders impractical the enactment of a mandatory maternity leave law, even 
if it were deemed desirable. Added to this, there is ‘always a risk of rejection.’252As 
Hantrais notes:  
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The transferability of policies between countries is largely dependent on 
the match between prevailing circumstances in the lesson-exporting and 
lesson-importing countries, and the interplay between policy 
environments and processes. 253 
The reality is that ‘there are degrees of transferability,’ and as the discussion in 
subsequent chapters will illustrate, there are disparities that exist in the US, which 
operate to render impossible and/or difficult the adoption of some gender specific 
equality measures.254The importance of recognizing such disparities has been 
highlighted in the work of several scholars and writers, who emphasize the need to 
understand the complex socio-political context of the legal system under comparison. In 
particular, Mitchel De S.-OL.’E. Lasser advises that ‘the comparatist must become 
acquainted with the foreign legal culture.’255Similarly, Roger Cotterrell suggests that 
comparison requires a study of the culture itself, of ‘appreciating (interpreting and 
understanding) difference, not merely of observing strangeness.’256In his seminal work, 
Kahn-Freund also makes clear, ‘The use of the comparative method requires not only 
knowledge of the foreign law, but also of its social and above all its political 
context.’257Ultimately, as Danneman observes,‘there is no point in comparing what is 
identical, and little point in comparing what has nothing in common.’258With this 
understanding, these two jurisdictions have been chosen for comparison in this thesis as 
they share what De Cruz identifies as a baseline of similarity.259That is to say, the EU 
and the US are at a ‘similar stage in legal, economic, political, and social evolution,’260 
and are ‘relatively similar rather than highly divergent societies.’261Nevertheless, as 
similar as they are, they are also different. Most clearly, these differences are evident in 
the fact that the US is a national state with a federal government and a common law 
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system. In contrast, the EU is an international entity, with a civil law tradition. 
Furthermore, whereas market integration was the initial thrust behind EU anti-
discrimination efforts, the impact of slavery and a rights-based approach to equality 
have been significant in the development of US antidiscrimination legislation.262Added 
to this, the US is considered a country of ‘laissez-faire’ capitalism, with an ideology that 
celebrates individualism and believes that important societal decisions should be left to 
the market.263It is also said that ‘the most abiding and durable self-characterization of 
the United States is that of freedom. The concept of freedom lies at the heart of 
American identity.’264It is against this freedom that the concept of equality for pregnant 
workers has to compete, and where equality often ‘suffers from an unfavourable 
comparison with liberty.’265   
In comparison, the EU is defined by its ‘European Social Model,’ enshrined in 
the idea of a ‘highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and 
social progress.’266This model is grounded in the universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality, and solidarity, where EU citizens have ‘social rights’ in addition to 
legal and civil rights.267Varying by Member State in the level of benefits and protection 
afforded, these social rights include, education, healthcare, pension, unemployment 
benefits, and family benefits. Consequently, it has been said that ‘the welfare state is a 
defining feature of Europe.’268  
This overview of differences suggests that for an assessment of EU solutions to 
be truly meaningful, certain legal, historical, and contextual nuances cannot be ignored. 
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This is because there are political, social, economic, and cultural events that affect the 
EU and US legal systems, as ‘every legal system is a product of its history and 
...political fortunes.269As DuBow and Elzion note, ‘comparative analysis, as a rule, deals 
with contextual explanations.’270However, while the assessment undertaken in this 
thesis seeks to take account of these explanations, word constraints limit the extent to 
which context can be meaningfully explored. Therefore, the discussion will be limited to 
a consideration of historical, legal, and conceptual differences between the EU and the 
US, whereupon it is suggested that the legal and conceptual differences constitute the 
greatest barriers to the adoption by the US of measures comparable to those found in the 
EU Pregnant Workers Directive.271   
c The dangers of comparative method. 
Finally, it is observed that as useful as the tool of comparative method is for this 
thesis, it also poses problems. The literature suggests that a meaningful comparison 
requires circumspection by the comparator, avoiding preconceptions pertaining to native 
legal systems. In Markensis’ opinion, using comparative method offers the ‘ability to 
challenge entrenched categories and fundamental assumptions,’ but it can also serve to 
entrench pre-existing prejudices.272Which is why De Cruz warms that there are ‘major 
pitfalls and perils that lie in wait for any comparative lawyer,’ including a ‘tendency to 
impose one’s own (native) legal conceptions and expectations on the system being 
compared.’273While this danger is likely greater when comparing Western with non-
Western legal systems, it highlights the need for the author to engage in distancing, 
differencing, and self-reflection. All of which requires an understanding of the law in 
one’s own terms, while also seeking to have one’s perspective challenged.274 In this 
regard, Frankenberg’s description of comparative law is compelling. He compares it to 
travelling, wherein the ‘traveller and the comparatist are invited to break away from 
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daily routines, to meet the unexpected and, perhaps, to get to know the 
unknown.’275This requires the legal comparator recognize their role as a participant-
observer and their need to break away from firmly held beliefs and prejudices, and to 
avoid being ethnocentric.276This suggests that ‘Reflection on our own (contrasting ) 
cultural ‘starting-point’ is always of crucial importance in any comparison, and should 
be taken very seriously when planning legal transfers.’277 
Heading this advice, this comparative research has been conducted with an eye 
to recognizing and challenging personal bias and prejudice.  
V Conclusion. 
This Chapter has done two things. First, by contrasting and comparing the legal 
rights of employees at a US company with the legal rights provided to employees in the 
EU, the inadequacy of a formal equality/equal rights based approach to addressing the 
problem of pregnancy discrimination was highlighted and the foundation was laid for a 
deeper examination of the EU and US models of equality. 
Secondly, this Chapter laid the groundwork for responding to the overall 
research questions for this thesis, presenting the comparative and feminist framework 
used to consider a specific issue of discrimination and examining the role of ‘special 
treatment’ legislation in  addressing it.   
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Chapter 3: The European Union model of equality 
A European approach to equality which is both pluralistic and  
Humanistic and which constitutes the basis for action both in the 
Community and in the rest of the world.278 
I Introduction 
The purpose of these next two Chapters is to explore the EU model of equality in 
depth, critically evaluating its solutions to pregnancy discrimination and considering its 
future initiatives. Part II begins this task with a discussion of the historical background 
to EU gender discrimination law. An examination of the origins of the EU approach to 
resolving gender discrimination is important for understanding the context in which 
equality measures for pregnant workers are adopted. The classical view, which is 
discussed in the important work of Mark Bell, suggests that EU social policy is located 
between two theoretical frameworks. They are, a ‘market integration’ model, which is 
primarily concerned with the functioning of the internal market, and a ‘social 
citizenship’ model, which is concerned with the protection of fundamental rights.279In 
the following discussion, it will be seen that because the Treaties maintain an economic 
focus for the Union, EU gender equality policy has historically emphasized the labour 
market participation of pregnant women and the idea of economic maximization, rather 
than equality per se.  
Part III offers an overview of the different forms of EU law and the powers of 
the EU institutions to adopt measures designed to address pregnancy discrimination. An 
initial comparison is undertaken with the laws and powers of the US Congress and the 
state legislatures, which will provide a foundation for the in-depth comparative 
discussion undertaken in subsequent Chapters.  
Against this background, Part IV begins the exploration of the EU model of 
equality, with a discussion of the right to equal treatment between women and men, and 
an initial comparison between EU and US measures intended to end both ‘direct’ and 
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‘indirect’ discrimination.280Parts V and VI examine two derogations in EU 
antidiscrimination law. Derogations may be understood as the exemption from, or 
relaxation of the mandate of equal treatment. In Part V, the key derogation requiring 
protection of the safety and health of pregnant workers, workers who have recently 
given birth or workers who are breastfeeding is explored through a discussion of EU 
secondary law and the laws of the member states. Part VI explores the derogation 
permitting positive action, which Collin’s prefers to term ‘a duty of reasonable 
adjustment.’281From an initial comparison with US ‘affirmative action’ measures, it will 
be seen that there is greater flexibility in application and acceptance of gender balancing 
measures in the EU. From the discussion of these two EU derogations, three things will 
also become evident. First, derogations play a pivotal role in addressing discrimination 
in the EU. Secondly, they have unintended negative consequences for the wider canvas 
of gender equality. Thirdly, they tell us much about the value placed on gender equality 
by the EU. 
This Chapter concludes with a discussion of the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming as it has been enacted at the supranational and national levels of the EU. 
Evidence will be presented in Part VII to show that the EU is fully committed to this 
transformative strategy and is at the forefront of utilizing it in governance. This 
discussion is intended to set the stage for the exploration in Chapter 7 of the debate 
surrounding the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the strategy in the EU and the 
specific lessons EU experience offers US nascent efforts.  
II The historical basis. 
A review of the literature examining EU social policy reveals an economic and 
social basis to EU measures designed to address gender discrimination. Before 
undertaking a close review of EU pregnancy discrimination law, it will be helpful first 
to explore these dual bases. 
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a An economic basis. 
In their Gender Equality Report to the Commission, Burri, and Prechal outline 
the inauspicious start to the first Treaty measure addressing equality between women 
and men, noting that: 
The background to [Article 119] was purely economic; the member 
states, in particular France, wanted to eliminate distortions in 
competition between undertakings established in different member states. 
France had adopted provisions on equal pay for men and women much 
earlier and it feared that cheap female labour in other member states 
would put French undertakings and the economy at a disadvantage.282 
Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that EU gender equality measures initially 
arose out of a desire by several European countries to create an economic and political 
union.283By entering into this union, and in an effort to achieve their goals, the member 
states ceded part of their sovereignty, via Treaty, to the EU institutions, to make and 
adopt laws. As the CJEU observed in the landmark case of Costa v E.N.E.L: 
The member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law, which binds both 
their nationals and themselves.284 
With this economic goal of competitiveness, gender discrimination became a 
focus for the member states of this European Economic Community (EEC, now the 
European Union (EU)), because it was understood to create market inefficiency. As 
Hugh Collins observes, discrimination was seen to damage both profits and 
productivity. Consequently, action was taken not only because ‘unequal treatment is 
wrong in principle,’ but also because ‘it is inefficient in practice.’285Simply stated, the 
problem was that a member state that paid women less than men could have an 
economic advantage against a member state that statutorily provided for equal pay 
between the sexes. The resolution to this problem was the adoption of Article 119 in the 
original constitutional treaty establishing the EEC in 1957, which was concerned with 
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the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work.286Notwithstanding 
its economic foundation, Article 119 is generally acknowledged to have provided a 
springboard to the social basis for equality, and the means by which other areas of 
gender discrimination could be addressed by the EU institutions. Much has been written 
about the social basis of EU antidiscrimination law, and the EU’s move ‘from market 
integration to the rights of individuals,’ and from a narrow focus on market efficiency to 
a ‘broader focus on human dignity, diversity and social inclusion.’287However, as the 
discussion below reveals, this move has been slow and measured. 
b A social basis. 
 The fact is, as Fredman writes, Article 119 effectively lay ‘dormant’ for 20 
years,288before being resurrected by the European Court of Justice (ECJ, now Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU)), in the case of Defrenne v Sabena.289In that case, the court 
acknowledged that the aim of Article 119 was to avoid ‘competitive disadvantage in 
intra-community competition.’290It also emphasized that the union was not merely an 
economic one, but one that ensured social progress. This is to say that Article 119 had a 
double aim, ‘which is at once economic and social.’291This assertion had as its 
background the Council Resolution of 21 January 1974, concerning a Social Action 
Programme, the preamble to which stated that such a programme: 
Involves actions designed to achieve full and better employment, the 
improvement of living and working conditions and increased involvement 
of management and labour in the economic and social decisions of the 
Community, and of workers in the life of undertakings.292 
 The Resolution also set forth a priority of undertaking:  
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Action to achieve equality between men and women as regards access to 
employment and vocational training and advancement and as regards 
working conditions, including pay.293 
The actions undertaken were the adoption of three Council Directives. Directive 
75/117/EEC, relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women 
(EPD).294Directive 76/207/EEC, on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training, 
promotion and working conditions (ETD),295and Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of 
social security, as discussed further below, and throughout this thesis.296  
This notion that there is a ‘double aim’ in the EU, that it is at once both 
economic and social in its aims, has since been solidified by the provisions of the 
amending Treaties adopted since 1974. Most notably, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
expanded the competence of the community to adopt legislation on the issues of 
discrimination and equality. Article 2 was extended to task the Commission with 
promoting equality between women and men and Article 3 was extended to specifically 
endorse the strategy of gender mainstreaming by providing that, ‘In all other activities 
referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to 
promote equality, between men and women.’ Additionally, Article 13 was added, which 
authorized action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Treaty of Amsterdam also expressly 
replaced Article B in the Treaty on EU (Maastricht Treaty) with the specific objective 
‘to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment.’297  
It is generally observed that approval of the EU social agenda (ESA) was 
intended to end the asymmetry of the social and economic dimension, which Edoardo 
Ales argues, signifies the EU’s move towards a ‘social market economy versus a purely 
neoliberal one.’298Sonia Mazey’s description is informative in this regard, noting that 
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the Treaty of Amsterdam marked ‘the constitutional coming of age for EU gender 
equality policy and the birth of EU gender mainstreaming.’299This coming of age was 
notably expanded in 2000, when the European Council set forth ‘the indissoluble link 
between economic performance and social progress,’ with its approval of the ESA and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), which, in light of its provisions, Diamond 
Ashiagbor calls an ‘enormously important supporting beam to the edifice of European 
social rights.’300Ashiagbor is correct to highlight the central role played by the CFR in 
cementing EU social rights, because, in addition to its declaration of specific 
‘fundamental rights’ for EU citizens, there is a Preamble, which includes the statement 
that, ‘the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity.’301Indeed, any lingering misunderstanding as to the 
importance of the CFR is removed by the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the Treaty of 
Maastricht (TEU), now known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and 
made the CFR legally binding, with the same status as the Treaties. Article 2 of the 
Lisbon Treaty also reaffirmed the declaration in the CFR, providing that: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between 
women and men prevail. 
In light of such developments, academics have emphasized the social 
commitment of the EU.302Arguably, this commitment is supported by the judgement of 
the CJEU in the case of Deutsche Telekom AG v. Lilli Schr𝑜eder, which had the effect 
of elevating the social objective dramatically. In that case, the Court held that: 
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The economic aim pursued by Article 119 of the Treaty, namely the 
elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings 
established in different member states, is secondary to the social aim 
pursued by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a 
fundamental human right.303 
Notwithstanding this judgment, the results of this study suggest that the original 
market approach to ending discrimination has not, and likely will never disappear in the 
EU. Instead, as the subsequent discussion will show, economic considerations remain at 
the forefront in the provision of pregnancy and maternity pay and maternity leave. As 
Tomas-Bianov astutely observes, the economic perspective is the ‘red thread in the 
[equality] strategy.’304  
c Criticisms of the economic basis. 
There has been a significant amount of commentary regarding the economic 
basis of EU social policy, including from Sandra Fredman, who observes that  
From its inception as an economic union, the EU granted the status of 
fundamental rights, not to civil and political rights or even socio-
economic rights, but to basic market freedoms: freedom of movement of 
goods, services, and labour. Any social rights have, until recently, had to 
be justified in market-creating terms.305 
Likewise, Joanna Kantola notes in her book, Gender and the European Union, 
that gender equality law in Europe was initially adopted not out of concern with 
women’s interests, but out of a concern with economic principles.306The reality is, as the 
academics highlight, the EU did not initially seek to address gender discrimination from 
a moral or ethical standpoint. Rather, its drive to adopt antidiscrimination law was based 
upon a need to remove existing barriers prohibiting the achievement of a single 
economic market. This need, as Mark Bell observes, meant that EU gender equality law 
was initially an ‘economic expedient’ and was only later recast as a fundamental 
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right.307Notwithstanding this recasting, as Catherine Barnard notes, EU social policy 
remains an eclectic body of ‘employment-related social policy.’308This suggests that sex 
discrimination law is at best inextricably intertwined with economic integration, or at 
worst, is secondary to it.  Any secondary role has been severely criticised by some 
academics, including Maria Stratigaki, who argues that the economic basis of EU social 
policy is ‘a limitation upon the reach of policy outcomes.’ While her observations are 
not without basis, her assessment of European politicians as playing only, ‘lip service’ 
to equality as a fundamental principle of democracy and social justice is somewhat 
excessive. While it is undeniable that EU gender equality policy has an, ‘inherent double 
identity as both economic and social policy,’ the equality provisions found in EU 
primary and secondary legislation cannot justly be described as insincere.309 
Furthermore, with regard to pregnancy discrimination, it will likely always be at the 
intersection of employment and social welfare, as women are fuel for the EU economic 
engine. For instance, even under the terms of the Commission’s ‘Strategy for Equality 
Between Women and Men 2010-2015,’ the focus is to get more women into 
employment in order to effectuate, ‘widening the human capital base, and raising 
competitiveness.’ Indeed, the EU Commission is unabashed in declaring that ‘In order to 
achieve smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, the potential, and the talent pool of 
women needs to be used more extensively and more efficiently.’310This achievement is 
to be secured through a variety of initiatives discussed in Chapter 4, including an 
increased commitment to gender mainstreaming, specific actions to close the gender pay 
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gap, and the increased provision of childcare facilities and other work/life reconciliation 
measures for women and men.311 
 It is offered that in light of the concrete and positive developments in equal 
opportunity that can be secured through practical measures, it should matter little that 
the basis for their promotion is economic rather than social. Nor should it be surprising 
that their basis is primarily economic. After all, while the Treaty of Lisbon makes 
explicit reference to goals beyond the establishment of an internal market, to include 
combating social exclusion and discrimination, and the promotion of the economic, 
social and territorial cohesion of the member states, the founding economic goal of the 
Union remains at the forefront of EU social policy.312This suggests EU anti-
discrimination law will always be shaped by a market focused on the movement of 
goods, capital, services, and labour, and the need to prohibit market distortion. To think 
otherwise, would be to fail to understand the purpose of what has been an economic 
union first, and foremost. Notwithstanding this focus, the results of this research suggest 
that the correlative social commitment of the EU has historically translated into the net 
being thrown much wider than in the US, in terms of the practical measures adopted to 
tackle discrimination and achieve equality for pregnant workers.  
III The acquis communautaire and legislative authority.313  
This Part explores the types of laws that can be adopted to address pregnancy 
discrimination at the supranational level and the role played in their adoption by the EU 
institutions. Due to word constraints, what is provided here can only be an overview, 
which is intended to aid the understanding of the substantive provisions of the EU model 
                                                 
311 The gender pay gap is defined as the difference between male and female median earnings divided by 
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Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strategy for equality 
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312 Treaty of Lisbon (n 266), Article 2. 
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of equality, and provide a basis for the comparative examination with the US, which is 
undertaken in subsequent Chapters.314 
a Legislative form. 
As stated previously, the EU model of equality uses a dual track approach to 
tackling pregnancy discrimination, which combines equal treatment with special 
treatment measures, complemented by the transformative strategy of gender 
mainstreaming. This means that EU gender equality legislation is made up of both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ laws, as those terms were defined in Chapter 1. More specifically, 
‘hard’ laws in the EU are the primary legislation of the Treaties and secondary 
legislation in the form of Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. In contrast, EU soft 
law, as an ‘umbrella concept,’ generally includes communications, notices, guidelines, 
recommendations, strategies, and the opinions of the EU Commission and 
Parliament.315Added to this, it can be said that EU laws are either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ in the 
sense that only some laws are legally binding upon the member states and, or provide 
for legal sanction for lack of compliance. In this regard, Regulations, Directives, and 
Decisions take precedence over national law, and whereas Regulations are binding 
legislative acts that are applicable across the entire EU, Directives only set forth the goal 
that one, more, or all member states are required to achieve. This is to say that each 
sovereign member state is required to adapt their laws to meet the goals of a Directive, 
but is free to decide how to do so. In contrast, a Decision is binding only upon those to 
whom it is addressed.  
  In Chapter 1, it was also observed that there are significant differences of detail 
in the EU and US models of equality. One significant difference noted here is that the 
types of legislative measures available to the EU institutions do not exist in the US. In 
the US, Congress and the state legislatures may pass only Bills and Resolutions, and the 
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President can issue Executive Orders.316Admittedly, while a difference in legislative 
form affects only the type, rather than the substantive provisions of antidiscrimination 
laws, this difference is still important to highlight because it provides one very good 
reason why there can never be a complete convergence of EU and US pregnancy 
discrimination law, even if it were desired.317 
b Legislative authority. 
A more important difference between the EU and US models of equality is in the 
conferral of legislative authority. In the EU, it is generally understood that the bulk of 
supranational legislative authority resides in the Commission, whose members are 
appointed by the member states.318As a hybrid institution, with a dual function as the 
policy making arm of the EU, the Commission has an institutional structure that 
combines executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Indeed, traditionally, the 
Commission has three core competencies—proposing, monitoring, and enforcing EU 
legislation. More specifically, it has the power to initiate legislation and develop policy. 
It also has power to enforce EU law via infringement proceedings against member 
states, under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). These combinational roles have led Laffan to describe the Commission as a 
‘policy entrepreneur’ and ‘policy manager,’319Linarelli also observes that in terms of 
gender equality, the Commission has emerged to become an, ‘especially vibrant law-
making institution.’320These are fair descriptions. In light of the significant powers 
conferred upon it, the Commission has historically had a central role in directing the EU 
agenda and shaping the content of its policy and norms.321However, it is fair to say that 
recent Treaty amendment and member state policy changes have reduced the vibrancy 
of the Commission to some degree. Notably, Article 289 (2) TFEU requires that in 
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proposing legislation, which is usually adopted by the Council of Ministers, the EU 
Parliament is to give its consent, as a special legislative procedure, whenever new 
legislation on combating discrimination is being adopted. In this procedure, Parliament 
has the right of veto, which the EU Council cannot overrule.  Added to this, there are the 
effects of member state austerity policies arising from the global economic recession 
dating back to 2008, which are clearly revealed in the inability of the Commission to 
secure agreement on its Proposal for a new Pregnant Workers Directive, as discussed in 
Part V, subsection c, below.322 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is suggested that the Commission remains 
essential to achieving progress in tackling pregnancy discrimination in the EU, and as 
the evidence presented in Chapter 5 will reveal, in comparison to the US Congress, the 
Commission remains far more vibrant in terms of advancing gender equality law. 
Indeed, the academic research considering the legislative role of the Commission, 
suggests there are two key reasons for the Commission’s continued vibrancy. First, the 
somewhat vague, general, and incomplete Treaty language, in terms of its aspirations 
and goals has aided the Commission and promoted flexibility in the measures it has 
proposed.323Added to this, there are 24 official languages in the EU as of 2015, which 
make the drafting of legislation difficult. In this context, as Voermans writes, 
‘constructive ambiguity greases the wheels of political cooperation.’324It also 
strengthens the legislative role of the Commission. This is to say that the use of terms 
sufficiently infused with optimism, yet vague enough to attain the political support of 
the twenty-eight signatories to a Treaty, enable the Commission to stretch its legislative 
authority to the maximum limit. An outline of Treaty provisions conferring authority 
upon the Commission to legislate on gender equality issues beyond equal pay will serve 
to explain this last point more clearly. 
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As observed in Part II above, the Treaty of Amsterdam first expanded the 
authority of the Commission, whereby Article 141(ex 119) extended the equality 
principle beyond the workplace, and imposed a general obligation on the EU in all of its 
actions to eliminate inequality and to advocate equality. This expansion was confirmed 
by Article 1(a) of the Treaty of Lisbon, and Article 23 of the CFR, which enshrine 
equality as a common value and fundamental right in the EU. Article 2(3) of the Treaty 
of Lisbon further mandates combating discrimination and social exclusion and the 
promotion of equality between women and men. While providing the Commission with 
a Treaty basis for legislative measures, these provisions, along with Article 10, also 
provide for ‘enhanced cooperation’ between the EU member states in matters involving 
the non-exclusive competencies of the Union, in areas such a social policy, economic 
policy, health, and education. Moreover, Article 23 of the CFR states that equality 
between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work, 
and pay.  
A second and key reason for the legislative vibrancy of the EU Commission is 
the adoption of the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) decision-making procedure of the 
Council in the field of health and safety. Prior to the adoption of QMV, under Article 
118a of the EC Treaty (now Article 137), a single member state of the EU could, and 
often did seek to veto equality measures. Instead, with the adoption of QMV, the 
adoption of equality Directives, including the Pregnant Workers Directive (PWD) was 
ensured. Some discussion of UK government objections surrounding the enactment of 
the PWD is appropriate here. 
 When the Directive was proposed, the UK observed the availability of Article 
100 of the EC Treaty as an alternative, and it argued, sounder legislative basis for the 
proposal. While this argument was not without reason, it had more to do with procedure 
than with substance. This is to say, UK objections were grounded not so much in a 
desire for legislative accuracy as they were in a desire to thwart the Directive in its 
entirety.325Article 100 required that the Council act unanimously on a proposal of the 
Commission, in contrast to Article 118a, which provided for QMV. Now, QMV under 
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the TFEU, Article 153(1) enables legislation in the area of equality and combating social 
exclusion to be more easily adopted at the EU level. 
As Table 1 below illustrates, within the milieu of its delegated authority, the 
Commission has been able to propose a broad array of equality measures. 
Table 1: EU Equality Directives 
 
 
Directive Number Amended OJ  Reference        
    
Equal pay for Men and Women 75/117  OJL 45, 19/2/1975 
    
    
Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Employment 76/207 2002/73 OJL269,5/10/2002 
    
    
    
Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Statutory  
Schemes of Social Security 
79/7  OJL 6,10/1/1979 
    
Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Occupational 86/378 96/97 OJL 46, 17/2/1997 
Social Security Schemes    
    
    
Equal Treatment of Men and Women engaged in an  
activity, including Agriculture, & self-employed.  
86/613 2010/41 OJ 180, 15/07/2010 
    
    
The Pregnant Workers Directive 92/85 2007/30 OJL165,27/6/2007 
 
    
The Parental Leave Directive 96/34 2010/18  OJL 68/13, 18/3/2010 
 
Directive on Fixed-term work 99/70  OJL 175,10/7/1999 
    
    
Equal treatment of men and women in access to 
and supply of goods and services. 
 
2004/113  OJL373,21/12/2004 
    
Directive on the implementation of the principle of          
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation. 
(RECAST)  
2006/54  OJL204,26/07/2006 
 
Proposal  for a Directive amending Council Directive 
92/85/EEC COM(2008) 637 final 
 
Proposal for a Directive for improving the gender  
Balance among non-executive Directors of companies 
listed on stock exchanges COM(2012) 614 final 
   
    
    
Source:  Author’s analysis of EU legislation    
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IV The EU dual track approach to equality. 
Having provided the historical and legal background to the EU model of 
equality, the remainder of this Chapter explores its ‘dual track’ approach, which seeks 
substantive equality by combining equal treatment with special treatment measures, 
complemented by the transformative strategy of gender mainstreaming. This Part begins 
with an examination of the EU provision of equal treatment between women and men. It 
then explores the differences in application of the concept of indirect discrimination 
between the EU and the US, providing initial evidence for the conclusion that the 
concept has potential to be far more transformative for gender equality in the EU than in 
the US.326 
a Direct discrimination. 
To restate, equal treatment (formal equality) is the centre-point of EU and US 
antidiscrimination law. As stated above, in the EU equal treatment was originally 
enshrined in Treaty as an isolated provision with regard to equal pay. It was expanded 
during the 1970s by three Directives regarding equal pay, equal treatment as regards 
access to employment, and equal treatment in matters of social security.327The purpose 
of these Directives was to put into effect in the member states the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in an employment context. Accordingly, each Directive 
contained the negative prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex, providing in 
virtually identical terms ‘that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on ‘grounds of 
sex, either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family 
status.’328This mandate of formal equality was intended to end both direct and indirect 
discrimination in the EU and was restated in Article 14(1) of the Directive 2006/54/EC 
(Recast Directive). The Recast Directive repealed and recast 76/207/EEC (as amended 
by 2002/73/EC) and several other Directives, providing that there shall be no direct or 
indirect discrimination ‘on grounds of sex’ in the public or private sectors, including 
                                                 
326 For a discussion of the application of the concept in the US, see Chapter 5. 
327 Equal Pay Directive (n 172); Equal Treatment Directive (n 122); Equal Treatment in matters of social 
security (n 174) 
328 Equal Treatment Directive (n 122) Article 5(1). 
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public bodies, in relation to employment, working conditions; including dismissals as 
well as pay.329  
According to settled EU case law, direct, or overt discrimination involves ‘less 
favourable’ treatment ‘on grounds of sex,’ as in the use of masculine and feminine 
gender in job advertisements, job descriptions, and collective agreements; 
discrimination against married women, pregnant women and women on maternity leave; 
differences in pay and, or working conditions according to sex, including social benefits 
and retirement ages; and by virtue of Directive 2004/113/EC, where sex is a factor in the 
assessment of insurance risks.330   
As observed in Chapter 1, the requirement of ‘less favourable treatment’ requires 
a point of comparison. A comparison must be made between cases of persons of 
different sex, such that the circumstances in the one case are the same, in the sense of 
being substantially similar, or not materially different. A problem arises therefore where 
inequality stems from gender difference, as in the case of pregnancy. Pregnancy, as 
Fredman observes, involves ‘a difference with distinction.’331Initially, in resolving this 
problem, the national courts of the EU member states were ‘the first to wrestle with the 
question,’ as there was no express prohibition against pregnancy discrimination in the 
original Treaty.332At the outset, as no point of comparison could be found between a 
                                                 
329 ibid, Article 2(1). Now Article 2(1) (a) and (b) of the Recast Directive (n 15), the EPD 75/117/EEC (n 
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330 See: Case 129/79 Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith [1980] ECR 1275, where a female manager was paid 
less than male predecessor. Also, Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire 
Area Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 0723, involving a different pensionable age for men and 
women; Case C-177/88 Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) 
Plus [1990] ECR I-3941, refusal to appoint a pregnant woman; Hertz (n 126), dismissal by reason of 
pregnancy; Case C-187/98 Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic [1999] ECR I-
07713, where regulations imposed conditions on married female workers that were not imposed on 
married male workers; Case C-595/12 Loredana Napoli. v. Ministero della Guistizia-Dipartimento 
dell’Amministrazione penitenziaria. [2014] ECR 0, concerning the automatic exclusion of a female 
worker from a training course because she has taken compulsory maternity leave. See: Council Directive 
2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in the access to and supply of goods and services.{2004} OJL 373/37, and the decision of the 
CJEU in Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and others v Conseil 
des ministres [2011] ECR 00. 
331 Fredman, ‘A difference with distinction: pregnancy and parenthood reassessed’ (n 138) 106. 
332 It was also not expressly prohibited in US civil rights legislation prohibiting sex discrimination. See 
the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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pregnant woman and a man, it was determined that there could be no discrimination on 
grounds of sex.333Subsequently, the problem was resolved through comparison with 
‘analogous circumstances,’ as in the UK case of Hayes v Malleable Working Men’s 
Club and Institute, where the Employment Appeal Tribunal determined that the correct 
comparator for a pregnant female employee was a sick male employee. 334 
When faced with this problem at the supranational level, the CJEU properly 
ruled that discrimination based on pregnancy is discrimination based on sex. It also 
cemented into the acquis communautaire the concept that pregnancy is sui generis. This 
is to say that in relation to pregnancy, it is impossible to find a person of the opposite 
sex who is in a directly comparable situation. Not even the hypothetical ‘sick man’ is 
comparable, for, as the court held in Webb v. EMO Cargo, ‘pregnancy is not in any way 
comparable with a pathological condition.’335Initially, to solve the riddle that pregnancy 
creates, the CJEU relied upon Article 119 EEC (now Article 141 EC), and Articles 2(1) 
and 5(1) of Directive 76/207/EEC (now 2006/54/EC). Beginning with Dekker, the CJEU 
held that refusal to appoint a pregnant woman was direct sex discrimination.336In the 
cases of Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund (Hertz), Habermann-Beltermann, 
and Webb v. EMO Cargo, the Court also held that the dismissal of a pregnant worker on 
account of pregnancy, or essentially on account of pregnancy, can affect only women 
and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex.337This is so regardless 
of whether a pregnant worker has been engaged under a fixed term (temporary), or 
indefinite contract.338These judgments have since been codified by the PWD, and have 
been affirmed by the CJEU in all subsequent cases alleging pregnancy discrimination in 
                                                 
333 For an EU case on point, see: Turley (n 37) 70. Tribunal held that to dismiss a woman because she was 
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334 Hayes v Malleable (n 39) and the US case of Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 282 F3d 856 (5th Cir 
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the EU, including in the case of Silke-Karin Mahlburg, where a statutory prohibition 
preventing a woman’s employment from the outset and duration of her pregnancy 
served as the basis for a refusal to hire.339  
These EU cases are path breaking, as they exemplify the idea that ‘to disregard 
relevant differences is as unjust as it is to regard irrelevant differences.’340They also 
exemplify a profound difference between the EU and US models of equality. That being 
how each jurisdiction treats the difference that pregnancy makes. As the discussion of 
US antidiscrimination law in Chapter 5 will reveal, while the US also prohibits 
discrimination against pregnant workers, it stops short of treating pregnancy as sui 
generis. Instead, US adherence to formal equality underpins a national preference for 
‘pregnancy blindness’ in the workplace.  
b Indirect discrimination. 
The concept of indirect discrimination was also initially discussed in Chapter 1, 
where it was noted that the concept was judicially created in the US, and as Nancy 
Travis observes, it was originally ‘intended to displace established social norms.’341EU 
antidiscrimination law also addresses this more subtle form of discrimination, which 
occurs: 
 Where an apparently neutral provision, criterion, or practice would put 
persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons 
of the other sex unless that provision, criterion, or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary.342  
Despite a substantive similarity, the results of this close review of case law 
reveals the application of the concept to pregnancy and maternity differs considerably 
between the EU and the US. This difference in application is directly related to the 
rights and protections afforded to EU women by the PWD and the Recast Directive. 
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62 Wash & Lee L Rev 3, 5. 
342 Case C-116/06 Sari Kiiski v Tampereen kaupunki [2007] ECR I-7643, para 3, referencing Article 2(2) 
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This is to say that the express provision of rights to pregnant workers pertaining to 
hiring, dismissal, leave, pay, and workplace accommodations create less need to rely on 
the concept to secure gender equality in the EU than exists in the US. Instead, in the US, 
as the discussion in Chapter 5 will reveal, in the absence of a right to paid leave or 
workplace accommodations, the concept has been relied upon, albeit largely 
unsuccessfully, to claim workplace policies disproportionately affecting pregnant 
employees amount to discrimination. These workplace policies generally pertain to the 
provision of sick leave, light duty assignments, flexible work, and part-time work.  
Juxtaposed to this, the EU variant of the US paradigm of disparate impact 
discrimination is focused on invalidating other workplace policies based upon 
unexamined assumptions and stereotypes disproportionately affecting women, 
especially atypical workers. The following exploration of the application of the concept 
in the EU will show that using indirect discrimination to dismantle polices that 
disproportionately affect women is vitally important for advancing substantive equality 
for pregnant workers, because upon return work and, as ‘women with children,’ they 
comprise the largest segment of atypical workers in the EU.343   
c Atypical workers. 
The author’s review of EU case law found that cases alleging indirect sex 
discrimination  mostly concern the pay and conditions of part-time workers, and that the 
CJEU has been willing to take on the task of eliminating what one Advocate General 
refers to as ‘the frequent discrimination that still remains.’344This willingness is 
illustrated by the fact that the Court has found indirect discrimination in an array of 
situations, including where an apparently neutral provision results in the hourly rate of 
pay for part-time work to be lower than for full-time work, 345and where part-time 
employees are excluded from an occupational pension scheme.346It has also been found 
to occur where a part-time worker converting to full-time work is placed on a lower pay 
                                                 
343 See further, the statistics and discussion in Chapter 4. 
344 Case C-300/06 Ursula Voß v Land Berlin [2007] ECR I-10573, Opinion of AG Ruiz- Jarabo Colomer, 
para 27. 
345 See: Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd. [1981] ECR 911, paras 14-15. 
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scale than previously occupied while job-sharing; 347when calculating length of service 
for appointment as established staff, 348and where to gain exemption from a qualifying 
exam, part-time employees must work several years longer than full-time 
employees.349Finally, it has been found where a part-time worker is required to pay 
pension contributions for a longer period than a full-time worker, in order to obtain a 
proportionately lower pension,350and where the voluntarily payment of a Christmas 
bonus excluding part-time workers adversely affects women.351  
One commonality that emerges from these cases is judicial flexibility towards 
burden of proof requirements. This is to say that statistical percentages for establishing a 
‘difference in treatment which is material’ are not rigidly applied by the EU courts. 
Rather, the use of set percentages has been categorically rejected, with the CJEU stating 
in Brachner that: 
As a general rule, it will hardly ever be possible to lay down fixed 
percentages as; in addition, the absolute figures and the intensity of the 
effects in each case may also be relevant.352 
Flexibility is further illustrated by the Court’s refusal in the case of Seymour-
Smith to temporally limit statistical proof, ruling that: 
With regard, in particular, to statistics, it may be appropriate to take into 
account not only the statistics available at the point in time at which the 
act was adopted, but also statistics compiled subsequently which are 
likely to provide an indication of its impact on men and on women.353 
This case was referred to in Edwards (2), wherein the UK Court of Appeal held 
that when considering the statistics proffered, a tribunal ‘was entitled to take into 
account its own knowledge and experience’ of social factors, which in this case was, 
                                                 
347 See: C-243/95 Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v The Revenue Commissioners and Department of 
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‘that the burden of child care falls upon many more women than men and that a far 
greater proportion of single parents with the care of children are women rather than 
men.354 
It is undeniable that EU judicial flexibility has been boosted by the changes 
wrought to the test of indirect discrimination by Directive 2006/54/EU, which recast 
several Directives, including Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997, on the 
burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex. Article 2(2) of Directive 
97/80/EC had provided that indirect discrimination exists where the apparently neutral 
provision, criterion, or practice disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of the 
members of one sex. This wording has been changed to require only that persons of one 
sex are placed at a particular disadvantage. This change directly impacts the type and 
amount of proof required to show indirect sex discrimination in the EU. As noted by 
Catherine Barnard: 
This shift from actual to potential disparate impact recognizes that in 
some areas common sense would dictate that there may well be disparate 
impact, but it is difficult to obtain statistical proof.355 
By way of contrast, and as the discussion in Chapter 5 will show, burden of 
proof requirements in the US hold that for there to be indirect discrimination/disparate 
impact, there must be ‘statistically sufficient’  disparities in the hiring, promotion, and 
other selection rates for any protected group, which meet the ‘four-fifths or 80% 
administrative rule.’356Added to this, it will be seen that evidence is temporally limited 
and cannot serve as a basis for proving discrimination beyond the time period analysed.  
From the foregoing discussion, it should begin to be evident that the EU and US 
approaches to indirect discrimination represent points at the opposite ends of a road to 
achieving greater substantive equality. At one end, judicial acknowledgement of the 
burden that care giving imposes upon women’s careers illustrates the breadth of the EU 
position on indirect discrimination, which could ultimately transform the workplace 
from a male-defined organizational norm, towards one that supports all workers in their 
                                                 
354 London Underground Ltd v Edwards (No.2) [1999] ICR 494 [20(ii)] (Potter L.J.) See also Chief 
Constable of Avon & Somerset Constabulary v Ms A Chew [2002] Emp LR 370 [52]. 
355 Catherine Barnard, EU Employment Law (4th edn, OUP 2012) 280. 
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roles as caregivers. At the other end, as the discussion in Chapter 5 will reveal, the 
judicial balancing of economic interests and a statutory defence, enable US employer’s 
discriminatory policies towards pregnant workers to continue, under the guise of gender 
neutrality. While it is acknowledged that Article 2(1) (b) of the Recast Directive also 
provides a defence to an employer where the discrimination is ‘objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary,’ the 
CJEU has unequivocally rejected ‘economic justifications’ for discriminatory policies, 
including any argument that avoidance of discrimination will involve increased costs for 
the employer.357Thus, the picture that emerges is one in which the concept of indirect 
discrimination is being used in the EU to advance equality in new areas. Arguably, the 
CJEU is supported in its efforts by the Council’s adoption of Directives specific to 
atypical workers, including the Agreement on Part-Time Work, the Agreement on 
Fixed-Time Work, and the Directive on Temporary Agency Work.358In contrast, in the 
US, the concept is being used, albeit rather unsuccessfully, to address the ongoing lack 
of workplace accommodations for pregnant workers.     
V Special protection of pregnancy and maternity—a derogation from 
equal treatment. 
Sandra Fredman, in her book called Women and the Law, observes that ‘the 
equal treatment principle is a complex and often clumsy medium for the protection of 
pregnancy and parenthood.’359It is for this very reason that EU law provides a 
derogation from equal treatment from the beginning of pregnancy until the end of 
maternity leave. This derogation is contained in Directive 92/85/EEC (PWD), and is 
expressly referenced in Article 2(c) of Directive 2006/54/EU, which provides that 
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discrimination includes ‘any less favourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy 
or maternity leave within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC.’360This Part explores the 
EU derogation through a discussion of the general features of the PWD, the member 
state laws that transpose its protective provisions into national law, and the EU 
Commission’s proposal for a new Directive.  
This exploration recognizes that there are valid questions about whether the 
PWD and the broader protections afforded by national law are substantive equality 
measures. Indeed, as the discussion in Chapter 2 revealed, there is a clear difference of 
opinion among feminist legal theorists as to the equality value of ‘special treatment’ 
measures. That discussion is further addressed in Chapter 4, where evidence will be 
presented that is intended to suggest the EU institutions are fully cognizant of the role 
that their equality measures play in achieving true equality, or continuing harmful 
stereotypes, and earnestly seek to reconcile the two. Here, the focus is on exploring the 
different levels of protection afforded within the EU. 
a Supranational protection 
The derogation from equal treatment afforded to pregnant workers by EU 
antidiscrimination law is contained in Directive 92/85/EEC, concerning the 
implementation of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of 
pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth and women who are 
breastfeeding (PWD). The PWD supplements existing EU antidiscrimination law. This 
means that not only is unfavourable treatment of a woman in relation to pregnancy or 
maternity direct discrimination on grounds of sex, but special protection is afforded 
against dismissal from the beginning of pregnancy until the end of maternity leave, save 
in exceptional circumstances. Added to this, there is a right to take maternity leave, a 
right to workplace accommodation, and within certain limits, a protection of income for 
the worker who is pregnant, or has recently given birth.361The most remarkable aspect of 
the PWD is that in return for this special employment position, before, during, and after 
birth, there is a restrictive effect upon occupational activity. EU pregnant and 
                                                 
360 See further, the discussion on pp149ff. 
361 See: Recast Directive (n 15); Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112), and the discussion in Chapter 4.  
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breastfeeding workers are not permitted to work in activities which have been assessed 
as revealing a risk of exposure, jeopardizing safety and health, to certain particularly 
dangerous agents or working conditions.362Nor are they required to work at night, if it 
would be contrary to their health and safety.363Additionally, a two-week portion of the 
fourteen continuous weeks of maternity leave required by the PWD is mandatory.364As 
the discussion in Chapter 5 will reveal, such restrictions upon a woman’s employment 
are not constitutionally permissible in the US, nor are they acceptable to liberal 
feminists.365 
 The reason for this restrictive effect is that health and safety concerns underpin 
the protections the Directive affords:  
 In view of the harmful effects which the risks of dismissal may have on 
the physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding, including the particular risk that 
pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their 
pregnancy.366 
These concerns are expressly restated in the Recast Directive (2006/54/EC). 
Recital 24 in the preamble refers to the fact that the CJEU has recognized the legitimacy 
of ‘protecting a women’s biological condition during pregnancy and maternity and of 
introducing maternity protection measures as a means to achieve substantive equality.’ 
Recital 25 also clarifies that ‘protection’ for maternity leave includes the right to return 
to the same or an equivalent post, to suffer no detriment in terms and conditions as a 
result of taking such leave, and to benefit from any improvement in working conditions 
to which they would have been entitled during their absence.367  
In light of its mandates, the question arises as to whether the PWD is an example 
of excessive legal paternalism, or a praiseworthy measure for overcoming the injustice 
that formal equality creates.368While the discursive analysis surrounding this question is 
                                                 
362 ibid, see Annex II for a definition of agents and working conditions. 
363 Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112), Article 7. 
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addressed in Chapters 4 and 6, a preliminary observation is appropriate here. As the 
PWD remains at the crux of EU antidiscrimination law, it suggests that some restriction 
on individual autonomy has generally been accepted as necessary to prevent the 
exploitation of pregnant women. The fact that the restrictive effect upon occupational 
activity and the benefits accorded a pregnant worker may in fact be greater under 
national laws than is mandated by the PWD, suggests, as Julie Suk claims, that in the 
EU ‘the special protection of maternity and pregnancy is hardly ever questioned.’369The 
following discussion of the varied member state protections will serve to emphasise this 
last point. 
b National protection. 
In their implementation of EU law, member states are under a duty to transpose 
Directives in a manner that is effective, timely, and proportionate, and must notify the 
Commission of the measures they have undertaken. Failure to transpose properly or to 
do so inadequately can result in an infringement action by the Commission, pursuant to 
TFEU, Article 258 (ex Article 226.)  In light of the vast amount of EU law, it should not 
be surprising therefore, that transposition is a source of a significant amount of ongoing 
research and debate, with some observers arguing that there is a ‘transposition deficit’ in 
terms of member state implementation of EU law.370A common riposte to such an 
argument is that as the Commission has limited resources and can only monitor a 
fraction of infringements, claims of non-compliance are questionable.371Another 
response holds that some of the deficit is due to the complexity of the policy to be 
transposed, rather than merely a deliberate effort to avoid the application of EU 
law.372While the issue of transposition is generally beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
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concept of ‘gold plating’ in transposition is relevant to this discussion of the national 
measures adopted under the mandate of the PWD. This is because the other side of a 
transposition deficit is ‘gold plating.’ This is to say that when transposing an EU 
Directive into law, a member state may ‘go beyond what is required…while staying 
within legality.’373Indeed, the results of this in depth study of member state measures 
reveals that in transposing the PWD, the majority of the twenty-eight member states 
have in fact elected to adopt measures that go beyond the minimum protections 
mandated, as interpreted by the CJEU. This ‘gold plating’ of the PWD is illustrated by 
the fact that although the payment of an ‘adequate allowance’ has been interpreted by 
the CJEU to mean that member states may provide less than full pay, eleven member 
states have elected to provide full pay, for at least part of the maternity leave they 
provide.374It is also illustrated by the fact that while the mandates of the PWD do not 
preclude the dismissal of a woman who is suffering from a pregnancy-related illness, 
which continues after the expiration of maternity leave, several member states have 
legislatively extended the period of protection.375This is the case in the Netherlands, 
which provides up to two years of pay to any worker who is unable to work due to 
sickness during pregnancy, and in Malta, which prohibits dismissal of a female worker 
during the five months after her return from maternity leave.376The duration of 
maternity leave provided by many member states is also longer than the minimum 
fourteen weeks required by the PWD. Member state provision varies, from the minimum 
of 14 weeks in a small number of member states, to 28 weeks in others, and in certain 
circumstances to up to 52 weeks, although not all of which is paid.377 
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Because member states have broad discretion in carrying out the health and 
safety mandates of the PWD, the actual provisions of their national laws differ greatly. 
These differences extend to the amount that employees and employers are required to 
contribute to the social security system that funds the allowance, as well as differences 
in eligibility requirements, differences in mandatory leave lengths, differences in work 
restrictions, and a differential impact of childbirth complications, and multiple births 
upon overall maternity leave length. These differences are seen in Lithuania, where to 
be eligible for statutory benefits, women are required to have twelve months work 
experience for the past two years.378Whereas, in Latvia the requirement is six months, 
and in Estonia it is three months.379This difference is also seen in the adoption of a 
lengthy leave mandate, as found in Austria, where, for eight weeks before delivery and 
eight weeks after delivery [Schutzfrist], women are not allowed to be employed, even 
though they may want to be.380 
Member state laws also distinguish between the leave and pay provisions 
available to full-time employees and to women in other work capacities. For instance, 
while many member states modify, or exclude coverage for unemployed and marginally 
employed women, France extends leave and pay to students and people in vocational 
training.381In point of fact, until passage of Directive 2010/41/EU (the self-employed 
directive), the self-employed were also excluded from maternity benefits mandated by 
the PWD.382Now, under Article 8 of 2010/41/EU, women assisting a self-employed 
partner will be eligible for benefits if they become partners in, or employees of, the 
business. Notably, the UK, in its transposition of Directive 2010/41/EU, through 
SI2014/606, has elected to go further, and provides an entitlement to a maternity 
allowance for spouses of self-employed workers who ‘habitually participate in the 
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activities of the self-employed worker and perform the same tasks and ancillary 
tasks.’383  
One feature that immediately emerges from this review of EU national laws is 
the strong workplace protection for pregnancy and maternity, aiming to accommodate 
the main biological difference between men and women. These protections stand in 
contrast to US laws discussed in Chapters 5. It is also notable that if the EU 
Commission’s proposal for an amendment to the Pregnant Worker’s Directive is 
adopted, these protections will be expanded even further. A review of the Proposal 
below will serve to highlight the expanded provisions, the intense debate surrounding 
the relationship between equality and protection, and the limitations of the Proposal.  
c A new Pregnant Workers Directive? 
It is generally acknowledged that negotiations surrounding the passage of the 
original PWD had the effect of limiting the Directive’s reach. Specific objections raised 
by the UK government succeeded in securing a final Directive that provided for fourteen 
rather than sixteen weeks of leave and payment of an ‘adequate allowance’ rather than 
full pay, as was originally proposed.384Today, a proposal for a new PWD seeks to 
reinstate the requirement of full pay and extend maternity leave to twenty weeks. 
Proposed more than six years ago by the European Commission (October 2008) and 
amended by the European Parliament in October 2010,385this legislative amendment 
forms the basis of what the European Commission views as part of a package for better 
reconciliation of professional, private and family life.386In addition to fully paid and 
longer maternity leave, the proposal extends protection against dismissal, to include the 
first six months after a return to work.  Further amendments to the proposal would 
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oblige member states to grant additional maternity leave in cases of multiple births, 
and/or a child born with disabilities.387Furthermore, a new Article 11a would be 
inserted, expressly mandating at least two hours time off for breastfeeding, with no 
limitation of breastfeeding to within one year of birth.388 
(See, Table 2 below for a comparison of several of the provisions of the ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ PWD) 
Table 2: Old v. New Pregnant Workers Directive 
PWD    Maternity 
Leave 
Maternity  
Pay 
 
Paternity 
Leave 
Paternity  
Pay 
Breastfeeding  
Leave 
Adoption 
Pay/Leave 
Flexible  
Work 
Treaty 
Basis 
Current 
92/85/EEC 
   Length 
varies by 
State 
14-52 
weeks. 
 
Amount 
Varies by 
State. 
69-100% 
 
None None By Request, 
no general 
entitlement. 
Same 
leave as 
for natural 
parents. 
Pay varies 
by State 
By 
Request 
only. 
 
Health 
& 
Safety 
Basis  
Art .153 
TFEU 
Proposed 
COM(2008)  
637final 
   20 week 
Minimum 
100% 
salary 
2 weeks 100% 
pay x 2 
weeks 
Right, not 
limited by age 
of child. 
2x 1 hour per 
day 
Same 
leave as 
for natural 
parents 
Same rate 
as natural 
parents 
Right to 
PTwork 
x 1 year 
after 
birth. 
Adding 
Equality 
Basis—
Art 157 
TFEU. 
Dual 
Basis 
Source: Author’s analysis of Commission MEMO/08/603 
 
In light of its provisions, supporters of the Proposal declare that it ‘corresponds 
to our common sense belief that such a moment marks the appearance of difference 
between women and men.’389On the surface, the Proposal does seem well designed to 
achieve progress in tackling pregnancy discrimination and several observations can be 
offered to support the argument in favour of its passage, including that it dovetails with 
EU efforts to increase the economic participation of women and the Europe 2020 
strategy for growth, jobs, and substantive equality at work.390Its leave mandate is also in 
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keeping with international recommendations suggesting that maternity leave of at least 
eighteen weeks has a positive impact upon the health of women and children.391There is 
also ample evidence to suggest the current Directive is no longer up to the task of 
advancing substantive equality. Indeed, the statistics presented in Chapter 1, and the 
case law discussed in Chapter 4, reveal the EU objective of ‘special treatment’ needs 
amendment, in light of the fact that over time it has been defined by the CJEU to mean 
less than full pay and because, women undergoing ‘in vitro fertilization’ (IVF), 
surrogate mothers, and most men are excluded from its provisions.392As the discussion 
in Chapter 4 will also reveal, the limitations of the Directive are not resolved by national 
measures, which, while being generally more expansive, are focused solely on women, 
and vary widely in the protections they afford.393  
These observations do not ignore the criticisms of feminists, academics and 
others, or the concerns of some member states, including the UK, that expanded 
maternity leave is economically burdensome and could ‘adversely impact young 
women’s employment rates.’394There is a significant amount of important academic 
research indicating that ‘special treatment’ in the form of short-term, job-protected paid 
leave serves to alleviate the disadvantage to women’s careers that pregnancy and 
childbirth can create, but the provision of longer leave than is medically necessary to 
recover from childbirth can endanger women’s position in the labour market, as it 
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reinforces traditional roles of child bearers and childcare givers.395These concerns 
appear to have held sway with the member states, for when the proposed Directive was 
debated at the 3131st Council Meeting on December 2011, it was concluded that twenty 
weeks of maternity leave with full pay were ‘unacceptable to the Council’ and that ‘such 
a solution could have counterproductive effects [for women].’396  
As there has been no further progress on the Proposal since a failure to obtain the 
requisite qualified majority in 2011, the Commission recently announced its intent to 
withdraw it and replace it if it is not adopted within the next six months. The results of 
this research suggest that in the interests of substantive equality, the Proposal should not 
be adopted. The basis for this suggestion is that the decisions of the CJEU in the cases 
that have come before it since the Proposal was first submitted reveal that pregnancy 
discrimination is far more nuanced than originally thought.397They also suggest that the 
Proposal is a helpful, but largely inadequate tool for advancing substantive equality, as it 
does not provide maternity rights to surrogate mothers or men.398Nor does it adequately 
resolve the conflict that arises between special protection and equality under PWD, 
Article 141 EC, the Equal Pay Directive, and the Equal Treatment Directive, as revealed 
from the discussion of CJEU case law in Chapter 4. Consequently, faced with what is 
damning evidence of the limitations of its failed Proposal, the question arises as to what 
a new Proposal should look like. While I do not profess to have all, or even the best 
answer to what this new Proposed Directive should look like, it is appropriate to offer 
some suggestions. These suggestions form part of the discussion of the ‘EU model of 
equality redirected,’ which is undertaken in Chapter 4, part IV (b). 
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VI Positive action—a derogation from equal treatment. 
a A shared derogation. 
In addition to adopting ‘special treatment measures’ for pregnancy and 
maternity, EU antidiscrimination law permits positive action measures, which: 
Aim at eliminating or counteracting the detrimental effects on the 
underrepresented sex (mostly women) in employment or in seeking 
employment which arise from existing attitudes, behaviour and structures 
based on the idea of a traditional division of roles in society between men 
and women.399  
The discussion in Chapter 5 will reveal that while positive action is also 
permissible under US antidiscrimination law, a clear distinction lies in its history, name, 
and use. The US initially mandated what is termed ‘affirmative action,’ in order to 
address racial discrimination, and only later considered the parameters of measures 
intended to address gender inequality in private employment. In contrast, positive action 
in the EU is a more recent voluntary policy for addressing gender inequality, and is yet 
to be mandated. Added to this, member state measures suggest positive action is more 
generally accepted in the EU as necessary to ensure full equality in practice between 
men and women in working life. As Advocate General Tesauro observed in Kalanke v. 
Freie Hansestadt Bremen, the idea of positive action ‘marks a transition from the 
individual vision to the collective vision of equality.’400 
In contrast, in the US, affirmative action measures are extremely controversial 
and are the subject of ongoing litigation seeking to curb their use. As the First Circuit 
Court of Appeal in the case of Cotter v. City of Boston euphemistically observed, ‘There 
is rich public debate about the issue of affirmative action.’401This debate forms part of 
the comparison undertaken in Chapter 5. The results of that comparison suggest that 
while there are similarities in these derogations, there are also differences in approach 
that serve to prevent any significant convergence between EU and US antidiscrimination 
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law in this area. As an aid to that comparison, this Part explores the EU derogation 
permitting positive action. Evidence is presented that is intended to show that while 
positive action is an important tool for addressing the barriers faced by women in the 
workplace, especially because of its potential to counteract the gender negative effects 
that protective measures create, the confusion surrounding its permissible boundaries 
has rendered it less effective than it might otherwise be. A historical review of the 
evolution of positive action in the EU will serve to make this point clearer. 
b Legislative confusion 
While the term ‘positive action’ was not expressly used in the Equal Treatment 
Directive of 1976, Article 2(4) provided that the Directive, ‘shall be without prejudice to 
measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing 
existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities.’ In light of this provision and 
with the express encouragement of the EU institutions, all EU member states adopted 
some form of positive action by 1995.402Notwithstanding broad acceptance of the 
concept, the lack of any clear mandate or definition, and the elasticity of Article 2(4), 
has resulted in what the Commission recognizes as a ‘degree of confusion surrounding 
the definition of positive action’ in the member states. 403It was this confusion that 
rendered national measures vulnerable to legal challenge, and in the initial cases 
interpreting Article 2(4), the CJEU stated that the Article was: 
Specifically and exclusively designed to allow measures, which, although 
discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce 
actual instances of inequality, which may exist in the reality of social 
life.404 
Notwithstanding this, the Court declared that any ‘generalized preservation of 
special rights for women’ by a member state was incompatible with equal treatment. It 
also declared that as positive action was a derogation from the principle of equal 
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treatment, it would interpret member state measures strictly.405This strictness was 
evident in the subsequent case of Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen. There, the court 
held that despite there being an under representation of women in a particular 
employment position, and that the applicants were in possession of equal qualifications 
with male candidates, Germany could not adopt a positive action measure that gave 
women ‘automatic priority.’406  
It is generally acknowledged that the immediate impact of the Kalanke decision 
was a chilling effect on the adoption of positive action measures by member states.407In 
response, the EU Commission and the EU Parliament felt compelled to issue guidance 
as to the interpretation to be given to the ruling. They also voiced support for a proposal 
to amend Article 2(4), in order to expressly permit positive action in favour of the 
underrepresented sex ‘on condition that the employer always has the possibility of 
taking account of the particular circumstances of a given case.’408With the prescient 
observation that, ‘the anti-discrimination laws which were adopted twenty years ago are 
not now sufficient to achieve equality for women as regards their access to employment 
and promotion,’ the Commission and Parliament concluded that only a positive action 
measure requiring automatic quotas violated Article 2(4).409  
The use of positive action has since become institutionalized in the primary and 
secondary legislation of the EU, with Article 141(4) (ex Article 119(4), and now Article 
157 (TFEU)) providing that: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women 
in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any 
member state from maintaining or adopting measures providing for 
specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented 
sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers. 
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Declaration No. 28 on the Article provides that ‘member states should in the first 
instance aim at improving the situation of women in working life.’ Added to this, there 
is the most recent legislative provision authorizing gender based positive action 
measures. Article 3 of the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC, which provides that: 
Member states may maintain or adopt measures within the 
meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring 
full equality in practice between men and women in working life. 
Notwithstanding this permissibility, a lack of legislative clarity as to the types of 
measures that are envisaged has served to ensure that the use of this derogation remains 
constrained by case law. While this may change in the near future, as the CJEU has yet 
to rule on member state measures enacted pursuant to Directive 2006/54/EC, it is 
questionable whether any change will be far sweeping, for as Mark Bell has observed:  
 The Court has baulked at measures conferring automatic and 
unconditional preferential treatment for women, at least at the point of 
selection for employment.410 
Instead, in interpreting EU law, the CJEU has enumerated three categories of 
positive action measures, and a threefold test to be satisfied if member state measures 
are to be considered valid. The three categories outlined by Advocate General Maduro 
in Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, are as follows: 
1. A first category includes measures, which are not directly 
discriminatory in nature but aim simply at improving the training and 
qualifications of women (for instance the allocation of training places 
to women). 
2. A second category contains measures, which aim at enabling women 
to better reconcile their role as parent and their professional activity 
(such as the possibility to benefit from nursery places offered by the 
employer). 
3. The third category includes measures, which also aim at achieving 
equality between men and women in the labour market, but are 
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discriminatory in nature in that they favour women in order to reduce 
their under-representation in professional life. The third category 
includes measures having a direct impact on employment, which give 
preference to women in selection processes or set targets or quotas to 
be achieved.411  
The three-fold test requires an ‘existing imbalance’ between men and women in 
a specific sector, or career grade, and that the positive action measure, which must be 
‘interpreted strictly,’ is able to ‘remove the discrimination.’412This test ensures that 
gender specific measures in appointment and promotion are only valid where gender 
does not automatically and unconditionally give priority to women, when women and 
men are equally qualified, and where the candidates are the subject of an objective 
assessment, which takes account of the specific personal situations of all 
candidates.413This means that selection of a female candidate cannot be ‘based on the 
mere fact of belonging to the under-represented sex.’414It also means that in the EU, 
‘positive discrimination’ is prohibited, and gender can only be a ‘plus’ factor, 
considered in addition to other qualifications.415To fall within the equal treatment 
derogation a positive action measure may not amount to the total exclusion of men. This 
means that earmarking posts for women contravenes EU law, as does a national 
provision, which reserves an exemption from the age limit for obtaining access to 
public-sector employment to women, but not men.416It also means that measures 
permitting time-off for employed women to feed their child, but not for employed men, 
unless the child’s mother is also employed are prohibited.417  
Notwithstanding that EU legislation expressly permits measures providing 
‘specific advantages’ to the ‘underrepresented sex,’ this study also found the CJEU 
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emphasizes gender neutrality over gender specificity in the cases that have come before 
it. In Marschall, the Court said that a:  
Gender specific measure... will not be proportionate to the aims of 
remedying specific inequalities faced by women in practice and 
promoting equal opportunity if the same result could be achieved by a 
gender-neutral provision.418 
To ensure gender neutrality, the Court has relied upon the ‘principle of 
proportionality:’ 
 Which requires that derogations must remain within the limits of what is 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view and that 
the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the 
requirements of the aim thus pursued.419 
Overall, these cases reveal a concern that positive action measures must be 
carefully designed to address existing inequalities and not make new ones. Indeed, the 
Court has said that the distinction between positive action measures that are upheld, or 
fall foul of EU law is determined by whether, or not they remove: 
 Obstacles rather than imposing results, or ensuring equality at starting 
points rather than at points of arrival, or guaranteeing equality of 
opportunity rather than equality of result.420  
In effect, this suggests that the CJEU has adopted the narrow conception of 
substantive equality in its interpretation of the goal that the EU derogation seeks to 
achieve, as that concept was described in Chapter 1. Support for this suggestion can be 
found in the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Briheche: 
Whereas the broad terms in which this objective is framed would seem to 
include measures designed to achieve substantive equality between men 
and women in the labour market, the Court has interpreted Article 2(4), 
in a narrow way, referring to the restricted concept of equality of 
opportunity.421 
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While it is difficult to know whether the CJEU’s interpretation falls short against 
legislative intent, when one considers the economic underpinnings of EU 
antidiscrimination law and the lack of any legislative proposal to clarify the derogation, 
it may be concluded that it does not. On the other hand, what is known is that the 
Court’s narrow interpretation of EU law has been met with harsh criticism from some 
academics, who observe that even where member state measures have been successful 
in removing obstacles to employment, they have only served to include more women in 
the male norm. Therefore, while Colm O’Cinneide views positive action favourably and 
believes that these measures are ‘essential for delivering real change,’422other writers are 
openly critical, arguing that positive action, along with ‘special protections’ for 
pregnancy and maternity, ‘do not deliver any real change, rather, they work negatively 
to stereotype women as caregivers.’423Their complaint is that women are only 
accommodated in the workplace; the workplace is not transformed for the benefit of all 
workers, male and female. A consideration of these criticisms follows.  
c Criticisms of positive action.  
The case of H. Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visseri, 
involved an employer’s exclusive allocation of nursery places to female employees, save 
in cases of emergency. The CJEU upheld this particular positive action measure on the 
basis that it did not reserve to women places of employment, but rather enjoyment of 
certain working conditions.424Specifically, the Court held that what it reserved: 
Falls in principle into the category of measures designed to eliminate the 
causes of women’s reduced opportunities for access to employment and 
careers and are intended to improve their ability to compete in the labour 
market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men.425 
In response to this judgment, Brady Mitchell criticizes positive action measures 
generally for not having ‘provided a significant boost to women despite their purported 
benefits,’ and the decision in Lommers specifically, for serving to ‘perpetuate negative 
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stereotypes about women in the workplace.’426Likewise, Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella 
asserts that the ruling ‘sends the message that normally ‘care work is for women’ and 
men enter the picture only in exceptional circumstances.’427These observations, while 
forceful, tend to minimize the gendered reality of women’s lives. This is to say that 
where an employer’s provision of childcare, as in the Lommers case, is insufficient to 
meet the needs of all employees, a gender-neutral measure would fail to improve the 
situation for female employees. In the absence of a sufficient number of places, it is 
important that the needs of female employees be emphasized. This emphasis is 
necessary because a significant amount of research has found that having children has a 
negative impact on women’s employment rates, and the lack of affordable, quality 
childcare can operate to exclude women from the labour market, or force them into part-
time work.428As Fineman observes, in carrying the burden of caring responsibilities, it is 
mothers who ‘bear most of the economic and occupational costs of parenting, even 
though everyone in a society benefits from good childcare.’429In light of these findings, 
Lommers suggests that adherence to gender neutrality does little to further substantive 
equality for women where there are insufficient public and private supports for caring 
obligations. 
 It is also suggested that the author’s interpretation of Lommers is not critically 
weakened by the CJEU’s decision in Roca, as that case did not involve the provision of 
a ‘service’ to employees, but a right to leave. In Roca, the employer’s positive action 
measure provided leave to all employed mothers, but only to an employed father where 
the mother was also an employed person. The CJEU correctly held that such a measure 
did not comply the terms of Article 2(4) ETD or 157(4) TFEU, as it was: 
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Liable to perpetuate a traditional distribution of the roles of men and 
women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to that of women in relation 
to the exercise of their parental duties.430  
The CJEU’s response in Roca has been praised by Eugenia Caracciolo di 
Torella, as both ‘innovative,’ and one that places the CJEU in ‘a unique position to 
affect change’ with respect to the stereotypical roles of men as ‘breadwinners’ and 
women as ‘carers.’431While she may well be correct, it is suggested that di Torella is 
likely over optimistic in her characterization of the current role played by the CJEU in 
advancing substantive equality. Arguably, Roca is more important for illustrating the 
delicate balance required by legislatures and employers seeking to adopt measures 
intended to address the problem of gender inequality, than it is for evidence of a 
proactive CJEU.    
d Potential for progress. 
The evidence presented in this Part has sought to show that positive action, like 
protection for pregnancy and maternity, is an important component of the EU model of 
equality. Notwithstanding that member state measures are oftentimes clumsy and 
lacking in any clear understanding of potential negative gender effects, there is a clear 
commitment to utilize positive action to improve access to employment for women. 
Indeed, only the boundaries set by the CJEU in interpreting Article 2(4) ETD and 157(4) 
TFEU, have served to limit member states’ efforts to date.  
Ultimately, what may prove to be more useful than the ad hoc decisions of the 
CJEU for advancing gender equality is Article 3 of the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC. 
The preamble to Directive 2006/54/EC, references the fact that it brought together, ‘for 
reasons of clarity,’ the main provisions existing in this field, including CJEU case law. It 
also references equal treatment as a fundamental right, suggests addressing gender 
segregation in the workplace through flexible working time and parental leave 
arrangements, and expressly permits the use of positive measures.432The preamble also 
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suggests that in adopting such measures, ‘member states should, in the first instance, 
aim at improving the situation of women in working life.’433Arguably, the Recast 
Directive allows for positive action measures of a broader scope than those adopted 
pursuant to Article 2(4) ETD, especially as it is supplemented by Article 6 of Directive 
2004/113/EC providing for equal treatment between men and women in access to and 
supply of goods and services, the first EU Directive addressing gender equality issues 
outside the field of employment.434However, as stated previously, this assertion will 
only be borne out by future case law. 
  In the meantime, research conducted at the request of the Commission reveals 
that the member states have embraced the concept of positive action, with all states 
having adopted some form of positive action, and several states indicating their 
willingness to enact measures beyond the employment context.435Although the majority 
of measures remain limited to employment, several states have enacted positive action 
in the areas of education, the provision of goods and services, and in the appointment of 
women to Company Boards.436Importantly, in the near future, positive action may also 
move beyond voluntary measures, to become mandated in the EU, in certain 
circumstances. That is, if the EU Commission’s 2012 proposal for a Directive on 
improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on the 
stock exchanges is enacted. If it is, it will set a minimum objective of 40% women as 
non-executive directors of public listed companies, within the three tests outlined 
above.437The potential of this measures to advance substantive gender equality cannot be 
overstated, for historically the EU has relied on soft law voluntary agreements, such as 
‘Diversity Charters,’ to increase female and other minority group participation; seeking  
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to emphasise the ‘business case’ for diversity, by arguing that it results in increased 
profitability, economic stability and growth.438The limitations of this voluntary approach 
have been revealed by statistics, which show that while about 60% of university 
graduates in the EU are women, only 12% are board members of its biggest listed 
companies, with only 3% being Presidents of those companies.439 
Comparatively speaking, the ‘business case’ argument for diversity is also used 
in the US.440But, while both the EU and US institutions advocate for the increased 
participation of women on the boards of publically traded companies, only the EU has 
made the ground-breaking determination that a lack of significant progress in this area 
necessitates the adoption of a Directive.441In light of its mandate, the proposed Directive 
has the potential to be far more transformative than the comparable US measure, which 
stop short at a duty of disclosure only.442  
VII Gender Mainstreaming. 
As stated in the Introductory Chapter, this soft law strategy seeks to advance 
significant reforms to institutional structures and procedures, and as Fredman observes, 
‘gender mainstreaming was specifically introduced as a response to the deficiencies of 
the individual rights approach,’443and focuses on proactive, institutional 
change.444Indeed, because legislation has been insufficient to address gender 
discrimination, gender mainstreaming has been embraced by the EU as part of ‘a move 
beyond the narrow scope of employment rights.’445As such, Bob Hepple suggests that 
gender mainstreaming, along with positive action, is a proactive measure, which 
constitutes a ‘fourth generation’ equality strategy, involving a shift away ‘from negative 
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duties towards positive duties to promote equality.’446Fourth generation claims aside, as 
with all concepts used to address equality issues, gender mainstreaming is a contested 
concept that has strengths and weaknesses, as well as its supporters and critics. An in-
depth discussion of the strategy’s strengths and weaknesses is deferred until Chapter 7, 
wherein the often-critical analysis surrounding its adoption and implementation in the 
EU will be used to highlight several important lessons for US nascent efforts. This Part 
seeks to lay the groundwork for that critical discussion, setting forth the gender 
mainstreaming measures that exist on the supranational and the national levels of the 
EU. These measures will show that the EU is fully committed to the concept, and is at 
the forefront of utilizing gender mainstreaming as a holistic strategy for achieving 
gender equality in governance. 
a Mainstreaming at the supranational level.  
First appearing in response to the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action at the fourth World Conference on Women, 1995,447the 1996 
Commission Communication recognized the need for, ‘a cultural transformation of 
individual behaviour,’ and adopted gender mainstreaming as the tool to accomplish 
this.448The first definition of gender mainstreaming in the EU was given as ‘The 
systematic consideration of the differences between the conditions, situations, and needs 
of women and men in all Community policies and actions.’ In this regard, it was noted 
that this did not: 
Mean simply making Community programmes or resources more 
accessible to women, but rather the simultaneous mobilisation of legal 
instruments, financial resources and the Community’s analytical and 
organisational capacities in order to introduce in all areas the desire to 
build balanced relationships between women and men. In this respect, it 
is necessary and important to base the policy of equality between women 
and men on a sound statistical analysis of the situation of women and 
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men in the various areas of life and the changes taking place in 
societies.449  
The subsequent, ‘Fourth Action Programme for Equal Opportunities’ 
emphasized mainstreaming the gender perspective into all areas of Community policies; 
requiring social transformation by bringing, ‘equality out of the ghetto.’450The mandates 
of Articles 8 and 10 of the TFEU, which stated that the EU ‘shall aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women’ in all its activities, 
bolstered the strategy and cemented a holistic approach to equality, requiring horizontal 
integration across all policy areas and vertical integration throughout all levels of the 
hierarchy. Indeed, in direct contrast to what will be seen as a limited and politically 
fragile strategy in the US, gender mainstreaming in the EU has expanded in its legal 
commitment, to include ‘social mainstreaming.’451This expansion is a direct result of the 
adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which provides support for an intensified social focus 
in the EU and a formal legal commitment to mainstreaming in economic and social 
policy. Referred to as a ‘new horizontal social clause’ regarding ‘social progress’ and 
‘social justice,’ Article 9 requires the Union take into account the guarantees of adequate 
social protection when implementing new policies.452The Treaty has also enabled ‘social 
mainstreaming’ to become embedded in the national legislation of member states, as 
illustrated by the UK Equality Act of 2010, as previously discussed in Chapter 1.453  
The Commission, as the policy making arm of the EU, has also been concerned 
to ensure that the EU institutions and member states promote equality through their 
mainstreaming activities. In an effort to ensure a degree of uniformity in these activities, 
the Commission has relied upon soft law instruments, including a ‘Roadmap for equality 
between women and men’ (Roadmap), a 2008 manual for the implementation of gender 
mainstreaming in employment, social inclusion, and social protection policies, and the 
2011 analysis of good practices in gender mainstreaming, which was commissioned 
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from the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). Of these instruments, the 
Roadmap stands out as an important tool for nudging multi-level mainstreaming efforts 
forward, as it is updated in five-year periods. For instance, the 2006-2010 Roadmap 
sought the integration of gender issues in policy making by means of specific gender 
objectives and quantified targets; including greater female employment; increased 
childcare facilities, and increased female graduates in maths, science, and 
technologies.454Building upon these efforts, but also observing that ‘progress is still too 
slow in most areas and gender equality is far from being achieved,’ the Commission 
adopted a new five year Roadmap in 2010.455This Roadmap set forth almost identical 
policy areas, but also expressed a specific commitment to gender mainstreaming as 
‘integral’ to its policymaking.456The Commission also declared that it sought to promote 
the ‘full implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, including the development 
and updating of indicators.’457This is an important development, as research suggests 
that indicators are important instruments for guiding policy efforts, and their value 
depends on the knowledge, willingness, and ability of the member states to accurately 
collect data and report on them. Recognizing this fact, the new Roadmap seeks annual 
reporting of gender equality efforts by member states, as well as the appointment of a 
high-level group on gender mainstreaming, among its other recommendations.   
 In addition to these external efforts, there are the internal gender mainstreaming 
activities of the EU institutions. For its part, the EU Parliament has tasked three bodies 
to be in charge of gender mainstreaming and has spent the last decade implementing 
initiatives and activities in order to intensify its mainstreaming efforts. It has also 
critically reviewed the success of its efforts to date, concluding that they could be 
enhanced through measures generating greater engagement; enhancing the capacities 
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and networking of the stakeholders, and by increasing the number of women members 
to Parliament and their representation in positions of power.458 
b Mainstreaming at the national level. 
At the national level, two Directives mandate that the member states are 
similarly obligated to undertake gender mainstreaming. In almost identical terms, 
Article 29 of Directive 2006/54/EC, and Article 12 of Directive 2010/41/EU state that: 
Member states shall actively take into account the objective of equality 
between men and women when formulating and implementing laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions, policies and activities…459 
In short, EU secondary law expressly tasks the individual member states to 
consider the potential negative impacts of their national policies upon women. In order 
to appreciate just how potentially transformative this mandate is one need only consider 
the types of regulations and policies that are included. Among others, there are policies 
pertaining to the provision of maternity leave and maternity pay, the organization of 
work, the public provision of childcare, and the fixing of school hours—all of which may 
have differential impacts on the situation of women and men. The problem is, however, 
that constraints have been placed upon the transformative potential of the strategy, albeit 
unintentionally. These constraints arise from the fact that as the Directives set forth only 
the goal to be achieved, the member states remain free to undertake gender 
mainstreaming as they see fit. As a result, and as Jill Rubery’s important research 
reveals, national measures implementing gender mainstreaming vary greatly, in both 
degree and effect. Consequently, while several states have adopted the strategy via 
statutory mandate, others have only set up committees tasked with gender 
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mainstreaming, or have provided only guidelines for mainstreaming, or only a ‘political 
commitment’ to undertake gender assessments of all new pieces of legislation.460  
Additionally, despite trying to ensure a degree of success among these varied 
efforts, including by giving the member states quantative targets in order ‘to give 
impetus to their equal opportunity strategy,’ the EU Commission acknowledges that the 
member states rely mostly upon the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), and soft law 
instruments, as a mode of adoption and implementation, rather than hard law.461This use 
of the OMC, which is at the core of new governance in the EU, has important 
implications for the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming. For this reason, a brief 
discussion of OMC follows.462  
c Open Method of Coordination. 
OMC is a soft law method, as that term was explained in Chapter 1. Defined by 
the Commission as ‘an intergovernmental method of soft coordination, by which 
member states are evaluated by one another, with the Commission’s role being one of 
surveillance,’ OMC is intended to encourage learning induced policy change at member 
state level without the oppressive use of EU powers to ‘regulate’ and control 
compliance.463As such, OMC offers replacement of obligations with incentives, 
wherein, national governments are engaged in voluntary political coordination through 
national plans (NAP) regarding common objectives, whose achievement is measured by 
common indicators.464Overall, the aspiration of OMC is the convergence of member 
state policy, of harmonization without dictation, and of mutual learning and the 
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development of good practices. This aspiration is emphasized by the European 
Commission White Paper, 2001, which defined OMC as, ‘a way of encouraging co-
operation, the exchange of best practice and agreeing common targets and guidelines for 
member states.’465  
Notwithstanding the clear supranational support for OMC, there is significant 
academic debate concerning its use. On one side of the debate is Benz, a supporter who 
views it as a, ‘device for generating and spreading best practices and achieving greater 
convergence towards EU policy.’466Added to this, Ashiagbor argues that it is, ’a form of 
governance which has the potential to achieve policy coordination without threatening 
jealously guarded national sovereignty.’467On the other side of the debate is Syrpis, who 
is sceptical and asserts that OMC has many ‘unproven benefits,468and Shore, who 
critically views it as a means by which European governance is extended into a range of 
new policy areas that were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of national 
governments. For Shore, OMC is ‘eroding state sovereignty in the areas of social 
protection, inclusion, education, youth and training’ and acting as a, ‘key instrument for 
‘Europeanising’ domestic policy agendas,’ which serves to ‘subvert parliamentary 
democracy and advance a new form of elitism.’469While also being critical of new 
governance, Edquist views it not as a threat to sovereignty, but as a tool to push member 
state agendas, and to deter ‘contentious activism.’470 
While there is likely a grain of truth in each of the criticisms, they tend to ignore 
the fact that soft law is an indispensable tool in a Union of twenty-eight sovereign 
countries, often with diverse interests. Consequently, soft law instruments are useful for 
advancing social policy in areas where national interests create impasse. This has 
certainly been the case in the EU, where OMC has offered a framework for a myriad of 
economic and social policies, including employment, social protection, social inclusion, 
education, and training. Indeed, OMC is epitomized by the European Employment 
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Strategy (EES), by which member states are encouraged to develop their national 
employment policy in accordance with a common plan, and then share, evaluate, and 
coordinate with other member states. This common plan is encapsulated in the 
‘Employment Guidelines,’which are the priorities and targets for employment policies 
proposed by the Commission, agreed to by national governments, and adopted by the 
EU Council. While it is fair to say that the focus of these guidelines is an increased 
employment rate of women and men in the EU, this goal is not to be achieved at any 
cost. Rather, it is to be secured through a labour environment of adequate flexibility, 
protection, and quality employment.471Within this environment, ‘family friendly 
policies,’which are intended to better reconcile work, private and family life, while 
promoting equal opportunities, have been part of the EES since the issuance of its first 
guidelines in 1998, and remain central to its common priorities and targets, including 
with the Commission’s March 2015 proposal for new policy guidelines.472These new 
guidelines are intended to supplement those that remain in force since 2010, supporting 
the achievement of ‘smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth’ and the aims of the yearly 
cycle of economic policy coordination, called the ‘European Semester.’473Together, 
these policies frame the scope and direction for national economic policy coordination 
and provide the basis for country specific ‘Recommendations,’which are tailored advice, 
intended to help member state countries boost jobs and growth.474In part, these 
guidelines and Recommendations urge member states to consider whether their national 
measures are up to the task of increasing opportunities for combining work with social 
responsibilities, including through the provision of flexible working, job-protected, paid 
leave, and the provision of adequate, affordable adult and child care. If they are not, 
national governments have the opportunity to address the shortfall in their ‘National 
Reform Programmes’(NRP), which are submitted annually for analysis by the 
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Commission for compliance with the Europe 2020 strategy, of which the EES forms a 
key part.475 
Notably, this annual programme of planning, monitoring, and examining 
national employment policies has a specific commitment to gender 
mainstreaming.476The implication of this commitment, as defined by Rubery, is not just 
that women have access to the labour market, but that there is a fundamental 
transformation of economic and social structures that underpin the labour market.477This 
is to say that there is a commitment to changing the underlying causes of inequality, 
rather than merely focusing on the labour market. As Rubery observes, gender 
mainstreaming ‘is a strategy which focuses on the supply side of the economy, as 
opposed to one seeking to change the behaviour of employers.’478 
There is evidence to suggest that such an approach to gender mainstreaming 
tends to lead to an expansive view of equality of opportunity, as is illustrated by 
McGuaran’s research on Ireland’s experience with the strategy. Her research found 
gender mainstreaming led to ‘a gradual and greater acceptance by policy-makers and 
implementers of the fact that gender equality could be relevant to many 
policies.’479McGuaran’s findings bolster Rubery’s research into the gender 
mainstreaming efforts of member states, in which she found evidence of changes in 
public policy in areas of job segregation, pay, work-life reconciliation, and childcare 
provision.480Their research is valuable, for it suggests that gender mainstreaming is an 
important tool for making gender visible, for creating an understanding of the needs and 
conditions of women and men (including pregnant workers), and making policy more 
effective in securing substantive equality. Notwithstanding the foregoing assertions, it is 
acknowledged that soft law has its limitations, and that the EU’s foray into gender 
mainstreaming has not been an unqualified success. In Chapter 7, the issues surrounding 
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the adoption and implementation of the strategy in the EU are discussed, and it is 
suggested that it is essential for the US to understand the problems that have arisen and 
to address certain conditions and factors whose existence are deemed essential if its 
gender mainstreaming strategy to be implemented successfully.  
VIII Conclusion 
The discussion in this Chapter has done three things. First, it has set forth the 
historical context in which EU gender discrimination law has developed. As the 
discussion of comparative method in Chapter 2 emphasized, context matters in the sense 
that an understanding of the complex socio-political context of the legal systems under 
comparison is essential if the research questions posed are to be answered persuasively. 
Secondly, the discussion has shown that by carving out ‘special treatment’ from equal 
treatment legislation, combined with positive action measures, and the soft law strategy 
of gender mainstreaming, the EU has adopted a holistic approach to addressing 
pregnancy discrimination that seeks to ensure that compensation for disadvantages in 
the professional careers of women continues. Thirdly, this Chapter has laid the 
foundation for a critical evaluation of the EU model of equality in practice and provided 
the basis upon which to draw lessons about best practices, and to assess a convergence 
in US antidiscrimination law.  
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Chapter 4: The European Model in practice 
Whilst on paper the law exists and is comprehensive, in practice, it is too 
often circumvented.481 
I Introduction. 
This Chapter is concerned with critically considering the European Union (EU) 
model in practice. The intention is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of a 
‘special treatment ‘approach to tackling pregnancy discrimination, to suggest several 
lessons for the United States (US) in its efforts to tackle this seemingly intractable 
problem, and to explore several promising developments in EU gender discrimination 
law. 
This critical examination begins with a review of the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), illustrating the conflict inherent in legislation 
providing for formal equality and requiring treatment that respects difference. Part III 
then presents and addresses the arguments and research supporting claims that ‘special 
treatment’ measures tend to institutionalize motherhood and have fallen short in 
advancing substantive equality. Part IV closes the discussion with an exploration of the 
EU response to these criticisms, which is illustrated in the redirection of its gender 
equality policy. This redirection tells us much about the value placed upon equality for 
pregnant workers in the EU, where there is an understanding that to be successful, an 
integrated gender equality strategy must be inclusive and progressive. 
Overall, this Chapter presents the argument that while the EU model of equality 
has limitations, it is a holistic and evolving approach to addressing pregnancy 
discrimination, which offers additional measures and lessons to the US in its struggle 
with this pernicious issue. 
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II The conflict between protection and equality. 
As the Treaties and several Directives mandate equality and protection for 
pregnancy and maternity, there is both great potential to advance substantive equality 
and great potential for conflict when these provisions are applied in practice. Advocate 
General (AG) Trstenjak, in the case of Virgine Pontin v T-Comalux SA, has highlighted 
the potential to advance equality, observing that, with regard to the Equal Treatment 
Directive (ETD) and the Pregnant Workers Directive (PWD), both those directives do 
not operate merely in parallel with each other but are to a certain extent interlocked.’482 
The results of this study reveal that while there is indeed interconnectivity between the 
equality Directives, it is not absolute. Rather, there exists significant conflict in EU 
antidiscrimination law when applied in practice. This conflict suggests the need for a 
new equality Directive, the substance of which was initially discussed in Chapter 3. 
a The ‘productive worker.’ 
 This examination takes as its starting point the valuable research conducted by 
Annick Masselot and Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella into the case law of the CJEU up 
until 2001. In their article, Pregnancy, Maternity and the organisation of family life: An 
attempt to classify the case law of the Court of Justice, they introduce the thesis that 
over the years the CJEU has shown itself to be more comfortable dealing with the 
treatment of pregnant workers than with those on maternity leave, and conclude that the 
manner in which the Court has treated these workers is based upon the male norm, 
social stereotypes, and the concept of a ‘productive worker.’483This examination of 
CJEU case law up until 2014 will build upon their conclusions, showing that case law 
addressing hiring and dismissal has indeed been far more effective in terms of 
advancing equality for women than case law addressing issues of pay or leave. This 
examination will also reveal that while much of the case law subsequent to 2001 can be 
interpreted to offer support for Masselot and di Torella’s conclusions, it can also be 
interpreted to support another conclusion. That is, the conclusion proffered by the results 
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of this research, which is that the CJEU is more concerned with the economic impact of 
its measures, than with continuing gender stereotypes. This is to say that although the 
Court may not have done as much as it could to ensure substantive equality, or clarify 
conflicting legislative provisions, its failure to may be related as much to the fact that 
pregnancy is a riddle that cannot be resolved, in terms of its need for special treatment, 
as it is to do with the Court’s desire to interpret EU law in a manner that is palatable to 
the member states. Indeed, it is suggested that the Court’s interpretation reflects the 
strength of the economic underpinnings of EU antidiscrimination law and the fact that 
the perpetuation of gender stereotypes is more firmly rooted in the limitations of the 
Directives themselves, than in the failures of the Court. The Court is limited to working 
within the confines of EU legislation. Legislation that is reflective of the lack of desire, 
at the time that it was adopted, to tackle sex discrimination and gender roles beyond the 
confines of the workplace.484 
To make this point more clearly, this examination will separately address three 
areas of EU protection for pregnancy and maternity: hiring and dismissal, leave, and 
pay. This discussion will reveal a concern for the economic impact of legislation is often 
reflected in the Court’s judgements regarding pay and maternity leave.485This is to say 
that while economic concerns have historically been rejected by the CJEU as regards 
discrimination, they have not been rejected as regards the provision of pay and 
leave.486While the CJEU is unequivocal in stating that discrimination on grounds of 
pregnancy can never be, ‘justified by the financial consequences’ that ensue to an 
employer as a result of the special protections that the ETD and PWD afford, pay and 
leave are the locus where the concepts of equality and special protection under the PWD 
collide with the provisions of Article 141 EC, the Equal Pay Directive (EPD), and the 
ETD. 487 
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b The pregnant worker—hiring and dismissal. 
The results of this research confirm the findings of Masselot and di Torella, 
showing that the CJEU is at ease with enforcing a negative prohibition against a refusal 
to hire, or the dismissal of a worker, from the beginning of pregnancy, until the end of 
maternity leave. Indeed, it is here that the Court has been willing to expound upon the 
interlocking nature of the equality Directives to ensure that the greatest numbers of 
women are afforded legal protection. Arguably, the Court has been assisted in this 
regard by the fact that individually the equality Directives do not contain all of the 
protections afforded EU workers. For instance, it is not the PWD that affords protection 
against a refusal to hire a pregnant worker or employment on terms suggestive of 
discrimination on grounds of sex. These protections are afforded by Article 2(3) of the 
ETD 76/207/EEC, which prohibits unfavourable treatment of women in their access to 
employment and working conditions, ‘without prejudice to provisions concerning the 
protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity.’488While the 
PWD expressly prohibits dismissal during pregnancy and maternity, save in exceptional 
circumstances, the decision to dismiss a worker on the grounds of pregnancy and/or the 
birth of a child constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex.489As such, it is also 
prohibited by the ETD.  
The Preamble to the PWD also states that the protections it affords should not 
work ‘to the detriment of directives concerning equal treatment for women and men.’ 
However, the problem is the PWD does not express exactly how this is to be achieved 
and consequently the CJEU has been left to make this determination. The results of this 
study suggest that the Court has been more willing to find the Directives interlocking, 
and less willing to defer to the economic concerns of the member states and employers 
in the hiring and dismissal of a pregnant worker, than in the provision of ‘maternity 
leave,’ and ‘maternity pay.’ A brief review of dismissal cases will help to make this 
point more clearly, showing that the CJEU is highly sensitive to the precarious situation 
of pregnant workers and the families they support when employers make the 
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determination to dismiss them. This has been the case where the health and safety 
protections adopted by member states appear to conflict on their face with equality. The 
Court has declared that they may be permissible protections, but they cannot be used by 
employers as the basis for dismissal. This was the case in Habermann-Beltermann, 
wherein the Court held that an employer could not terminate an employment contract on 
account of pregnancy, even where there was a statutory prohibition on nighttime 
work.490 
This review found cases involving dismissal are generally divided into two areas 
of focus—those in which the Court has delineated the circumstances in which dismissal 
is prohibited and those in which the Court has determined the category of workers 
entitled to the protections of the equality Directives. We shall consider first the cases 
addressing the circumstances surrounding dismissal, before pressing on to consider 
whom the Directives protect.   
i. Circumstances surrounding dismissal.  
To recall from Chapter 3, it is settled EU case law that dismissal of a female 
worker on account of pregnancy, or essentially on account of pregnancy, can affect only 
women and therefore constitutes direct sex discrimination.491Added to this, Article 10 of 
the PWD prohibits dismissal from the beginning of pregnancy to the end of maternity 
leave. This suggests to an employer that there is a clear period of time during which 
dismissal should not occur, absent exceptional circumstances. A problem arises 
however, where the dismissal is of worker with an illness that falls outside of the 
protected period. The EU has expressly addressed the problem of incapacity during 
pregnancy and maternity by providing a right to paid leave.492For illness that either 
continues, or arises after the end of maternity leave, the CJEU has been careful to affirm 
the temporal nature of the protection afforded by the PWD, while also ensuring that the 
principle of equal treatment is upheld. For instance, in the Hertz case, the Court stated 
that while neither the PWD nor the ETD prohibit the dismissal of a woman for absences 
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occurring after the protected period, employers cannot use the limitation to excuse an 
otherwise prohibited dismissal.493In Brown v Rentokil, the Court delineated further the 
circumstances in which dismissal is prohibited, stating that when computing the period 
justifying the dismissal, an employer may take into account a woman’s absences for 
illness arising after maternity leave, but may not take into account absences for illness 
that arose during pregnancy and maternity leave.494The Court expanded upon these 
rulings in Nadine Paquay v Société d’architectes Hoet + Minne SPRL, when it stated 
that both the PWD and the ETD prohibit dismissal that occurs after the protected period, 
where the decision to dismiss was taken while the worker was pregnant, and the decision 
‘had been formed in a number of stages.’495  
Another circumstance in which the Court has unequivocally stated that the ETD 
and PWD prohibit dismissal concerns the employment contract itself. In the case of 
Webb, the Court stated that it matters not that at the time of her dismissal the pregnant 
worker is unable to fulfil the task for which she is recruited.496Nor does it matter 
whether she is employed under a contract for an indefinite period, or for a fixed term. In 
Tele Danmark A/S v. Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (HK), and 
Maria Luisa Jiménez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, two cases involving fixed 
term contracts in which the judgments relating to dismissal and non-renewal were 
released on the same day (4 October 2001), the CJEU made clear that the PWD makes 
no distinction as to the scope of the prohibition against dismissal according to the 
duration of the employment relationship.497It also said that while the non-renewal of a 
fixed-term contract, when it comes to the end of is stipulated term, cannot be regarded 
as dismissal under Article 10 of the PWD, it could be regarded as direct sex 
discrimination under the ETD, if the non- renewal was motivated by the workers 
pregnancy.498 
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These judgments lead to two inescapable conclusions. First, employers in the EU 
cannot use fixed-term contracts as a means to avoid the prohibition against dismissal of 
pregnant workers. Secondly, the PWD and the ETD provide women with dual legal 
protection from dismissal. As stated in the Opinion of AG Tizzano in Melgar, this is: 
Protection of a more general nature deriving from the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of sex, set out in Directive 76/207 and more 
specific protection offered by Directive 92/85, which, in Article 10, 
prohibits dismissal.499 
ii. Who is protected? 
A second area of focus for the CJEU concerns the situation in which an 
employer defends the dismissal on the basis that the woman was not a ‘pregnant 
worker’, within Article 2(a) of the PWD. This is to say: 
A pregnant worker who informers her employer of her condition, in 
accordance with national legislation and/or practice. 
 This situation is well illustrated by the case of Dita Danosa v. LKB Lizings SIA. 
There, the dismissal concerned a pregnant woman who was a member of a capital 
company’s board of directors. The CJEU declared that who is considered a ‘worker,’ is 
determined by finding that the person ‘performs services for, and under the direction of 
another person, for which there is receipt of remuneration.500Based upon this definition, 
the fact that a person is a member of a board of directors of a Company, does not, in and 
of itself rule out finding a relationship of subordination rather than of self-
employment.501Instead, subordination is determined from the facts and circumstances of 
the relationship between the board and the director. Moreover, even if the facts do not 
support the conclusion that a director is a worker for the purposes of the application of 
the PWD, dismissal would be otherwise contrary to the ETD, as it prohibits dismissal 
for reasons connected with pregnancy.502  
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The case of Mayr was initially discussed in Chapter 2, and offers a further 
illustration of the interlocking nature of the Directives. In that case, the employer 
claimed that the worker was not entitled to the protection afforded by the PWD, as she 
was not pregnant at the time of her dismissal. Instead, at that time, Ms. Mayr was out on 
sick leave because she was undergoing In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), and although her 
eggs had been fertilized, they had yet to be implanted in her.503In light of this fact, the 
CJEU had: 
 The opportunity of ruling for the first time on the compatibility with 
Community law of the termination of an employment contract on the 
grounds of a worker’s possible future pregnancy.504 
 The Court’s response was to accept that life (pregnancy) did not occur before the 
transfer of fertilized ova into the woman’s uterus, and refused to find that the protections 
afforded by the PWD apply to a woman undergoing IVF. Nevertheless, it determined   
that the provisions of the ETD precluded dismissal where a woman was at an advanced 
stage in IVF, and where dismissal was based on the fact that the woman had undergone 
such treatment.505 
  These judgments are insightful. They serve to illustrate the interlocking nature 
of the equality Directives. They also illustrate just how proactive the CJEU has been in 
adopting an expansive interpretation of the protections afforded by the ETD and the 
PWD and ensuring uniformity in the laws of the member states in the area of hiring and 
dismissal. This proactiveness will stand in stark contrast to the judgments issued by the 
Court in cases addressing a worker’s right to leave and/or pay during pregnancy and 
maternity. The discussion below will reveal that in those cases, deference to the 
economic interests of the member states has required the Court to undertake an 
increasingly strict interpretation of the equality Directives. The upshot of which, it is 
suggested, is to challenge the EU and/or the member state legislatures to respond. 
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c Maternity leave—a limited right 
 The judgments of the CJEU, in cases involving maternity leave reveal a lack of 
dynamic interpretation and clear hesitancy to find the equality Directives interlock to 
afford greater substantive equality. This lack of dynamic interpretation dates back to 
before the enactment of the PWD, to when the ETD contained the only derogation from 
equal treatment for pregnant workers. In Hoffman, the Court was required to interpret 
Article 2(3) of ETD, which states that: 
This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning 
protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity.  
In its initial interpretation, the Court determined that member states were free to 
provide for maternity leave for mothers, to the exclusion of fathers.506The Court referred 
to the ‘special relationship’ between a mother and her child after childbirth and the 
‘undesirable pressures’ to return to work prematurely, concluding that: 
Directive 76/207 is not designed to settle questions concerning the 
organization of the family, or to alter the division of responsibility 
between parents.507 
 Unsurprisingly, Hoffman has been the source of much academic debate, 
including criticism for reinforcing the ‘gender stereotype of women as caregivers and 
the ideology of motherhood based upon rhetoric of ‘protection.’508Hervey and Shaw 
write that Hoffman represents, ‘The archetypal statement of the perpetuation of ‘separate 
spheres’ ideology and the ‘acceptance that the private sphere is beyond the reach of 
[EU] law.’509Considering Hoffman in the context of other decisions, Foubert argues that 
‘the Court has often endangered women’s position in the labour market, by simply 
reinforcing women in their traditional roles of child bearers and child carers.’510Added 
to this, McGlynn argues that ‘The rhetoric of protection taps into a stream of thinking 
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which sees all women as delicate and in need of paternal/patriarchal control and 
supervision.’511 
Notably, although the Commission had the opportunity to correct the CJEU’s 
interpretation in its original proposal for a Pregnant Workers Directive (Directive 
92/85/EEC), it chose not to do so. Instead, it expressly deferred to the member states, 
providing that the Directive’s leave provisions were limited to pregnant workers, 
workers who have recently given birth, or workers who are breastfeeding, ‘within the 
meaning of national legislation, and/or national practice.’512In light of the divisive 
debate surrounding the adoption of the PWD, this deference is not surprising.513It is also 
not surprising, that in light of this provision, in all the cases in which it has considered 
the issue of maternity leave since the adoption of the PWD, the CJEU has restated its 
conclusion in Hoffman that Article 2(2) of the ETD (now Recast Directive 2006/54/EC 
Article 2(2) (c)) recognizes that it is legitimate to ensure the protection of: 
A woman’s biological condition during and after pregnancy and, 
secondly, to protect the special relationship between a woman and her 
child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by 
preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens 
which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment.514 
While these judgments justify a conclusion that the CJEU is patriarchal, merely 
continuing the historical treatment of women as objects of guardianship, the results of 
this research suggest they also justify another conclusion: that the CJEU is concerned 
less with gender stereotypes and paternalism, and more with the economic repercussions 
of its judgments. Indeed, three recent judgments addressing the issue of maternity leave 
suggest, contrary to the assertions of McGlynn, that the Court does not view all women 
as in need of protection, rather only those who are covered by the express provisions of 
the Directives as transposed into the laws of the member states. Beginning with Montull, 
the CJEU observed that self-employed women who are not ‘employed’ have no right to 
maternity leave under the PWD. The PWD ‘covers only pregnant workers and workers 
                                                 
511 McGlynn (n 513) 35. 
512 Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112), Article 2(a), (b), (c). 
513 See discussion of UK objection to the PWD in Chapter 3. 
514 See: Hofmann (n 511), para 25. For more recent cases, see: C.D. (n 395), para 34; Kiiski (n 345), para 
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who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding and who work under the direction of 
an employer.’515The Court also stated that while the PWD permitted the sharing of 
maternity leave with the father, it only did so where the mother had a right to leave. 
Meaning, therefore, that a father’s right to share maternity leave is not independent of 
the mother’s right.516 
Following on from this, in the 2014 cases of C.D. v .S.T. and Z. v. A Government 
Department, the CJEU held that member states are not required to provide maternity 
leave pursuant to Article 8 of the PWD, to a female worker who, as a commissioning 
mother has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement, even in circumstances where 
she may breastfeed the baby following the birth, or where she does breastfeed the 
baby.517The Court also held that the refusal to provide paid leave does not constitute 
discrimination on grounds of sex, under the latest version of the ETD(Articles 4 and 14 
of Directive 2006/54/EC), as the refusal of leave is equally applicable to the 
commissioning father.  
In effect, in all three cases, the CJEU was unwilling to find a right to maternity 
leave, where member state law had not expressly provided for it. By refusing to apply 
the provisions of the ETD in circumstances in which the PWD failed to afford 
substantive equality, the CJEU chose to defer to the national laws of the member states, 
even though many of them had not contemplated advances in medical technology. To 
reach this decision, it was necessary for the CJEU to accept the Opinion of AG Wahl, 
over that of AG Kokott, issued on the same day. It was also necessary for the Court to 
make a strong comparison to the EU right to leave on the adoption of a child, where 
recital 27 in the preamble to Directive 2006/54/EC states that: 
It is for the member states to determine whether or not to grant such a 
right to paternity and/or adoption leave and also to determine any 
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conditions, other than dismissal and return to work, which are outside 
the scope of this Directive. 
These rulings suggest that the CJEU is uncomfortable advancing gender equality 
in areas not expressly provided for in the Directives or national law, and where to do so 
would impose significant economic costs upon the EU member states. This is somewhat 
surprising; in light of the historic role the Court has played in advancing the rights of 
pregnant workers. As observed in Chapter 3, the CJEU determined that pregnancy was 
sui generis even before the EU adopted the PWD. Likely, this hesitancy reflects the fact 
that maternity leave involves life outside of work and an area of equality that the Court 
has not inherently been willing to step into, in the absence of legislative provision. 
Arguably, it is also reflective of the fact that the financial cost of maternity leave has 
been the subject of an ongoing debate in the EU, following the Commission’s proposal 
for an amendment to the PWD, seeking to expand the length of maternity leave, and 
making it fully paid.518Added to this, the legislative connection of maternity leave to a 
woman’s biological condition means that neither a man nor a surrogate mother can lay 
equal claim to it.   
However, while, such a construct has made it difficult for the CJEU to further 
equality for pregnant workers, the Court has, in recent decisions, shown a renewed 
purpose, wherein it has carefully parsed out maternity leave from leave accorded to 
workers, in their capacity as parents of a child. For instance, in Roca Alvarez the CJEU 
distinguished the Hoffman decision and determined that the ETD precluded member 
states from passing measures which: 
Provides that female workers who are mothers and whose status is that 
of an employed person are entitled, in various ways, to take leave during 
the first nine months following the child’s birth, whereas male workers 
who are fathers with that same status are not entitled to the same leave 
unless the child’s mother is also an employed person.519 
                                                 
518 See: Parliament, Costs and Benefits of Maternity and Paternity Leave (n 380) and EU Parliament, 
Fully paid maternity leave of 18 and 20 weeks—Impact Assessment. (2010). 
519 Roca Alvarez (n 422), para 39. 
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It may be concluded that with these recent decisions, the Court has issued a 
challenge to the member states and its fellow EU institutions—to either amend their 
national laws, and/or amend the PWD. It waits to be seen what their response will be.  
d Maternity leave—a protected right. 
Despite being a limited right, it is undeniable that EU maternity leave is strongly 
protected by the dual provisions of the PWD and the ETD. Established case law holds 
that if a woman is entitled to utilize the right to maternity leave under the PWD, this 
utilization must not affect her employment relationship, the rights that are derived from 
that relationship, or result in discrimination to her. Added to this, if a woman in the EU 
is treated unfavourably because of absence on maternity leave, she suffers 
discrimination on grounds of her pregnancy, and this constitutes discrimination within 
the ETD.520Furthermore, it is irrelevant whether the unfavourable treatment occurs 
within the context of an existing employment relationship, or a new employment 
relationship.521 
A number of prominent cases have brought the status of maternity leave into 
sharp focus. In Sarkatzis Herrero v Imsalud, the CJEU found unfavourable treatment 
where a national rule provides that seniority and eligibility for promotion only run from 
the date of taking up a new employment position and the worker in question is delayed 
from starting a permanent position by taking maternity.522 In Land Brandenburg v 
Ursula Sass, the Court said that unfavourable treatment also occurs regardless of the fact 
that the worker is not treated any worse than a male colleague starting work on the same 
day, because the treatment stemmed ‘exclusively’ from taking maternity leave. 
Additionally, the CJEU has stated that the inclusion of a period of national statutory 
maternity leave, even if longer than any EU mandatory minimum, is required in the 
calculation of a qualifying period for classification to a higher salary grade, where 
failure to do so would result in a woman who has taken maternity leave, not being able 
to attain the higher salary grade until 12 weeks after a male colleague who started 
                                                 
520 Case C-284/02 Land Brandenburg v Ursula Sass [2004] ECR I-10895, para 25. 
521 Case C-294/04 Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto Madrileño de la Salud (Imsalud) [2006] ECR  I-
1513, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para 39. 
522 ibid, para 46 of the Court’s judgment. 
 143 
employment on the same day that she did.523 In Loredana Napoli. v. Ministero della 
Guistizia-Dipartimento dell’Amministrazione penitenziaria, the Court said that 
unfavourable treatment also occurs where a woman on compulsory maternity leave is 
excluded from a vocational training course that is necessary for promotion.524 
Additionally, where national law provides full maternity pay during maternity leave, 
with the requirement of employment for at least three months without interruption 
before the start of the leave, such a provision is impermissible, as it will dissuade a 
worker from exercising her right to take a different form of leave before taking 
maternity leave.525  
It is also established case law that a period of leave guaranteed by EU law cannot 
affect the right to take another period of leave guaranteed by that law.526As the right to 
maternity leave is a protected right, it does not serve to replace or defeat any other 
protected right. Maternity leave in the EU has a different purpose than other types of 
leave. As observed above, it is a protected purpose, a gender-specific leave, related to a 
woman’s ‘biological condition’ and ‘special relationship’ to her newborn child. 
Consequently, a woman must be given the option to defer any non-maternity leave that 
she was unable to take.527This means that any conflict between annual leave and 
maternity leave is a conflict between two absolute rights of workers, neither of which 
permit any derogation. Therefore, where an employer or collective bargaining 
agreement fixes the period of annual leave for the entire workforce and it overlaps with 
maternity leave, effectively causing a loss of annual leave,528the worker on maternity 
leave must be able to take her annual leave during another period, regardless of any, 
‘organizational difficulties’ that result.529This rule is equally applicable where maternity 
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leave conflicts with parental leave.530This means that a denial of an employee’s request 
for a change in leave, from parental leave to pregnancy leave, amounts to 
discrimination.531  
The CJEU has also determined that resetting the clock to zero when calculating 
the minimum contribution period for a right to claim maternity leave any time a woman 
changes her employment status, amounts to discrimination. In INAMI, the most recent 
case considering the right to maternity leave, the CJEU issued a judgment on 21 May 
2015, stating that the: 
 PWD prohibits a member state from imposing a new six-month minimum 
contribution period prior to eligibility for a maternity allowance merely 
because the employment status or post of the worker concerned has 
changed.532 
As Advocate General Sharpston observed, to hold otherwise would discourage 
women from embracing new career opportunities, for fear of losing entitlement to 
maternity allowance.533 
In light of these judgments, it seems fair to conclude that maternity leave is first 
among equals in the EU, in terms of its status as a protected right. This protected status 
is markedly different to the US national right to leave afforded by the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA).534As the comparative discussion in Chapter 5 will reveal, 
while the FMLA’s gender-neutral leave provisions are broader than those of the PWD, 
in the sense that they do not exclude men, adoptive, or surrogate parents, the fact is that 
few US workers have the right to take twelve weeks unpaid leave, as eligibility 
requirements are strict. Furthermore, even where a woman has the right to take FMLA 
leave for pregnancy and maternity, the employer can require her to use accumulated 
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paid vacation and/or sick time.535Not only this, when taking this leave, the employee is 
only entitled to the employment benefits that accrued prior to the date on which the 
leave commenced, and not those she would have been entitled to had she not taken 
leave.536This is not the case in the EU, where there is the recognition that there is no 
point in a woman taking pregnancy and maternity leave if it results in her being worse 
off in her working conditions by doing so.  
e The conflict between maternity ‘payment’ and ‘pay.’ 
To reiterate, in the EU, discrimination on grounds of pregnancy can never be 
‘justified by the financial consequences’ that ensue to an employer as a result of the 
special protections that the ETD and PWD afford.537Nevertheless, a closer review of 
case law addressing the conflict between what constitutes ‘pay’ and what constitutes 
‘payment’ within the context of pregnancy and maternity makes clear that economic 
considerations are acceptable, as: 
Community law leaves some discretion to national authorities to take 
into account the social and economic conditions in their country and to 
decide what income can be considered adequate for a woman on 
maternity leave and which conditions are necessary to ensure that she 
will not be prejudiced in her future professional life.538 
Community law in this context means Article 119 EEC (now 141 EC), which 
established the principle of equal pay for men and women. The second and third 
paragraphs of the Article providing that: 
For the purposes of this Article, ‘pay’ means the ordinary basic or 
minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or 
in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his 
employment from his employer. 
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The principle of equal pay was defined by Article 1 of the EPD (now Article 4, 
Recast Directive) to mean, ‘for the same work, or for work to which the equal value is 
attributed.’ Regarding the worker on maternity leave, the PWD provides in Article 11(2) 
(b) the, ‘right to maintenance of a payment... and/or entitlement to an adequate 
allowance...’Historically, the CJEU has interpreted EU law to mean that maternity pay is 
not required to be full pay. Indeed, this has been the Court’s interpretation even before 
the PWD was adopted. Beginning with Gillespie v. Northern Health, the Court stated 
that while neither the Treaty, nor the EPD required full pay during maternity leave, there 
were no criteria laid down for determining the amount.539Instead, its adequacy was to be 
determined by the national court, with reference to the length of the leave and other 
protections afforded by national law. The impact of this judgment was only lessened 
when the Court laid down the principle of calculation that: 
To the extent that it is calculated on the basis of pay received by a 
woman before the commencement of maternity leave, the amount of 
benefit must include pay rises awarded between the beginning of the 
period covered by reference pay and the end of maternity leave, as from 
the date on which they take effect.540 
 The pay provisions of the PWD were first applied by the CJEU in Margaret 
Boyle v. EOC. In that case, the Court clarified that in terms of maternity pay, the PWD 
set forth the floor amount of ‘sick pay’ as the amount below which payments to workers 
on maternity leave may not be set, although member states were free to provide for a 
more favourable level of pay, including full pay, if they so chose.541The Court also 
allowed member states to make the issuance of greater maternity payments conditional, 
which meant that they could require repayment of any amount in excess of what would 
have been the ‘sick pay’ amount, if a woman failed to return to work after the 
completion of maternity leave.542Furthermore, the Court held that EU law permitted 
national legislation providing that annual leave ceased to accrue during the period 
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beyond the fourteen weeks provided for by Article 8 PWD (supplemental leave), but 
pension rights accrual could not.543  
Considering the cases of Gillespie and Boyle, Masselot and di Torella suggest 
that the CJEU used the wrong approach regarding maternity pay; applying ‘special 
protection,’ when it should have been concerned only with equality.544They criticize the 
Court’s approach as one based on the idea of a ‘productive worker’ rather than equality, 
due to the court’s position that a woman on maternity leave can have no 
comparator.545Their argument holds fast against the author’s review of recent case law 
in which the CJEU has reiterated that women on maternity leave are sui generis, and 
that they may, but are not required to receive full pay. Indeed, beginning with Alabaster 
v. Woolwich, decided more than a decade after Gillespie, the CJEU had the opportunity 
to reconsider its decision.546Instead, it restated paragraph 17 of the judgment in 
Gillespie, that: 
 A woman taking maternity leave provided for by national legislation are 
in a special position which requires them to be afforded special 
protection, but which is not comparable, in particular, either with that of 
a man or with than of a woman actually at work.547 
 
The opinion of AG Kokott in Kiiski also lends credibility to Masselot and di 
Torella’s conclusion that the CJEU considers women on maternity leave to be 
‘unproductive’ workers, as the AG stated that: 
Although women on maternity leave are doubtless in need of special 
protection, their position is not comparable to individuals who are 
actually at work, that is to say, in active service.548 
Finally, two judgments released in 2010 cement the authors’ conclusions. In 
Sanna Maria Parviainen v Finnair Oyj, the CJEU stated that the situation of pregnant 
workers and workers on maternity leave ‘cannot be treated alike for all 
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purposes.’549Then, in Susanne Gassmayr v Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und 
Forschung, the Court concluded that: 
Workers taking maternity leave... are in a special position which requires 
them to be afforded special protection, but which is not comparable with 
that of a man or with that of a woman actually at work, or on sick 
leave.550 
Ultimately, while it is true that these judgments can fairly be criticised for a 
focus upon protection, rather than equality, the results of this study suggest they more 
clearly illustrate the limitations of EU law, and the Court’s overriding concern for the 
economic impact that a requirement of full pay imposes upon the member states, than 
with continuing gender stereotypes. These limitations and concerns extend to cases 
concerning the pay of a pregnant worker during temporary transfer, or incapacity, as 
discussed below. 
f Temporary transfer or incapacity. 
CJEU case law reveals that the ability of a member state to determine ‘adequacy’ 
extends beyond maternity allowance, to include the pay of a pregnant worker who has 
been temporarily transferred to another job during the course of her pregnancy. This is 
so, despite the fact that it is a compulsory transfer for health and safety reasons pursuant 
to Article 5, of the PWD. Article 5 requires employers evaluate the specific risk of 
exposure to hazardous agents, processes, or working conditions for a pregnant worker, 
to communicate those risks, prohibit the exercise of certain activities, and provide for a 
temporary adjustment in working conditions, and/or working hours, or transfer to 
another job.551Considering this issue, the CJEU has determined that despite the fact that 
payment to the worker is pay within the meaning of Article 141 EC; the worker is not 
entitled to receive the pay on average that she received before her transfer. Rather, her 
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pay cannot be less than that paid to the workers doing the job to which she is 
temporarily assigned, with any: 
 Pay components or supplementary allowances relating to her 
professional status, such as allowances relating to her seniority, her 
length of service and her professional qualifications.552 
In effect, the transferred worker is not entitled to all the pay components and 
supplementary allowances that are dependent on the actual performance of specific 
duties.553This is problematic because the consequence for a transferred pregnant worker  
and the family she supports can be the loss of 40% of what her pay had been prior to 
compulsory transfer, where 40% consisted of, ‘supplementary allowances’ that were 
contingent upon the performance of, ‘specific functions in particular circumstances,’ 
which the worker did not do upon transfer.554However, it is fair to say that partial pay is 
far better than an unpaid leave of absence or the dismissal from employment that a US 
pregnant worker is often presented with.555 
Additionally, although pregnancy is considered sui generis in the EU, the right to 
pay for a pregnant worker who is on sick leave, prior to maternity leave is also the same 
as any other worker on sick leave. This is to say that the pregnant worker may not be 
deprived of full pay when all workers are entitled to full pay when incapacitated for 
work, but there is no principle or rule that requires her to receive full pay, per 
se.556Instead, the payment of wages to a pregnant worker is the same as that for a worker 
on sick leave, which falls within Article 141 EC and the ETD, as amended. The CJEU 
has stated that while pregnancy itself is not comparable to a pathological condition: 
Pregnancy is a period during which disorders and complications may 
arise compelling a woman to undergo strict medical supervision 
and...may cause incapacity for work...557  
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This means that where a pregnant worker is on sick leave because of a 
pathological condition related to pregnancy, a sick leave scheme, which does not 
distinguish between a pregnancy-related illness and any other form of illness, may 
provide for a reduction of pay based on the length of absence. Added to this, where the 
occupational sickness scheme of a member state provides for absences for illness to be 
offset against a total number days of paid sick leave, it may include absences for 
pregnancy-related illness, provided the pay is not lower than the minimum to which a 
pregnant worker is otherwise entitled.558 
In sum, where the pregnant worker is transferred, or prohibited from working, 
her income must be made up of her average basic salary and components relating to 
occupational status, and may exclude supplementary allowances. This is because Article 
11(1) of the PWD is the only provision governing the income to which a pregnant, 
worker is entitled during pregnancy, and it refers to maintenance of ‘payment,’ not pay. 
Where a pregnant worker is unable to work by virtue of an illness arising during 
pregnancy, or the worker has given birth and is on maternity leave, that same worker is 
then entitled to an income that is at least equivalent to a ‘sickness’ allowance. In all of 
the foregoing situations, the worker may, but is not entitled to receive full pay.  
Masselot and di Torella criticise the CJEU for not finding a right to full pay, 
arguing that the Court could have found that the PWD prohibits any kind of reduction in 
income, when interpreting the term ‘adequate allowance’ for the purposes of income 
during maternity leave (Article 11(2) (b)).559 While their assertion is correct, it is a 
common riposte to say that if the legislative institutions of the EU had wanted to 
mandate full pay, they would have done so. Instead, the Directives are deliberately 
circumscribed, deferring to the national laws of the member states. These assertions will 
be addressed further in subsection (h). Instead, the next subsection turns to discuss the 
manner in which EU law addresses the issues of multiple discrimination against 
pregnant workers, and discrimination against those associated with pregnant workers. 
The results of this exploration of the concepts of ‘multiple’ and ‘associative’ are 
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intended to further support the assertion that the limitations of and conflicts in EU law 
offer compelling evidence of the need for a new equality Directive. 
g  ‘Multiple’ and ‘associative’ discrimination.  
i. Multiple discrimination. 
In the EU, and the US for that matter, a pregnant worker may suffer 
discrimination on multiple grounds, including sex, race, nationality, religion, age, or 
disability. While EU and US law provides protection against discrimination for a 
number of protected categories, a pregnant worker who seeks redress against ‘multiple,’ 
or dual forms of discrimination, is required in both jurisdictions to prove each ground 
separately.560This is to say that the protection against discrimination afforded by EU and 
US antidiscrimination law does not actively target multiple/dual discrimination against 
pregnant workers. Rather protection is secured through what Solanke aptly terms 
‘single-dimension silos.’561Neither the EU’s PWD, nor the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 
expressly target multiple discrimination, or multiple inequalities, rather several legal 
measures separately address the protected categories. This means that a pregnant 
worker, discriminated on several grounds, must seek redress under each enumerated 
ground.562Undoubtedly, this failure to expressly address multiple discrimination can 
impose additional procedural and financial burdens upon a pregnant worker, who must, 
as part of any litigation strategy, decide whether to pursue, one, or all grounds. This 
difficulty is illustrated by the EU case of Maria-Luise Lindorfer v Council of the EU, 
where the two AGs and the Court were presented with the issue of multiple 
discrimination on the basis of sex, age, and nationality, regarding the calculation of 
pensionable service years under a community pension scheme. Ultimately, the CJEU 
chose to deal with each ground separately, ruling only that there had been discrimination 
based on sex.563 
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This silo approach has been heavily criticised by scholars on the basis that 
isolating gender equality from other forms of inequality is irrational, and ignores its 
compounding effect.564While the cogency of these criticisms cannot be ignored, it is 
suggested that the criticism properly lies in the limitations of the antidiscrimination 
laws, rather than with the courts. Considering EU law for the moment, multiple 
discrimination is only referred to in recital 14 of the Racial Equality Directive 
2000/43/EC, and in recital 3 of the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC. The 
recitals of the Gender Equality Directive 2006/54/EC and the Pregnant Workers 
Directive do not contain any such reference.565Why is this? 
It is suggested that there are at least two reasons for the limitations of EU gender 
equality law as regards multiple discrimination. The first stems from the confusion 
surrounding the concept itself, which renders the adoption of legislation difficult.  
Indeed, the discursive analysis surrounding the concept suggests that ‘multiple 
discrimination’ is but one of several terms used to describe discrimination against 
women on grounds beyond sex and gender. Others include, ‘additive,’ ‘compound,’ and 
‘intersectional’ discrimination. Taking Burri and Schieck’s definition of these terms: 
‘Additive’ or’ compound’ discrimination would signify instances of 
discrimination on more than one ground, where the role of the different 
grounds can still be distinguished. Intersectional discrimination would 
refer to such discrimination against women where the influence of 
various grounds cannot be disentangled...566  
Nevertheless, it is proffered that conceptual confusion is a weak reason for EU 
gender equality law failing to address multiple discrimination. After all, the EU 
institutions have a varied amount of literature to rely upon in crafting an appropriate 
legislative provision, and can rely on input from a variety of stakeholders. Indeed, 
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566 Burri and Schiek (n 569) 3. 
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Article 8 B (3) of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the Commission a broad mandate for this 
input, providing that:  
The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with 
parties concerned in order to  ensure that the Union’s actions are 
coherent and transparent.  
Notably, this conceptual confusion may be overcome in the near future, as the 
Preamble to the ‘Rome Declaration on Non Discrimination, Diversity and Equality,’ 
which was issued in 2014 by the Italian Presidency of the EU Council, expressly 
references ‘the necessity to combat multiple discrimination experienced by women...’ It 
also includes a commitment to welcome the 2015 establishment of a High-Level Group 
on Non-Discrimination, Equality, and Diversity by the Commission, for the 
development of common objectives for equality and non-discrimination.567It is expected 
that these common objectives will include addressing the problem of multiple and 
associative discrimination in the EU. 
Arguably, a second and more valid reason for the limitation of EU law is 
member state objection to the expansion of its anti-discrimination regime. This is to say 
that, while the EU institutions understand that, ‘discrimination on more than one ground 
has a stronger effect of exclusion, than discrimination on only one ground,’ and that 
associative discrimination can be just as harmful to an individual as any other form of 
discrimination, the adoption of specific measures regulating these types of 
discrimination remain a challenge for a union with twenty-eight member states, each 
having different interests.568A short discussion of the failure of the Commission to 
secure adoption of the so-called ‘Horizontal Directive,’ since its proposal in 2008, will 
serve to highlight the extent of these challenges.569  
The proposed amendments to the Horizontal Directive, which were suggested by 
the EU Parliament in April, 2009, specifically provided for protection against ‘multiple’ 
                                                 
567 Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Rome Declaration on Non Discrimination, 
Diversity, and Equality (2014). 
568 See, Burri and Schiek (n 569) 20. 
569 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
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and ‘associative’ discrimination.570However, at the last Council discussions in 
December 2011, it was stated that further discussion was necessary on a number of 
grounds, including the ‘legal certainty in the Directive as a whole.’571Four years later, 
these discussions have yet to occur; suggesting that it is fair to conclude the Directive is 
dead. Even if it is not, a close examination of its provisions suggests that the proposed 
Directive, while helpful, is severely limited in its approach to tackling the problem of  
‘multiple’ and ‘associative’ discrimination. This is because the Directive does not 
include gender as a protected category. It also does not apply to employment, in direct 
contrast to the much broader legislation found in some of the EU member 
states.572Nevertheless, it can be said to represent an acknowledgement by the EU that 
the problem of multiple and associative discrimination must be tackled, and puts the 
issue squarely on the radar for future equality initiatives. 
ii. Associative discrimination. 
 Associative discrimination is discrimination against an individual because of 
association with another person who has a protected characteristic. While the ETD and 
PWD do not expressly prohibit associative discrimination, the CJEU has found that EU 
law protects against associative discrimination where the protected characteristic is 
disability. In Coleman v. Attridge, the CJEU found that Directive 2000/78/EU applies 
not only when the disabled person is the direct victim of discrimination, but also when 
the direct victim of discrimination is a person associated with the disabled person. For 
example, where there is dismissal of an employee who is not disabled, but whose child 
is disabled.573Unfortunately, this reasoning has not been extended to prohibit an 
employer from affording less favourable treatment to a man on the grounds of a 
woman’s pregnancy. In the United Kingdom (UK) case of Kulikaoskas v. Macduff 
Shellfish, Judge Lady Smith distinguished Coleman, and held that the concern of the 
PWD, the ETD, and the national law at issue was with the woman’s ‘biological 
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condition’ and ‘not with the wider objective of promoting conduct that secured the 
autonomy of women or respect for their gender.’574This reasoning is difficult to 
understand, as it ignores the fact that a woman’s biological condition may be put at 
considerable risk if her partner loses their income! It also reveals the need for any new 
Proposal for a PWD to expressly address the problems of multiple and associative 
discrimination. 
III The problem with ‘special treatment’ and other reconciliation 
measures 
Following on from Masselot and di Torella’s conclusion that the manner in 
which the CJEU has treated pregnant workers and workers on maternity leave is based 
upon the male norm and social stereotypes, this Part turns to consider the broader debate 
surrounding the use of ‘special treatment’ measures to address the problem of pregnancy 
discrimination. Recalling from the discussion in Chapter 2, there is a deep and trenchant 
debate, wherein some sophisticated arguments suggest that maternity leave specifically, 
and reconciliation measures generally (otherwise called ‘family friendly’ and ‘work life 
balance’ measures in the US) have tended to institutionalize motherhood and have fallen 
short in advancing substantive equality. As stated in Chapter 1, reconciliation refers to 
the EU soft law strategy that encourages member states to adopt measures to enable men 
and women to balance the conflicting demands of work, private life, and caring 
responsibilities, which in turn, increase labour market participation rates and birth rates. 
These measures include the provision of childcare, paid leave, and flexible working 
arrangements. My exploration of EU reconciliation measures will show that while the 
criticisms are compelling, these measures offer practical solutions to difficult problems, 
where the role of the EU institutions in ensuring equality is limited. The crux of the 
problem is that as the supranational institutions have no authority in family policy, the 
actual adoption of measures to facilitate equal opportunities is the responsibility of the 
member states. Therefore, while the EU institutions may seek to emphasise gender 
equality, member states may elect to emphasise other goals in the measures they adopt. 
Indeed, the discussion below reveals that as gender equality is but one of a number of 
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goals member states seek to achieve through their provision of maternity leave and other 
reconciliation measures, there is a gap between the equality EU institutions seek, and the 
reality of what has been achieved to date. 
a The critics and the research. 
Critics assert that while opening the workplace doors to women, ‘special 
treatment’ and other reconciliation measures have sometimes failed to challenge the 
male norm, and often served to entrench it.575Clare McGlynn argues:   
The quid pro quo for the positive outcome is the perpetuation of 
outmoded assumptions about childcare and parenting, which conform to 
the dominant ideology of motherhood and may therefore,have a 
detrimental impact on women’s opportunities for the future 576 
This argument has traction. A significant amount of research has been 
undertaken into the impact of maternity leave upon women’s careers, including a 2013 
study by the Pew Research Group, which found the gender pay gap between women and 
men increases with longer maternity leave.577In contrast to short-term maternity leave, 
which increases women’s attachment to the labour force, translating into higher 
wages,578long paid maternity and parental leave induces a significant delay in return to 
work, a pay penalty, and lower level occupational positions, with contrasting 
implications for women of different socio-economic classes.579In the EU, awareness of 
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the potential negative impact of maternity leave upon women’s careers has even begun 
to affect its take-up. This is the case in the UK, where 43% of women return from 
maternity leave earlier than they would prefer, and about half of those say they do so 
because of fears over job security.580 
Added to this, there is a vast amount of academic and feminist research and 
critique charging that while reconciliation policies ‘have enabled more women to 
become economically active, they have also exacerbated gender occupational 
inequality.581For instance, the research of Mandel et al., into the source of wage 
inequality in twenty countries reveals that although more women have been recruited 
into the EU labour force, they are disproportionately in low paying jobs, leading them to 
conclude that ‘family friendly policies do not contribute to narrowing the gender 
gap.’582These findings are supported by Vogel-Polsky’s research, which concludes: 
Community legislation has proved a necessary but not sufficient remedy 
against sex discrimination; while the Equality Directives have been 
useful in combating individual cases of sex discrimination, they have to 
date had no significant impact on the sex segregated labour market.583 
This is to say that higher proportions of women remain in lower paid 
occupations, including teaching and childcare, while men are more likely to be found in 
higher paid occupations, including construction and technology, which in turn, has grave 
implications for women and the families they support, as women are more likely to live 
in poverty than men are.584But, there is no need to take sides here, as research conducted 
at the request of the Commission acknowledges the range of strengths and weaknesses 
with its reconciliation policy. A 2005 comparative review of the reconciliation measures 
of thirty European countries revealed the measures adopted have generally been gender 
polarizing; reflecting cultural assumptions that care work is woman’s work, with most 
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measures focusing mainly on the issues faced by women while working, and rarely 
addressing the role of men in caring responsibilities.585To be more specific, the review 
found national measures varied greatly, and that while ‘best practices’ combined 
maternity and paternity leave, childcare, and flexible working, as found in the Nordic 
countries of Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, overall, national policies generally failed to 
address the connection between the distribution of care work and gender inequality.586In 
fact, in all the countries reviewed, the burden of family and care responsibilities 
generally relied much more on women than on men, even if there were differences 
between the countries. As the Report stated: 
Women are generally seen as carers... Consequently, reconciliation of 
work, private and family life is often perceived as a women’s issue.587  
The findings of a subsequent Report, conducted at the request of the 
Commission in 2014, found no change in this polarization. Rather the conclusion 
reached was that: 
There is a considerable gender gap in the proportion of mothers and 
fathers who have reduced their working hours to take care of a child. 
Women are much more likely to reduce their working hours for this 
reason and the figures are particularly pronounced in Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK, and Austria.588 
Two features immediately emerge from this critical review of EU reconciliation 
measures. The first is that member state measures are overwhelmingly focused at 
women. The second is that they are limited to the workplace. As these features help 
explain the gap in the equality the EU institutions seek and the reality of what these 
measures have achieved to date, they are separately discussed below.  
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b Woman focused 
A common theme in feminist criticism is that EU reconciliation policies have 
failed to encompass a broader understanding of care; that family responsibilities are the 
responsibilities of all workers, regardless of sex, race, class, and so forth, and that 
reconciliation laws merely serve to perpetuate the traditional division of gender roles. 
Put more succinctly, the focus on women has meant that reconciliation measures merely 
serve to reinforce the dominant ideology of motherhood, and are a lost opportunity for 
achieving structural change As Guerrina asserts:  
The focus on women and mothers contradict the ethos of reconciliation 
policies, the purpose of which should be to challenge hegemonic gender 
narratives and divisions of labour in the family.589 
The consequence of such a focus, as Gornick and Meyer’s astutely observe, is to 
put ‘aside larger political questions about the organization of paid work and care, as well 
as the nature of men’s economic, and familial roles.’590While Gornick and Myers also 
suggest there may well be ‘a trade-off between some policies that make it easier for 
women to combine work and family and women’s advancement at work,’591the results 
of this research suggest the trade-off would likely be minimized if EU equality policies 
were more inclusive, regarding men. Instead, EU reconciliation measures have tended to 
be more detrimental and less emancipating than their advocates hoped. These advocates 
include Bob Hepple, who calls family-friendly reconciliation policies part of a new 
stage in gender equality, ‘the fourth stage is one in which the focus is moving towards 
comprehensive, and transformative equality’592He views reconciliation of workplace 
demands and family responsibilities as the natural expansion area for EU gender 
equality initiatives, representing a move from a childbearing focus to a childrearing 
focus. He is correct. However, the dual economic/social focus of EU equality policy and 
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the taxonomy of regimes across the member states have clearly limited the gender 
positive effects of these measures to date.593 
It is suggested that the tendency of EU reconciliation policy to institutionalize 
motherhood has been exacerbated by the failure of the member states to meet targets for 
providing childcare, as set by the Council at the Barcelona Summit in 2002. EU reports 
show that more than a decade after these targets were set, there are large differences in 
availability, quality, and cost of coverage across the member states, with only about half 
surpassing the 33% benchmark for children under the age of three.594The consequence 
of this particular failure is that more than six million women aged 25-49 say they are 
forced into not working, or can only work part-time, because of their family 
responsibilities, with more than one quarter finding the lack of childcare facilities, and, 
or their cost, being the main problem.595 
Research reveals that the greatest factor influencing a woman’s decision to work 
part-time is parenthood, ‘because these women are often involved in childcare duties 
when care services are lacking or not meeting the needs of full-time-working 
parents.’596Research indicators also show that temporary and part-time work may lead to 
lower pay and poorer working conditions than most other forms of employment.597 
Research also reveals that too many part-time jobs create a ‘golden ghetto’ for 
women,598as motherhood is related to an employment ‘penalty.’599Furthermore, 
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motherhood has a long reach throughout women’s lives, translating into lower pay, 
lower occupational status, and lower pension rights. Moreover, this penalty continues 
after care duties have ceased.600 
In light of the foregoing, it may be concluded that EU provision of maternity 
leave or the right to flexible working will do little to advance substantive equality, if 
men are not properly included in the equality equation.   
c Workplace focused 
 A second feature that emerges from EU reconciliation measures is that they are 
workplace focused. A focus that fails to fully acknowledge that inequalities in the 
private sphere maintain inequalities in the public sphere. This is to say that inequality in 
household labour is linked to inequalities in the workplace. As observed by the 
Commission, ‘Europe has not yet achieved a full balancing of men and women’s 
domestic tasks and family involvement.’601Although men work longer paid hours, 
women perform more unpaid housework and caring hours, translating into a longer 
workweek.602It is this double burden upon women of paid and unpaid work that national 
practices and policies can either reinforce, or challenge. It is generally acknowledged 
that historically, member state reconciliation policies have reinforced this double 
burden.  However, with the redirection of member state reconciliation policy, as 
discussed in Part IV, this burden may ultimately be challenged. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this research found several good reasons for the 
workplace focus of EU reconciliation measures. First, as stated above, the EU 
institutions have no authority in family life. Secondly, equal economic independence is 
viewed by the EU institutions as a, ‘prerequisite for enabling both women and men to 
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exercise control over their lives and to make genuine choices.’603As economic 
independence is sought to be achieved through participation in the labour market, a 
focus on the removal of barriers to women’s workplace participation is deemed essential 
to advancing equality between women and men.  
Finally, there are the overriding economic needs of the Union. This is to say that 
the push for reconciliation measures has as much to do with the economic needs of the 
EU and the reality of labour shortages, as it has to do with a desire for women to achieve 
economic equality. These economic needs are highlighted by the fact that a majority of 
OECD countries, including the US and those in the EU, have seen low or declining 
fertility rates, accompanied by longer life expectancy.604A resulting concern is increased 
public expenditure on pensions and care for the elderly, while being accompanied by a 
declining shortage of labour. Consequently, in 2010, with the global economic crisis 
acting as a key concern, and faced with the prospect of a shrinking working-age 
population, Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, outlined a Europe 2020 
strategy as one based on ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.’605With an ambitious 
target of 75% employment for women and men, ages 20-64 by 2020, a woman who 
permanently leaves the workforce upon pregnancy, or birth of a child is a lost labour 
opportunity in the EU, where 2/3 of the working age population are employed, 
compared to 70% in the US.606Furthermore, with variation among the member states, 
the participation rate for women who have children is lower than for women without 
children, with 32% of employed women aged 25 to 54 having one child of less than 6 
years working part-time, while for employed women with three children or more, where 
the youngest is aged 6 or less, 50% are working part-time.607It is against this background 
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that the EU has adopted two ‘Flagship Initiatives’—an ‘Agenda for new skills and jobs’ 
and the ‘European Platform Against Poverty.’ In part, these initiatives seek to increase 
the activity rate of women, through the promotion of programmes, national ‘flexicurity’ 
measures, and reconciliation policies; including longer maternity leave, subsidized 
childcare, expanded paid leave, and flexible working. 
From the discussion thus far, several points may be made. First, as gender 
equality is but one of a number of goals for EU reconciliation measures, it should not be 
surprising that a gap has emerged between the equality sought and the reality of what 
these measures have achieved thus far. Secondly, it should also not be surprising that 
‘special treatment’ is not a ‘silver bullet’ for tackling pregnancy discrimination, or 
achieving gender equality in the workplace. As the discussion throughout this and 
earlier Chapters revealed, it would be naive to expect any single measure to completely 
end the inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion faced by pregnant workers, especially as 
all gender discrimination laws have some unintended negative effects. Added to this, 
there is a significant amount of research suggesting that discrimination has evolved over 
time, becoming immune to the traditional antidiscrimination regime.608This evolution 
has often been referred to in the literature in terms of ‘generations.’ A brief discussion of 
these generations will help underscore the challenge posed to EU and US policy-makers 
in their future equality initiatives. 
d First and second-generation discrimination. 
As Susan Sturm, in her essay on ‘second generation’ employment discrimination 
explains, the existence of ‘first generation’ or blatant discrimination, which was targeted 
by first generation anti-discrimination legislation, has metamorphosed into ‘second 
generation’ bias, and ‘third generation’ discrimination.609First generation sex and 
pregnancy discrimination has been easy for employers to understand. A letter refusing to 
employ a pregnant woman or the dismissal of a woman from her employment, upon 
becoming pregnant, with the accompanying statement that ‘this is no job for a pregnant 
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woman,’ has generally become a thing of the past, with antidiscrimination law 
prohibiting such behaviour.610Nevertheless, as Sturm observes, and the evidence 
presented in this thesis reveals, inequality continues. This inequality is of a new form 
that Sturm calls ‘second generation’ bias, which involves ‘practices and patterns of 
interaction among groups within the workplace that over time, exclude, non-dominant 
groups.’611The excluded groups include women, minorities, and the disabled, as 
revealed by Sturm’s evaluation of employment regulation in the US. Sturm’s work 
observes that patterns of interaction shaped by organizational structure, ‘influence 
workplace conditions, access and opportunities for advancement over time, and thus 
constitute the structure for inclusion, or exclusion.’612Indeed, significant socio-legal 
research conducted into the legal profession, university academics, the science fields, 
and the boardrooms of private companies has illuminated how discrimination in this 
changed environment has served to limit women’s access to and success in the 
workplace, and resulted in underrepresentation in leadership positions.613  
Added to this is a plethora of scholarly research in the EU and the US indicating 
that pregnancy, maternity, and motherhood operate to compound other gender-based 
employment inequalities, including with regard to wages and occupational status. The 
research shows that these inequalities cannot be fully explained by differences in 
education, work experience, race, or job characteristics.614Rather, gender stereotypes 
and statistical discrimination serve to impact the careers of women, because of 
assumptions that women who have children are less committed, less productive, and less 
competent employees.615Joan C. Williams coined the term ‘maternal wall’ to describe 
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how women with family obligations face challenges to their progression in employment, 
as marriage and childcare negatively affect perceptions of their commitment in the 
workplace.616The research of Michelle Budig and Melissa Hodges further reveals that 
motherhood more strongly penalizes women who are less educated and in lower income 
levels.617 
The policy responses of the EU and the US to the disadvantage created are the 
concept of ‘indirect/disparate impact discrimination’ and the derogation of 
positive/affirmative action, involving changes in recruitment, promotion, mentoring, and 
training. However, as the evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggested, and the discussion 
in Chapter 5 will confirm, these policies have been differently applied in the two 
jurisdictions, and, while these measures have been partially effective in addressing the 
problem in some professional areas, significant barriers to equality remain. The 
complexity is that women live integrated lives, that:  
Women’s careers are complex and multidimensional, yet work practices 
appear to exist in a single dimension—the male-defined organizational 
dimension.618 
Indeed, evidence of women’s disadvantage in the workplace has been 
sufficiently robust that in cases pertaining to pregnancy and maternity discrimination, 
US and EU courts have taken ‘judicial notice of the real-world prevalence of the 
stereotype that pregnant women and young mothers will make undesirable 
employees,’619and the ‘fact that pregnancy and motherhood entail disadvantages for the 
women concerned in their professional careers.’620These disadvantages may be 
compounded by ‘third generation discrimination,’ which, according to Gráinne de 
Búrca, involves ‘deep patterns of systemic inequality, and can be seen across the field of 
                                                 
616 See: S.J. Ceci and W.M. Williams, ‘Understanding current causes of women’s underrepresentation in 
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617 Michelle J Budig and Melissa J. Hodges, ‘Statistical Models and Empirical Evidence for Differences in 
the Motherhood Penalty across the Earnings Distribution’ (2014) 79 Am Soc Rev 358. 
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619 See: Miriam Zambrano-Lamhaouhi v. NY City Board of Education et. al. 866 FSupp 2d 147(EDNY 
2011) 172. 
620 See: Case C-218/98 Abdoulaye v Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA [1999] ECR I-5723, para 56. 
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access to public and social services, such as housing, education, and health.’621In turn, 
these disadvantages highlight the multiple dimensions of poverty and exclusion; 
requiring modern, effective and targeted ‘social protection,’ as discussed below.622 
e A proactive CJEU or legislative reform? 
In response to Masselot and di Torella’s criticisms of the CJEU, the results of 
this research suggest three reasons for the failure of the court to resolve the conflicts 
inherent in the EU law. First, there is the overwhelming lack of legislative clarity in the 
equality Directives themselves. While the ETD was intended to put into effect the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women in regards to ‘working 
conditions,’ the concept of ‘working conditions’ has never specifically been defined by 
the EU legislature. Likewise, the PWD, while declaring that the protections it affords 
should not work ‘to the detriment of directives concerning equal treatment for women 
and men,’ lacks any direction as to how this is to be achieved. Added to this, the PWD’s 
overriding purpose of ‘improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding,’ curtails 
its ability to be a truly effective substantive equality measure. The basis for the measure 
is a paternalistic concern based upon the biological condition of the woman, rather than 
a clear acknowledgement that childbearing has historically had a negative impact upon 
the careers of women.  
Finally, as the CJEU considers the issues arising from pregnancy and maternity 
on a case-by-case basis, its decisions only ever lead to ad hoc change. This is 
particularly true of the conflict arising from the application of the concepts of ‘pay,’ 
‘payment,’ and ‘allowance’ under the provisions of the equality Directives and Article 
119 EEC (now Article 141 EC). The resolution suggested here is supranational 
legislative action rather than a call for a more ‘proactive’ CJEU, as Masselot and di 
Torella demand. Their demand ascribes to a supranational court far more power to effect 
                                                 
621 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Stumbling into Experimentalism: The EU Anti-Discrimination Regime’ in Charles 
F. Sabel, Zeitlin, Jonathan (ed) Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New 
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evaluation of the need for and effectiveness of current measures in the Member States (2011). 
622 See: Communication: ‘The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion ‘ COM (2010) 
758 Final 5. 
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legal change than may be reasonable to expect, in light of the separate roles played by 
the EU institutions, and the underlying economic basis of EU equality measures, as 
discussed above and in Chapter 3. Instead, the suggestion of this thesis is the adoption of 
a new equality Directive, which, at a minimum, recasts the conflicting provisions of EU 
secondary law into a single Directive, as previously discussed in Chapter 3. A new 
Directive would help ensure that subsequent changes to national laws are harmonious, 
and uniform. 
This argument is not intended to ignore the fact that as the driving force behind 
European integration, the CJEU has historically interpreted the EU Treaties and 
secondary legislation in a most expansive manner.623Nor, that its interpretation has often 
enabled equality measures to be more effective than they would otherwise be, if left 
solely to member states. As Karen Alter’s important empirical work has shown, the 
CJEU is ‘perhaps the most active and influential international legal body in existence.624 
However, today, the CJEU is operating in a different environment. One in which the EU 
is recovering from a world economic recession that began in 2008, and is the deepest 
seen since the end of the World War II. According to EU records: 
Gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 4% and industrial production 
dropped by 20% to 1990 levels. After two years of growth, the EU re-
entered recession in 2012. In 2013, unemployment reached 12% on 
average across the euro.625 
It is against this backdrop that the CJEU has been tasked in the most recent cases 
coming before it to consider the right to receive ‘full pay’ during pregnancy and 
maternity, and of men and surrogate mothers to claim maternity leave. While it is 
undeniable that political concerns have no place in the decisions of the Court, the 
language of the Treaties and the equality Directives ensure that the economic concerns 
of the member states, as translated into national law, do. Therefore, it would be naive to 
                                                 
623 See generally, Clifford J Carrubba and Lacey Murrah, ‘Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary 
Ruling Process in the European Union’ (2005) 59 Int’l Org 399. 
624 Karen J. Alter, The European court’s political power: selected essays (OUP 2009) 186. 
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expect the CJEU to engage in an expansive interpretation of EU law, to the economic 
detriment of the member states, and where EU legislation is not explicit. To do 
otherwise, would risk losing the Court’s hard won expansive legal competence, which a 
large body of sophisticated research reveals has led it to be ‘the most effective 
supranational judicial body in the history of the world.’626It would also increase the 
tensions that already exist between the CJEU, the member states, and their national 
courts, some of which seek to impose constitutional constraints upon EU law.627These 
tensions are well illustrated by the comments made by Justice Underhill in a sex 
discrimination case at the UK tribunal appeal level, in which he expressed the opinion 
that, ‘even judgments of the European Court are not to be read like sacred texts.’628Thus, 
faced with an increasing number of jurisdictional challenges by the national courts and 
decried by national governments as an activist court in need of reigning in,629it would be 
foolhardy for the CJEU to act in place of the EU legislature, particularly when a High-
Level Group on Non-Discrimination, Equality, and Diversity is being established by the 
EU Commission and is specifically tasked with ‘the development of common objectives 
for equality and non-discrimination.’630In sum, I agree with the Opinion of AG Wahl, as 
approved by the CJEU in Z. v A Government Department, which is to say that on this 
issue, ‘I do not believe that it is for the Court to substitute itself for the legislature.’631 
f Third generation discrimination. 
Sandra Fredman argues that social protection is best assured through enforceable 
socio-economic rights that impose proactive duties on governments.632However, as the 
                                                 
626 For example, Alex Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP 2004)1. 
627 See: the discussion of the rulings of the German Constitutional Court and the France’s Conseil 
Constitutionnel in Karen J. Alter (n 580) 210.  
628 UKEAT/0069/09/JOJNewcastle-upon-Tyne NHS Hospital Trust v Armstrong & others [2010] All ER 
(D) 215 (Mar), para 71. 
629 See generally: Dawson M, Witte BD and Muir E (eds), Judicial Activism at the European Court of 
Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013) 
630 See: Patrick Hennessy, ‘Conservative MPs demand veto over Britain’s EU Judges’ The Telegraph 
(London, Monday 12 September 2011) Politics. 
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631 Z v A Government department (n 395), para 120. 
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discussion so far has revealed, EU and US antidiscrimination law is concerned with 
status discrimination, and as Charlotte O’Brien observes, ‘The reconciliation project has 
been treated as something different to, and unconcerned with, socio-economic 
restructuring.633Nevertheless, the results of this research suggest the EU 
antidiscrimination regime is evolving in response to the fact that these new forms of 
discrimination are not easily addressed, and that rigid regulatory measures are weak 
tools for addressing deeply entrenched structural and systemic discrimination, where 
there is no single intentional act, or actor. In this evolving regime, the dual concepts of 
‘dignity’ and ‘social inclusion,’ accompany the traditional equality concepts, as found in 
the language in Articles 1A and 10A of the Treaty of Lisbon; the Preamble to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as Articles 1, 25, and 31, and the Europe 2020 
Strategy.634Arguably, if emphasized in the national measures of the member states and 
by the CJEU in the cases that come before it, this new regime will move the EU away 
from a ‘fault-based’ model for anti-discrimination measures, to one that seeks the 
restructuring of institutions rather than individual change. As Karon Monaghan writes, 
this requires a shift in obligations from individuals, ‘least able to make change’ to 
institutions.635Indeed, it requires a ‘transforming’ strategy, intended to achieve gender 
equality, without which, as Fredman argues, discrimination, and social exclusion, ‘will 
remain unchanged.’636While gender mainstreaming remains the focal EU transformative 
strategy for achieving this change, as discussed further in Chapter 7, there is evidence to 
suggest that the EU model of equality is otherwise being redirected, including with a 
push for two new equality Directives, and efforts to make member state reconciliation 
measures more effective. The discussion of the new equality Directives was undertaken 
in Chapter 3. Below, the refocus of reconciliation measured is addressed within a 
broader discussion of the redirection of the EU model of equality. 
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IV The EU Model of equality redirected. 
The discussion in Parts II and III of this Chapter served to illustrate the gap 
between the substantive equality EU antidiscrimination law seeks to achieve, and 
equality in fact. This final Part seeks to present evidence of a redirection in the EU 
model of equality. 
a Reconciliation refocused 
Understanding that no single law can be expected to completely resolve 
discrimination, but can present yet another stepping stone on the road to tackling a 
pernicious problem, the results of this research reveal that the EU institutions have 
redirected their efforts in recognition that: 
Gender equality cannot be achieved by an anti-discrimination policy 
alone, but requires measures to promote harmonious coexistence and 
balanced participation by men and women in society...637 
As previously stated, EU equality measures seeking to protect pregnancy and 
maternity are focused on the biological and productive role of women. In contrast, 
measures seeking to provide reconciliation between paid work and family life are 
focused on the caring role of workers. While the former is exclusively reserved to 
women, the latter is not, and as Hugh Collins observes, this distinction allows a ‘shift 
towards policies to tackle socially constructed inequalities and in particular to promote a 
more equal sharing of paid and unpaid work between men and women.638 However, as 
this research, the Commission’s research, and the feminist research discussed above has 
revealed, poorly designed policy has constrained the potential of EU reconciliation 
measures. As an EU Parliamentary working paper on atypical work in the EU observed 
regarding occupational segregation, ‘A serious question arises as to whether attempts to 
create more security for atypical workers are prone to produce unintended 
                                                 
637 Regulation (EC) No 1922/2006 of the European Parliament and of The Council 20 December 2006 on 
establishing a European Institute for Gender Equality, OJ L403/9 Preamble, para (11). 
638 Hugh Collins, Employment law (OUP 2003) 253. 
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effects.’639The unintended effect Parliament was referring to is an increase in the 
number of workers in involuntary temporary and part-time work, from 53.7% and 18% 
in 2001, respectively, to 60.3% and 25.6% in 2009, 640along with the correlative pay 
penalty for part time work.641  
In response to the criticisms and reports on the negative gender impact of its 
reconciliation measures, the EU institutions have endeavoured to refocus member state 
efforts. Beginning in December 2007, the Council called on the Commission to evaluate 
the legal framework supporting reconciliation and the possible need for improvement. 
Additionally, a ‘Resolution’ of Parliament recognized that, ‘responsibility for children is 
a responsibility shared between parents irrespective of sex’ and urged the member states 
to ‘mutualise the costs of maternity and parental leave allowances in order to ensure that 
women no longer represent a more costly source of labour than men.’642Subsequently, in 
March 2008, the Council reiterated that further efforts should be made by the member 
states and the Commission to reconcile work with private and family life for both 
women and men, and in 2011, the Council emphasized that:     
Active participation and involvement of men in reconciliation measures 
is crucial for reaching the work-life balance, since both women and men 
could benefit from family-friendly employment policies and from equal 
sharing of unpaid work and of responsibilities in the household. In this 
regard, due attention should be paid to tackling gender stereotypes.643  
Urging member states to redirect the focus of their reconciliation measures to 
address the role of men in achieving gender equality, the Council stated: 
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 In order to improve the status of women and promote gender equality, 
more attention should be paid to how men are involved in the 
achievement of gender equality, as well as to the positive impact of 
gender equality for men and for the well-being of society as a whole.644 
In support of this redirection, the Commission’s Strategy for Equality Between 
Women and Men 2010-2015 has sought to address the role of men in achieving gender 
equality.645With an understanding that an integrated, holistic gender equality strategy 
must be inclusive, the Commission’s recommendations include the development of a 
‘Framework for Action on Men,’ as an impetus to what it aptly called a ‘stalled 
revolution.’646The idea being that gender equality will only advance if men are involved 
in making the social changes necessary to achieve it. Importantly, the core of the social 
change sought is with regard to gender segregation in the home because, as stated in Part 
III, inequality in household labour is linked to inequalities in the workplace. In order to 
challenge these inequalities, the EU institutions accept the ‘need for more effective 
reconciliation policies.’647These more effective policies promote a balanced approach to 
equality in private, family, and working life through a more gender egalitarian division 
of household and caring labour, as secured through the adoption of ‘sharing’ measures, 
including:  
 Gender neutral parental leave measures. 
 Gender neutral workplace flexibility rights. 
 Measures tackling gender segregation in education, training, and 
employment. 
 Measures tackling gender stereotyping in education and childcare. 648 
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 Arguably, Article 33(2) of the CFR aids the EU institutions in their refocusing 
efforts, with its mandate that:  
To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to 
protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the 
right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or 
adoption of a child. 649 
It is possible that this new balanced approach will result in greater substantive 
equality in the EU, especially if the recent withdrawal of the Commission’s Proposal for 
a new Pregnant Workers Directive leads to a more comprehensive gender equality 
Directive being proposed, and men’s ‘right to care’ is secured, as discussed further 
below.650          
b A Proposal for a Directive for Gender Equality, Accommodation & Leave. 
Recalling from the discussion in Chapter 3, Part V, Subsection c, in October 
2008, the EU Commission submitted a proposal for a new Pregnant Workers Directive. 
However, on 1 July 2015, after being stuck in the legislative process for almost seven 
years, the Commission elected to withdraw it, stating that by doing so: 
This opens the way for a fresh approach to meet the policy objectives of 
improving the protection of mothers, better reconciling professional and 
family life and facilitating female participation in the labour market.651 
While it is unknown exactly what this new approach will be, what is known is 
that the EU Commission and Parliament are presented with a clear opportunity to do 
more than merely filling the gaps in their original Proposal. Here, it is appropriate to 
offer some suggestions as to how that opportunity should be used. 
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First, it is suggested that the EU Commission and Parliament should propose a 
‘Directive for Gender Equality, Accommodation & Leave,’ which would ascribe 
maternity leave rights to a broader category of workers; thereby shifting the focus from 
the biological condition of women, to the needs of all workers. More specifically, it is 
suggested that as with the 2008 Proposal, the Commission should use Article 153 of the 
TFEU, as the basis for this new Directive, which provides that: 
With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 151 TFEU, the Union 
shall support and complement the activities of Member states in 
improving the working conditions to protect the safety and health of 
workers and in ensuring equality between women and men with regard to 
labour market opportunities and treatment at work. 
Building upon the Preamble contained in its original Proposal, the Commission 
should also expressly highlight that equality is a fundamental right under Articles 21 and 
23 of the CFR, and that surrogates and men are included with adoptive parents in the 
assertion that ‘all parents have the right to care for their child.’652 
Secondly, this Directive should be used as a vehicle for recasting and 
legislatively clarifying the conflicts that have arisen over the years between the PWD 
and other EU equality legislation, as discussed in Part II, above. More specifically, this 
new Directive should recast the PWD and consolidate it with the ETD, the Parental 
Leave Directive (2010/18/EU), and the Self Employed Directive (2010/41/EU). While 
this new ‘Directive for Gender Equality, Accommodation, and Leave’ should retain the 
gender focused provision of workplace accommodation for pregnant and breastfeeding 
workers, and include measures intended to make leave more attractive to men, it should 
also re-write the concept of maternity leave, to deemphasize paternalism towards 
women and maximize health and safety for all workers. This may be best achieved by 
providing a gender-neutral right to job protected, fully paid leave, to be used by all EU 
workers for ‘self-care’ or the ‘care of others.’ As the right of leave for ‘self-care’ and 
‘care of others’ is more expansive than an express right of leave for pregnancy and 
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maternity, it naturally includes men, surrogates, women undergoing IVF, and others in 
its provisions.653It is suggested that without either amending or recasting the PWD, in 
order to address the lacuna in EU antidiscrimination law as revealed by CJEU case law, 
the goal of greater substantive equality in the EU will likely remain elusive, and its 
promising trajectory will stall. 
c The EU ‘right to care.’ 
In Chapter 1, it was suggested that one element of a truly holistic approach to 
addressing the problem of pregnancy discrimination is the collaboration between 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. In the new balanced approach in the 
EU, and in an effort to be both collaborative and inclusive, men are called upon to 
become the ‘gatekeepers of equality,’ and are supported in their right to care.654This 
right to care is to be secured by making parental leave, the mainstay of EU 
reconciliation policy, more attractive to men than it has been to date. The fact is, while 
gender-neutral parental leave has been supported in the EU since the 1995 Framework 
Agreement on parental leave was concluded between several social partners and given 
legal effect in Directive 96/34/EC, statistics reveal that women continue to use it more 
than men, even in Sweden, where parental leave was first introduced in 1974.655This 
difference in use is illustrated by the findings of a 2004 Euro barometer survey in which 
84% of the men interviewed stated that they had never taken parental leave, nor were 
they thinking of doing so. The reasons men do not take parental leave in the EU have 
been well documented. They include a concern that taking leave will negatively impact 
their career prospects, a gender stereotypical belief that parental leave is for women, and 
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because fathers’ earnings are generally higher than mothers’ earnings, unpaid or poorly 
paid parental leave reinforces existing social and economic pressures against gender 
equality. 656As Gornick and Meyers conclude, ‘individuals cannot make unconstrained 
choices until they have both realistic opportunities and social approbation for those 
choices.’657 
Responding to these statistics, and in an effort to encourage men to take parental 
leave, to assert their ‘right to care,’ and assume an equal share of caring, the EU adopted 
a Revised Agreement on Parental Leave, as implemented by Directive 2010/18/EU. A 
quick review of this Directive will help to illustrate the redirection of EU equality 
policy.  
The strength of Directive 2010/18/EU lies in the fact that it applies to all EU 
workers, men, and women, irrespective of their type of employment contract. It also 
increases the length of leave from three to four months, makes leave a non-transferable 
individual right, and is accompanied by the right to request flexible working upon return 
to employment.658There is however, one fundamental weakness in the Directive. It is its 
failure to mandate full pay during leave. As the research of Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt, 
into the parental leave polices of twenty-one countries found: 
In the absence of generous paid leave, traditional gender roles and the 
typically lower earnings levels of mothers lead to the large majority of 
parents to choose to have mothers not fathers to stay at home to give 
care.659 
While it can be concluded that the lack of full pay will prohibit the Directive 
from being truly transformative, in light of the economic conditions in which 
households operate, it is asserted that it can still help to de-couple care from motherhood 
and reduce employer ‘incentives to discriminate against potential leave takers.’660This 
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assertion is not without basis, as the Directive is modelled on the 2002 and 2008 reforms 
to the Swedish parental leave system, which was found to result in an increase in leave 
use by fathers from 43% to 75%.661It is suggested that the new Parental Leave Directive 
should have similar results, which will help to de-marginalizes men in EU equality law. 
And, as di Torella observes, it should also help complete ‘the deconstruction of the two-
sphere structure’ between caring and non-caring work.662As such, the Directive 
constitutes a powerful and potentially transformative equality measure, as well as 
evidence that the EU model of equality, in its redirected format, is truly holistic in its 
approach to seeking greater substantive equality.  
The redirected European model of equality is depicted in the following diagram: 
Figure 1 European Model of Equality—redirected. 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of EU equality measures 
d Lessons for the US. 
If the discussion of the EU model of equality in this and the last Chapter was at 
all clear, several important points will have thus far emerged. First, the EU model of 
equality is well developed, proactive, and provides exceptionally strong protections 
                                                 
661 Duvander and Johansson (n 660). 
662 Caracciolo di Torella (n 432). 
Substantive 
equality
Equal Treatment 
Measures
Special Treatment 
Meaures
1. Pregnancy 
&Maternity.
2. Posiitve Action
Transformative Measures
1. Gender Mainstreaming
2. Reconcilation.
3.. The right to care.
 178 
from discrimination for pregnant and breastfeeding workers and women on maternity 
leave. Secondly, this model of equality has limitations. Not all workers benefit from EU 
protections, and some equality measures actually exacerbate gender disadvantage in 
other ways. Thirdly, there are weaknesses that result from reliance upon soft law 
measures. In the absence of hard law mandates, policy-makers are free to emphasize 
labour maximization over gender equality. However, soft law also reflect the challenges 
posed to the enactment of antidiscrimination law, and the impact of the economic 
underpinnings of the EU.663  
Finally, a particular strength of the EU model of equality is its ability to quickly 
respond to the conflicts and limitations inherent in its antidiscrimination regime and the 
fact that discrimination continues in a changed environment. As Geddes observes, 
‘major changes can occur at the EU level in relatively little time if a contingent 
opportunity is seized.’664 
In light of the foregoing, two initial lessons emerge for the US in its struggle 
against pregnancy discrimination. First, pregnancy creates a unique riddle where anti-
discrimination measures seek formal equality between women and men. In response to 
this, the EU accepts that gender equality does not require the choice of one concept over 
another or of ‘hard’ law over ‘soft’ law. Formal equality and special treatment may co-
exist together. However, where they do, they are bound to collide. The problem is, 
without express legislative definition of what is meant by equality, courts are left to 
resolve the issue, and as the important work of Gerald Rosenberg has revealed, courts 
are poor substitutes for legislatures.665Consequently, it may be concluded that if there is 
to be clarity and consistency, legislative bodies should take the opportunity to define 
equality concepts and goals, both expansively and definitively. However, in light of the 
difficulty in securing support for antidiscrimination law, legislatures may prefer to 
                                                 
663 See: Paul Blyton, Work-life integration: international perspectives on the balancing of multiple roles 
(Paul Blyton ed, Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 72, for a discussion of the fact that reconciliation policies 
‘require a significant revenue base in order to finance such commitments.’ 
664 Andrew Geddes, ‘Britain, France, and EU Anti-Discrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU 
Policy Paradigm,’ (2004) 27 (2) WEurPol 334, 351. 
665 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change? (University of Chicago 
Press 1993). 
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embrace ‘soft law’ solutions, or language that is sufficiently ambiguous as to advance 
substantive equality where some movement forward is to be preferred over stasis. 
Secondly, no single anti-discrimination measure can hope to end discrimination, 
nor can it advance equality between women and men without some unintended negative 
consequences. New generations of discrimination exist in which there is an absence of 
discriminatory intention and where employment practices and systems have led to 
systemic discrimination. This changed environment requires the adoption of a holistic 
approach to tackling systemic discrimination against women generally, and pregnant 
workers specifically. A holistic approach was previously defined in Chapter 1 as 
existing of four elements. To restate, these elements require a macro approach to 
tackling the problem of discrimination, collaboration between stakeholders, a 
combination of hard antidiscrimination law and soft law initiatives, and the 
reconsideration, and redirection of policy efforts where research, evaluations, reports, 
and studies suggest that tweaking is necessary. This is to say that well-targeted measures 
require well-informed policies, which in turn, requires careful study and evaluation. As 
Guerrina observes: 
Trying to understand the overall impact of social policies on gender 
structures is inherently difficult. However, it is an important exercise, as 
only by exposing the gendered nature of political narratives, can we then 
assess the extent to which substantive equality has been 
institutionalized.666 
V Conclusion 
This Chapter concluded the discussion and critical evaluation of the varied 
aspects of the EU model of equality. A detailed analysis of the EU model in practice has 
revealed the conflicts inherent in legislation providing for formal equality and requiring 
treatment that respects difference, offering valuable insights for the US in its efforts at 
addressing discrimination against this particular category of workers. A broader 
consideration of EU equality policy has also revealed the strengths and weaknesses of 
measures that overwhelmingly focus on women and the workplace. While 
                                                 
666 Guerrina, ‘Parental leave rights in Italy: reconciling gender ideologies with the demands of 
Europeanization’ (n 603) 105. 
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acknowledging that the EU model of equality is not without its limitations, evidence has 
been presented to support a characterization of the EU model as one that is holistic in its 
approach and  truly committed to achieving substantive equality between women and 
men. This is to say, the EU model of equality is not static. Rather, it is one that seeks to 
meet the challenge of discrimination in a changed environment, redirecting its equality 
policy, and moving away from the narrow conception equality and reconciliation as 
between paid and unpaid work for women, towards a broader and more transformative 
conception of ‘sharing’ family responsibilities between women and men.667As Walby 
writes, ‘The EU does not simply follow the lead of national governments, but on equal 
opportunity issues has often been in advance of many member states.’668 
It is against this model of equality that the US model will now be considered and 
compared and the central research question will be addressed: Is the trajectory of US 
antidiscrimination law shifting away from a purely formal equality approach to 
addressing pregnancy discrimination, towards a more holistic approach that seeks 
greater substantive equality, and imposes a duty to promote or achieve equality? 
 
  
                                                 
667 See: Stratigaki, ‘The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in EU Policies: The Case of “Reconciliation of 
Work and Family”’ (n 311). The author argues that ‘sharing’ was the original meaning of the concept of 
reconciliation, which shifted to ‘encouraging flexible forms of employment.’  
668 Sylvia Walby, ‘The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of Gender Regime’ 
(2004) 11 Social Politics 4, 17. 
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Chapter 5: The US model of equality 
We know a lot about the disease of workplace inequality, but not much 
about the cure.669 
I Introduction 
This Chapter begins the in-depth discussion of the US model of equality, wherein 
evidence of major developments at the national, state, and local level are presented, 
which serve to suggest that the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is shifting away 
from a purely formal equality approach to addressing the problem of pregnancy 
discrimination, towards a more holistic approach that seeks greater substantive equality. 
One of the major developments to be discussed in this Chapter is the adoption of the 
2008 Amendments Act (ADAAA) to the American’s with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
which suggests that impairments resulting from pregnancy, including gestational 
diabetes/preeclampsia may be disabilities requiring employers to provide ‘reasonable’ 
accommodation to an employee.670While it is acknowledged that there are important 
limitations in the Act and its application to pregnancy is a matter of judicial 
interpretation, the growing case law is promising.  
The results of the author’s systematic and detailed review of the 
antidiscrimination laws of the fifty US states and Washington D.C. reveal another 
promising development—an increasing number of state and local measures, adopted and 
proposed, that are intended to address the nationally unresolved problem of pregnancy 
discrimination.671By virtue of the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, all state 
legislatures are free to adopt broader equality laws and measures than those provided by 
Congress, as long as they do not conflict with Constitutional guarantees and are not pre-
empted by federal law, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI, 
Clause 2).672In Chapter 6, a discussion of this comparative review is undertaken, 
                                                 
669 Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin and Erin Kelly, ‘Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the 
Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies’ (2006) 71 Am Soc Rev 589, 590. 
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671 See the discussion in Chapter 6. 
672 California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra 479 US 272 (1987) (footnote 22), for a discussion of pre-
emption and Congressional intention ‘to occupy the field,’ thus ‘prohibiting state law in a particular area.’ 
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wherein it is suggested that although these state measures are ad hoc and can never offer 
the broad protection that national laws can, they suggest a degree of ‘legal convergence’ 
of the US approach with the EU holistic approach to addressing pregnancy 
discrimination and advancing equality.673 
The final and arguably most dramatic development in US antidiscrimination law 
is the adoption of gender mainstreaming as domestic equality strategy. In keeping with 
the historic use of executive power by Presidents when seeking to expand civil rights 
protections and shape the public debate, in 2009 President Obama issued Executive 
Order No. 13506, ‘Establishing a Whitehouse Council on Women and Girls.’674The 
Order requires that all: 
Federal programs and policies address and take into account the 
distinctive concerns of women and girls, including women of colour and 
those with disabilities. 
 This Order is discussed in Chapter 7, wherein it is suggested that with its 
adoption and implementation, the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is shifting 
perceptibly, this is to say that it is moving away from a purely formal equality ‘rights-
based’ approach to gender quality, towards one that seeks to impose a duty to promote 
or achieve equality.  
Before offering evidence of a shifting trajectory, this Chapter aims to present the 
national equality model against which this shift is taking place. Following on from the 
discussion of the historical background to the EU model of equality undertaken in 
Chapter 3, Parts II and III place the US model in historical context, with a discussion of 
its Constitutional and statutory ‘rights’ based approach to addressing discrimination, and 
a comparative review of its legislative authority and legislative forms. Part IV and V 
build further upon the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4, aiming to provide accounts of the 
most significant differences and similarities between EU and US antidiscrimination law. 
Then, Part VI critically considers the US model in practice, revealing clearly the lacuna 
in protection from pregnancy discrimination that a requirement of formal equality 
                                                 
See also: William J. Brennan Jr., ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights’ (1977) 90 
Harv L Rev 489. 
673 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of ‘holism’ and Chapter 2 for a discussion of ‘legal convergence.’ 
674 Executive Order No. 13506 (n 12). 
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creates. Part VII closes the Chapter with a discussion of several congressional measures 
that offer practical solutions to the problem of inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion in 
the workplace, and with the suggestion that the patchwork protections these measures 
afford offer initial evidence the US is moving towards a more holistic approach to 
tackling pregnancy discrimination.     
II The historical basis. 
In Chapter 3, it was shown that the EU approach to gender equality has a dual 
focus on market integration and concern for human dignity, diversity, and social 
inclusion. In contrast, a review of the literature examining US law reveals an approach 
to equality that is ‘rights based’ and underpinned by the American ideals of ‘liberty, 
equality, justice, and fair opportunity for everybody.’675Before undertaking a close 
review of US pregnancy discrimination law in practice, it will be helpful to consider 
here the historical basis of the US approach to gender equality.   
a Constitutional rights. 
There is a vast amount of academic research chronicling the ‘rights based’ 
approach to US antidiscrimination legislation.676Much of that research references the 
institutional, cultural, and political history behind its benchmark antidiscrimination 
legislation of 1964, which has its roots in the US Constitution (Constitution) and the 
governmental exclusion of non-whites. This research reveals that the Constitution, when 
it was adopted in 1789, was fundamentally concerned with curbing abuse of government 
power, based upon a belief that ‘government would do too much’ for people, rather than 
on the notion of equality.677As Associate US Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg has 
written: 
                                                 
675 P. Burstein, Discrimination, jobs, and politics: The struggle for equal employment opportunity in the 
United States since the New Deal (University of Chicago Press 1998) 1. 
676 See: R.B. Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of Advancing The 
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The word "equal" or "equality" does not even appear in the body of the 
U.S. Constitution or in the first ten amendments, ratified in 1791, the 
amendments composing the Bill of Rights.678 
The Constitution did not address social or economic rights. Instead, the notion of 
equality was that which was within the drafter’s’ historical vision.’679This vision did not 
include non-whites.680Indeed, the first census in 1790 divided the US population into 
‘free white males’ and ‘free white females,’ ‘all other free persons’ and ‘slaves,’ all of 
which was underpinned by Section 2, Article I of the Constitution, until it was altered by 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.681That ‘free white’ men and ‘free white’ women 
were listed as separate categories reveals that women were a distinct relational and 
subordinate category to men. It was a relational category that the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, a post-Civil War Amendment and tool originally 
intended to eliminate racial discrimination, did not initially address. This is to say that 
while broadly providing that, no state shall, ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws,’ Section 1 of the Amendment was not initially 
construed by the US Supreme Court (USSC) to mean equality between women and men. 
Instead, it was construed to end racism. In fact, it was not until over one hundred years 
after its enactment that the Fourteenth Amendment was successfully relied upon to 
address sex discrimination.682With this success, members of the USSC have declared 
that America has been positively ‘transformed by the standards, promises, and power of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.’683This includes Justice Souter, who calls the Amendment 
‘the most significant structural provision adopted since the original Framing [of the 
Constitution]684and Justice Ginsberg, who views it as part of the ‘story’ of the extension 
of the Constitution, containing commitments having ‘growth potential.’685While these 
                                                 
678 Ginsburg (n 697) 264. 
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are fair assessments, the author’s study of federal case law found the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be a woefully inadequate tool for pregnant workers. It also found this 
inadequacy has three root causes. The first being that the Constitutional proscription of 
discrimination is limited to the actions of government actors. There is no Constitutional 
right of redress against the wrongs of private employers. The Fourteenth Amendment 
only prohibits discriminatory conduct by the states, and the Fifth Amendment only 
prohibits discriminatory conduct by the federal government.  
Secondly, as the proscription applies only to intentional discrimination, an 
employer in a constitutionally based claim cannot be liable in the absence of motive. As 
the court observed in Zichy v. City of Philadelphia: 
The principle difference between the two standards is that under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, sex discrimination becomes illegal only if 
intended, while under Title VII proof of intent is unnecessary and 
discriminatory impact alone establishes liability.686 
Finally, as the Fourteenth Amendment provides for ‘equal protection,’ it 
commands only the achievement of formal equality under a rigid Aristotelian approach, 
as previously discussed in Chapter 1. To recall, this approach seeks procedural fairness 
only, not result. It emphasizes the like treatment of persons under like circumstances and 
conditions. Under the provisions of the Constitution, this means that once a class of 
persons is determined to exhibit characteristics that are different, there can be 
constitutionally justified different treatment. The Constitution does not require things 
‘which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the 
same.’687Meaning, therefore that same rights do not necessarily result in equal rights. It 
also means, as Judge Posner wrote in the case of Jackson v City of Joliet, that the 
Constitution is a ‘charter of negative rather than positive liberties.’688  
                                                 
686 Kathleen Zichy and Jane E. Shofer v. The City of Philadelphia 392 F Supp 338 (ED Pa March 19, 
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b Civil rights. 
The history of civil rights legislation in America has been well chronicled, and I 
do not profess to have an important opinion on the issue.689Nevertheless, a brief foray 
into the context in which civil rights legislation was adopted, with its focus upon 
tackling race discrimination, will help to clarify the context in which sex, and then 
pregnancy discrimination came to be statutorily prohibited in the US.  
This exploration begins with the end of the US Civil War, which while ending 
slavery, is generally acknowledged to have failed to end race discrimination.690 
Following the Civil War, in 1865, Congress enacted the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
provided that ‘Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. ‘However, a number of states attempted 
to avoid its requirement by passing ‘Black Codes,’ which placed significant legal 
limitations on the newly free slaves. Partially in response to this, Congress adopted 
various Reconstruction laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which granted 
citizenship and the same rights enjoyed by white citizens, to all male persons in the US 
‘without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude.’691This idea of equality was also embedded in the Constitution with the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, as discussed above, which was 
followed by implementing legislation. Nevertheless, as Maslow and Robison’s research 
into US civil rights legislation and the battle for equality from 1862-1952 observes, the 
laws enacted between 1866-1875 did not ‘succeed in obtaining actual as well as legal 
equality for the freedmen.’692Indeed, the years into the twentieth century are defined by 
the efforts of many US states to avoid equality and preserve the status quo.693The USSC 
was also complicit in this continued race discrimination, as illustrated by its decision in 
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Plessy v Ferguson, which upheld segregation as constitutional under its ‘separate but 
equal’ doctrine.694 
In an effort to counteract the inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion of non-
whites, civil rights organizations were formed, including the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909.695While the original goal of the 
NAACP was to end segregation in education, it achieved success in a variety of 
additional areas, including, employment, housing, voting, public accommodation, and 
transportation. Its most famous case, Brown v Board of Education, is generally 
acknowledged to have spurred the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, which 
culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.696 
If any of the foregoing discussion has been at all clear, it should be evident that 
the initial focus for civil rights legislation in the US was race discrimination, not sex 
discrimination. This is not to say that there was not a call for civil rights for women. 
While assembled on 19 July 1848, at Seneca Falls, New York, the First Women’s Rights 
Convention delegates drew up a declaration of sentiments modelled upon the 
Declaration of Independence. They asserted ‘that all men and women are created free 
and equal,’ and demanded equality before the law and in educational and economical 
opportunities. Indeed, a Constitutional Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was viewed as 
the most permanent means of redress.697Calls to Congress for labour reforms also 
included the request to provide equal pay for equal work for women in all industries, 
which culminated in the Equal Pay Act of 1963.698 
Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that sex did not figure into the initial 
debates concerning the adoption of the nation’s benchmark civil rights legislation, which 
spanned the course of twenty years, from the introduction of the first Bill to prohibit 
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discrimination, ‘on the basis of race, color, or creed,’ in 1942.699There is also evidence 
to suggest that the prohibition of discrimination because of ‘sex’ was only included in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as a result of a last minute amendment offered by Rep. 
Howard W. Smith, arguably ‘in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery.’700As Mr. Smith has 
been described as a ‘staunch opponent of all civil rights legislation,’701and ‘not a civil 
rights enthusiast,’702some scholars have concluded that he offered the Amendment as an 
attempt to derail the Bill, which backfired.703In contrast, others, including Jo Freeman, 
assert that this conclusion is wrong and that the Amendment was the result of the actions 
of ‘policy entrepreneurs.’704While it may never been known which view is accurate, as 
the lack of any lengthy discussion on the Amendment renders a definitive conclusion 
difficult, what is known is that it was one of the most ‘filibustered bills in modern 
times.’705The Bill underwent ‘over 21 congressional hearings and thousands of pages of 
the Congressional Record as well as public and scholarly debate, before it became 
national law.’706Ultimately, the amendment was adopted after a ‘hasty debate’ under the 
so-called ‘five-minute rule.’707Notwithstanding the inclusion of a statutory prohibition 
against sex discrimination, the provision was not interpreted by the USSC to include 
pregnancy discrimination.708Instead, pregnancy discrimination only came to be 
prohibited in the US when the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) was adopted by 
Congress in 1978.709  
By way of summary, some clear differences are evident in the context in which 
sex discrimination was initially legislatively addressed in the EU and the US. Recalling 
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from the discussion of EU law in Chapter 3, sex discrimination in the form of unequal 
pay was addressed in the original constitutional treaty in 1957 for reasons of economic 
principles. In the US, sex discrimination was initially considered less in need of 
amelioration than race discrimination, and was addressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
for reasons that remain debatable. A further distinction, as the following discussion will 
reveal, is that notwithstanding pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination in the EU 
and the US, the US has elected to tackle the problem through a mandate of formal 
equality. In contrast, EU antidiscrimination law provides special protection from the 
beginning of pregnancy until the end of maternity leave.  
III Legislative authority and legislative form. 
This Part comparatively explores legislative authority and the legal measures that 
may be adopted to address pregnancy discrimination in the US. However, due to word 
constraints, what is provided here can only be an overview, which is intended to aid the 
understanding of the substantive provisions discussed in Parts IV and V. This discussion 
will also serve to further highlight the similarities and differences between EU and US 
antidiscrimination law. 
a Congress and Congressional measures. 
Recalling the discussion in the foregoing Chapters, it should be understood that 
as ‘avant-garde,’710and innovative as the EU may be, ‘somewhat more than an 
international organization but less than a state,’711it remains a creature of international 
Treaty. Moreover, despite the fact that a ‘Constitutional Treaty’ was proposed in 2005, 
and a former President of the EU Commission has called for a federation of EU states, at 
most, the EU can be considered a confederation of independent nation states, from 
which its member states are free to withdraw.712Consequently, even though the CJEU 
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references the European Treaty as ‘the basic constitutional charter,’ the EU equality 
model is the offspring of delegated institutional authority, wherein the form and reach of 
equality measures is limited only by the inability of the member states to agree, rather 
than by the terms of any written Constitution, as is the case in the US.713As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the US is defined by its federal system of government, in which power is 
divided between the fifty individual states and the federal government. Under this 
division, national legislative power is vested in  Congress, by virtue of the Constitution, 
which states in Article 1, Section 1 that: 
All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives. 714 
Here, a brief review of the role of Congress will serve to highlight the 
differences between EU and US legislative authority.  
The US Senate has one hundred members, two from each state in the Union, who 
are elected in accordance with the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. The House of 
Representative has four hundred and thirty five permanent members, apportioned 
between the states based upon their total population. The main function of Congress is 
to make national law. In doing so, Congress may propose one of four types of action—a 
Bill, a resolution, a joint resolution, a concurrent resolution, and a simple resolution. A 
Bill is the form used for most national legislation, and once the Bill is approved in 
identical form by both bodies of Congress, it becomes law in any of three situations: if 
 It is signed by the President; or 
 The President has failed to sign it within 10 days, where Congress is in 
session; or 
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  Where a Presidential veto of the Bill has been overcome by a two-thirds 
vote in each House.  
There is little practical difference between a Bill and a Joint resolution. Both 
Bills and resolutions are subject to the same procedure, except that when a Joint 
Resolution amending the Constitution has the approval of 2/3 of each house, it does not 
require Presidential approval. Instead, it is sent to the US States, requiring 3/4 of the 
states to ratify before the Constitution is amended.715In contrast, a concurrent or simple 
resolution is not legislative, but merely a vehicle for expressing the facts, principles, 
opinions, and purpose of Congress.716A further distinction is that a concurrent resolution 
is a resolution of both Houses of Congress, whereas a simple resolution is the resolution 
of only one. As they are not legislation, they are not sent to the President for approval. 
Pursuant to the legislative powers discussed above, Congress has enacted a 
variety of antidiscrimination and equality laws, which directly or indirectly benefit 
pregnant workers. These laws are as follows: 
 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), which makes it illegal to pay men and 
women differently if they perform equal work in the same workplace;717 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Title VII) which prohibits  
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin 
and sex;718 
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, (ADEA) prohibits 
discrimination in employment against individuals at least 40 years of 
age;719 
 Section 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, makes it illegal to 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability in federal 
government;720 
                                                 
715 U.S. Constitution, Article V. Also, Hollingsworth v. Virginia 3 Dall 378 (1798). 
716 See: INS v Chadha 462 US 919 (1983), for a discussion of Congressional legislation and the 
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717 EPA (n 171). 
718 Title VII (n 171). 
719 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (Pub. L. 90-202) (ADEA). 
720 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (Pub. L 93-112) 29 U.S.C. Ch. 16. 
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 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,(PDA) amends Section 701 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to prohibit sex discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to 
pregnancy or childbirth;721 
 Title I of the American’s with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) makes it 
illegal to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability in 
the private sector, state and local government;722 
 Section 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amends Title VII 
and the ADA to permit jury trials, awards of compensatory and punitive 
damages in intentional discrimination cases; 
 The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) permits eligible 
employees in a covered workplace to take up to 12 weeks of leave for 
reasons of birth, adoption, or to care for a newborn, or to care for a 
spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious health condition, or for 
their own serious health condition;723 
 The Genetic Information Non Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA); 
prohibits discrimination against employees or applicants because of their 
genetic information;724 
 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), 
expressly overturned Supreme Court judgments in Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, and Kentucky Inc. v. Williams, on 
the basis that they narrowed the scope of protection afforded by the 
ADA. It also found existing EEOC regulations on the ADA to be 
inconsistent with Congressional intent; and725 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 (ACA), amends 
the Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) to require employers of 
50 or more employees covered by the FLSA, to provide unpaid 
                                                 
721 PDA (n 117). 
722 ADA (n 141). 
723 Family and Medical Leave Act 1993, 29 USCS 28. 
724 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.  
725 ADAAmendments Act of 2008 (n 141). 
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reasonable break time for employees to express breast milk for one year 
after a child’s birth, as well as ‘a place, other than a bathroom, that is 
shielded from view and free from intrusion from co-workers and the 
public, to be used to express milk.’726 
In addition to enacting legislation, Congress has the power to amend the 
Constitution, and to date there have been twenty-seven such amendments. In accordance 
with the provisions of Article V, an amendment requires either a proposal by Congress 
with a 2/3 majority vote, in both the House and the Senate, or by a constitutional 
convention called for by 2/3 of the state legislatures. Notably, in every Congress since 
1923, a proposal has been submitted for an ‘Equal Rights Amendment’ (ERA), 
providing that ‘equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any state on account of sex’.727Although this ERA never obtained 
the necessary number of ratifications for it to be enacted after Congress adopted a joint 
resolution proposing it in 1972, the results of this research suggest that its proposal 
provided impetus for the enactment of similar amendments to a number of state 
Constitutions.728As the discussion in Chapter 6 will reveal, these state ERAs have led to 
the creation of a new body of law, much of which has benefitted women generally, and 
pregnant workers specifically. The power of state legislatures to enact this body of law 
will now be explored. 
b State legislatures and state measures. 
State legislatures have available to them the same legislative measures as 
Congress, but state laws only apply within state borders. More specifically, under the 
Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, all powers not granted to the federal 
government are reserved for the states and the people. Pursuant to these powers, the 
states may enact prophylactic legislation intended to redress past discrimination, so long 
as it has not been pre-empted by federal law. Pre-emption renders state law invalid 
                                                 
726 ACA (n 120). 
727 See: Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson and Gail Falk, ‘The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women’ (1971) 80 Yale LJ 871, 886. 
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under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the Constitution—the so-called ‘Supremacy Clause,’ 
by, which the US Constitution and federal laws are declared the supreme laws of the 
land. The results of this research suggest that it is of central importance to pregnant 
workers that Congress has decided not to occupy the field with respect to laws designed 
to address discrimination. This means that as Congress is not the sole source of 
legislation designed to secure equality for pregnant workers, the individual states of the 
Union may enact measures that go beyond congressionally mandated minimums, so long 
as they are not inconsistent with the purposes of the PDA, do not violate the prohibitions 
contained in Title VII, nor conflict with Constitutional guarantees.729In Chapter 6, the 
equality measures enacted by the fifty states and Washington D.C. are critically 
explored for their ability to broaden the rights and protections afforded to pregnant 
workers, as well as for their limitations compared to EU measures. Overall, the evidence 
presented in Chapter 6 will seek to show that these state measures play a critical role in 
shifting the  US antidiscrimination regime towards achieving greater substantive 
equality. 
c Presidential policy and executive power. 
Presidential policy and executive power play a central role in shifting the 
trajectory of US pregnancy discrimination law. This is because under the provisions of 
the Constitution, national lawmaking is a power that is shared by both Houses of 
Congress and the President.730The President has the limited and qualified power to 
nullify proposed legislation by veto, which informs Congress that the legislation being 
proposed does not accord with Presidential policy. In addition to this negative power, 
Presidential policy is a significant source of legislative proposals by Congress. As noted 
by John V. Sullivan, Congressional Parliamentarian:  
The ‘executive communication’ has become a prolific source of 
legislative proposals. The communication is usually in the form of a 
message or letter from a member of the President’s Cabinet, the head of 
an independent agency, or the President himself, transmitting a draft of a 
                                                 
729 See: Guerra (n 693). Also: Brennan Jr., ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual ’Rights’ 
(n 693). 
730 Chadha, (n 737) 947. 
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proposed bill to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President of the Senate.731 
In the case of the current President, Barack Obama, the results of this research 
reveal that his social policy has been a source of a number of legislative proposals that 
seek to advance substantive equality between women and men, while also benefitting 
pregnant workers, either directly, or indirectly.732A case in point is the healthcare reform 
law (ACA), which is arguably the landmark legislation of his Presidency. The ACA is of 
key interest to this research, because although it is not an antidiscrimination law per se, 
it contains three important provisions intended to improve the health and safety of 
pregnant workers, including: 
 Banning health insurers from requiring that women pay more for the 
same insurance coverage as men; 
 Requiring that all insurance plans provide maternity health coverage; 
 Requiring break time for nursing mothers in workplaces with 50 or more 
employees.733 
This use of a health and safety measure to advance substantive equality is 
informative. It suggests that a President may find it easier to address workplace 
disadvantage using health legislation rather than antidiscrimination law. The failure to 
secure an amendment to the PDA, to include breastfeeding as a protected activity, 
(S418), or passage of the ‘Breastfeeding Promotion Act’ (H.R. 2790) in 2003, which 
was followed by a similarly doomed proposal in 2005 (H.R.2122), reveals the difficulty 
of expanding the US antidiscrimination regime and the role health and safety legislation 
plays in making breastfeeding a protected activity, of sorts.734As the discussion in 
Chapter 2 revealed, there are significant conceptual and philosophical differences 
between US feminists in their support for equal treatment, versus support for measures, 
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which require employers to treat some workers differently, in order that they may be 
treated equally. The adoption of the ACA suggests that these conceptual barriers, while 
significant, are not insurmountable, and may be overcome through the adoption of laws 
directed at health, safety, and labour conditions. Indeed, this was the case with regard to 
the provision of workplace leave in the FMLA, wherein its supporters described the 
proposal as a ‘labor standard’ as opposed to a ‘benefits’ Bill.735In Part VII, the ACA, the 
FMLA, and the ADAAA are considered more closely for the patchwork protections they 
afford pregnant workers, and their role in shifting the trajectory of US antidiscrimination 
law towards greater substantive equality.  
In addition to Presidential proposals, the results of this research suggest the 
power of the President to issue an Executive Order, for the management of the federal 
government, has been important tool for shifting the trajectory of US antidiscrimination 
law. Indeed, as the evidence presented in Chapter 7 will reveal, the power to issue an 
Executive Order has enabled the adoption of gender mainstreaming as a domestic 
equality strategy. The discussion will also reveal that this use of an Executive order to 
promote equal opportunities in the US is not unusual.736In point of fact, every Executive 
Order issued in the civil rights arena to date, has been followed by some form of federal 
legislation. Suggesting therefore, that the issuance of an Executive Order is merely the 
first step in the process of adopting gender mainstreaming as a national equality 
strategy.  
IV The US ‘rights based’ approach to equality. 
This Part begins the in-depth exploration of the substantive provisions of the US 
model of equality in comparative context. A discussion of the right to equal treatment 
between women and men, the statutory exceptions and defences available to employers, 
and the US derogation for gender based affirmative action will help provide a 
foundation for the critical consideration of US antidiscrimination law in practice, which 
is undertaken in Part VI.  
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a Statutory equality. 
To restate, Title VII is the nation’s landmark civil rights legislation, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of ‘race, color, national origin, religion, and sex 
(including pregnancy).’ It applies to hiring, discharge, transfer, promotion, demotion, 
compensation and ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’ In light of its 
statutory requirement of equal treatment, it may be concluded that Congress cemented 
the formal equality, rights-based approach to resolving discrimination into the US model 
of equality. This is to say that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of sex,’ 
did not signal a paradigm shift in the US approach to equality. This is the case, despite 
the fact, as noted by the USSC in Alexander v Gardner, when it was enacted by 
Congress, Title VII was intended to supplement Constitutional rights and sought ‘to 
assure equality in employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices 
that discriminate,’ and provided for, ‘statutory rights against invidious discrimination in 
employment and...a comprehensive scheme for the vindication of those rights.’737Part of 
the problem was that Title VII was initially limited to regulation of workplace 
behaviour, and only later extended to pregnancy, when the PDA was enacted in 1978 to: 
Guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the 
workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full 
participation in family life.738 
Today, while it can be said that fuller participation is apparent in the fact that 
women make up almost half of the US workforce, equal participation, particularly for 
pregnant workers, is arguably less evident, as a review of federal case law, in Part VI 
will show.739Another part of the problem is that neither Title VII nor the PDA defines 
discrimination. Instead, the PDA merely amended Title VII to provide that: 
 The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex,’ include, but are not 
limited to because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
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related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes.....740 
This research reveals that as the statute rests firmly upon the concept of formal 
equality and the need for a ‘comparator’, equality remains elusive for many pregnant 
workers. This is because the comparator is typically the ‘unencumbered worker,’ usually 
male and without carer responsibilities. Scholars, including Robin Guerrina, fairly 
criticize this unencumbered worker norm as resulting in merely ‘homologizing them 
with the male subject.’741Likewise, Joan Williams observes that this norm merely 
affords women ‘access to men’s traditional roles.’742Arguably, this norm is also 
discordant with US society, where caregiver responsibilities for children and adults are 
increasingly the norm. This new norm is illustrated by the fact that in 2011, the share of 
married-couple families where both parents work totalled 58.5%.743In 2014, this number 
increased to 60%.744Moreover, it was estimated that nearly one fifth of employed people 
in 2008 were caregivers to a person over 50.745Consequently, with a demographic aging 
of the US population, as in the EU, where care giving for children and elderly family 
members is likely to become the prevalent norm, the notion of the traditional workplace 
comparator is becoming ever more redundant.746 
 The final part of the problem is that there is no provision in US 
antidiscrimination law for the ‘uniqueness’ of pregnancy. As the USSC ruling in 
California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, (Guerra) emphasized, the legislative history 
of the PDA was ‘devoid of any discussion of preferential treatment of 
pregnancy.’747This fact was also noted in the dissent of Dennis, C.J., in Kazmier v. 
Widmann, wherein it was stated that the PDA failed to ‘affirmatively grant pregnant 
workers leave time or the right to return to their job.’748Nor does the PDA create any 
new rights or remedies for women. Rather, as noted by the USSC in Newport News. v. 
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EEOC, the PDA merely clarifies the scope of Title VII; recognizing that certain 
inherently gender-specific characteristics may not form the basis for disparate treatment 
of employees.749To recall from Chapter 1, disparate treatment involves treating some 
employees less favourably than others because of their sex. Disparate impact 
discrimination involves facially neutral employer policies that fall more harshly on one 
group than another.750Notwithstanding these distinctions, federal case law suggests that 
US antidiscrimination law adheres to the status quo, through the guise of the gender-
neutral concept of workplace ‘pregnancy blindness,’ in light of the concern that: 
The root of discrimination against pregnant women is the impression that 
once pregnant they will leave the labor force, which results in a view of 
women as marginal workers preventing them from receiving equal 
treatment in employment,751 
The evidence presented in Part VI will show that this ‘pregnancy blindness’ 
requires pregnant workers to be treated the same as other employees—equally well, or 
equally badly. Furthermore, pregnancy-related illnesses are not always considered a 
disability, nor are they considered sui generis, as in the EU. Rather, they are considered 
temporary sicknesses, like any other, and for which the pregnant worker is to be treated 
the same as any other worker—no better and no worse. This means that an employer 
may dismiss a pregnant worker, for if the pregnant worker’s condition impacts their 
ability to work, they are deemed sick, and as sick workers, they are subject to workplace 
rules, including dismissal for excessive absences. That is, unless the employee is eligible 
for any of the patchwork of protections afforded by the other equality measures 
discussed in Part VII and Chapter 6.   
b Exceptions and defences. 
One clear similarity between EU and US antidiscrimination law is that the right 
to equality in the workplace is not absolute. As previously observed in Chapter 3, there 
are statutory exceptions and defences to EU and US antidiscrimination legislation that 
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operate to enable employers’ sexually discriminatory policies to be upheld in certain, 
narrowly defined circumstances. However, unlike the EU, they translate to mean that 
although the safety of a pregnant worker’s foetus cannot render an employer’s 
discriminatory policies valid, the safety of customers or third parties can. This was the 
case in Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, where the court held that the safety of airline 
passengers could operate to justify sexually discriminatory policies resulting in the 
layoff of flight attendants during their first five months of pregnancy.752By upholding 
these types of employer policies, USSC Associate Justice Ginsburg has criticised the 
Court for decisions that are ‘a study in male hesitancy and legal timidity.’753She is 
correct. USSC decisions interpreting the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII have 
historically been restrictive, revealing a preference for legislative expression over 
judicial interpretation.754Case law also reveals that the USSC’s timidity in addressing 
sexually discriminatory policies has been furthered by Title VII’s express permission of 
sex-based discrimination, where sex is considered to be a ‘bona fide occupational 
qualification’ (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the operation of the business or 
enterprise.755In Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, the USSC observed that this provision 
shows, ‘Congress’ unwillingness to require employers to change the very nature of their 
operations in response to the Statute,’ because the Statute’s goal is to, ‘eradicate 
discrimination while preserving workplace efficiency.’756Timidity aside, it may be 
argued that the lack of any national, job protected paid leave during pregnancy 
exacerbates the impact of many of these decisions to a degree not felt by a worker in the 
EU.757It can also be argued that the BFOQ defence to direct discrimination authorizes 
US courts to balance the limited and competing rights provided to pregnant employees, 
against the prerogatives of employers. Viewed critically, Baer argues that as the US 
government is business-friendly, ‘employer’s interests are more important than those of 
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workers.’758Baer’s criticisms are not without merit, as the discussion in Part VI will 
show. It will also be shown that the transformative potential of the concept of disparate 
impact, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, has been limited in the US by the 
touchstone defence of ‘business necessity,’ as well as by an overall lack of USSC 
direction to the lower federal courts. This is to say, that while the concept of ‘disparate 
impact’ was intended to close the loophole, and remove ‘built in headwinds,’ a lack of 
direction by the Supreme Court and the lack of any national measure mandating the 
workplace accommodation of pregnancy, or publically supported paid leave, have 
enabled employer policies to freely operate to the disadvantage of pregnant workers.759 
V Affirmative action—a derogation from equal treatment. 
It is not enough to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must 
have the ability to walk through those gates.760 
As affirmative action forms an intrinsic part of US antidiscrimination legislation, 
it is worth briefly drawing attention to this similarity between the EU and US models of 
equality. A similarity that is highlighted by the fact that the US derogation also does not 
directly benefit pregnant workers, but can be said to indirectly help to overcome the 
disadvantage that childbearing and childrearing have on women’s careers.761 
Notwithstanding this similarity, there are clear distinctions between the EU and the US 
derogations. As the discussion in Chapter 3 revealed, EU positive action is applied in a 
broader manner than US affirmative action, and is a more generally accepted tool for 
advancing equality of opportunity, as revealed by the fact that every member state had 
enacted some form of positive action as far back as 1995.762In contrast, there is a wealth 
of evidence to support a finding that despite executive and congressional support for the 
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derogation, the confused boundaries, the legal challenges, its temporal quality, and the 
divisive debate surrounding its use have made it less attractive to private employers in 
the US. And, perhaps most importantly, have placed it on a different trajectory to its 
counterpart in the EU. These findings are evident from the discussion below. 
a Executive and Congressional support. 
US affirmative action has been defined as: 
Any measure beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice, 
that permits consideration of race, national origin, sex, or disability, 
along with other criteria, and which is adopted to provide opportunities 
to a class of qualified individuals who have either historically or actually 
been denied those opportunities and/or to prevent the recurrence of 
discrimination in the future.763 
Research reveals that the US has been at the forefront in utilizing affirmative 
action to address past discrimination.764This should not be surprising, in light of the 
racism in which the Civil Rights Act of 1964 arose. As stated by the USSC in Albemarle 
v. Moody, Title VII was intended to spur: 
Employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employer 
practices and to endeavour to eliminate, so far as is possible, the last 
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s 
history.765 
While affirmative action has historically been used to address race 
discrimination in the US, it can be and has been used to address gender discrimination. 
Its use can also be mandatory or voluntary. There are two situations in which private 
employers are required to utilize gender-based affirmative action in the hiring and 
promotion of female employees. The first is pursuant to a court order, In a legal action 
for discrimination, the remedial provisions of §706(g) of Title VII authorize courts to 
use any equitable relief deemed appropriate, including affirmative action. As observed 
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by USSC Justice Brennan in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ‘in some circumstances, 
such relief may be the only effective means available to ensure the full enjoyment of the 
rights protected by Title VII.’766The majority also concluded that ‘Congress did not 
intend to prohibit a court from ordering affirmative action in appropriate circumstances 
as a remedy for past discrimination.’767  
The second situation in which affirmative action is required is where the private 
employer is the recipient of a governmental contract or subcontract. Several federal 
laws, and many state and local laws require private employers in receipt of federal (or 
state) governmental and municipal contracts or subcontracts, to have an affirmative 
action program. Additionally, Presidential Executive Order 11246 mandates affirmative 
action by government contractors.768The use of Executive Order to require affirmative 
action is important for two reasons. First, as the US Department of Labo[u]r (DOL) 
estimates that as many as 26 million people or 22% of the US civilian workforce were 
employed by covered contractors in 2002, this data suggests that an executive mandate 
is an important tool for advancing equality of opportunity.769 
Secondly, this controversial executive strategy is not unique to the US. As 
McCrudden’s research has found, ‘governments the world over use their contracting 
power to produce social justice results.’770Indeed, many EU member states use 
government procurement contracts to tackle the gender pay gap, and have given an 
advantaged position in public procurement competition to those companies that follow a 
quota system to increase the number of women on company boards.771All of which 
suggests that the use of government contracting power is an important tool for 
advancing substantive equality. 
In addition to mandated affirmative action, Title VII, permits private employers 
to voluntarily undertake an affirmative action plan to address sex segregation, provided 
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their plans comply with three the criteria laid down by the USSC in United Steelworkers 
of America v. Weber, and reaffirmed in Johnson v Transportation Agency. Under this 
test, there must be a ‘manifest imbalance’ in the relevant workforce. Secondly, the plan 
must be temporary, seeking to ‘eradicate traditional patterns of segregation.’ Finally, the 
plan cannot ‘unnecessarily trammel the rights,’ or create an ‘absolute bar’ to the hiring 
or advancement of non-beneficiaries. As the Court stated in Weber, in enacting Title 
VII, ‘Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to 
prohibit all voluntary, race [and gender]-conscious affirmative action.’772Applying this 
criteria in Johnson, the USSC found that private affirmative action plans aid in 
‘eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace,’773and upheld the 
employer’s selection of a woman for a road-dispatcher position, where the job category 
was traditionally regarded  as ‘male,’ and where gender was only ‘one of numerous 
factors’ considered.774Moreover, the Court said that employers are not required to justify 
an affirmative action plan with their own prior discriminatory practices; rather they may 
rely ‘upon a conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.’775 
Voluntary employer plans are also supported by the provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which states that nothing in the Act ‘shall be construed to 
affect...affirmative action or conciliation agreements that are in accordance with the 
law.776As the USSC has yet to outline ‘the permissible outer limits of voluntary 
programs undertaken by employers to benefit disadvantaged groups,’777the EEOC has 
promulgated guidelines for employers taking action,’ to improve employment 
opportunities of minorities and women.’778The importance of these guidelines lay in the 
ability of the EEOC to give safe harbour to employers who have enacted plans pursuant 
to them, as ‘those taking such action should be afforded protection against Title VII 
liability which the Commission is authorized to provide under Section 713(b) (1).’779The 
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provision of a safe harbour is clearly intended to encourage employers to adopt 
affirmative action plans. 
Notwithstanding strong congressional and executive branch support for 
affirmative action, the research of Appel, Gray, and Loy found that private employers 
are generally reluctant to adopt voluntary plans. They suggest three reasons for this 
reluctance. First, the lack of USSC clarification of the line between what is permissible 
affirmative action, and what is not. Secondly, the persistent threat of ‘reverse 
discrimination’ litigation. Finally, the adoption of an affirmative action plan can give 
rise to negative repercussions for employee relations.780As the following discussion will 
show, these reasons are supported by the findings of this research.  
b Confused boundaries and ‘reverse’ discrimination. 
The author’s review of federal case law found that while hostility towards and 
litigation against affirmative action is generally focused on governmental plans, private 
employer’s voluntary plans have also been challenged.781These challenges generally 
emanate from white males, claiming ‘reverse discrimination’ where they have been 
unsuccessful in seeking selection, promotion, or training where an affirmative action 
plan has been adopted.782Even where these challenges have failed, employers have 
incurred costs defending them, which arguably act as a disincentive to their adoption. A 
brief discussion of the litigation and USSC judgments relating to affirmative action 
plans will help to explain this disincentive more clearly. 
The basis for any claim seeking to enjoin implementation of an affirmative 
action plan depends upon whether the plan’s creator is a government actor, or a public 
or private employer, and as observed by Justice O’Connor with regard to the landmark 
case of Adarand III, these cases involve ‘fairly straightforward facts, [but] implicate a 
                                                 
780 Appel, Gray and Loy (n 445) 374. 
781 For Supreme Court rulings on point, see the discussion in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed 476 US 
267(1986) and Johnson (n 793) (fn 161). 
782 For example, Michael W. Ulrich v. Exxon Company, USA. 824 FSupp 677 (SD Tex 1993); Lee Yeager 
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complex scheme of federal statutes and regulations.’783The approach taken by the USSC 
to governmental affirmative action plans is that:  
 A group classification long recognized as in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed 
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of 
the laws has not been infringed.784 
   This inquiry requires any gender classification imposed by a governmental actor 
to be analysed by a reviewing court using ‘intermediate scrutiny.’ This is to say that: 
 
To withstand constitutional challenge...classifications by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives.785 
This level of scrutiny was restated by the USSC in United States v. Virginia, as 
requiring sex-based classifications to be supported by an ‘exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ and ‘substantially related to the achievement of that underlying 
objective.’786However, confusion surrounds the evidentiary standard that must be met. 
While the Supreme Court in, Richard v. Croson said that ‘a significant statistical 
disparity’ could justify race-conscious affirmative action programs, the lower federal 
courts acknowledge that they ‘work without an analogous evidentiary label from the 
United States Supreme Court’ when considering gender-based plans.’787In the absence 
of any specific direction from the USSC for analysing constitutional challenges to 
gender-based affirmative action plans, the 4th, 9th, 10th and 11th Circuit Courts of 
Appeal788have followed the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Mississippi v. 
Hogan, which holds that statutes classifying on the basis of gender must be based upon 
reasoned analysis’ rather than ‘ the mechanical application of traditional, often 
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.’789This is to say that 
                                                 
783 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico Pena, Secretary of Transportation, et.al. 515 US 200 (1995) 
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a government’s rationale for a gender preference ‘must be sufficient to show that the 
preference rests on evidence of informed analysis rather than on stereotypical 
generalizations.’790In light of the foregoing, it may be deduced that a state entity 
implementing a mandated affirmative action program may rely upon the federal 
government’s compelling interest in implementing the local plan, but a voluntary plan 
will be struck down if it is based upon oversimplified methodology, or lacking narrow 
tailoring.791 
The employer must also bear in mind that the USSC has suggested a 25-year 
sunset for governmental affirmative action programs, on the basis that ‘all governmental 
use of race [and gender] must have a logical end point.’792The idea being that by that 
time affirmative action will have achieved its goal of greater equality of opportunity. 
Notably, for a number of states, including Oklahoma, New Hampshire, Arizona, 
Nebraska, Michigan, Washington, California, Florida, and Texas, the logical endpoint 
appears to have arrived, for their legislatures have enacted measures expressly 
prohibiting preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of race, or sex. In the case of 
California, Proposition 209 amended the State Constitution to expressly provide that: 
The State shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, 
or public contracting. (Cal.Const. art. I, §31) 
While it is true that these amendments only apply to state actors, there is a 
significant amount of research to suggest that these prohibitions indirectly impact 
private employers’ willingness to adopt affirmative action measures, and have ‘added 
another chapter to the long and tortuous history’ of affirmative action.’793And, although 
these measures are most clearly directed at public university ‘race based’ admission 
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programmes, there is some evidence they are hindering public contracting and hiring 
initiatives intended to address the structural inequalities faced by minorities and 
women.794Furthermore, while it is true that only a few US states have passed these ballot 
initiatives, they suggest a clear disconnect between public opinion and the reality of 
women’s lives. This is to say that while statistics reveal the pay gap between women and 
men continues, with women more likely than men to be in poverty, public opinion in 
some US states appears to believe that equality has been achieved.795  
c Negative repercussions.  
Also, instead of being viewed as an antidiscrimination programme, research 
reveals that affirmative action has been ‘painted as a policy of institutionalized 
discrimination against white men.’796This has resulted in negative repercussions for 
private employers who have adopted affirmative action plans, notwithstanding that it is 
not a requirement for quotas, preferential hiring, or promotion and is only a requirement 
of a good faith effort in recruitment, training, and outreach.797Nevertheless, negative 
repercussions and a divisive public debate surrounding their use are intense. Much of 
this intensity arises from the fact that affirmative action requires cognizance of 
demographic characteristics, and as Crosby observes, ‘Americans prefer not 
to.’798Indeed, in contrast to the individual rights discussed in Part II above, which 
operate as a passive policy of equal opportunity, affirmative action is an active policy 
for addressing discrimination in the US. As an active policy, these measures ask 
employers to do more than merely act passively neutral in their recruitment, training, 
and outreach to women and minorities, in order to secure true equality of opportunity. 
The problem is however, the US prefers to resolve discrimination via individual action, 
                                                 
794 See: Y L C Heron and B A Williams, ‘Government Contracting Preference Programmes After 
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rather than through group change. As Kang and Banaji observe, American ‘society tends 
to view discrimination as a species of individual tort.’799Consequently, as Linda 
Nicholson notes ‘the public remains very dubious about supporting programmes that 
might respond’ to difference.800This dubiousness has translated into heated debates as to 
the meaning of, and the need for affirmative action in the various areas of American life, 
including education, employment, political office, and the award of federal government 
contracts. As Clayton and Crosby observe, ‘The issues are complex, they stir strong 
feelings.’801These strong feelings have translated into ‘extreme positions.’802These 
positions are illustrated by the comments of those in favour of affirmative action, who 
assert that such programs are not ‘preferential treatment’ but ‘an opportunity for more 
accurate measures [of merit]’803and are really ‘fair measures.’804In contrast, opponents 
contend that affirmative action programs are anti-meritocratic, reinforce inferiority, and 
undermine the principles of ‘fairness and equity,’ as the cornerstones of 
democracy.’805As Reyna, et al., perceptively write: 
Both supporters and opponents seem perpetually to contradict each other 
when it comes to how they define affirmative action: Does it, in reality, 
promote racial and gender equality and minority representation, or is it 
a policy that promotes reverse discrimination and quotas?806 
In addition to the entrenched public debate, private employers considering 
voluntary affirmative action are faced with an array of scholarly research seeking to 
either question, or explain the social and economic value of private plans.807For 
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instance, whereas Herring’s empirical research supports a business case for affirmative 
action and diversity, finding that it leads to increased sales revenue, more customers, 
greater market share, and relative profits,808contrasting literature suggests an unintended 
negative consequence of affirmative action is that it stigmatizes the recipient and 
decreases their performance outcomes.809Yet more studies of voluntary affirmative 
action by private employers suggest that many of the measures adopted are merely 
‘window dressing, to inoculate themselves against liability, or to improve morale rather 
than to increase managerial diversity.’810Additionally, the USSC has muddied the waters 
with its observation that classifications based upon group membership ‘carry a danger of 
stigmatic harm.’811While the Court’s observation concerned race-based affirmative 
action in university admission programs, the opinion of Justice Powell may be 
extrapolated to apply to the gender-based voluntary plans of private employers. This is 
to say that: 
Preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding 
that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special 
protections based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.812 
In sum, the results of this research suggest the confused boundaries of 
affirmative action, the attendant litigation, and potential negative repercussions for 
private employers limit its potential as an equal opportunity tool. It has also placed it on 
a different trajectory to its counterpart in the EU where there is an active discussion to 
move beyond a permissible derogation to actively require gender quotas in the 
appointment of women to the boards of public companies.813 
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VI Equality in practice. 
 In Chapter 4, a critical examination of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) was undertaken, the results of which revealed the conflict 
inherent in legislation providing for formal equality and requiring treatment that 
respects difference. Here, US federal case law is critically examined, illustrating the 
problems inherent in adopting a purely ‘equal rights’ based approach to equality that 
views the workplace in a vacuum, requires a comparator in assessing pregnancy 
discrimination, and results in conflicting judicial determinations as to which workplace 
practices are discriminatory. This examination will divide the case law into two 
categories—those in which the courts have considered constitutional protection and 
those in which they have considered statutory protection from discrimination. This 
examination will serve to show that discrimination persists in the US, despite the two-
fold rights and protections afforded against discrimination contained in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution and in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
(PDA).814Discrimination is apparent in the fact that employers have withdrawn offers of 
employment upon discovering that the applicant was pregnant, maintained policies that 
unlawfully require female workers to report any pregnancy immediately to the company, 
to provide certification of ability to work, or to take one month mandated leave upon 
giving birth. Additionally, employers in the US have terminated the employment of 
female employees within hours of disclosing pregnancy and have denied female workers 
the right to return to work after childbirth.815  
a Equal protection under the Constitution. 
In the initial cases that came before it alleging a constitutional violation, the 
USSC held that sex differences supported different treatment in matters where sex was 
determined to be a material factor, and discrimination was determined to be benignly in 
women’s favour. As a result, an Oregon statute forbidding women to work more than 
                                                 
814 PDA (n 117).  
815 See press releases for EEOC v. Muskegon River Youth Home, dated 11/7/12; EEOC v Capri Home 
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ten hours per day, a Michigan statute preventing most women from becoming licensed 
bartenders, and a Florida statute excluding women from jury duty unless they 
affirmatively volunteered to serve, were all upheld by the USSC as Constitutional.816 
Ergo, sex was found to be a reasonable basis for legislative classification. Indeed, as 
stated in Part II above, the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to enable the 
invalidation of statutory provisions providing for different treatment of men and women 
in the same circumstances was not successfully argued before the USSC until over one 
hundred years after its enactment. In the ground-breaking case of Reed v Reed, the 
unanimous view of the court was that the statutory provision giving a mandatory 
preference for appointment as administrator to a male applicant over a female applicant 
under the Probate Code violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.817In light of this determination, the Equal Protection Clause (EPC) offered 
a basis upon which to invalidate state laws limiting women’s employment opportunities 
in the US, including the right to practice law, and to work the same hours as, or to 
receive the same pay as men.818 
However, as important as the EPC has become for advancing sex equality in the 
US, it has failed to provide a basis upon which to invalidate state laws discriminating 
against pregnant workers, as the USSC decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, illustrates. In that 
case, the court held that excluding pregnancy from a disability programme established 
under state law did not constitute gender-based discrimination in violation of the EPC. 
Instead, the Court found that: 
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit 
eligibility because of gender, but merely removes one physical condition, 
pregnancy, from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true that 
only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every 
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based 
classification...819 
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The court extended this reasoning two years later, when it considered Title VII’s 
statutory prohibition of discrimination in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, where the 
employer’s disability plan excluded coverage for disabilities related to normal 
pregnancy.820Despite the fact that every Federal Appeals Court presented with this 
question had determined that pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII, the USSC 
majority found that Title VII analysis should parallel that for equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that, consequently, the plan was not discriminatory.821It 
was only with the passage of the PDA in 1978, that it became discriminatory to treat 
pregnancy-related medical conditions less favourably than other medical conditions. 
b Statutory ‘pregnancy blindness.’ 
It is undeniable that the effect of Title VII, as amended by the PDA, has been to 
end the most abhorrent private employer regulations and policies that have often forced 
women to choose between having a child and having a job. The statute has resulted in 
elimination of sex specific ‘foetal protection’ policies, and automatic dismissal from 
employment upon becoming pregnant.822Because of the PDA, a US employer can 
generally take into account only the woman’s ability to get her job done. As the 
Supreme Court  stated in Johnson, ‘the decision to become pregnant or to work while 
being either pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant is reserved for each individual 
woman to make for herself.’823Notwithstanding these achievements, a close review of 
federal case law reveals that because formal equality is the statutory standard chosen to 
protect female workers from being treated differently from other employees simply 
because of their capacity to bear children, the workplace status quo of the male norm has 
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remained unchallenged. Commentary taken from the legislative history of the PDA will 
serve to illustrate this point more clearly: 
Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered employment 
must focus not on their condition alone, but on the actual effects of those 
conditions on their ability to work. Pregnant women who are able to 
work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other 
employees...824 
Implicit in the provisions of the PDA is the concept of ‘pregnancy blindness,’ as 
reflected in the defining statement of Posner, CJ in the case of Troupe v May Dep’t 
Stores Co., wherein he observed that the PDA requires ‘the employer to ignore the 
employee’s pregnancy, but not ...her absences from work......’825This concept of 
‘pregnancy blindness’ is firmly embedded in federal judicial analysis of pregnancy 
discrimination claims based upon discharge from employment for absences from work. 
This means therefore, that, ‘The PDA is not violated by an employer who fires a 
pregnant employee for excessive absences, unless the employer overlooks the 
comparable absences of similarly situated non-pregnant employees.’826It also means that 
it is irrelevant if the worker’s absences are for the purposes of pumping breast milk. As 
lactation is not a ‘condition related to pregnancy’ under the PDA, but is a condition 
related to breastfeeding, termination of employment for unauthorised absence does not 
constitute gender discrimination.827As stated by the US District Court for Colorado in 
Falk v. The City of Glendale, termination in this context is ‘about workplace conditions, 
not about discrimination.’828Notably, this finding was made notwithstanding the fact that 
only women are affected and that medical necessity may require a newborn to be 
breastfed. As Judge Pitman observed in McNill v. NYC Dept. of Correction, ‘The PDA 
only provides protection based on the condition of the mother—not the condition of the 
child.’829 
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Juxtaposed to EU antidiscrimination law discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, under 
which pregnancy is treated as sui generis, and pregnant and breastfeeding workers are 
entitled to workplace accommodations, or, if unavailable or unfeasible, are entitled to 
paid leave, formal equality in the US may result in the lawful dismissal from 
employment. As stated in Coney v. Dallas Housing Authority, the PDA ‘does not 
require employers to give pregnant employees special treatment.’830It only mandates 
that employers treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees who are 
similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.  But, the fact is, as many 
academics observe, pregnant employees can never truly be alike non-pregnant 
employees, and it is only through the artifice of ‘pregnancy blindness’ that they are 
rendered identically situated.831This artifice perpetuates discrimination in the workplace 
and fails to address inequality in circumstances. It also fails to address what Travis 
views as an ‘over attribution of poor performance to employee shortcomings.’832This is 
to say that courts tend to defer to employer’s decisions to terminate a pregnant 
employee, where performance is deemed ‘deficient’ compared to non-pregnant 
employees. This umbrella concept of deficient or poor performance justifies dismissal 
where a pregnant employee does not meet sales or revenue quotas, and so performs 
poorly in comparison to non-pregnant employees, or where there is tardiness, or calling 
in sick to work while pregnant, as in the cases of Miles v. Dell, Inc., Smith v. Alternative 
Resources, and Dormeyer. 833The judgment in Riddick v. MAIC, also makes clear that 
the dismissal of a pregnant employee for ‘performance related’ issues is lawful, even if  
it occurs the day of return from a period of medically-imposed bed rest, and where the 
‘performance related’ issues were mostly detected during the pregnant employees 
absence.834Even where an employee is able to show that male employees have been 
treated differently, as in Stanley v. Abacus, dismissal may be upheld on the basis that the 
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evidence is either ‘vague and conclusory,’835or as in Grace v. Adtran, on the basis that 
the employees at issue were not ‘similarly situated’ in all relevant respects.’836  
It may be concluded therefore, that although the proponents of the PDA felt 
assured that the legislation would ‘end employment discrimination against pregnant 
workers,’ this Congressional effort has been woefully inadequate in addressing the role 
that reproduction plays in continuing sex inequality. As eloquently observed by Justice 
Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Gilbert: 
[Discrimination] is a social phenomenon encased in a social context and, 
therefore, unavoidably takes its meaning from the desired end products 
of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may demand due 
consideration of the uniqueness of the ‘disadvantaged’ individuals.837 
The results of this research suggest the ‘unique’ disadvantage of pregnant 
workers is beginning to be recognized by US Courts, as the following discussion of the 
application of the concept of ‘disparate impact’ reveals.   
c Disparate impact. 
The EU variant of the US paradigm of disparate impact discrimination was 
discussed in Chapter 3, wherein it was observed that in the absence of nationally 
mandated workplace accommodations and job-protected paid leave, US pregnant 
workers have sought to rely upon the concept of disparate impact in their efforts to 
dismantle employer workplace policies that disproportionately affect them. These 
workplace policies generally pertain to the provision of sick leave, light duty 
assignments, flexible work, and part-time work. However, the results of this study found 
that the reach of the concept is limited and that it has been largely ineffective in 
addressing these workplace policies. Three reasons are suggested for this limitation. The 
first is that employers can claim a statutory defence for their workplace practices. This is 
to say that when it codified the judicially created concept of disparate impact into the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress had the opportunity to expand its application. 
Instead, it retained the defence that, ‘the practice is job-related for the position in 
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question and consistent with business necessity.’ This defence is only defeated if an 
employee can show a refusal by the employer to adopt an available alternative practice 
with less disparate impact, and which serves the employer’s needs.838The result of this 
exception, as discussed further below, is that cases alleging disparate impact/indirect 
discrimination against pregnant workers have been less successful, and disparate 
treatment cases have been ‘less hard to prove or win.’839This is to say that although there 
is a less stringent standard of proof required for ‘business necessity’ than for the defence 
of BFOQ, the 1991 codification provided that the motive of the employer is irrelevant, 
as is the fact that an employer used the same practice in the past. 
A second reason for the concept’s limitation is the requirement of statistical 
proof, which was also discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of a comparison with EU 
proof requirements. Case law reveals that in the US, the need for sophisticated statistical 
analysis and expert testimony setting forth competing explanations for the disparities 
has made disparate impact cases extremely difficult to prove and win. Michael Selmi’s 
research also reveals that a strong reliance upon statistical proof makes US cases very 
expensive to pursue.840The recent cases of EEOC v Bloomberg and Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v Betty Dukes, serve to illustrate the challenges posed in pursuing a claim of sex 
discrimination via a claim of disparate impact. In the former case, the Court found the 
statistics presented by the plaintiffs to ‘be inadequate.’ In Wal-Mart, which was one of 
the most expansive class actions in the US, the USSC majority stated that the plaintiffs’ 
statistical proof was ‘insufficient’ for creating a prima facie case.841  
Finally, the greatest limitation upon the reach of disparate impact has arisen 
because the USSC has not decided a case on the issue since the codification of the 
concept in 1991. As a result, there are conflicting interpretations among the lower 
federal courts regarding the application of the concept to pregnancy discrimination. The 
reality is that a majority of lower courts are unwilling to view workplace requirements 
                                                 
838 Civil Rights Act of 1991 §109, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. Section 703e, § 2000-2e . Specifically 2000e-
2(k) (1) (A) (i), (ii), and (c). 
839 Julie C Suk, ‘Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide’ (2008) 85 
Wash U L Rev 1315, 1321.  
840 Michael Selmi, ‘Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?’ (2006) 53 UCLA L Rev 701 
841 EEOC v Bloomberg LP 778 F Supp 2d 458; 2011 US Dist 92677Lexis (SDNY2011); Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Betty Dukes, et al. 131 SCt 2541; 180 LEd 2d 374 (2011).  
 218 
as ‘practices’ which disproportionately affect pregnant women. To do otherwise, they 
claim, would be to allow the disparate impact theory to justify what they perceive to be 
a request for ‘preferential treatment’ for pregnant workers.’842The basis for this view, as 
stated in Stout v Baxter is that, ‘all job requirements, regardless of their nature, affect 
‘all or substantially all pregnant women,’ for a limited period of time.843In contrast, a 
minority of lower federal courts accept that certain workplace policies are 
discriminatory per se, including those, for example, that treat pregnant workers less 
favourably than workers who have sustained a work-related injury. Indeed, several 
juries have accepted the argument that any distinction made by an employer policy 
between occupational and non-occupational injuries for ‘light duty’ work eligibility, 
necessarily excludes pregnant women, and is a prima facie showing of disparate impact 
on pregnant women.844 
It is suggested that the minority approach of taking a broad interpretation of the 
disparate impact theory is not only accurate, it is consistent with the goals of the PDA, 
as ‘Congress did not intend the same treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities to 
mean identical treatment.’845Nevertheless, the response of the majority of courts, 
reflected in the judgment in Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, is that the ‘concept of 
disparate impact does not stretch that far; ‘and that the majority courts are performing a 
service to women, by failing to find disparate impact.846In Dormeyer, the Court declared 
that: 
Nor would pregnant women or women in general, benefit from such a 
stretch. Firms would be deterred from employing women of childbearing 
age if required to overlook the inability of a particular woman, because 
of complications of pregnancy, to do the work for which she had been 
hired.847 
                                                 
842 See: Stout (n 337), and generally, see: E.L. Ngov, ‘War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate 
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The consequence of the majority interpretation is that employers have used the 
PDA to deny pregnant employees workplace accommodations. This is to say that 
pregnant employees can be denied ‘modified,’ ‘limited duty,’ or ‘light duty’ 
assignments, as long as the employer’s basis for the denial is non-discriminatory.848The 
majority of lower courts have found that a non-discriminatory basis includes situations 
where employers reserve these types of assignments for employees suffering from 
occupational-related injuries or illnesses, or where they are not an accommodation 
offered to any temporarily disabled worker in the workplace.849This was the case in 
Reeves v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., where the Court held an employer may 
lawfully dismiss a pregnant employee pursuant to a pregnancy-blind policy denying 
light duty work to employees not injured on the job, or unable to perform heavy 
lifting.850 Furthermore, as the Court in Tysinger v. Police Dept. of City of Zainsville, 
emphasized, any request for accommodation by a pregnant worker may be deemed a 
request for ‘more favourable’ treatment, rather than of equal treatment.851The result, as 
in the case of Freppon v. City of Chandler, is that employers may lawfully discriminate 
against their female employees, denying them paid work and placing them on unpaid 
leave.852The PDA is not violated when an employer places a pregnant employee on 
involuntary leave, so long as they treat pregnant workers no differently than any other 
temporarily disabled employee. This is because a workplace policy that does not have 
pregnancy as a determining factor in the decision, but applies to any employee suffering 
from a temporary medical restriction which interferes with their job duties does not run 
afoul of the PDA.853Indeed, pregnancy discrimination will only be found to occur in 
situations of different treatment. Thus, ‘an employer violates the PDA when it denies a 
pregnant employee a benefit available to temporarily disabled workers holding similar 
                                                 
848See: Guarino v. Potter 102 Fed Appx 865; 2004 USApp LEXIS 13258 (5th Cir 2004); Chapter 7 
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job positions.’854As observed in Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Texas, discrimination 
occurs where ‘a facially neutral policy may be selectively applied to pregnant 
workers,’855as where a pregnant employee is denied ‘lifting assistance’ given to non-
pregnant female employee.856  
Unfortunately, as Herald astutely observes, the majority interpretation reflects 
not only a ‘predilection to maintain the status quo’ in the workplace, it also reinforces 
‘workplace essentialism;’ meaning, the continuance of those organizational structures 
which disproportionately exclude women.857It is suggested that the majority 
interpretation also signifies judicial acceptance of the employers’ argument of an 
‘economic benefit’ to limiting certain workers to performing employment duties.858This 
argument is based upon the fact that workers who have sustained a job-related injury are 
entitled to ‘worker’s compensation,’ whether or not they work, Therefore, allowing 
employees eligible for workers’ compensation to perform some light-duty work has a 
clear economic benefit for the employer. The problem with this reasoning, from the 
point of view of women, is that as the majority of pregnant workers in the US have no 
access to paid leave, there will rarely be any ‘economic benefit’ in providing them with 
light duty work.  
In light of the foregoing, one could easily conclude that the application of the US 
Constitution and Title VII to pregnancy reveals a dismal trajectory for US 
antidiscrimination law, and one that is completely different to that of the EU. In 
response, it is offered that while such a conclusion is not necessarily erroneous, the 
results of this research suggest that it is imprecise. The fact is they are not the sole 
source of protections afforded pregnant workers. There is significant evidence of a 
growing number of national, state, and local measures that seek to offer practical 
solutions to the inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion suffered by this segment of the 
workforce. This last part will present evidence of the growing number of national laws 
                                                 
854 Spivey v Beverly Enterprises, Inc. 196 F3d 1309 (11th Cir 1999) 1313 (citing Byrd v. Lakeshore 
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that help advance equality for pregnant workers. Evidence of state and local measures 
will be presented in Chapter 6. 
VII Patchwork protections. 
The results of this research reveal an increasing number of US measures 
providing for protection against discrimination for pregnant and breastfeeding workers, 
job protected paid leave, workplace accommodations, and gender mainstreaming, which 
taken together suggest the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is shifting. This shift 
should be of no surprise, in light of the fact that 73% of American voters support paid 
sick leave, paid family leave, equal pay for equal work, and affordable child and elder 
care.859Research conducted by Joan Williams has also found that these family 
supportive policies are the single most important factor in attracting and retaining 
employees.860Added to this, a recent Working Paper, issued by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research reveals that a lack of leave and other ‘family friendly’ measures 
negatively impacts female labour participation, finding that: 
In 1990, the US had the sixth highest female labor participation rate 
among 22 OECD countries. By 2010, its rank had fallen to 17th. We find 
that the expansion of “family-friendly” policies including parental leave 
and part-time work entitlements in other OECD countries explains 28-
29% of the decrease in US women’s labor force participation relative to 
these other countries...861 
These are interesting findings, in light of the discussion in Chapter 4, wherein it 
was observed that gender equality is only one of a number of goals that family friendly 
policies seek to address in the EU, and that increasing labour supply is another 
important goal. In response to this problem in the US, several Congressional Bills have 
been proposed, which are intended to expand the provisions of the FMLA, provide 
employees with paid sick leave, and a right to request a change in workplace 
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conditions.862These proposals are matched by a number of state and local initiatives, as 
the discussion in Chapter 6 will reveal. As many of these proposals have yet to be 
adopted, it is worth drawing attention to three national laws that already offer some 
accommodation and unpaid leave to eligible pregnant workers.   
a ‘Reasonable accommodation’ under the ADA. 
Notwithstanding the PDA does not require an employer to provide a workplace 
accommodation for a pregnant employee unless she or he does so for other employees 
with a non-work related illness or injury, a worker with a pregnancy-related impairment 
may be able to claim that they have a disability for which they are entitled to a 
‘reasonable accommodation’ under the ADAAA. Because the act has relaxed the 
duration and severity requirements for qualified disabilities under the ADA and 
expanded the class of persons entitled to protection, it is now easier to prove that a 
‘pregnancy-related’ medical condition, which limits a ‘major life activity,’ is a covered 
disability. Indeed, when Congress enacted the ADAAA in 2008, it expressly stated that 
it intended to reverse several decisions of the USSC interpreting the application of the 
ADA, as well as the interpretive regulations of the EEOC.863In part, the changes 
wrought are intended to address the situation wherein an employer dismisses a woman 
who is unable to perform her job duties, owing to medical complications that are a result 
of pregnancy.864However, the extent to which this intent becomes reality is yet to be 
seen, as the federal courts have only just begun to consider the application of the 
ADAAA to pregnant workers. Some indication is given by the 2013 case of Young v 
UPS, in which the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals noted that although ‘Congress 
amended the ADA in 2008 in order to expand the category of individuals who fall 
                                                 
862 See H.R.532, providing six of 12 weeks parental leave made available to a federal employees shall be 
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within its ambit,’ it is not retroactive.865Thus, the Amendment leaves unaddressed 
pregnancy discrimination arising prior to 2008. 
For its part, in its new policy guidance, the EEOC suggests that impairments 
resulting from pregnancy, including gestational diabetes/preeclampsia may be 
disabilities requiring employers to provide ‘reasonable’ accommodation to an employee, 
but correctly stops short of stating that pregnancy itself is a disabling condition.866It is 
promising that several federal district courts addressing accommodations under the new 
amendments have expressly deferred to the EEOC regulations on the matter. In 
Wannamaker v. Westport, the US District Court for Connecticut noted that while the 
regulations have no binding effect, they are ‘useful to understanding the intended 
meaning of the amendments.’867That being said, the regulations were relied upon to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that ‘transverse myelitis’ rendered her disabled and entitled 
to an accommodation, rather than to uphold it, on the basis that, ‘even under the 
ADAAA’s broad definition of disability, short-term impairments would still not render a 
person disabled within the meaning of the statute.’868A more recent decision offers some 
promise. Distinguishing cases decided before the 2008 amendments, the District court in 
Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital, observed that the ADAAA is ‘more lenient,’ and that the 
EEOC regulations provide that effects of an impairment lasting, or expected to last 
fewer than six months are included.869However, while giving some hope, the ruling in 
Nayak also gives rise to concern regarding the issue of causation. This is because the 
Court rejected the argument that disability discrimination may be proved by showing 
that the employer had a mixed motive for terminating the employee’s employment and 
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held that a Plaintiff was required to show that the employer would not have fired her 
‘but for’ her actual or perceived disability.870  
In light of the foregoing, it is fair to say that a pregnant worker must meet a 
heavy burden before being afforded the protections of the ADAAA. As one District 
Court has observed, ‘pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not considered a 
disability under the ADA.’871But, as another observed, ‘a pregnancy-related impairment 
may be considered a disability, if it substantially limits a major life activity.’872However, 
even if the ADAAA is found to apply, there is no guarantee of an accommodation. And, 
even where an accommodation is required, as observed in Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot 
Dogs, the employer only has to provide, ‘a reasonable accommodation, not the 
accommodation [the employee] would prefer.’873Furthermore, the employer has the 
right to refuse a request if they can show that it would cause an ‘undue hardship.’ This 
means that an accommodation may be denied if it is either too difficult or too expensive 
to provide, in light of the employer’s size, financial resources, and the needs of the 
business. The consequence being that the pregnant worker is then left without paid 
employment, or entitlement to paid leave for the duration of her pregnancy. She may 
however be entitled to take unpaid leave under the FMLA, if she is an ‘eligible’ 
employee. 
b Leave under the FMLA. 
 Eligibility for unpaid leave under the FMLA requires the pregnant worker to 
have worked for the covered employer for at least 12 months, and had a least 1,250 
hours of service during the 12 months immediately preceding the leave, and work at a 
location where the employer employs 50 or more employees within a 50 mile 
radius.874These eligibility requirements are strict, and stand in stark contrast to the EU 
right to pregnancy and maternity leave, which as the discussion in Chapter 3 revealed, 
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applies to all workers, full and part-time, and on a permanent or temporary contract of 
employment. This contrast is further highlighted by statistics showing that about half of 
all US workers are in firms that are not covered by the FMLA and millions more 
workers may work for employers covered by the FMLA, but they are not qualified as 
individuals for its protections.875As the discussion in Chapter 7 will reveal, this lack of 
coverage is an ongoing policy concern of President Obama, who has consistently 
included funding in his government budget for a ‘State Leave Fund,’ to help states with 
the start-up costs of establishing a paid leave programme. The President also supports 
Congressional expansion of the FMLA and passage of legislation enabling private 
employees to accumulate paid sick leave.876 
c Breastfeeding accommodation under the FLSA. 
In contrast to the ADAAA and the FMLA, which offer practical solutions to 
some workers for the workplace disadvantages created by pregnancy and maternity, the 
changes wrought by the ACA to the FLSA require workplace accommodation for 
breastfeeding workers. This national measure is included in the discussion of pregnancy 
discrimination because statistics indicate that after childbirth, women are returning to 
work earlier than ever before. According to a 2011 ‘current population report’ by the 
Census Bureau: 
More women are working within a year of giving birth (64 percent in 
2005–2007 compared with 39 percent in 1976–1980 and 17 percent in 
1961–1965. 877 
As 43% of women return to work within three months of giving birth in the US, 
there is a need for consistency and clarity in the employment rights afforded to workers 
who wish to continue to breastfeed their children. 878The problem is, however, there has 
been a historical conflict between the federal courts as to whether or not discrimination 
against lactating workers is sex discrimination. In contrast to the EU, which expressly 
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includes breastfeeding within the ambit of its Pregnant Workers Directive, nothing in 
the PDA references breastfeeding, and until recently, state and federal courts have been 
unwilling to find that dismissal of a breastfeeding employee is sex discrimination.879This 
was the case in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., where the court stated that: 
While it may be that breast-feeding and weaning are natural 
concomitants of pregnancy and childbirth, they are not ‘medical 
conditions’ related thereto.880 
Likewise, in the 2009 case of Allen v. Totes., the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying 
upon the federal district court ruling in Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores,881held that the 
termination of the employment of a worker who takes extra breaks to pump breast milk 
is not unlawful, as ‘breastfeeding discrimination does not constitute gender 
discrimination.’882Although Justice Kane noted in the case of Falk v. City of Glendale 
that: 
A plaintiff could potentially succeed on a claim if she alleged and was 
able to prove that lactation was a medical condition related to 
pregnancy, and that this condition, and not a desire to breastfeed, was 
the reason for the discriminatory action(s) that she suffered, 
He dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint in part.883In contrast, more recent federal 
judicial opinion has found that breastfeeding per se is a medical condition related to 
pregnancy. In EEOC v Houston Funding II, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
discharging an employee because she was breastfeeding was sex discrimination. Ruling 
that: 
Lactation, the physiological process of secreting milk from mammary 
glands and directly caused by hormonal changes associated with 
pregnancy and childbirth, was a related medical condition of pregnancy 
for the purposes of [discrimination under Title VII].884 
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This ruling was followed by the US District Court for Colorado, in Signe Martin 
v. Cannon Business Solutions, Inc.885Additionally, the US District Court for Kansas 
declared that ‘even where the failure to provide breastfeeding accommodations does not 
violate Title VII,’ an argument could be made that a complaint of inadequate 
accommodation is protected from retaliation under Title VII.886  
While conflicting interpretations render it impossible to state definitively that 
lactating workers can rely upon Title VII to protect them against discrimination in the 
disguise of neutral workplace policies, the 2010 amendment to Section 7 of the FLSA 
may make reliance unnecessary, at least for some workers.887Because of changes 
wrought by the ACA, Section 7 now requires employers of 50 or more employees 
covered by the Act, to provide unpaid reasonable break time and a place for employees 
to express breast milk for one year after a child’s birth. Notwithstanding these changes, 
critics will likely observe that the FLSA, the FMLA, and the ADAAA only offer some 
women relief from workplace disadvantage. Such criticism is not without merit, as the 
discussion below acknowledges. 
d Criticisms of national measures 
 It is true that a US employer must have a certain number of employees to be 
covered by federal legislation, and the number varies, depending on the statute and the 
type of employer, public or private. For private employers, Title VII/the PDA and the 
ADA require 15 employees, whereas the FMLA and the FLSA require 50. It is also true 
that limited coverage is not the only critical observation that can be levied at these 
national measures. Unlike the EU, where accommodation for pregnant workers is rooted 
in the ‘uniqueness’ of pregnancy, accommodation of pregnancy in the US is rooted in its 
potential to give rise to a ‘disabling’ condition. This difference is illustrated by the fact 
that the national requirement for workplace accommodation is contained in the ADA, 
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rather than the PDA.888There is also no private cause of action for a violation of the 
breastfeeding accommodation provisions of the FLSA. Rather, enforcement is achieved 
through a complaint to the DOL, which may seek injunctive relief in federal district 
court, with an award of back pay.889This means that while a lactating employee may be 
entitled to special accommodations, the failure of an employer to comply with the 
statute does not amount to discrimination. This means that intentional discrimination 
will not give rise to an award of compensatory and/or punitive damages against an 
employer. 
 Notwithstanding the criticisms, this study found ample evidence to suggest that 
these national measures help advance substantive equality. Research reveals that the 
PDA has ended the most blatant discrimination against pregnant workers, and the 
FMLA has provided a leave right for 60% of workers for the birth of a child.890That 
leave right includes prenatal care, and can be used for severe morning sickness.891Added 
to this, the ADAAA and the FLSA require workplace accommodation for some 
pregnant and breastfeeding workers.  
Still, critics may proffer that these laws provide weak evidence that the trajectory 
of the US model of equality is shifting. Indeed, an entire symposium issue of the 2012 
American Journal of Comparative Law contained a number of excellent thought 
provoking essays, which, in the words of Gráinne de Búrca, presented ‘an apparently 
sharp contrast in the respective state of antidiscrimination law in Europe and the United 
States at present.’ 892It is fair to say that several of the articles addressing substantive 
areas of US antidiscrimination law were not very encouraging. The article by Ruth 
Rubio Marin, for instance, argued that in the US, ‘gender inequalities are the same as, or 
worse than in Europe,’ and that EU and US norms concerning gender and age 
discrimination follow distinct paths, and suggested that a combination of legal, 
historical, cultural, ideological, and political factors make it unlikely that these paths 
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will develop similarly.893More specifically, Rubio Marin’s essay sought to emphasize 
that the EU, in contrast to the US, is concerned with the unequal distribution in roles, 
tasks, and powers between women and men, and is supporting ‘gender quotas.’894Rubio 
Marin argued that this support suggests a move from an equal rights and opportunities 
approach in the EU to what she calls a ‘parity democracy model.’895While asserting that 
the core objective of this EU model is ‘to unsettle the separate spheres tradition...’ she 
concluded that this new model ‘won’t fly in the United States.’896  
Julie Suk’s essay on mandatory maternity leave and retirement in the EU and the 
US contained further stark contrasts. She observed that in the US, mandatory equality 
measures are prohibited as being discriminatory, whereas in the EU, they are accepted, 
as part of what she calls ‘collectively imposed norms about the role of work in a 
person’s life cycle.’897While asserting that a policy of mandatory maternity leave, or for 
that matter, mandatory paternity leave, is ‘a form of labour market regulation that can 
promote gender equality if properly designed,’ Suk recognized that such mandates 
‘could not plausibly be entertained in the United States.’898Suk is correct. In the US, a 
provision for mandatory leave violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution.899 
Mark Bell presented a slightly less sombre picture of the different trajectories of 
EU and US law in his essay considering gender identity and sexual orientation.900While 
showing that the EU has gone further to prevent discrimination on these grounds than 
US federal law and highlighting some significant differences, he also found similar 
problems and tensions, and a rare, but similar approach taken by a US court on the issue 
of gender reassignment.901This more positive outlook on US antidiscrimination law was 
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continued in Elizabeth Emens’ essay, which considered the 2008 Amendments Act to 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADAAA), which, as she observed, ‘attempts to 
restore a broader vision of the original ADA.’902While highlighting the limitations of the 
Amendments, and raising a concern that US federal courts will find ways to limit the 
new law, Emens observed that this is a ‘fascinating and uncertain time for U.S. 
disability law.’903The results of this research suggest that it is also a fascinating and 
uncertain time for US pregnancy discrimination law. A closer review of the ADAAA 
has revealed that the statute holds great promise for some pregnant workers, aided in 
part by the interpretative regulations issued by the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC). These regulations seek to ensure that employers and the federal 
courts adhere to the broadest application possible of the amended statute.904 
It is notable that in her commentary on the essays in the symposium, de Búrca 
acknowledges that the academics cannot agree and that in the EU and the US ‘there are 
similarities in the way problems of entrenched discrimination are being addressed and in 
some of the solutions being tested...’905Considering the reasons offered by the academics 
for the different trajectories of EU and US law, de Búrca also argues that the cultural 
and ideological, political, and institutional differences are not entirely convincing. She 
suggests a ‘temporal’ reason for their differences.906More specifically, de Búrca 
observes that the US is several decades ahead of the EU in its antidiscrimination regime 
and has suffered both a political and social backlash that has yet to be experienced in the 
EU.  She concludes that as some pushback to equality initiatives is already occurring in 
the EU: 
‘It would seem both premature and unconvincing to argue that the 
prospects for European antidiscrimination law are much brighter and 
more secure than the trajectory of the United States would predict.’907 
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The results of this in-depth study of antidiscrimination law in relation to 
pregnancy suggests that it is also premature and unconvincing to argue that the US 
trajectory is completely dismal. This is to say that while the US Constitution and 
national laws are characterized by a ‘pregnancy blind’ approach to addressing 
discrimination, there are important developments on the national, state and local level, 
which suggest the US trajectory is shifting away from a purely equal treatment rights- 
based approach to pregnancy discrimination, and towards a more holistic approach that 
seeks greater substantive equality, and imposes a duty to promote or achieve equality. 
As the discussion in the following Chapters will reveal, national laws do not present the 
complete picture of the US model of equality as it applies to pregnancy discrimination in 
the twenty first century. Instead, there are additional hard and soft law equality 
measures, adopted and proposed, on the national, state, and local level through which 
the US formal equality rights-based approach to tackling pregnancy discrimination is 
being reconsidered, and redirected, albeit exceedingly slowly.908 
VIII Conclusion 
This Chapter has set out to do two things. First, to critically and comparatively 
map the way in which the US model of equality has addressed pregnancy 
discrimination. Secondly, to present initial evidence the trajectory of US 
antidiscrimination law is shifting from an ‘equal treatment’ approach, towards one that 
seeks greater substantive equality for pregnant workers. 
 It was argued above that US law expressly prohibits pregnancy discrimination, 
which is essentially the treatment of a woman in a less favourable manner simply 
because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to pregnancy or 
childbirth. This less favourable treatment is a consequence of commonly held beliefs 
that are often attached to women. For example, women who become pregnant are less 
reliable workers, or will leave the workplace upon giving birth. As these beliefs have no 
rational basis, and ought not to be taken into account in the labour market, US 
                                                 
908 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. 
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antidiscrimination law mandates equal treatment of a pregnant employee with other 
employees. 
The discussion above also revealed two similarities and one clear difference 
between the EU and US models of equality. First, the US requirement of ‘equal 
treatment,’ is also not absolute. Title VII contains exceptions and defences to 
employer’s discriminatory practices. Secondly, US law also contains a derogation, 
which permits employers to adopt voluntary affirmative action plans, giving some 
gender-based preference in recruitment, training, and outreach. However, unlike EU 
antidiscrimination law, there is no derogation in US law for ‘special protection’ from the 
beginning of pregnancy until the end of maternity leave. 
The discussion of federal case law highlighted the damaging effects of a purely 
equal treatment approach to tackling the problem of pregnancy discrimination, where 
there is no national provision of job protected paid leave or workplace accommodation 
of pregnancy or breastfeeding. These damages are wide ranging, and include unpaid 
leave, loss of health benefits, and loss of employment. It is for this very reason that the 
trajectory of US antidiscrimination law has appeared dismal, at least when compared 
with EU antidiscrimination law, which treats pregnancy as sui generis, and mandates the 
provision of job protected paid leave and workplace accommodations.  
In response to the limitations of US antidiscrimination law, it was shown that 
Congress has adopted several measures, which as the discussion above revealed, provide 
some pregnant and breastfeeding workers with a right to a workplace accommodation 
and, or a job protected unpaid leave of absence. While it is acknowledged that these 
measures do not expressly recognize the difference that pregnancy makes, nor do they 
provide protections as expansive as those afforded by EU law, they do suggest a shift in 
the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law, away from a purely ‘equal treatment’ 
approach to pregnancy discrimination, towards one that seeks greater substantive 
equality. In the next two Chapters, further evidence will be presented to support the 
suggestion of a shift in the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law.  
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Chapter 6: State legislatures—shifting the trajectory 
The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act... would ensure that expectant 
mothers are not forced out of their jobs simply because they need minor 
adjustments to their duties to continue working during pregnancy.909 
I Introduction 
In Chapter 5, initial evidence was offered to suggest that there are important 
developments on the national, state, and local level, which reveal that the trajectory of 
US antidiscrimination law is shifting away from a purely equal treatment approach to 
tackling the problem of pregnancy discrimination, towards a more holistic one that seeks 
greater substantive equality, and imposes a duty to promote or achieve equality. This 
Chapter seeks to explain, justify, and elaborate upon these developments, focusing on 
the state and local measures that have been adopted and proposed to address the 
problem. It also follows on from the discussion of the differences between EU and US 
antidiscrimination law outlined in earlier Chapters, revealing why, even with these 
practical measures, US antidiscrimination law will never completely emulate that of the 
EU, even if it were desired. Recognizing and considering what Rudolf Schlesinger terms 
the, ‘structural divergences’ between common law and civil law legal systems and 
institutions, part of the role of this Chapter is to assess the disparities created by the 
legal and conceptual elements of the US environment, and to consider the particular 
barriers they create to the adoption of substantive equality measures.910This 
consideration is made with the acknowledgement that while other historical, cultural, 
and political disparities exist that may be worthy of further research, the focus of this 
research is upon two disparities deemed to pose the greatest difficulties.   
This Chapter is divided into four Parts. Parts II and III discuss the barriers 
imposed by the US Constitution and the conceptual objections of ‘equal treatment’ 
(liberal) feminists to the adoption of substantive equality measures for pregnant 
                                                 
909 Taken from a personal email communication with co-sponsor to the proposed Act, US Senator for New 
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workers.911In this discussion, it will be shown that the US Constitution presents a legal 
barrier to the adoption of mandatory leave, but not to job-protected paid leave, 
workplace accommodations, or gender mainstreaming. It will also be shown that 
conceptual adherence to formal equality presents a significant barrier to the adoption of 
substantive equality measures, but more so at the national, than at the state and local 
level. Part III concludes with the suggestion that having overcome both barriers to some 
degree, the US state legislatures are acting as laboratories of democracy in their 
adoption of measures designed to advance substantive equality. 
In support of this suggestion, Part IV considers, compares, and contrasts the 
equality measures enacted and proposed by the fifty US states and Washington D.C. 
These measures are considered for their ability to broaden the rights and protections 
afforded by national law and for their limitations compared to the EU’s PWD.912While 
finding state measures are not as expansive as their EU cousin, this Chapter concludes 
that they reveal an emerging shift in the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law. This is 
to say that with these measures, the US is slowly moving to the next stage, beyond a 
single vision, rights-based model of equality, and towards a truly holistic, and 
transformative model. This conclusion is bolstered by the bold and novel assertion in 
Chapter 7, that gender mainstreaming is now a US domestic equality strategy. 
II Legal barriers to substantive equality measures. 
That pregnancy discrimination continues in the US, despite Constitutional and 
statutory efforts to end it was made clear in Chapter 5. Furthermore, as the previous 
discussion regarding the EU model of equality has revealed, pregnancy discrimination 
and a correlative legal response are not unique to the US. It was also revealed that 
whereas the only limit upon the adoption of equality measures in the EU is the ability of 
the member states to agree, the US Constitutional mandate of formal equality places 
specific parameters on the adoption of all national, state, and local legislation.913 
Furthermore, unlike the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which cannot 
                                                 
911 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the US Constitution, and Chapter 2 for a discussion of the division 
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declare member state laws invalid, the US Supreme Court (USSC), through its power of 
judicial review, as cemented in the cases of Marbury v Madison, and Fletcher v. Peck, 
may declare a statute of either Congress or a state void, if it exceeds their authority 
under the Constitution. This includes sex-based equality legislation.914  
In light of the foregoing, by evaluating specific EU legislation providing for 
maternity leave, workplace accommodations, and gender mainstreaming, against US 
Constitutional parameters, it is possible to determine whether or not these measures 
would be declared void if enacted in the US. By doing so, it is also possible to 
hypothesize how far the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law may shift, and legally 
converge with that of the EU.915 
a Maternity leave. 
In reviewing legislation having any gender-based classification, the USSC will 
subject it to what is called an ‘intermediate level’ of judicial scrutiny. This means that to 
be constitutionally valid, an equality measure must be found to ‘serve important 
governmental objectives’ and ‘the discriminatory means employed [must be] 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’916Thus, should Congress or 
the state legislatures enact equality laws similar to those contained in the EU model of 
equality, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, including paid mandatory maternity leave, 
workplace accommodations, and the strategy of gender mainstreaming, these measures 
would have to comply with the unique parameters established by the US Constitution, in 
order not to be struck down.  
Beginning with ‘maternity leave,’ if Congress were to enact a statute with 
provisions identical to those contained in the EU’s Pregnant Worker’s Directive 
92/85/EEC (PWD), it would be open to a constitutional challenge via judicial review. 
Under the ‘intermediate level’ of scrutiny set forth in the case of the University of 
Alabama v. Garett, Congress would be required to justify its new Act as a valid exercise 
of congressional power to enact a prophylactic measure, to ‘both to remedy and to deter 
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violation of rights guaranteed.’917That is, the right to be free from gender discrimination 
in the workplace. In order to be successful, Congress would be required to show that the 
measure was both, ‘congruent and proportional to the targeted violation,’ and that 
previously enacted sex discrimination measures have been unsuccessful in redressing 
the problem.918The previously enacted legislation Congress would likely rely upon are 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
(PDA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.919 
The reasoning in the review would be the same as that applied by the USSC to 
the Congressional enactment of the FMLA, which, as discussed in previous Chapters, 
entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave. In considering 
the ability of Congress to enact the FMLA, the USSC declared in Nevada v. Hibbs, that 
its authority to remedy and deter unconstitutional conduct meant that it could rely on 
and take account of the effectiveness of existing laws.920Consequently, in any challenge 
to its enactment of a ‘paid maternity leave’ statute, Congress would want to claim that 
the three existing laws relating to discrimination and leave are insufficient and not fit for 
purpose. In light of the clear limitations of Title VII and the PDA, as revealed in the 
discussion of federal case law in Chapter 5, it is suggested that it would not be a difficult 
task for Congress to argue ‘legislative ineffectiveness.’ At least to the extent that any 
proposed statute would follow the PWD, by seeking to prohibit the termination of 
pregnant employees, provide for paid leave, and mandate accommodation.  
In addition to providing testimonial, statistical, and other data that pregnancy 
discrimination continues in the US, despite the enactment of Title VII and the PDA, 
Congress would be able to rely on the fact that the FMLA also falls short of its target. 
That is to say, while the leave provisions of the FMLA were intended to make it, 
‘feasible for women to work while sustaining family life,’ Congress can argue that the 
statute has been unsuccessful for the vast majority of pregnant workers.921This is 
because the FMLA provides only unpaid leave and has very stringent eligibility 
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requirements.922To justify its claim, Congress could rely on Department of Labo[u]r 
(DOL) survey reports indicating that despite the twenty-two years that FMLA leave has 
been available, the percentage of workers covered by its provisions have remained 
almost static, only increasing from 54.9% of eligible employees in 2000, to 60% in 
2012, including less than one fifth of all new mothers.923Accordingly, Congress could 
argue that only by lowering the workplace minimum employee requirements from 50 to 
20 employees would eligibility be able to increase to a more significant level of 
67%.924Congress could also observe that until such a law is enacted, the US will be the 
only developed country that does not offer government sponsored paid maternity 
leave.925Moreover, Congress could rely on research indicating the significant economic 
benefits to women and US society with the provision of maternity leave. For not only 
does paid maternity leave increase women’s labour force attachment, it protects 
women’s wages; potentially limiting recourse to public assistance.926A large body of 
research also reveals a business case for paid leave, suggesting that it enables employers 
to attract and retain talent, lowering recruitment costs, and improving productivity.927 
Finally, as the USSC in California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, has 
already upheld the right of state legislatures to enact maternity leave laws, Congress 
could assert that it is now merely exercising its authority ‘to occupy the field’ and is 
seeking to enforce the substantive provisions of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (EPC).928This argument would be supported with evidence that 
the need for maternity leave had been the initial thrust behind the enactment of the 
FMLA, prior to the lobbying by equal treatment feminists for a ‘gender neutral’ measure 
for self-care and family leave.929   
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In response, those seeking to challenge the law would argue that maternity leave, 
without a parallel provision for paternity leave, not only violates the EPC, but reinforces 
the pervasive sex role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work, as 
discussed by the USSC in Hibbs.930In light of the dissenting commentary of USSC 
Justice Ginsburg, in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, referring to California’s 
law requiring leave only for disability in pregnancy, which was challenged in Guerra, 
and to which Justice Ginsburg stated that she would have ‘preferred the interpretation 
urged by the equal treatment feminists,’ it is thought that an EPC challenge would be 
extremely strong.931There is also the problem that a narrowly drawn maternity leave law 
runs the risk of being unable to respond to societal changes and technological advances. 
Recalling from the discussion in Chapter 4, the CJEU interpreted the EU right to 
maternity leave narrowly, thereby excluding men, adoptive parents, and surrogate 
mothers from the provisions of the PWD. In an effort to avoid similar limitations, it is 
suggested that if Congress were to enact a publically supported maternity leave law, it 
would be wise to provide for paternity leave, and address the rights of other workers, 
including surrogates and adoptive parents.932  
b Mandatory leave. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Congressional enactment of a ‘paid 
maternity leave’ law followed Article 8(2) of the PWD, and mandated a two week 
period of leave, it can definitively be said that this provision would be struck down as 
unconstitutional. The USSC decision in Cleveland Board of Education v Fleur makes 
clear that mandated leave violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the US Constitution.933This is because, ‘freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause,’ and 
‘the ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at work past any fixed time in 
her pregnancy is very much an individual matter.’934Consequently, while a US statute 
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could not require a woman to take maternity leave, or for that matter, require a man to 
take paternity leave, an employer could be required to provide leave to women and men 
alike.  
Finally, for any maternity leave measure to pass Constitutional muster, Congress 
must clearly articulate that its objective in the enactment, as stated by the USSC in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., is ‘to achieve equality of employment opportunities...’ for 
pregnant workers.935In this regard, it is suggested that a constitutional challenge to 
nationally provided maternity leave is less likely to be successful if Congress engages in 
careful drafting, taking into account Constitutional requirements and the conceptual 
barriers discussed below. It is suggested that this is most easily achieved through an 
amendment to the existing FMLA, providing publically funded, gender-neutral, longer, 
job-protected, paid leave to all workers.  
c  Workplace accommodations and gender mainstreaming. 
The foregoing constitutional analysis also applies to the enactment by Congress 
of laws pertaining to workplace accommodations, including the right of transfer to a less 
physically arduous position for the duration of pregnancy, the right to breastfeeding 
accommodations, and to a Congressional enactment of the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming.936The assertion relating to gender mainstreaming is made with the 
caveat that if Congress were to statutorily provide for such a transformative measure, it 
would be well advised to enact the broader strategy of ‘diversity mainstreaming,’ 
discussed in previous Chapters. This is because a broader provision would help protect 
the strategy against an EPC challenge, and would be in keeping with the broader 
categories of protection from discrimination afforded by Title VII. A more detailed 
discussion of the US strategy of gender mainstreaming is otherwise deferred until 
Chapter 7. 
With regard to workplace accommodations for pregnant workers, as Congress 
has already sought to address discrimination arising from workplace leave and 
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accommodation policies, via the FMLA, the American’s with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), these laws show that the US Constitution does not pose an insurmountable 
barrier to the adoption of substantive equality measures in this area.937Nevertheless, 
legislation expressly providing for paid leave and accommodation for pregnancy is yet 
to be adopted on a national level. Legislation was proposed in both houses of Congress 
in 2012 declaring it an unlawful practice ‘not to make reasonable accommodations to 
known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions of job 
applicants and employees,’ but neither measure was enacted. These Bills were re-
introduced in 113th Congressional Session, 2013-2014, but they too were never 
enacted.938 
The crux of the problem for women in the US is that Congress has consistently 
taken a reactive and piecemeal response to Supreme Court decisions highlighting the 
shortcomings of national equality laws, in contrast to the historically proactive and 
holistic approach taken by the EU institutions to the need to address the disadvantage 
that pregnancy creates for women’s careers. The results of this research suggest that one 
reason for this piecemeal approach is the adherence by Congress to particular equality 
concepts, as defined in Chapter 1, and as discussed further below. This suggestion does 
not ignore the fact that there is also reluctance by many members of Congress to expand 
what they view to be the public ‘safety net’ in the US. The debate surrounding the recent 
adoption of the ACA, which contains several provisions benefitting pregnant and 
lactating workers, highlights the challenge in expanding welfare provisions, even where 
they are contained in health and safety measures.939The reality is that in comparison to 
the EU, where there are strong social supports, the US is defined by its ‘anti-
welfarism.’940This is to say that whereas the EU mandates paid vacation time, maternity 
leave, and sick leave, among other social rights, the US does not yet mandate these 
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leaves nationally. While there are calls by President Obama to enact these laws, 
Congress has yet to do so; leaving the state legislatures to fill the vacuum, as discussed 
in Part IV.941 
III Conceptual barriers to substantive equality measures. 
Different treatment ‘requires employers to grant pregnant employees 
‘most favoured nation status.’942 
This research found that in addition to legal barriers, there are strong conceptual 
barriers to the adoption of substantive equality measures specific to pregnant workers. 
However, whereas legal barriers may render equality legislation void after its enactment, 
conceptual barriers have tended to preclude its enactment in the first place. This section 
considers these conceptual barriers, and assesses how and where they may be overcome. 
a Formal v. substantive equality. 
Recalling from the discussion in Chapter 2, the American feminist movement 
has a long and well-developed history, characterized by the development of two 
diametrically opposed philosophies regarding the adoption of measures intended to 
secure equality in pregnancy and maternity.943These two philosophies distil to result in a 
difference of support for ‘equal’ versus ‘special’ treatment. This is to say that conceptual 
and philosophical differences exists between support for equality measures that require 
employers to treat pregnant workers the same as any other employee, (formal equality- 
equal treatment adherents/liberal feminists) versus support for measures, which require 
employers to treat pregnant workers differently, in order that they may be treated 
equally (substantive equality/special treatment adherents). Recalling the discussion in 
Chapter 5 of employer policies limiting ‘light duty’ work to those injured on the job will 
help to make this distinction more clearly. Formal equality adherents accept such 
limitations as legitimate employer policy, and ignore the disproportionate impact on 
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pregnant employees. In contrast, substantive equality adherents argue that specific 
accommodation measures for pregnant workers are required in order to end the 
structural inequality that exists in the workplace. Viewed narrowly, formal equality 
feminists oppose the enactment of legislation providing protective rights for pregnant 
workers, in favour of ‘gender neutral’ legislation designed to protect all workers.944They 
assert that to do otherwise would operate to reinforce and reproduce social inequality. 
For these US feminists, the enactment of what they view to be ‘special treatment’ 
measures would also run counter to efforts that achieved success in ending the types of 
female protective legislation that historically disadvantaged women in the workplace, 
including women only ‘foetal protection’ policies and automatic dismissal upon 
becoming pregnant, as discussed in Chapter 5.945Their concern lies with the fact that the 
biological differences of women have historically been used to exclude and subordinate 
them. Therefore, ‘special treatment’ is considered damaging to equality efforts, serving 
to reinforce ‘ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the 
Constitution.’946Consequently, these feminists object to taking pregnancy into account 
in drafting workplace legislation. They object on the basis that ‘special treatment’ 
reinforces broader stereotypical notions of women as child bearers and carers.947 
The results of a closer review of national legislation reveals that the arguments 
of ‘equal treatment’ feminists, including those of Wendy Williams and Susan Deller 
Ross, have garnered significant Congressional support, as reflected in the comments of 
the drafters of the first FMLA bill, who ‘agreed that any national bill would focus not 
only on pregnancy, but on equal treatment for all workers.’948Their arguments have also 
historically received support from American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), economic 
theorists, and many US business leaders. This support was made evident in the 
numerous briefs filed in the landmark case of Guerra, and the suggestion that special 
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protections would encourage employers to employ fewer women,949on the basis that, 
‘pregnancy renders women less reliable, less productive employees, absent more often, 
more expensive; that is to say fundamentally different and handicapped.’950 
While the concerns raised by ‘equal treatment’ feminists are not without merit, 
as the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 of the unintended negative consequences of EU 
protective measures revealed, they fail to acknowledge that the formal equality model 
adhered to thus far, has only partly ended the inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion 
suffered by pregnant workers in the US. As the discussion in Chapter 5 showed, in the 
more than two decades since Guerra was decided, pregnancy discrimination continues 
under the guise of gender-neutral employer policies. As substantive equality/’special 
treatment’ feminists observe, including Professor Herma Hill Kay, pregnant workers 
have not achieved equality under the US model. These feminists correctly emphasise 
that ‘assimilation is not equality,’ and that as it is not possible to ‘gender neutralize’ 
pregnancy, formal equality can never bring about radical change in US society.951 
Rather, they claim, quite rightly that: 
In order to maintain a woman’s equality of opportunity during her 
pregnancy, we should modify as far as is reasonably possible those 
aspects of her work where her job performance is adversely affected by 
her pregnancy. Unless we do, she will experience employment 
disadvantages arising from her reproductive activity that are not 
encountered by her male co-worker.952 
Nevertheless, as Conaghan states, adherence to formal equality in the US has 
resulted in, ‘entrapment in theoretical and ideological straightjackets.’953This entrapment 
has historically resulted in a quagmire, particularly as regards the national provision of 
publically paid maternity leave and the workplace accommodation of pregnancy.954I use 
the term historically, as the results of this research suggest a resolution to this quagmire 
is slowly emerging on the national, state, and local level. There is also evidence to 
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suggest that the failure of formal equality to adequately address pregnancy 
discrimination is providing impetus to calls for a more expansive interpretation of the 
PDA by the US Supreme Court, as revealed in the amicus curiae brief filed by ACLU in 
the 2013 case of Young v. UPS. In their brief, the ACLU argued that the statute requires 
parity in employer’s treatment of pregnant workers, for the purpose of providing light-
duty work, even though an employer does not provide parity for all non-pregnant 
employees.955While this is a promising development, the response of the US Supreme 
Court in its judgment issued on 25 March 2015, was to reject this argument, with the 
statment that ‘We doubt that Congress intended to grant pregnant workers an 
unconditional most-favored-nation status.’956  
b Insurmountable barriers? 
The results of this research suggest that, as with most Constitutional barriers, 
conceptual barriers are not insurmountable, and may be overcome to some degree, 
through choice of legislative form and/or legislative forum. This assertion is based on 
two observations. First, Congress may use health and safety legislation rather than 
antidiscrimination law to regulate the workplace in a manner that advances gender 
equality. Recalling from the discussion in Chapter 5, the ACA contains several 
provisions that benefit pregnant workers, including banning health insurers from 
requiring that women pay more for the same insurance coverage as men; requiring that 
all insurance plans provide maternity health coverage; and requiring break time for 
nursing mothers in workplaces with fifty or more employees.957Although the ACA has 
been the subject of an extensive and divisive debate and Constitutional challenge, much 
of the criticism has been focused on the public and private cost of expanding healthcare 
provision and the public funding of abortion.958In contrast, the private workplace 
                                                 
955 Young (n 137) 446 (fn 4), and 575 U. S. ____ (2015) 13. NB: The matter was ultimately remanded to 
the District Court for trial on the issue of direct discrimination. 
956 Note: arguments in this appeal were heard by the USSC in December 2014. On April 27, 2015, the 
USSC vacated summary judgment in favour of the employer.  
957 Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 207) Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Public Law 111-148, Section 4207. As of March 23, 2010 amended section 7. 
958 See the concerns raised by Caterpillar, Verizon, and Deere—that the new law could adversely affect 
their company’s ability to provide health insurance to their employees: House of Representatives, ‘Energy 
& Commerce Subcommittee to Hold Hearing on Impact of Health Care Reform Law on Large 
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accommodation for lactating workers failed to give rise to the feminist objections seen 
with the adoption of the PDA and the FMLA.959Instead, over 360 organizations 
expressed support for the health reform bill.960This suggests that the use of health and 
safety legislation is a less controversial, albeit limited means by which Congress may 
advance substantive equality in the US.  
Secondly, as this study of state enacted antidiscrimination law reveals a variety 
of measures, some of which provide ‘special treatment’ for pregnant workers, these 
findings suggest that conceptual barriers to substantive equality laws operate differently 
at the national and state level in the US. The reason for this difference is rooted in the 
US system of ‘dual sovereignty,’ between the fifty states and the federal government. As 
explained in Chapter 5, by virtue of the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, all 
state legislatures are free to adopt broader equality laws than those provided by 
Congress, as long as they do not conflict with Constitutional guarantees and are not pre-
empted by federal law, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI, 
Clause 2).961Therefore, as Congress is not the sole source of equality laws, the fifty US 
states and Washington D.C. may elect to enact measures that go beyond the 
congressionally mandated minimums of the PDA. Importantly, this legislative 
prerogative of the states has been affirmed by the USSC, with its observation that the 
PDA does not prohibit all favourable treatment of pregnancy, as Congress intended it to 
be, ‘a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop—not a ceiling 
above which they may not rise.’962 
As the discussion in Part IV will show, this blessing of state enacted measures by 
the highest Court in the US cannot be overstated, as it offers a ‘green light’ for the 
                                                 
Employers’ (Committee on Energy & Commerce, 2010).  
<http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/energy-commerce-subcommittee-to-
hold-hearing-on-impact-of-health-care-reform-law-on-large-emplo> accessed 13/2/15. See also: Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al. 134 SCt 2751(2014), wherein the majority of the Supreme Court held 
that for profit corporations are not required to provide certain forms of birth control mandated by the ACA 
(n 120). 
959 See the history of the passage of the FMLA in Elving (n 162). 
960 Office of Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Supporters of Health Reform (2011). 
961 See: Guerra (n 693). See also: Brennan Jr., ‘State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights.’(n 693) 
962 ibid Guerra (n 693) 691 (quoting the Court of Appeals decision 758 F.2d, at 396). 
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adoption of a variety of substantive equality measures, including job-protected paid 
leave, workplBrennace accommodations, and gender mainstreaming. 
Having established the prerogative of the US state legislatures to adopt measures 
seeking substantive equality for pregnant workers, the next section addresses their 
motivation for doing so.   
c Why states enact ‘special treatment’ measures. 
The results of this study suggest three clear motivations for the US states, 
Washington D.C., and local municipalities within the states to enact equality measures 
providing ‘special treatment’ for pregnant workers.   
The first motivation was the enactment of an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to 
the state’s Constitution. It was observed in Chapter 5, that although the federal ERA 
never obtained the necessary number of ratifications for it to be enacted after Congress 
adopted a joint resolution proposing it in 1972, it did encourage the enactment of similar 
amendments to state Constitutions.963While the specific terms of the state ERAs did not 
always follow that of the federal proposal, they had the same intent, of ending sex 
discrimination.964This is to say that as the state ERAs reflected ‘a fundamental public 
policy against discrimination in employment,’965they required their state legislatures to 
consider the extent to which existing laws provided equality of opportunity for pregnant 
workers, and to make adjustments accordingly.966The result of this consideration was 
that several states amended their antidiscrimination laws to expressly prohibit 
discrimination against pregnant employees. Importantly, not only did many of these 
pregnancy discrimination laws actually precede the PDA, they often went further, not 
                                                 
963 Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), 86 Stat. 
1523. See also the discussion in Kay (n 32) 113, and Chapter 5. 
964 For the text of the amendments to the Constitutions of twenty states, see: Gladstone. Leslie W., CRS 
Report for Congress: Equal Rights Amendments: State Provisions (2004). See also: L.J. Wharton, ‘State 
Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against 
Sex Discrimination’ (2004) 36 Rutgers LJ 1201. 
965 Roberts v Dudley 140 Wn2d 58 (2000) at 78 (Alexander, J. concurring) (quoting Rojo v Kliger, 52 Cal 
3d 801(1990)). 
966 See the discussion of substantive equality in Chapter 1. See also: P.L. Proebsting, ‘Washington’s Equal 
Rights Amendment: It Says What It Means and It Means What It Says’ (1985) 8 U Puget Sound L Rev 
461, for a discussion of the efforts of the Washington State legislators to conform state statutes to the 
ERA. For a discussion of Montana’s efforts, see: Kay (n 32) 10. 
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merely providing for formal equality, but providing job-protected maternity leave and 
the right to compensation through the use of accumulated leave time. This was the case 
in Massachusetts, where its ‘Maternity Leave Act,’ enacted in 1972, mandated the 
provision of eight weeks, unpaid maternity leave, with a qualified right to return to the 
same or similar position.967This was followed by the Connecticut legislature in 1973, 
which adopted Bill No. 1565, ‘An Act Concerning Maternity Leave,’ prohibiting 
employers from terminating a pregnant worker, who was entitled to a maximum of nine 
months job-protected leave and compensation via accumulated sick and/or other leave 
benefits.968Then, in Montana, House Bill 9 was introduced in January 1975, and adopted 
by the legislature as ‘An Act to Provide Maternity Leave to Public and Private 
Employees,’ using the language and provisions adapted from Connecticut.969House Bill 
9 was expressly stated to be a ‘result of the Interim Committee on equal rights of the 
sexes,’ and rendered it unlawful to terminate a woman’s employment because of 
pregnancy, entitled pregnant workers to a ‘reasonable leave of absence,’ to 
compensation for disability because of pregnancy, and a right to reinstatement.970  
A second motivation for states to legislatively address pregnancy discrimination 
was in response to the limitations of national equality law. These limitations were made 
evident to both Congress and the state legislatures with several Supreme Court 
judgments, culminating in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, in which the Court declared 
that a private employer’s comprehensive disability insurance plan did not violate Title 
VII, because it failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities.971While Congress 
effectively overturned Gilbert, through its enactment of the PDA in 1978, the initial 
responses of several state legislatures again went beyond equal treatment. This included 
the California law, which provided a right to four months unpaid, job-protected leave to 
California’s pregnant workers.972As Shu and Wildman observe, the California law was, 
                                                 
967 Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act (MMLA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch.149, § 105D. 
968 State of Connecticut, Bill No. 1565: An Act Concerning Maternity Leave, January Session, A.D., 
1973. (Connecticut State Library Legislative Reference Section). 
969 Montana State Senate, Minutes of the Meeting, Labor and Employment Relations, HR (Jan 10, 1975) 
(Montana Hist Society, Collection RS44 Bx/Fd No 3/17, 1975). 
970ibid. 
971 Gilbert  (n 37). 
972 1978 Cal. Stat. 4320 § 1, adding CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.35 to the California Fair Employment 
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‘a proactive measure designed to provide an affirmative accommodation to pregnant 
employees.’973  
A third motivation for state action was the adoption of the Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), by the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1979. CEDAW is arguably an international bill of 
rights for women. It defines discrimination in Part 1, Article 1 as ‘any distinction, 
exclusion, or restriction made on the basis of sex...’974It also provides not only for anti-
discrimination measures to be adopted nationally, but also, ‘temporary special measures 
aimed at accelerating de facto equality...’ and ‘special measures aimed at protecting 
maternity.’ Although CEDAW was signed without reservation, by President Carter on 
17 July 1980, it was never ratified by the US Senate.975Had it been, it would have 
required the US to nationally adopt some form of maternity leave law, as signatories are 
bound to put its provisions into practice and are required to submit four-year reports on 
their progress, pursuant to Article 18.  
Inspired by the Convention, and in response to the lack of national ratification, 
sixteen US states, eighteen counties, and forty-four US cities have legislatively 
implemented the standards of CEDAW within their boundaries.976In point of fact, in 
1998, San Francisco was the first city in the world to adopt an ordinance reflecting the 
principles of CEDAW, including gender mainstreaming, after it was:977 
Inspired by the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing, and frustrated by the continued inability to get the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of  
                                                 
Practice Act, former CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-33. Subsequently re-chaptered and re-titled, see: Fair 
Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12945 (2013). For a discussion of the history of the 
California law, see: Shu and Wildman (n 53). 
973 Shu and Wildman (n 53) 127. 
974 See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article1 
975 UNDAW, ‘CEDAW: Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW’ (UN) 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm> accessed 23/04/2012, for a list 
of reservations by Country. While the Obama Administration supports the Convention, calling it ‘an 
important priority,’ policy decisions and issues continue to prohibit its ratification. See: Luisa Blanchfield, 
The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): 
Issues in the U.S. Ratification Debate (CSR: 7-5700, R40750, 2013)  
976 See: Judith Resnick, ‘The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland’ (2008) 
[2008] 73 Mo L Rev 1105. See also: New York City HRI   
<http://nychri.org/documents/CEDAWRes_000.pdf> accessed 11/09/2014 
977 The City refers to the strategy as ‘gender analysis’ See: Dept on the Status of Women, ‘Gender 
Analysis Guidelines’ (City & County of San Francisco, July 2008)  accessed 09/11/2014 
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Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ratified in the U.S. 
Congress...978 
It is important to note that there is great potential for the enactment of similar 
measures in other Cities, as San Francisco is spearheading a campaign to encourage one 
hundred other US cities to adopt a CEDAW measure by December 2015.979 
Overall, the results of this study found all three motivations were strong enough 
for US state legislatures to overcome conceptual (and other) challenges to their 
proposals. This is not to say that these challenges failed to impact the measures 
proposed, or that they ceased to exist once the laws were enacted. Indeed, a review of 
the legislative record reveals that prior to enacting the Montana Leave Law, arguments 
and amendments were considered and then rejected regarding a potential negative 
financial impact upon small employers.980The Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL) 
was also a ‘hotly debated law’ in California, and the provisions originally proposed were 
amended in response to employer opposition.981Despite these concerns, the California 
legislature believed the law was necessary to overcome: 
The current [Supreme] court rulings by naming pregnant employees as a 
preferential treatment of pregnancy, so long as it is consistent with the 
goal of achieving equality of employment opportunities.982    
This is also not to say that state enacted substantive equality measures have been 
free from constitutional or pre-emptive challenge.983These challenges have given US 
equal treatment feminists and business lobbyists alike the opportunity to reiterate their 
                                                 
978 See: Chapter 12 K: Local Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Ord. 128-98, App. 4/13/98, amended by Ord. 325-
00, File No. 001920, App. 12/28/2000). Also, Dept on the Status of Women, CEDAW in Action: Local 
implementation in the City and County of San Francisco (2010) 2; Adopting the Operative Principles of 
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
ORDINANCE NO. 7,224–N.S. Chapter 13.20. 
979 City of San Francisco, ‘Cities for CEDAW’ (City & County of San Francisco, 2014) 
<http://sfgov.org/dosw/cities-cedaw> accessed 11/09/2014. 
980 Montana State Senate, Senate Committee of the Whole, Amendments to House Bill No. 9 (1975) 
981 California Senate Office of Research and Kate Sproul, Women and Equality: A California Review of 
Women’s Equity Issues in Civil Rights, Education and the Workplace (Senate Publications, 1999) 45, 
Guerra (n 693) [fn1]. 
982 Guerra (n 693) 292 (Stevens, J.) 
983 This was the case with Miller-Wohl Co.v. Comm’r of Labor & Industry 515 F Supp 1264 (DMont 
1981), vacated, 685 F2d 1088 (9th Cir1982), remanded 479 US 1050; 107 SCt 919 (1987), and Guerra. 
(n 693). 
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arguments against ‘special treatment’ measures, most notably in the amicus curiae briefs 
filed in the landmark Guerra case.984However, as their arguments were ultimately 
rejected by the Supreme Court majority, it is fair to say state legislatures remain free to 
enact legislation providing some ‘preferential treatment of pregnancy, so long as it is 
consistent with the goal of achieving equality of employment opportunities.’985These 
state measures will now be critically reviewed for their ability to advance substantive 
equality for US pregnant workers.  
IV  State law in review. 
In an effort to answer the central question posed by this research, an in-depth and 
systematic review of the antidiscrimination laws, leave laws, and workplace 
accommodation measures of the fifty US states and Washington D.C. was undertaken. 
This review required using a variety of legislative resources, as there is no single 
collective repository for US state law. There are however, two resources where some 
collective information may be obtained. Unfortunately, neither is comprehensive or 
current enough to be reliable without further research. First, there is the website of the 
US Department of Labo[u]r, which lists some state labour laws.986A second useful 
resource is the website of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCLS).987 
NCLS conducts research in a variety of policy areas, including paid leave. It also offers 
access to state information and other legislative resources, which includes a searchable 
database containing the full text of state legislation for the current session. Together, 
these two websites offered good starting points for this research, but more 
comprehensive information was found using the state libraries and websites of the 50 
individual states and Washington D.C., where current and archived material were 
obtained.  
                                                 
984 NB: Cal Fed was joined in bringing the action by the Merchants & Manufacturers Association and the 
California Chamber of Commerce. For a list of briefs, see: Guerra (n 693). 
985 ibid 292. For a listing of listing of legislation relating to leave in California, from 1946-2004, see 
Milkman and Appelbaum, Paid Family Leave in California (n 9); Applebaum and Milkman Leaves that 
Pay. (n 9). 
986‘State-level Provisions for Pregnancy Accommodation and Pregnancy-Related Disability.’ (DOL, 2015) 
<http://www.dol.gov/wb/maps/3.htm> accessed 3/8/15 
987 National Conference of State Legislatures <http://www.ncsl.org/ > acccessed 20/8/15 
 251 
Additionally, the search engine LEXIS NEXIS was useful for searching federal 
and state case law using specific search terms including, ‘discrimination,’ ‘Title 
VII/PDA,’ ‘pregnancy, maternity, breastfeeding, and leave.’ The website of the US 
Supreme Court also provided access to the legal briefs filed in recent cases, as well as 
transcripts of oral hearings.   
The information gathered from this review was subsequently recorded onto 
separate Excel worksheets. The title of each Excel worksheet was dictated by the state 
laws that were recorded on them: ‘antidiscrimination measures,’ ‘breastfeeding 
accommodation measures,’ and ‘pregnancy, disability, family, medical and/or maternity 
leave measures.’ Additionally, each Excel worksheet contained separate headings 
reflecting such distinctions as the size of employer covered, the number of workers 
covered, eligibility requirements, and the name and reference of the state statute.988 
The results of this review, as discussed below, reveal three specific findings. 
First, where state (and local) legislatures have sought to address the problem of 
pregnancy discrimination, they have generally offered broader protections than the 
minimums mandated by federal law. Nevertheless, these protections remain limited in 
comparison to the protections afforded by the EU’s PWD and the national laws of the 
EU member states.  
Secondly, the protections afforded to pregnant workers by the state legislatures 
and Washington D.C. vary considerably, both in the number of workers covered and in 
the rights, they afford. In addition, because state laws are limited geographically, they 
can never offer the broad protections that national laws can.  
Finally, state equality laws play a vital role in addressing the problem of 
pregnancy discrimination in the US, and filling the lacuna left by Congressional 
adherence to formal equality. State measures also act as a bridge to the national adoption 
of job-protected paid leave and workplace accommodations. This is to say that the 
increasing number of state measures challenge Congress to do more and to do better in 
terms of the laws it proposes and enacts for workers and the families they support. 
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has yet to consider the ‘exact line of demarcation 
between permissible and impermissible preferential treatment under Title VII,’ state 
                                                 
988 See Appendices 2-4 in this thesis.  
 252 
legislatures remain in a unique position to act as laboratories of democracy in adopting 
practical measures that advance substantive equality for pregnant workers.989  
a State antidiscrimination law. 
 To restate, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the PDA, 
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, colour, religion, national origin, 
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth. A 
close review of legislation in the US states and Washington D.C. reveals that all but two 
states (Alabama and Mississippi) have enacted anti-discrimination laws embodying the 
sex discrimination policies contained in Title VII.990Furthermore, 37 states have 
measures that are more expansive in application, solely by virtue of the number of 
employees they protect. Specifically, while Title VII only applies to private workplaces 
having 15 or more employees. state statutes vary, applying to private workplaces having 
between 1 and 25 employees, and may apply to part-time and casual employees.991 
Moreover, the majority of state anti-discrimination measures extend to public arenas 
beyond employment, to include education, housing, public accommodations and credit 
transactions. Additionally, many state statutes prohibit discrimination on varying 
additional grounds beyond those listed in Title VII, including  ancestry, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, domestic violence victim status, marital 
status, family responsibilities, military status, citizenship status (in employment), the 
receipt of public assistance, political affiliation, personal appearance, disability, age, or 
on the basis of height, or weight, or lactation, and the equal pay requirement contained 
in separate federal statutes.992 
                                                 
989 Guerra (n 693) 293 [fn 4]. Note: local laws are not discussed separately, but within the context of state 
legislation. See Appendix 2. 
990 Note: Mississippi does have a legislative equivalent to the ADA, and prohibits against discrimination 
in housing and by housing authorities: ‘Rights and Liabilities of Individuals with ’Disabilities.’ Miss. 
Code Ann. § 43-6-5 (2013); Title 43. Public Welfare. Chapter 33. ‘Housing and Housing ’Authorities.’ 
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-33-723.  
991 Called ‘atypical workers’ in the EU. 
992 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, (Pub. L. 90-202) 29 USC, section. 621(as 
amended by section 115 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-166); ADA (n 141), ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (n 141); EPA (n 171).  
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With regard to pregnancy, Connecticut has more broadly defined discrimination 
‘based upon sex’ to include ‘discrimination related to pregnancy, childbearing capacity, 
sterilization, fertility, or related medical conditions.993Likewise, in 2013, Illinois 
amended its Human Rights Act to prohibit discrimination based upon pregnancy, 
childbirth, and conditions relating to pregnancy and childbirth.994The Virginia Human 
Rights Act and the Delaware Code also include ‘lactation’ as a protected ground.995Of 
note, is the fact that even though nineteen state statutes have not been amended to 
expressly provide that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination, as Title VII was 
so amended, it has not prevented their state courts from declaring that where a state 
statute is patterned after the relevant federal statute, it is to be construed in the same 
manner as the federal statute is construed. That is, to include pregnancy 
discrimination.996Nevertheless, a specific limitation of many of the state 
antidiscrimination laws is that despite covering more pregnant employees than their 
federal counterpart, the majority follow the federal judicial interpretation of PDA. This 
is to say that they require formal equality, in that a pregnant employee ‘shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work.’997 
Notably, in 2013, only six states in the Union mandated that a private employer 
provide some type of workplace accommodation for a pregnant employee, if requested. 
These are Louisiana, Connecticut, California, Hawaii, Maryland, and Washington. The 
Louisiana law expressly provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice to 
refuse a pregnant employee a ‘reasonable period of leave,’ (not to exceed four months) 
or ‘to refuse to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee to a less strenuous or 
hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy.’ Moreover, if an employer does 
not provide disability leave under a health, sickness, or temporary disability insurance 
                                                 
993 Connecticut Human Rights Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 (17) (2013). 
994 The Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2-102 (I) (2013). 
995 Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3903B (2013). Del.C. Title 19 Chapter 7, § 710. 
996 For example, Amy Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth 995 So2d 1118 (Fla 4th DCA 2008); Carol Self v. 
Midwest Orthopedics Foot & Ankle, P.C. 272 SW3d 364 (Mo2008); Lavalley v E.B. Whiting Co., 166 Vt 
205 (1997). 
997As illustrated by the Kentucky Civil Rights Act: Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.030 (8). 
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plan, an employer ‘shall not refuse’ an employee disabled by pregnancy, childbirth or 
related medical conditions a leave of absence for up to eight weeks.998  
Additionally, the Connecticut legislature has amended its Human Rights Act to 
prohibit an employer from terminating the employment of a pregnant employee, from 
refusing to grant a reasonable leave of absence for disability as a result of pregnancy, for 
failing or refusing to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any 
suitable temporary position which may be available, or for failing to reinstate a pregnant 
employee to her original job or equivalent position.999A reasonable leave of absence has 
been interpreted to mean 6-8 weeks for a normal pregnancy, but can be as long as is 
medically necessary.1000  
Similar measures are contained in the California Fair Employment Housing Act 
(FEHA), generally applying to employers of five, or more full or part-time 
employees;1001the Hawaii Administrative Rules, applicable to employers of one or more 
employees;1002the Washington State law against discrimination, applicable to employers 
with eight or more employees (Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 49.60.040 (7)(b) (2013), 
and the Maryland State Government Code, which repealed and re-enacted §20–601(a)-
(d) and 20-606(a)(4)) requiring reasonable accommodation in workplaces with fifteen, 
or more employees.1003Notably, in the period 2014-2015, the number of these state 
‘accommodation’ laws, almost doubled, as Delaware, Washington D.C., Illinois, 
Minnesota and West Virginia adopted laws expressly requiring private employers 
                                                 
998 Louisiana Pregnancy Discrimination Law, Acts 1997, No. 1409, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 1997, La. R.S. 23:342.  
999 See: Section 46a-60 (7) of the Connecticut Human Rights Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 (17) (2013), 
the employer must have three or more employees. 
1000 PCSW, Connecticut General Assembly: Permanent Commission on the Status of Women. About Your 
Rights. 
1001 Additionally, employers of 50 or more full or part-time employees are required to provide 12 
additional weeks under the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act 2008, Gov. Code sections 12945.1, 
12945.2. 
1002 Hawaii Administrative Rules 4, §12-46-106 through 108 [Eff 12/31/90] (Auth: HRS §§368-3, 378-8) 
(Imp: HRS §§368-3, 378-8). 
1003 Employment Discrimination- Reasonable Accommodations for Disabilities Due to Pregnancy, (HB 
0804) Chapter 548. Additionally, Maryland has a Bill pending to provide leave for pregnancy and 
childbirth: Employment Discrimination-Leave for Pregnancy and Childbirth HB1334. 
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provide an accommodation for employees who have ‘work-related limitations stemming 
from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.’1004 
Additionally, while not expressly providing for different treatment of pregnant 
workers, twenty-four state statutes require that disabilities stemming from pregnancy 
and childbirth are treated the same as all other ‘temporary disabilities’ for all job-related 
purposes.1005This is a promising development in US antidiscrimination law, particularly 
as the majority of these enactments were in direct response to the lower federal court 
ruling in Young v UPS, Inc., in which a pregnant worker with a lifting restriction was 
found ineligible for a light duty assignment under a Collective Bargaining Agreement 
that only provided temporary alternate work for employees, ‘unable to perform their 
normal work assignments due to an on-the-job injury.’ Instead, the pregnant worker was 
forced to take an extended unpaid leave of absence and lost her medical coverage until 
her return to employment, after giving birth.1006 
Despite the fact that UPS changed its policy, effective 1 January 2015, to include 
pregnancy related impairments, and the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission issued new guidelines for employers regarding the situations in which a 
refusal to provide a workplace accommodation to a pregnant worker may constitute 
discrimination, six state legislatures have elected to amend their antidiscrimination laws 
to expressly require accommodation of pregnant workers, and large number of others 
prohibit employers from distinguishing between work and non-work related illness and 
injury for the purposes of providing light duty work. As the recent determination of the  
USSC in Young, rejected the argument that the PDA requires an employer to provide the 
same accommodations to workplace disabilities caused by pregnancy that it provides to 
                                                 
1004 Del.C. Title 19 Chapter 7, § 710; D.C. Code § 2-1401.05 (b); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-102(I)-(J); Ill. 
Adm. Code tit. 56, § 5210.110; Minn. Stat. § 363A.08; Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act, W.Va. Code § 5-
11B-2. 
1005 ’DOL, ‘State-level Provisions for Pregnancy Accommodation and Pregnancy-Related Disability.’ 
(DOL, 2015)  <http://www.dol.gov/wb/maps/3.htm> accessed 8/3/15. 
1006 Young (n 137). See: Brigid Schulte, ‘States move to ensure pregnant workers get fair chance to stay on 
job’ (The Washington Post, 2014) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-
people/wp/2014/09/08/states-move-where-congress-wont-to-ensure-pregnant-workers-get-fair-shot-to-
stay-on-job/> accessed 7/3/15. 
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workplace disabilities that have other causes, but have a similar effect on the ability to 
work, it may be concluded that state legislators will continue to respond.1007 
b Critical observations. 
A critic would argue that the state antidiscrimination laws outlined above do 
little to shift the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law as it applies to pregnancy. In 
response, it is suggested that as notable as the general lack of state measures mandating 
workplace accommodations for pregnant employees is, four factors mitigate against 
eschewing the US states as laboratories of democracy, and dismissing their role in 
shifting the US towards greater substantive equality. 
First, this research found that two other states mandate workplace 
accommodations for pregnant workers, but limit their mandate to public employees 
(Alaska, and Texas).1008This suggests that workplace accommodations are on their 
legislative radar, and may be expanded to private workplaces in the future. 
Secondly, the absence of a state mandate does not preclude voluntary employer 
policies. In light of the US Supreme Court denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
Harness v. Hartz, private employers remain free to voluntarily provide an 
accommodation to pregnant employees, without being considered to have discriminated 
against male employees.1009Indeed, this research found that accommodations for 
pregnant and breastfeeding workers are often provided in the collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated between employers and unions.1010  
Thirdly, while state law may not require private employers to provide workplace 
accommodations for pregnant employees, municipal law may. For example, in New 
York City (NYC) pregnancy is deemed a ‘disability’ under its Human Rights Law, 
requiring employers within city limits and with more than four employees to make 
                                                 
1007 See: UPS, No. 12-126 Young v. UPS, Brief for the Respondent (2014), EEOC, Enforcement 
Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (2014), and Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
575 U. S. ____ (2015) 
1008 Alaska Stat. § 39.20.500(a); 39.20.520; Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Sec. 180.004. 
1009 Harness v. Hartz Mountain Corp. 877 F2d 1307 (6th Cir 1989). 
1010 See the discussion in David A. Dilts and Hedayeh Samavati, ‘The Arbitration of Gender 
Discrimination Grievances in the United States’ (2997) 12 J Individual Employment Rights 209, 215. 
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‘reasonable accommodations’ for their pregnant employees.1011As with state laws, the 
value of municipal laws in achieving greater substantive equality for pregnant workers 
in the US cannot be overstated, because they often apply to a vast number of workers. 
This is the case in NYC, which is the most populous city in the US, consisting of more 
than eight million people, within a state of more than nineteen million people.1012Placing 
this data into perspective, NYC has a population that is higher than that found in each of 
fifteen of twenty-eight EU member states.1013This suggests that the NYC measure will 
have a significant positive impact on the lives of pregnant workers and the families they 
support. 
Finally, two states have enacted equality measures containing provisions 
intended to address other discriminatory actions by employers that affect pregnant 
workers; thereby showing an awareness of the lacuna in national laws. For instance, the 
Human Rights Acts of Idaho and Missouri explicitly address the issue of ‘associative’ 
discrimination, as discussed previously in Chapter 4. The Idaho Human Rights Act 
provides, ‘The prohibition to discriminate shall also apply to those individuals without 
disabilities who are associated with a person with a disability.’1014This provision would 
undoubtedly cover a situation of the type that arose in the Coleman case, also discussed 
in Chapter 4, and involving a woman who was dismissed from her employment in the 
United Kingdom. In that case, the CJEU found the employer to have unlawfully 
discriminated against Mrs. Coleman because of her association with her disabled 
child.1015It is suggested that there is nothing prohibiting the application of the Idaho 
statute to a person associated with a woman disabled by pregnancy, although any such 
case has yet to be decided by the Idaho state courts. In an aside, it is acknowledged that 
the pregnancy ‘disability’ would also have to meet the criteria of Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as amended, as the Idaho statute mirrors federal law.1016 
                                                 
1011 NYC Human Rights Law, Title 8 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. 
1012 ‘State & Country QuickFacts’ (US Govt., 27 June 2013).  
<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html> accessed 2/7/2013 
1013 For data, see: Europa, Member Countries of the European Union (2013). 
1014 Idaho Human Rights Act, Idaho Code §67-5090. 
1015 S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law (n 578). 
1016 ADA (n 141); ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (n 141). 
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Notably, the prohibition against ‘associative’ discrimination contained in the 
Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) is not only broader than the Idaho measure; it is 
also broader than the EU’s PWD and Equal Treatment Directive. (ETD)1017The MHRA 
provides that it is an additional unlawful discriminatory practice for employers with six 
or more employees, ‘to discriminate in any manner against any other person because of 
such person’s association with any person protected by this chapter.’1018The protected 
grounds explicitly listed in the chapter are ‘race, color religion, national origin, ancestry, 
and sex, and age as it relates to employment, disability, or familial status as it relates to 
housing.’1019As the Missouri Court of Appeals has restated in Self. v. Midwest 
Orthopaedics, that pregnancy discrimination constitutes sex discrimination under the 
MHRA, it may be concluded that discrimination against a person because of their 
association with a pregnant partner, disabled or otherwise, would also be 
prohibited.1020In particular, the language of the MHRA suggests that a situation of the 
type that arose in Kulikaoskas v Macduff, also discussed previously in Chapter 4, would 
be prohibited—that of an employer affording less favourable treatment to a man on the 
grounds of a woman’s pregnancy.1021This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
although the Missouri courts have yet to consider ‘associative’ discrimination in relation 
to pregnancy, they have considered it in relation to the protected ground of disability. 
This was the case in Francin v .Mosby, where the court found evidence that an 
employee was discharged from employment shortly after discussing his wife’s illness 
during an interview with his new supervisor, and after having stated an intention to take 
leave under the FMLA and requesting to work part-time.1022In its ruling, the court 
                                                 
1017 See: RSMO-Chapter 213 Human Rights. See: Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112), Recast Directive 
(n 15) Note: Neither EU Directive contains any provision relating to associative discrimination. However, 
the legislation of several member states do contain such provision, e.g. Ireland, Bulgaria, Austria, UK, as 
stated in, Commission, ‘Gender Equality Documents’ (Commission, 2/5/2014) 56. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/document/index_en.htm#h2-4> accessed 15/2/2014  
1018 Title 12. Public Health and Welfare. Chapter 213. Human Rights. Additional unlawful discriminatory 
practices. § 213.070(4) R.S.Mo. (2013) (emphasis added.). 
1019 Title 12. Public Health and Welfare. Chapter 213. Human Rights. Additional unlawful discriminatory 
practices. § 213.010 R.S.Mo. (2013). 
1020 Self (n 1019) 369. 
1021 Kulikaoskas (n 579). 
1022 Francin v. Mosby, Inc. 248 SW3d 619 (Mo App ED2008). 
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expressly stated that the statute ‘provides a cause of action where an employee is 
discriminated against for his association with a person protected by the MHRA.’1023 
Nevertheless, as potentially ground-breaking as the Missouri measure is, and 
reflective of substantive equality measures that are helpful to pregnant employees and 
their families, US state and municipal measures otherwise fall short in comparison with 
the provisions of the EU’s PWD.1024This is because even where workplace 
accommodations are mandated they are limited by a proviso that a request for 
accommodation is unreasonable if it imposes ‘an undue hardship’ on the employer, 
without any provision for paid leave in the alternative.1025In point of fact, only seven 
states in the Union provide paid family/and or sick leave in addition to, or in the absence 
of an employer provided accommodation. (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Washington.) All of which underscores the observation by the 
National Partnership for Women and Families that in the US, ‘New and expecting 
parents need more—and expect better.’1026 
c Leave measures  
Notably, the US state legislatures have not been as productive in enacting leave 
measures as they have been with regard to enacting antidiscrimination measures. This 
study found that only eighteen states have separately enacted measures, or amended 
their existing legislation to embody the leave provisions contained in the FMLA, 
compared with the forty-eight states that have adopted measures embodying the 
provisions of Title VII. Moreover, even where seven states have enacted paid leave 
legislation, their provisions are less generous than those found in most EU member  
states, with the one year maternity, paternal, and parental leave mandated in Denmark 
being the most generous in the EU, of which thirty-two weeks are paid at a rate that may 
amount to full pay. In contrast, the average number of weeks available to pregnant 
workers and women on maternity leave in the US states are fewer than the average 
                                                 
1023 ibid 622. 
1024 Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112). 
1025 ibid, Article 5(3)  
1026 National Partnership for Women and Families, Expecting Better: A State by State Analysis of Parental 
Leave Programmes (2005) 5 
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fourteen weeks of paid leave available in the EU, under the PWD1027and in comparison 
to the fourteen weeks stipulated by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention on Maternity Leave.1028Paid leave in the US states is also certainly less than 
the average nineteen weeks of paid maternity leave estimated to exist across the thirty-
eight countries in the international Organization for Cooperation and Economic 
Development (OECD).1029 
The foregoing observation suggests that it is somewhat more palatable for US 
states to enact measures that proscribe conduct than it is for them to enact measures 
imposing positive duties upon employers, and providing for paid leave. This suggestion 
is supported by academic research showing that the proposal for paid leave in California 
met with significant employer opposition intended to defeat the bill.1030The research of 
Appelbaum and Milken found that the California business community was concerned 
the enactment of the programme would impose ‘extensive new costs on employers,’ 
would be a ‘particularly serious burden for small businesses,’ and had ‘strong concerns’ 
about abuse of the program.1031These concerns have largely proven to be unfounded, as 
the programme is 100% funded by a payroll tax on employees, with no evidence of 
widespread abuse. Furthermore, as regards increased administrative and personnel costs 
to employers, Appelbaum and Milken’s research found that, ‘After more than five years’ 
experience with [Paid Family Leave], the vast majority of employers report that it has 
had minimal impact on their business operations.’1032 
Similarly, the passage of the New Jersey paid leave programme in 2008 had to 
overcome twelve years of legislative battles to provide six weeks of paid leave, rather 
than the twelve weeks originally proposed. Even on its day of passage, it was strongly 
opposed by the Chamber of Commerce, alleging that it would make business in New 
                                                 
1027 See discussion in Chapters 3 and 4. See Appendix 4. 
1028 ILO, The TRAVAIL Database of Conditions of Work and Employment: Working Time-Minimum 
Wages-Maternity Protection (2012). The US has not ratified C183- Maternity Protection Convention, 
2000 (No.183), Geneva, 88th ILC session (15 Jun 2000). 
1029 OECD—Social Policy Division—Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. PF2.1: Key 
characteristics of parental leave systems (2012). 
1030 See: Senate Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations hearing on Bill No SB 1661, Disability 
Insurance: Family Members (2001-2002). 
1031 Applebaum and Milkman Leaves that Pay (n 9) 4. 
1032 ibid. 
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Jersey ‘more expensive, more challenging and less competitive...’1033Despite the 
economic concerns voiced against the provision of paid leave, sixteen US States 
currently have some form of paid leave legislation pending, modelled on the California 
program considered further below.1034 
Overall, state-enacted leave measures relating to pregnancy and maternity are 
more expansive than the federal leave statute (FMLA), solely virtue of the greater 
number of employees covered, and less stringent eligibility requirements imposed. As 
stated previously, the FMLA applies only to private workplaces with 50 or more 
employees, and requires employees to have worked 1250 hours in 12 months prior to the 
taking of leave. In contrast, state measures vary from applying to private workplaces 
having between 1, and 100 employees, and in the number of hours and months that an 
employee is required to have worked for a covered employer. Leave lengths also vary 
from a ‘reasonable’ period of absence due to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical 
condition, to between 6 and 12 weeks in a 12-month period, or 10 or 16 weeks in a 24-
month period. Notably, in Tennessee, private employers with 100 or more employees 
are required to provide up to four months of gender-neutral leave for adoption, 
pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing.1035Whereas, public employers of 30 or more 
employees and private employers with 50 or more employees in Rhode Island are 
required to offer 13 weeks of maternity leave in 24 months.1036   
Several states also expressly provide leave for ‘pregnancy disability’. The 
Oregon provision for family leave includes ‘any period of disability due to 
pregnancy...’1037Furthermore, where an Iowa employer (of 4 or more employees) does 
not provide disability leave under a health, sickness or temporary disability insurance 
plan, state law mandates that they ‘shall not refuse’ an employee disabled by pregnancy, 
childbirth or related medical conditions a leave of absence for up to eight weeks.1038 
                                                 
1033 Southern NJ Chamber of Commerce, Paid Family Leave Desk Letter-Full Senate, April 7, 2008 
(2008)  
1034 NCSL, Employee Leave Legislation—2014 Year End Summary (2014). 
1035 Leave for Adoption, pregnancy, childbirth and nursing and infant Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4-21-408.  
1036 Rhode Island Parental Family and Medical Leave Law, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-48-1 et seq. 
1037 Family Leave, ORS § 659A.150 (6) (c) (2011). 
1038 Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Iowa Code § 216.6 (2) (2013). 
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While leave without pay is clearly not the best solution for women with families 
dependent upon their income, it is far preferable to dismissal from employment.1039 
Importantly, even if a state measure does not mandate family and, or medical 
leave beyond federal provisions, it may expressly award unemployment insurance 
benefits to pregnant women, unable to work ‘due to disability.’1040And, as stated 
previously, a private employer may voluntarily elect to do so. Notably, US government 
statistics also show that paid leave, which includes pregnancy and maternity leave, was 
the most prevalent employee benefit provided by private employers throughout the US 
in 2012, with 84% of private industry workers receiving holiday or personal leave, and 
61% covered by a sick leave plan.1041However, statistics also indicate that the voluntary 
employer provision of maternity leave in the US is more generally available to the 
educated classes. Between 2006 and 2008, 66% of new mothers with a bachelor’s 
degree had access to paid leave, before or after the birth of their first child, compared to 
19% of new mothers who had less than a high school education.1042This suggests that 
for women without access to paid leave and workplace accommodations, an overriding 
concern by US liberal feminists of ‘paternal protectionism,’ and push for gender 
neutrality may appear somewhat elitist. It may also be that scholars who object to 
special measures, on the basis that ‘they don’t disrupt the gendered patterns of working 
and caring that reinforce the in egalitarian relationship at home and at work,’ tend to do 
so from a privileged vantage point.1043Suggesting, therefore that state and local equality 
measures help bridge an obvious socio-economic gap in the protection that exists in the 
US. 
                                                 
1039 See: UN, Children’s Rights and Business Principles (2012). The survey reported that 5% of women 
were ‘let go’ from their employment during pregnancy or within 12 weeks of giving birth. 
1040 See: Colorado C.R.S. 8-73-108(4) (b) (I). 
1041 BLS and Robert W. Van Giezen, Beyond the Numbers: Paid leave in private industry over the past 20 
years (Aug 2013/Vol 2/No18, 2013). 
1042 UN, Children’s Rights and Business Principles (n 1058) 12. 
1043 Julie C. Suk, ‘ “A More Egalitarian Relationship at Home and at Work”: Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent in 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Essays in Honour of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’ 79 (Feb 4, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:10582562> accessed 9/25/2013. 
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d California—the ‘gold standard.’ 
This research found the broadest equality measures are those contained in the 
family and medical leave and temporary disability insurance programs enacted in 
California,  Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, which are intended to 
ensure that a woman unable to work due to disability during pregnancy, receives some 
monetary benefit. However, as laudable as these measures are, they are inadequate to 
address the lack of national public income support payments tied to leave. They also 
differ greatly in their provisions. For instance, New York has two state laws that 
combine with the FMLA to give 18 weeks partly paid, job-protected leave for a 
‘normal’ pregnancy and childbirth, with a maximum of 26 weeks for a ‘complicated’ 
pregnancy and childbirth, such as one involving a caesarean section. In contrast, for a 
normal pregnancy and childbirth, leave consists of 2 weeks under New Jersey Family 
and Medical Leave Act and 16 weeks under the temporary disability leave law. The 
temporary disability leave is also not paid maternity leave—it covers pregnancy 
disability and childbirth. It is the state and federal FMLA, which provide unpaid leave 
for a New Jersey worker to care for a newborn infant.  
Furthermore, in all five states, a pregnant worker must also meet the separate 
eligibility requirements for disability insurance coverage in order to receive benefits. 
And, an evident limitation is that they are a monetary benefit only and not a leave 
entitlement. Consequently, they do not provide for job protection, only the state and 
federal FMLAs do. In addition, while New York provides up to 26 weeks of disability 
benefits for pregnant workers and women who have given birth, that state lacks any 
leave measure, although a leave Bill is currently pending in the legislature.1044Instead, 
New York’s temporary cash benefits are available to most workers when they are 
disabled by an injury or sickness that is not work-related. This benefit amounts to fifty 
percent of the employee’s average weekly wage, to the maximum benefit of $170 per 
week, and applies to ‘disability caused by or in connection with a pregnancy.’ (N.Y. 
Workers’ Comp. Law § 201(9) (B).)  
                                                 
1044 See: New York State Assembly. Bill No. S04373 and AO3069. 
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It is generally acknowledged that the California measures mandating leave and 
benefits for private employees set the gold standard for state programmes in the US. 
Considered to be ‘a model of success,’1045receiving an ‘A grade’ from the National 
Partnership for Women and Families, research reveals that California has gone further 
than any other state (and Congress) in seeking to achieve substantive equality for 
pregnant workers.1046Enacted subsequent to the amendment of the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) in 1978, to proscribe certain forms of 
employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, and requiring employers with 
five or more full or part-time employees to provide up to four months unpaid, job-
protected disability leave, 1047the measures was amended in 1992 to provide a woman up 
to 55% of salary to a maximum weekly cap of $1104, in 2015, under the state disability 
plan.1048This provision was supplemented in 1993 by the California Family Rights Act 
(CFRA), under which workers were provided an additional 12 weeks of unpaid, job-
protected leave to bond with a newborn, adopted child or foster child.1049Then, 
recognizing that many workers could not afford to take an extended leave without pay, 
in 2002, the California Paid Family Leave Insurance Programme (‘PFL’- § 3300 (2013)) 
was enacted to provide up to 6 weeks of ‘partial’ wage replacement to eligible 
employees, financed through payroll taxes. Estimated to cover approximately thirteen 
million workers in California, the program is notable for being the first of its kind in the 
US, and is intended to make it easier for employees to balance the demands of the 
workplace and family care needs at home, by providing approximately 55% of lost 
income.  
However, as groundbreaking as the California provisions are, a closer review 
reveals that they too are limited in comparison to the EU’s Pregnant Worker’s Directive. 
The academic discourse surrounding the enactment of the California laws strongly 
suggests that these limitations are partly due to stakeholder objections. Indeed, the PFL 
                                                 
1045 ERA Expecting a Baby, (n 53)14. 
1046 NPWF, ‘Expecting Better: A State-by-State Analysis of Law That Help New Parents’ (2012) 
<www.NationalPartnership.org> accessed 6/8/2013. 
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was originally intended to provide for 12 weeks leave, but employer objections led to 
negotiations resulting in reduced the leave time, removing the employer contribution, 
and allowing an employer to require that an employee use up to two-weeks of employer 
provided vacation before applying for state benefits.1050Additionally, the PFL does not 
provide either job protection or return rights, and the wage replacement is lower than 
that found in most EU states. Nevertheless, this research found the PFL law to be a 
progressive and substantive equality law that applies equally to fathers and to mothers, 
helping to overcome the stereotype that ‘baby bonding time’ is an exclusive need of 
mothers. Its importance also lies in the fact that the California legislature made specific 
declarations in the Act that are analogous to the preamble of several EU social 
Directives, including the Parental Leave Directive, (2010/18/EU), relating to issues of 
flexibility and work life balance.1051Specifically, the California legislature found and 
declared that: 
(c) Developing systems that help families adapt to the competing interests 
of work and home not only benefits workers, but also benefits employers 
by increasing worker productivity and reducing employee turnover. 
(f) The majority of workers in this state are unable to take family care 
leave because they are unable to afford leave without pay. When workers 
do not receive some form of wage replacement during family care leave, 
families suffer from the worker’s loss of income, increasing the demand 
on the state unemployment insurance system and dependence on the 
state’s welfare system. 
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature to create a family temporary 
disability insurance program to help reconcile the demands of work and 
family.1052 
While the legislative history of the PFL law does not reference EU legislation, 
the comments listed in the third reading of its passage as Senate Bill 1661, indicate an 
awareness of the unenviable situation of the US, in comparison to other countries. This 
is to say that ‘the United States is one of the few developed countries in the world 
without a national paid parental leave program.1053 
                                                 
1050 See: workingfamilies.org, A Guide to Implementing Paid Family Leave: Lessons from California 
(2011)< http://www.paidfamilyleave.org/pdf/pfl_guide.pdf>accessed 10/8/2015 
1051 Parental Leave Directive 2010/18/EU (n 535). See also Chapters 3 and 4. 
1052 California Unemployment Code Section 3300-3306.  
1053 Senate Third Reading SB 1661 (Kuehl), as Amended August 23, 2002. Majority Vote. 
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Importantly, research also suggests that the California programme has been an 
unequivocal success. Statistics produced by Rossin-Slater, Mayer, and Waldfogel show 
that the availability of partial wage replacement has increased leave use in California by 
115- 140%.1054Prior to the adoption of the PFL, women in California took around 3-
weeks of maternity leave. With the advent of the Act, not only has leave taking 
increased by an average of 3-4 weeks, it has had a positive labour market effect for 
women, with ‘an 6-9% increase in work hours, conditional on employment, 1-3 years 
after the birth, and possibly with similar growth in wage income.’1055Unsurprisingly, 
these statistics have been used to support President Obama’s call for Congressional 
passage of publically supported paid leave law.1056 
It is notable that in addition to guaranteed leave in California, pregnant 
employees are entitled to a ‘reasonable accommodation’ of pregnancy and related 
medical conditions. Under the FEHA, a pregnant employee may request transfer to less 
strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy. The Regulations 
contained in the California Government Code, Section 12926, state that accommodation 
includes ‘childbirth or medical conditions related to childbirth’ and ‘breastfeeding or 
medical conditions related to breastfeeding.’ Accommodations may include not only the 
provision of facilities for breastfeeding, but also ‘job restructuring, part-time, or 
modified work schedules.’ The reasoning behind these provisions is that 
accommodation of pregnant workers, rather than transfer, would be ‘less costly, and 
often more desirable and appropriate’ for both the employer and the employee.1057  
Collectively the California laws most closely resemble EU equality laws for this 
category of workers. However, as expansive as the California’s laws are, it is undeniable 
that they are too geographically limited in effect to be able to address the lacuna in 
federal law. The California laws are applicable to a population of only 38 million people 
in a nation of approximately 318 million people.1058Nevertheless, it is suggested that 
California, along with other US state (and local) legislatures are ‘testing the waters’ of 
                                                 
1054 Rossin-Slater, Ruhm and Waldfogel (n 9) 12.  
1055 ibid. 
1056 See the discussion in Chapter 7. 
1057 Senate Judiciary Committee, AB 1670, Assembly Judiciary Committee, Hearing August 17, 1999. 
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paid parental leave and workplace accommodations.1059The ripple effect of such 
enactments cannot be overstated. California’s measures have become the model for 
legislative proposals mandating paid leave and workplace accommodations for pregnant 
workers nationally,1060and as the National Conference of State Legislatures notes, the 
legislatures in thirty-five states and Washington D.C. considered bills related to 
employee leave in 2014.1061This number will likely increase in 2015, as the President’s 
Budget includes $2.2 billion in funds to support the US states in developing paid family 
and medical leave programs.1062 
e Breast-feeding accommodation.1063 
In 2012, the US was listed last out of thirty-six developed countries on the ‘Save 
the Children’s Breastfeeding Policy Scorecard.’1064Attempting to fill the lacuna in 
national law, twenty-five US states and Washington D.C. have separately addressed 
breastfeeding in the workplace by prohibiting discrimination against breastfeeding 
workers, and/or by requiring workplace accommodations. Notably, all of these state 
breastfeeding measures were enacted prior to the 2010 amendment to Section 7 of the 
Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act (FLSA), which was discussed in Chapter 5. Section 7 now 
requires employers of fifty or more employees covered by the Act are to provide unpaid 
reasonable break time for employees to express breast milk for one year after a child’s 
birth, as well as ‘a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from 
intrusion from co-workers and the public,’ to be used by female employees to express 
milk.1065 
                                                 
1059 See: R Haygood and R Hensley, ‘Beyond the FMLA: A survey of state laws and legislation 
mandating paid family leave’ (2007) 34 Empl Relats Today 63, 73. 
1060 See: Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S.942/ H.R.1975; Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, 
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2007. Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 207) Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
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However, as with state enacted antidiscrimination and leave measures, state 
breastfeeding measures vary greatly in the rights and protections they afford. For 
instance, Mississippi and Hawaii prohibit discrimination against the use of ‘lawful’ 
break time to express breast milk, but do not mandate any workplace 
accommodations.1066In Connecticut, employers are prohibited from discriminating 
against an employee who has the right to use her meal or break period to express breast 
milk, but employers are not required to provide additional break time. The Connecticut 
statute also mandates that employers ‘shall make reasonable efforts’ to provide a private 
location.1067 
In contrast, the Washington D.C. Human Rights Act includes breastfeeding 
within the definition of sex discrimination, and requires employers to provide 
reasonable unpaid breaks and a sanitary location.1068Additionally, Rule 4-518, setting 
forth the D.C. Breastfeeding Guidelines recommend employers offer breastfeeding 
employees a flexible schedule, job-sharing or telecommuting arrangements, and allow 
the employee to bring a small fridge or freezer for storage.1069  
The size of the workplaces covered by the state statutes also varies, from 1, 3, 4, 
8, 25, or 50 employees, and with the majority of state measures limiting the length of 
accommodation from birth until 12 months. Only Vermont and New York require an 
accommodation to continue for three years. Additionally, while not expressly mandating 
that employers provide special accommodations to their breastfeeding employees, the 
legislatures of three states have adopted ‘joint resolutions’ recognizing breastfeeding’s 
value to the state and its citizens.1070In the case of Virginia, while its antidiscrimination 
law expressly prohibits the discharge of an employee on the basis of lactation, it does 
not mandate any accommodation by employers. Rather, a 2002 House Joint Resolution 
(HJ145ER) ‘encourages’ employers to recognize the benefits of breast-feeding and to 
                                                 
1066 Miss. Code Ann. § 71-1-55  (2013); HRS § 378-2 Discriminatory practices made unlawful; offenses 
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provide reasonable, unpaid break time and location to women.1071Similarly, Wyoming 
adopted Bill No. 005 in 2003. Section 2 states that, ‘the Legislature encourages 
breastfeeding and commends employers, both in the public and the private sector, who 
make accommodations for breastfeeding mothers whenever feasible.’1072Additionally, 
the 2012 Utah legislature adopted a ‘Joint Resolution on Breastfeeding’ to ‘encourage 
employers to make accommodations to meet the breast feeding needs of their 
employees.’1073  
In contrast, the legislatures of Washington State, North Dakota, Texas, and 
Rhode Island have adopted an alternative means of encouraging voluntary 
accommodation efforts by employers. These laws expressly permit an employer to use 
either an ‘infant-friendly’ or a ‘mother-friendly’ designation on its promotional 
materials, if the employer adopts an approved workplace breastfeeding policy. While all 
four statutes list the minimum policy requirements necessary to achieve the designation, 
including time, place and storage provisions,1074the Rhode Island law is supplemented 
by a $1,000 ‘Breastfeeding support grant’ to businesses, ‘to establish or enhance’ a 
lactation program in the workplace.1075  
 However, overall, the results of this research reveal three limitations in the state 
‘breastfeeding laws,’ beyond a general lack of express mandate and paid time off. First, 
in comparison to the provisions of Section 7 of the FLSA, employers are exempt from 
the state law if they can show that ‘the practice unduly disrupts the operations of the 
employer’ or places and ‘undue hardship’ on the operation of the employer’s business. 
State statutes generally define disruption and hardship to mean any action that requires 
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in relation to factors, such as the size 
                                                 
1071 House Joint Resolution No.145: Encouraging employers to recognize the benefits of breast-feeding 
and set aside appropriate space for such activities. 
1072 Original House Joint Resolution Bill No.005: Enrolled Joint Resolution No.1, House of 
Representatives, Fifty-Seventh Legislature of the State of Wyoming, 2003 General Session: A Joint 
Resolution recognizing breastfeeding’s value to the state and its citizens. 
1073 State of Utah 2012 General Session. H.J.R. 4 Enrolled. Joint Resolution on Breastfeeding. 
1074 Workplace breastfeeding policies-Infant friendly designation, Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 43.70.640 
(2013); Workplace breastfeeding policies- Infant friendly designation, N.D. Cent. Code, § 23-12-17  
(2009); Business Designation as “Mother-Friendly,” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 165.003  (2013); RI 
Dept of Health, ‘RI Breastfeeding Coalition: Breastfeeding Support Grant’ (State of RI, 2013)  
<http://www.health.ri.gov/partners/coalitions/breastfeeding/about/grants/index.php> accessed 20/08/2013 
1075 ibid, RI Dept of Health. 
 270 
of the business, the financial resources of the business, or the nature and structure of its 
operation, including consideration of the ‘special circumstances of public safety.’1076  
Secondly, the state measure may only apply to public employees. For instance, 
Montana requires all public employers to have written policy supporting the 
accommodation of breastfeeding workers and Indiana limits paid accommodation to 
state employees.1077 
Finally, only seven of the states with a legislative mandate of accommodation 
provide for private enforceability. Instead, the majority of states address breastfeeding 
accommodation as an issue of workplace conditions, rather than as discrimination.1078 
This means that where accommodation is mandated as part of a state’s health and safety, 
or labour laws, rather than as a human rights or antidiscrimination measure, the state’s 
Department of Labo[u]r enforces the law, and any fine accrues to the state, not to the 
employee. As most of the civil penalties are relatively small, the mandate appears 
somewhat toothless.1079Furthermore, even where a state statute permits a private cause 
of action, the results of this research reveal the financial consequences to an employer 
may be limited. This is the case in Hawaii, where the successful plaintiff is limited to an 
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the cost of suit, and $100. (HRS §489- 22). 
Colorado also requires non-binding mediation between an employee and an employer 
prior to commencement of any litigation of a violation of the Statute1080  
f Shifting the trajectory.  
Notwithstanding the limitations of state equality laws, the results of this research 
suggest that the state (and local) legislatures are acting as laboratories of democracy, 
helping to shift the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law from a purely formal equality 
approach to addressing the problem of pregnancy discrimination, towards one that seeks 
greater substantive equality between women and men. Furthermore, as the vast majority 
                                                 
1076 See: the Workplace Accommodations for Nursing Mothers Act, C.R.S. 8-13.5-103 (2012). 
1077 Public Employer policy on support of women and breastfeeding-unlawful discrimination, Mont. Code 
Anno., § 39-2-215 (2012). 
1078 As does the FLSA (n 120), see the discussion in Chapter 5. 
1079 The author’s research found fines are levied at $100 in California, $100 per violation in Vermont, and 
$500 in Maine.  
1080 Workplace Accommodations for Nursing Mothers Act, C.R.S. 8-13.5-103 (2012). 
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of US law is state law, these legislatures offer the largest venue for the enactment of 
practical measures, including job-protected paid leave, workplace accommodations, and 
the strategy of gender mainstreaming. Indeed, the results of this research reveal that 
since 2013, state legislative proposals pertaining to pregnancy and maternity have 
increased, with some having since become law. This was the case with Rhode Island 
House Bill 5889 and Senate Bill 0231, establishing a temporary caregiver insurance 
programme, which was signed into law on January 11, 2013. The resulting Act provides 
gender neutral ‘wage replacement benefits’ to workers taking time off to bond with a 
new child.1081While the programme is limited in that it initially provides only four 
weeks of benefits, increasing to eight weeks in 2016, and the weekly rate varies between 
$72 and $752 per week, it serves to illustrate that the US State legislatures are 
continually proposing and enacting broader equality measures than Congress.1082Indeed, 
Connecticut is acknowledged to be the first state in the Union to mandate that employers 
provide paid sick leave to eligible workers.1083In addition, on June 24, 2013, Special Act 
No. 13-13 was adopted by the Connecticut General Assembly, establishing a ‘Task 
Force on Family Medical Leave Insurance,’ to study the feasibility of creating an 
insurance program to provide short-term benefits to workers who are unable to work due 
to pregnancy, or the birth of a child, or a non-work-related illness or injury, or the need 
to care for a seriously ill child, spouse or parent.1084Added to this, in 2014, fourteen 
states and Washington D.C. passed a total of twenty-two employee leave measures, in 
which California became the second state to enact a paid sick leave law. Additionally, 
Massachusetts voters approved a paid sick leave law in a ballot measure.1085 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that US state equality 
measures remain limited when compared to the EU’s Pregnant Workers Directive 
(92/85/EEC) and the national laws of the EU member states. Although inconsistencies 
also exist between the EU member state measures, the reality is that the presence of an 
                                                 
1081 RI Gen Laws. Ch. 28-41 Temporary Caregiver Insurance. 
1082 RI Dept of Labor & Training, ‘Temporary Disability Insurance’ (R.I. Govt., 2013).  
<http://www.dlt.ri.gov/tdi/> accessed 9/8/2013 
1083 Paid Sick Leave Act 2011 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 11-52 (S.B. 913) (West). 
1084 SB No. 6553/ HB065553LAB_031513: An Act Establishing A Task Force to Study Family Medical 
Leave Insurance. 
1085 NCSL, Employee Leave Legislation-2014 Year End Summary. 
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overriding Directive means that EU pregnant workers and women on maternity leave 
receive some level of job-protected paid leave, and the right to workplace 
accommodations.1086There is no comparative national measure in the US. Nevertheless, 
by recognizing the need to go further than merely prohibiting discrimination in order to 
advance equality, the state legislatures and Washington D.C. are moving US 
antidiscrimination law towards a substantive equality approach to addressing pregnancy 
discrimination, thereby enabling this category of workers to achieve what Grossman 
aptly calls, a full right to ‘social citizenship.’1087And, while criticism may fairly be 
levied at these state measures for an overriding and pervasive use of legislative 
terminology defining pregnancy in terms of ‘disability’ rather than sui generis, these 
measures seek to achieve the same goals as the Pregnant Workers Directive. That is, the 
advancement of equality of opportunity. Furthermore, it is also possible that most US 
pregnant workers seeking greater substantive equality care less about conceptual 
underpinnings and the terminology used in legislation to define their condition, or to 
ascribe rights, and more about the practical measures that are adopted to enable them to 
fully participate in the workplace.   
V Conclusion  
The goal of this Chapter was to present evidence of promising developments at 
the state level, which serve to suggest the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is 
shifting away from a purely equal treatment approach to tackling pregnancy 
discrimination, towards one that seeks greater substantive equality. I approached this 
task by first discussing the Constitutional and conceptual barriers that exist to the 
adoption of the protective measures contained in the EU’s Pregnant Workers Directive 
92/85/EEC. It was shown that although the parameters set by the US Constitution 
preclude an exact equivalent of the Directive, legislation providing for job-protected 
paid leave, workplace accommodations, and gender mainstreaming would survive a 
Constitutional challenge, if drafted in accordance with the parameters outlined. It was 
                                                 
1086 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
1087 L.C. McClain and J.L. Grossman (eds), Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship 
(CUP 2009) 234. 
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also shown that although the objections of US equal treatment feminists has served to 
thwart the adoption of national legislation that treats pregnancy as sui generis, a 
different legislative forum, and, or legislative form can facilitate the passage of 
measures that provide some preferential treatment for pregnant workers.   
Then, having explored how two specific barriers to the adoption of substantive 
equality measures may be overcome, it was instructive to examine the motivation for 
state legislatures to do so. A detailed survey of state and local laws indicated three 
strong motivations: (1) the adoption of an Equal Rights Amendment to the state 
Constitution; (2) awareness of the limited protections afforded by national 
antidiscrimination law; and (3) the failure of the US Senate to ratify CEDAW. These 
motivations, either separately or together were found to provide impetus to the 
enactment of a variety of equality measure benefitting pregnant workers, including 
protection against discrimination, job-protected leave, workplace accommodations, and 
the strategy of gender mainstreaming. Although a closer review revealed the vast 
majority of state laws are not as expansive as the PWD and likely never will be, these 
measures, yielded shared principles. That pregnant workers have a right to full 
participation in the workplace, and that states are entitled to assist in this.  
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Chapter 7: Gender Mainstreaming 
We must go beyond in an increasing effort to attain what in truth may be 
an unattainable summit.1088 
I Introduction 
Evidence was presented in the last two Chapters, which was intended to show 
that while there are profound differences of detail between EU and US 
antidiscrimination laws, there are important developments, which suggest the US is 
shifting away from a purely equal treatment approach to tackling the problem of 
pregnancy discrimination and towards one that seeks greater substantive equality.  
Advancing further evidence in support of this suggestion, this Chapter makes a bold and 
original claim, contrary to the assertions of Sylvia Walby,1089that the US has adopted the 
global strategy of gender mainstreaming domestically.’1090Specifically, it is suggested 
that with President Obama’s issuance of Executive Order No. 13506 in 2009, 
‘Establishing a Whitehouse Council on Women and Girls,’1091gender equality in the US 
is moving from being merely a ‘woman’s issue,’ to what Stratigaki correctly refers to as 
‘everybody’s business.’1092 
In order to explain, justify, and elaborate upon this claim, the discussion in this 
Chapter is divided into five parts. Part II follows on from the initial consideration of 
gender mainstreaming undertaken in Chapter 3, and addresses the specific lessons that 
arise from EU experience with implementation at the supranational and national levels. 
Part II suggests that it is essential for the US to understand these lessons, and address 
certain conditions and factors, whose existence are deemed essential for its gender 
mainstreaming strategy to be implemented successfully; as well as those conditions 
operating to render it ineffective as a tool for achieving greater substantive equality.  
                                                 
1088 William J. Brennan Jr., ‘Improving the Administration of Justice Today’ in Donald K. Carroll (ed), 
Handbook for Judges (1961) 139. 
1089 ‘The US is noteworthy for the absence of gender mainstreaming among its gender equality policies,’ 
Sylvia Walby, The Future of Feminism (Polity Press 2011) 80. 
1090 See Chapter 3. 
1091 Executive Order No. 13506 (n 12). 
1092 Stratigaki, ‘Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action’ (2005) (n 11). 
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Parts III and IV present evidence of the US venture into gender mainstreaming. 
Part III begins with a discussion of the unique vehicle chosen to adopt the strategy, 
revealing that while there is a history of Executive Orders designed to promote equal 
opportunities in the US,  the use of ‘soft law’ rather than a Congressional Act renders 
gender mainstreaming much more fragile, and subject to continuing political good 
will.1093Then, considering the specific lessons suggested by EU experience with the 
strategy, Executive Order No. 13506 (Order) is carefully reviewed for its limitations and 
its transformative promise. Finally, in Part IV, an original assessment is made of US 
implementation efforts taken to date, and of the Order’s overall likelihood of success in 
moving the US towards greater substantive equality.  
 In Part V, it is appropriate for the discussion to pan out to consider the 
importance of gender mainstreaming for US equality efforts. Evidence will be offered, 
which is intended to show that the importance of the strategy lies in its ability to be 
complementary, holistic, and a less controversial tool for achieving greater substantive 
equality in a nation where ‘special treatment’ rights for pregnant workers, and 
affirmative action measures give rise to particularly emotive debates.1094The conclusion 
reached is that with the adoption of gender mainstreaming, the US is moving towards a 
broader and more holistic approach to addressing gender inequality that will benefit 
pregnant and breastfeeding workers, and women on maternity leave. 
II Lessons from the EU 
While the EU is arguably the international leader in the adoption of the strategy, 
it is generally observed that its foray into gender mainstreaming has not been an 
unqualified success. The results of Benschop and Verloo’s study of EU experience 
reveals that there were high expectations that gender mainstreaming would operate as a 
powerful and ‘transformative’ strategy. Indeed, it was intended to bring a, ‘new élan to 
the stale domain of gender equality politics.’1095This expectation was not wholly 
unreasonable for, as Jacqui True observes, gender mainstreaming represents ‘a powerful 
                                                 
1093 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. 
1094 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
1095 Y. Benschop and M. Verloo, ‘Sisyphus’ sisters: can gender mainstreaming escape the genderedness of 
organizations?’ (2006) 15 J Gen Studies 19, 20. 
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challenge to business-as-usual politics and policy making.’1096This is because gender 
mainstreaming offers a different equal opportunity policy. In contrast to formal equality 
and special treatment, which focus upon the rights and needs of individuals, gender-
mainstreaming focuses on the institutional structures that give rise to inequality, 
disadvantage, and exclusion.1097These policy differences are best explained using the 
three innovative descriptions advanced by Rees: 
 Equal treatment—a ‘tinkering’ approach, brings women’s rights into line 
with men. 
 Special treatment/positive action—a ‘tailoring’ approach, designed to 
address women’s needs. 
 Gender mainstreaming—a ‘transformative’ approach, designed to 
integrate gender into all, systems, structures, policies, processes, 
procedure, organization and culture.1098 
In short, gender mainstreaming requires policy-makers and implementers not to 
accept that existing policy or the policy being advanced or considered is in effect 
gender-neutral, or free of bias towards the male norm. As such, the strategy operates to 
complement existing equality laws, challenge the status quo, and end structural 
discrimination through its application to all policies—economic, social, and political. 
However, the discursive analysis surrounding the strategy’s adoption and 
implementation in the EU suggests that it has fallen short of its potential to date. One 
response to this often critical analysis is that as gender mainstreaming is a long-term 
strategy for dismantling structural inequalities, it is likely premature to conclusively 
judge its achievements, or failures. Nevertheless, the analysis is useful, as it serves to 
highlight the promise and the pitfalls of this equal opportunity strategy for the US. It 
also serves to highlight the various methods, tools, and best practices, that have evolved 
in the EU, which are intended to enhance its likelihood of success, while minimizing the 
                                                 
1096 Jacqui True, ‘Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming’ 
(2001) 45 Int Stud Quart 27, 27 
1097 See Chapters 1 and 3. 
1098 Rees (n 11) 557 
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challenges posed to implementation. All of which, offers valuable lessons for US 
nascent efforts. A discussion of these lessons follows. 
a Lessons regarding ‘adoption’ and ‘implementation.’ 
As observed previously in Chapter 3, the EU institutions have sought to give 
direction to the member states in their adoption and implementation of gender 
mainstreaming in their employment policies. For instance, in its ‘Manual for Gender 
Mainstreaming,’ the Commission emphasizes that in order to be successful; the strategy 
requires the completion of four steps.1099The first step is related to implementation, 
‘getting organized,’‘building ownership’ and getting the necessary stakeholders 
involved. The second stage involves knowledge building, requiring a specific 
understanding of gender inequalities in participation, resources, norms, values, and 
rights. The third and fourth stages involve assessing policy impacts and redesigning 
policies.1100 
Arguably, successful implementation of gender mainstreaming will result in the 
adoption of reconciliation policies that include men in domestic labour, the right to fully 
paid, job-protected leave, workplace accommodations, and legislation to end the gender 
pay gap, gender balance on political and public corporate boards, and the recognition of 
a right to adequate, affordable childcare.1101While it is undeniable that the EU has 
addressed most, if not all of these issues, the level to which gender mainstreaming has 
resulted in these policies being re-designed has been varied. Recalling the discussion 
from Chapters 3 and 4, the take up of parental leave among men in the EU remains low, 
childcare is a social right in some states, but not in others, the gender pay gap remains 
an unresolved problem and female participation in political life and on boards and 
committees remains limited. This variance has resulted in broad academic analysis, 
leading to conclusions of ‘inconsistent effectiveness in mainstreaming efforts,’ 1102a 
                                                 
1099 Commission, Manual for Gender Mainstreaming: employment, social inclusion and social protection 
policies (n 641); Council, Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and 
Presentation of Good Practice, EG-S-MS (98) 2. Strasbourg. Council of Europe. (n 101). 
1100 Commission, Gender mainstreaming of Employment policies: A comparative review of thirty 
countries (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union) 5. 
1101 See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
1102 E.M. Hafner-Burton and M.A. Pollack, ‘Mainstreaming gender in the European Union: Getting the 
incentives right’ (2009) 7 Comp Eur Politics 114, 115. 
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‘considerable variation ‘ in implementation,’1103and ‘ uneven ‘ and ‘ambivalent 
outcomes’ in the EU.1104These conclusions are buttressed by the Commission’s own 
study of gender mainstreaming in thirty countries, which found large differences 
between them in their organization and implementation of the strategy.1105Of most 
concern was the Commission’s finding that despite the passage of more than a decade 
from its initial adoption in the EU: 
It is the general trend that gender differences are overall scarcely 
documented or taken into account in the design and implementation of 
policies.1106  
 These inconsistencies are in large part attributable to the fact that the format for 
transposition of gender mainstreaming measures has been left to the discretion of the EU 
member states. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the strategy relies mostly upon the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) with ‘soft law’ instruments, as the chief mode of 
adoption and implementation.1107This discretion has resulted in a variety of vehicles 
being utilized to adopt and implement gender mainstreaming, with some being more 
effective than others.1108And, while it is undeniable that the use of ‘soft law’ has enabled 
some member states to implement gender mainstreaming where public objections to 
governmental intrusion and economic considerations weigh heavily against the 
enactment of equality legislation, academic research reveals that the lack of ‘hard law’ 
implementation has limited the strategy’s effectiveness.1109  
The Commission’s conclusions support the academic research, the results of 
which also suggest that the different manner in which the strategy has been adopted by 
                                                 
1103 Mark A. Pollack and Emilie Hafner-Burton, ‘Mainstreaming gender in the European Union’ (2000) 
7(3) JEPP 432, 439. 
1104 Stratigaki, ‘Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action’ (2005) (n 11)169. 
1105 Commission, Gender mainstreaming of Employment policies: A comparative review of thirty 
countries (n 1123) 6; Commission, Gender mainstreaming active inclusion policies—Final synthesis 
report (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009). 
1106 ibid. Commission, Gender mainstreaming active inclusion policies—Final synthesis report 131. 
1107 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the OMC in the EU. 
1108 Commission, Gender mainstreaming of Employment policies: A comparative review of thirty 
countries (n 1123) 
1109 See: David M Trubek and Louise G Trubek, ‘Hard and soft law in the construction of Social Europe’ 
(presentation at the workshop “Opening the Open Method of Coordination,” Florence: July 2003), 
Rubery, ‘Gender mainstreaming and the open method of coordination: is the open method too open for 
gender equality policy?’(n 465) 
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the member states, affects the strategy in practice. As Rees observes, governments and 
organizations are not always committed to the strategy, ‘except where there is a 
statutory duty so to do and a political will.’1110 
 In light of the foregoing, it is suggested that an initial lesson for the US is that 
without both a statutory obligation to mainstream gender and the political will to do so, 
there is a danger that gender mainstreaming will be weakly institutionalized; lessening 
the likelihood of policy redesign, particularly in light of the inequalities faced by 
pregnant workers. However, as discussed in Part III, there is not yet a national statutory 
obligation to mainstream gender in the US, only a political will to do so.1111  
b Lessons regarding ‘approaches’ to gender mainstreaming.  
There are also lessons to be learned from the EU regarding the approach to be 
taken in implementing gender mainstreaming.   
The literature categorizes the varied approaches taken in the EU as either 
‘integrationist,’ ‘agenda setting,’ or ‘transformative.’1112Jahan established these 
approaches in 1995, and states that the difference between them is determined by the 
degree to which gender issues have become incorporated into existing policy paradigms, 
or have resulted in change in policymaking approaches and structures.1113Where gender 
mainstreaming is ‘integrationist.’ gender is merely addressed within existing policy 
paradigms. With an ‘agenda setting’ approach, the policy agenda is reoriented. Only 
with a ‘transformative’ approach, is there a more complete change, involving: 
Decision-making structures and processes, in articulation of objectives, 
in prioritisation of strategies, in the positioning of gender issues amidst 
competing, emerging concerns, in building a mass base of support 
among both men and women.1114 
                                                 
1110 Rees (n 11) 569. See also, Walby, ‘Gender mainstreaming: Productive tensions in theory and practice’ 
(n 11) 14. 
1111 See Chapter 6, for a discussion of gender mainstreaming at the US local level. 
1112 See: F. Beveridge and S. Nott, ‘Mainstreaming: A Case for Optimism and Cynicism’ (2002) 10 Fem 
LS 299, 300. Also: Walby, ‘Gender mainstreaming: Productive tensions in theory and practice’(n 11) 
1113 Rounaq Jahan, The Elusive Agenda: Mainstreaming Women in Development (Zed 1995). 
1114 ibid 126. 
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 While accepting these distinctions, Beveridge et al., argue that for gender 
mainstreaming to be truly transformative, resulting in ‘engendering policy making,’ 
greater emphasis must be placed upon the ‘inclusion and participation of women in the 
decision-making processes of society.’1115This requires taking steps beyond encouraging 
women to participate, to include actively addressing the institutional configurations that 
support the current divisions of power.1116In discussing the matter, Lombardo and Meier 
helpfully distinguish five policymaking shifts that they argue must occur before it can be 
said that a ‘feminist model’ of gender mainstreaming has been put into practice. These 
distinctions offer valuable markers for the US in its approach to gender mainstreaming. 
They are as follows: 
 Conceptual shift—targeting patriarchy through a focus on gender. 
 Incorporation of a gender perspective into the mainstream political 
agenda. 
 Power shift—equal political representation of women with men, 
 Institutional and organizational culture shift in political decision 
making—requiring changes in policy process, mechanisms, and actors. 
 A shift to mainstreaming diversity and greater involvement of civil 
society.1117 
This suggests that if mainstreaming is to be truly effective in the US, the 
approach taken must be carefully considered, chosen, and implemented. In this regard, 
the EU is categorized by the utilization of either the ‘expert-bureaucratic’ or a 
‘participatory-democratic’ approach. The difference between these two approaches is 
defined by ‘who’ undertakes the assessment of gender impact.1118In the expert-
bureaucratic approach, experts, bureaucrats, and specialists are tasked. In the 
participatory-democratic model, a broader section of civil society is included in the 
                                                 
1115 Fiona Beveridge, Sue Nott, and Kylie Stephen, ‘Mainstreaming and the engendering of policy-
making: a means to an end?’ [2000] 7 JEPP 385, 389. 
1116 ibid 403. 
1117 E. Lombardo and P. Meier, ‘Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a Feminist Reading?’ 
(2006) 13 EJWS 151. 
1118 Beveridge, Nott, and Stephen, ‘Mainstreaming and the engendering of policy-making: a means to an 
end?’(n 1138). 
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assessment.1119The existence of two approaches raises the question of which one is 
preferable. Research conducted by Beveridge, Knott, and Stephen suggests the second 
approach is preferable as it promotes participation and emphasizes official 
accountability.1120The results of Bibbings’ research support this suggestion, with the 
conclusion that ‘the broader the types of actors associated with the process of change, 
the more likely that gender mainstreaming will be a successful process.’1121In effect, the 
participatory-democratic approach offers a cross-fertilization of ideas, and reflects the 
fifth shift in policy making required by Lombardo and Meier’s feminist definition of 
gender mainstreaming, as discussed above. Indeed, although the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, research suggests a trend in reliance upon one or the other. This is 
unfortunate, as both approaches have limitations, and would work better if utilized 
together. A comparison of the limitations of these approaches will serve to make this 
last point more clearly. 
 Beveridge’s research has found that the EU Commission at first utilized the 
expert-bureaucratic approach, and only later moved toward a more consultative 
participatory-democratic approach in the period from 1995-2006.1122The reason for the 
change was two-fold. The first was a finding that the expert-bureaucratic approach was 
characterized by a failure to incorporate broader views beyond the experts and 
bureaucrats. The second reason was a lack of accountability, which had the effect of 
resulting in very little change.1123However, the participatory-democratic approach to 
implementing mainstreaming has its own drawbacks, as Donaghy’s research of Northern 
Ireland’s experience indicates. He found that the participatory-democratic approach 
assumes, ‘there are established groups and organizations with which to consult,’ and 
concluded that in the absence of such groups, important interests are under-
represented.1124He also found that difficulties in the ability of consultees to respond to 
                                                 
1119 ibid 390.  
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1121 Sharleene May Bibbings, The politics of mainstreaming in critical perspective (Cambridge Scholars 
Pub. 2012) 101. 
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1123 ibid 211.  
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consultation requests, due to both time and resource limitations were also often 
underestimated. Furthermore, these difficulties were exacerbated where there was a lack 
of remuneration for the consultee’s contribution of expertise.1125  
In light of the foregoing, it is suggested that if the US intends for its 
implementation efforts to be successful, it ought to take a three-fold approach, seeking  
transformation by combining the ‘expert-bureaucratic’ and the ‘participatory-
democratic’ approaches when implementing its strategy. This is to say that the US 
should consider mainstreaming beyond gender, utilize internal experts and specialists 
within the executive branch in its implementation efforts, while actively seeking 
external participation and consultation, where available. While a caveat is offered that 
the US should not assume that there are organized groups with which to consult, in light 
of the historic involvement of non-governmental organizations, academics, and other 
stakeholders in its legislative equality efforts, problems in consultation are not 
anticipated.1126Nevertheless, every effort should be made to minimize the burdens that 
consultation and participation impose upon individuals and groups. This means that if 
participation is to be truly encompassing, the White House Council (Council), which is 
tasked with implementing the US strategy, should make provision for transportation, 
and day care, or other care costs. Otherwise, important interests may be under -
represented. 
c  Lessons regarding ‘challenges’ to gender mainstreaming. 
Academic research suggests that the greatest challenges and constraints to using 
gender mainstreaming to advance substantive equality in the EU have been four-fold. 
They are: 
 A lack of commitment by those charged with implementing the strategy: 
  A lack of financial and human resources; 
 A lack of institutional capacity; 
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 A failure to create the incentives necessary to ‘get it right.’1127  
These challenges will now be considered for their potential to affect US 
implementation efforts. 
i. Lack of commitment and failure of incentives. 
Considering what I describe as the ‘human constraints’ first, it can be said that as 
gender mainstreaming is intended to challenge the existing power structure and result in 
behavioural change, it would be naive to expect that all those individuals 
administratively charged with implementation are committed to its goals. As Ravindran 
observes, gender mainstreaming, ‘is about taking on patriarchy, misogyny, and 
discrimination, and the structures that uphold them.’1128Likewise, Benschop and Verloo 
discern, any assumption of cooperation is problematic, as gender mainstreaming is a 
‘contestation rather than collaboration process.’1129Consequently, where research has 
found that organizational resistance has hindered the implementation of gender 
mainstreaming in the EU, similar resistance to US efforts should be anticipated, with 
steps taken to overcome it. The steps highlighted by the research of Hafner-Burton and 
Pollack are helpful. The results of their research suggest that ‘hard law’ incentives are 
essential if implementation is to be carried out properly, and that resistance is best 
overcome through the mechanism of public accountability.1130This accountability is 
secured through regular monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of implementation efforts, 
including annual evaluations with reports published, and supported where necessary by 
recommendations for further action when departments are found to be 
‘underperforming.’1131As Rubery observes, a problem arises when a government is 
unwilling ‘to engage in the process of self-criticism and critical evaluation of policy 
programs.’1132 
                                                 
1127 Hafner-Burton and Pollack (n 1125). 
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Ultimately, the academic debate surrounding EU mainstreaming efforts suggests 
that a lack of commitment to implementation may prove even more dangerous than 
other challenges, which requires the US to be proactive and decisive in addressing it. 
This suggests that it is essential for the US to engage in a critical evaluation of its 
implementation efforts to date, preferably using the ‘transversal’ stocktaking exercise 
described by Alison Woodward in her evaluation of the success of EU efforts.1133This 
exercise requires a broad range of stakeholders are given the opportunity to consider and 
comment on the progress that has been made, and the gaps that remain. Taking such 
bold action in the US necessitates the inclusion of pregnant and breastfeeding workers 
and women on maternity leave in a review of Council efforts taken to date. Arguably, 
this would help garner public support for the strategy, provide momentum to 
implementation efforts and policy changes, and help revive the role of the US as being 
at the forefront in understanding the role that gender plays in continuing inequality, 
disadvantage, and exclusion. 
ii. Lack of resources and capacity. 
An extensive body of academic literature has found that institutional incapacity 
and a lack of financial and/or human resources have created significant challenges to EU 
implementation efforts.1134Furthermore, that resources and capacities vary greatly 
among the member states. This is to say that although there may be a desire to 
implement gender mainstreaming by the EU member states, their national institutions 
may lack the tools or the resources necessary to carry it out. Indeed, Walby’s research 
has found that the ‘absence of information, knowledge, and resources holds back gender 
mainstreaming by government officials.’1135Arguably, the challenge that lack of 
capacity poses to implementation efforts is not insurmountable—at least in terms of 
information and knowledge. At a minimum, to be effective, research suggests the need 
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for particular tools, including a common definition, clear instruction manuals, 
guidelines, training, and disaggregated statistics. These tools are already available at the 
supranational level in the EU.1136Consequently, if the EU institutions are serious in their 
efforts ensure the success of the strategy, to minimize financial costs, and harmonize 
member state efforts, they should do more to make these tools accepted, and utilized by 
the member states. As for the US, there is no need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ here. Instead, 
it should seek to minimize the challenge that any institutional incapacity poses by being 
proactive and providing government actors with the tools necessary to carry out 
implementation successfully. If these tools do not already exist, they can be created 
without difficulty, using as a model, the existing definitions, manuals, guidelines, 
training, and disaggregated statistics found in the EU and elsewhere.1137 
The adequacy of human and financial resources is far trickier to address, mostly 
because ‘adequacy’ is difficult to quantify. What constitutes ‘adequacy’ will depend on 
context, with a great deal of room for disagreement when these yardsticks are applied in 
practice. However, EU experience with this challenge is informative. Since December 
2011, the EU Commission has used a network of external experts and: 
This network undertakes an annual programme of policy-oriented 
research and reports to the unit ‘Gender Equality’ of the Directorate-
General for Justice and Consumers. It is comprised of experts in 
statistics, econometrics, social protection, social inclusion, and labour 
market economists covering all 28 EU Member States....1138 
 This inclusion of external experts suggests two important lessons for the US. 
First, because they come from all EU member states, their participation reflects a desire 
by the EU institutions to facilitate maximum support, ‘buy in,’ and the best outcome for 
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gender mainstreaming throughout the EU. This is to say that, in addition to providing 
research expertise to the Commission, this network of experts is uniquely placed to 
advance a dialogue with the member states, helping to garner governmental support for 
the strategy and harmonize their varied national efforts, where according to the research 
of Jill Rubery ‘the full implications of a commitment to promoting gender equality and 
gender mainstreaming have not been understood.’1139 
Secondly, broad engagement with external experts helps to offset any lack of 
financial and/or human resources that EU policy implementers may encounter. In effect, 
by tasking non-governmental experts and groups to undertake the research, data 
collection and reporting that gender mainstreaming necessitates, policy implementers 
are sharing the burden that implementation imposes.  
These are vital lessons for US gender mainstreaming efforts, especially as 
Executive Order No.13506 (Order) contains no express financial commitment for 
implementation of the strategy. Nor is the Order directly applicable to any US state. 
Consequently, EU experience suggests that the Whitehouse Council should proactively 
address a potential lack of human and/or financial resources by including experts from 
all fifty states and Washington D.C. in their research, data collection, and discussions of 
the policy changes they recommend. As it is not unusual for governmental actors in the 
US to commission and/or consider the external research reports and opinions of experts 
in the field of gender equality, it is concluded that outreach should not be a difficult 
task.1140 
d Lessons regarding mainstreaming beyond gender. 
To recall the discussion from earlier Chapters, some feminist scholars and other 
academics, including Fiona Beveridge, argue that to focus only on mainstreaming 
‘gender’ ignores the differential impact of policies upon differently disadvantaged 
groups.1141For these critics, isolating gender equality from other forms of inequality is 
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irrational. These arguments build upon the work of Kimberle Crenshaw and the notion 
of intersectionality, which was discussed in Chapter 2, and in which she argued against 
‘the tendency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience 
and analysis.’1142These limitations have led to a call for a broader approach to 
mainstreaming, one that reflects an understanding of intersectionalities and involves a 
move from gender mainstreaming to ‘diversity’ or ‘equality’ mainstreaming.1143As 
Squires observes, ‘gender can no longer be understood in isolation from diversity.’1144 
However, not all academics agree that mainstreaming beyond gender is the correct 
approach for addressing multiple areas of discrimination. The results of Mieke Verloo’s 
2006 comparative study of specific sets of inequalities (class, race/ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, and gender) argues strongly against a ‘one size fits all’ approach to multiple 
discrimination.1145Her study builds upon the research of other academics, which raised 
concerns regarding, ‘the assumed similarity of inequalities, the need for structural 
approaches, and the political competition between inequalities.’1146Notwithstanding 
these concerns, the argument for mainstreaming ‘equality’ for all groups covered by 
existing antidiscrimination legislation has significant traction with governmental actors 
in the EU, resulting in a discursive shift from ‘gender mainstreaming’ to ‘equality 
mainstreaming’ as a strategy. This shift is more clearly illustrated through a short 
discussion of the UK’s Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED), contained in the Equality 
Act 2010.1147Under the PSED, public bodies must have ‘due regard’ of the need to 
eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations 
between different people when carrying out their activities. Initially, the UK statutorily 
adopted gender mainstreaming as a ‘Gender Equality Duty’ (GED), in the Equality Act 
2006, and included pregnancy and maternity as an implicit part of gender. Now, the 
UK’s legislative mandate is contained in Section 149 of the 2010 Equality Act and 
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expressly includes pregnancy and maternity, and expands the duty beyond what may be 
considered strictly a ‘woman’s issue,’ to include gender reassignment, age, race, religion 
or belief, disability, sex, and sexual orientation.1148 
Overall, the PSED is an important change for pregnant workers, as it requires the 
specific issues and needs that pregnancy and maternity raise, (among others) are 
expressly considered when policy-makers draft, enact, and implement governmental 
policies, including those that are intended to advance substantive equality. This point 
deserves some elaboration. Using the example of a policy seeking to provide unpaid 
‘paternity’ leave, it can be said that having ‘due regard’ will reveal differing 
implications for differing groups of women. Indeed, such a policy focus is of 
questionable value to women from a lower socio-economic group, and to those from a 
single-parent household. Added to this, as the typically lower earnings level of mothers 
causes families to choose to have the mother stay at home where the leave provided to 
parents is unpaid, traditional gender roles remain unchallenged.1149Thus, ‘due regard’ 
will suggest that a policy supporting paid paternity leave will better advance substantive 
equality between women and men.   
 In light of the foregoing, an initial lesson from EU experience with gender 
mainstreaming suggests that every effort should be made to ensure that the US strategy 
is appropriately nuanced, so as to move beyond a simplistic model of equality to one 
that has a greater reach and positive impact upon the lives of all women.    
e Lessons regarding the ‘complementary’ role of gender mainstreaming 
If any of the foregoing discussion of gender mainstreaming has been at all clear, 
it should be understood that the strategy offers a distinct policy approach to addressing 
inequality—as against ‘equal treatment,’ which seeks to treat women the same as men, 
and ‘special treatment,’ which seeks to treat women differently from men. This is not to 
say that gender mainstreaming is a standalone strategy, nor is it intended to be used in 
place of the other approaches. Adopting Bennett and Booth’s metaphor of the ‘three 
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legged stool,’ gender mainstreaming in the EU is best described as dependant on three 
supports. The first two are equal treatment and special treatment. The third support is 
defined by Bennett and Booth as the ‘gender perspective,’ which  
Promotes actions that aim to transform the organization of society to a 
fairer distribution of human responsibilities. It acknowledges the 
differences between women and between men. The transformation of 
human lives is premised on the understanding that men are not the 
deliberate oppressors of women, but can also be disempowered by 
current social arrangements. The gender perspective is delivered through 
new tools for gender-sensitive policy-making.1150 
Thus, while equal treatment and special treatment are focused on the individual, 
gender mainstreaming is focused on the institutions, systems, and norms that create 
inequalities.1151It is generally agreed that these three focuses are distinct, but work 
together, and are mutually supportive for greater substantive equality in all social 
arrangements. Indeed, a Commission study of gender mainstreaming in fifteen EU 
member states describes the focus of positive action and gender mainstreaming as being 
‘complementary.’ This is to say that while gender mainstreaming acts ‘upstream’ on the 
causes of inequalities, positive action acts ‘downstream’ against the inequalities and 
seeks to correct them.1152 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is evidence to suggest that the three 
approaches have become ‘hybridized’ in some of the member states in the EU, creating 
a mix of approaches.1153As a result, a concern has been raised by some academics that 
instead of working together, the strategy of gender mainstreaming may be used by EU 
government actors to weaken, neutralize, or even eliminate other gender equality efforts, 
particularly those involving positive/affirmative action measures. This concern has been 
most persuasively argued by Stratigaki, who uses labour market texts as evidence that 
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this has been the effect of gender mainstreaming in the EU.1154Her concerns are 
highlighted by the comments of one EU Commission official who said, ‘If gender 
mainstreaming is everybody’s responsibility in general, then it’s nobody’s responsibility 
in particular.’1155Notably, in response to such concerns, the EU Parliament has issued a 
Resolution reaffirming that gender mainstreaming is ‘No substitute for specific equality 
policies and positive actions, as part of a dual approach to achieving the goal of gender 
equality.’1156 
Ultimately, the concern that gender mainstreaming will be used to crowd out 
positive action measures is unlikely to arise or have much traction in the US, where, as 
the discussion in Chapter 5 revealed, gender-based preferential measures are not 
generally accepted, rather they are extremely controversial and subject to legislative and 
constitutional constraints.1157In other words, there is little fear that the adoption of a 
gender perspective in policy-making will undermine US affirmative action plans, which, 
in any event, are temporally limited. Recalling from the discussion in Chapters 3 and 5, 
positive/affirmative action measures are not expected to last into perpetuity, even in the 
EU. Similar temporal limitations exist in the US. As Justice Ginsburg cogently observed 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, Article 1 (4) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) provides for ‘ temporally limited 
affirmative action.’ authorizing, ‘temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de 
facto equality’, that, ‘shall be discontinued when the objective of equality of opportunity 
and treatment have been achieved.’1158Therefore, rather than weakening or neutralizing 
positive/affirmative action measures, it may be concluded that gender mainstreaming 
offers both the EU and the US, an additional, longer-term, and arguably less 
controversial strategy for achieving greater substantive equality between women and 
men. 
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III Gender mainstreaming in the US. 
In Chapter 6, it was observed that sixteen US states, eighteen counties, and forty-
four cities have legislatively implemented the standards of the ‘Convention to Eliminate 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ within their boundaries, with some 
adopting the strategy of gender mainstreaming.1159The purpose of the next two Parts is 
to present compelling evidence that the strategy has also been adopted at the federal 
level, via Executive Order No. 13506, issued by President Obama in 2009.1160 
The discussion begins with a historical exploration of Presidential Executive 
Orders, for the purpose of providing an understanding of the limitations and promise of 
using such a unique vehicle to adopt the strategy. This is followed by a critical 
exploration of US implementation efforts, which is undertaken against a background of 
the lessons revealed from EU experience with the strategy, as discussed in Part II above.  
a Presidential Executive Orders. 
The assertion that the US has adopted gender mainstreaming domestically, and 
that it has done so via Executive Order raises the question of what an Executive Order 
is. In short, it is the command, or decree of a US President, intended to give guidance or 
direction to his, or her subordinates in the Executive Branch, or to affect an Act of 
Congress.1161The President’s power to issue such a command has two sources. 
Foremost, the President has ‘inherent’ authority to issue Executive Orders because of 
power bestowed by the US Constitution (Constitution). Secondly, the President may be 
delegated authority to issue an Executive Order by Congress.1162This executive authority 
is peculiar to the US federal system, with its divided government, through which 
executive power is vested in the President by virtue of the so-called ‘Vesting Clause’ 
contained in Article II, § 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution. Although there is no express 
authority to issue Executive Orders in the Constitution, the President is deemed to have 
authority to issue these orders from the aggregate powers that flow from, ‘either an act 
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of Congress, or from the Constitution itself.’ 1163In light of this power, Fisher observes 
that Executive Orders ‘represent a purely presidential initiative,’ or implement ‘statutory 
policy.’1164Indeed, through what Mayer and Price term, ‘the power to command,’ US 
‘presidents enjoy significant, but not unfettered latitude in governing the government 
through the issuance of executive orders’.1165This latitude is illustrated by the fact that 
there have been a vast number Executive Orders issued by US Presidents, covering 
matters ‘ranging from security clearances for all government employees, to smoking in 
the workplace.’1166  
The text of each Executive Order appears in the daily Federal Register, and 
while there is no exact figure of the number issued to date, the numbered series of 
published Orders in the Federal Register reached 13,679 by October 10, 2014, with 
estimates up to 50,000 for unnumbered Orders.1167This large number suggests that 
Executive Orders are important tools for Presidents seeking to effectuate presidential 
policy, and while research suggests that many Executive Orders have been controversial 
and proved politically costly to Presidents, others have been effective ‘law-making.’1168 
This efficacy is particularly true of Executive Orders in the area of civil rights. There is 
a history of Executive Orders going back over seventy years that have been designed to 
promote equal opportunities in the US.1169In point of fact, every Executive Order issued 
in the civil rights arena to date, has been followed by some form of federal 
legislation.1170This suggests that the issuance of Executive Order No. 13506 is in 
keeping with the historic use of this executive power by Presidents when seeking to 
expand civil rights protections, and shape the public debate. It is arguable therefore that 
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Executive Order No.13506 is merely the first step in the process of legislatively 
adopting gender mainstreaming as a national equality strategy.  
The foregoing suggestion does not ignore the fact that there are significant 
drawbacks to using an Executive Order as a vehicle to adopt gender mainstreaming as a 
domestic equality strategy. As Krent writes in his book, Presidential Powers, Executive 
Orders are not ‘considered law in the conventional sense,’ and most ‘do not have the 
status of binding rule or regulation.’1171The violation of an Executive Order cannot lead 
to a legal sanction, such as a fine or prison sentence. At best, federal departmental and 
agency heads found violating a presidential command are subject to removal from 
office. It may be concluded therefore, that although Executive Orders are required to be 
published in the Federal Register,1172they are ‘soft law’ as defined and discussed in 
Chapter 1. As such, they are a weaker vehicle than Congressional (hard) legislation, 
where, as Fine and Warber observe, ‘policy outcomes are more permanent.’1173Indeed, 
the results of this research suggest three reasons an Executive Order is a weaker vehicle 
for adopting gender mainstreaming than a statute. First, they are weaker because 
Executive Orders can be, and historically have been successfully challenged in the US 
Supreme Court, based upon the underlying principle of constitutional separation of 
powers.1174Secondly, they are weaker because Congress has the power to pass 
legislation overriding them. Finally, they are weaker because every President has the 
power to overturn an existing Executive Order, through efforts described by Mayer and 
Price as the actions of, ‘duelling presidencies.’1175In light of which, it may be deduced 
that the issuance of an Executive Order renders the adoption of gender mainstreaming 
much more fragile, and subject to continuing political good will. 
However, it is also possible to conclude that the method for adoption of the 
strategy in the US is consistent with the traditional ‘soft law’ method of adoption 
utilized by the EU member states, as discussed in previous Chapters, and in Part II 
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above. This choice of soft law also suggests the existence of concerns that are not 
dissimilar to those found in the EU.1176Concerns that include significant opposition to 
gender equality policy, in response to which, Fine and Warber suggest that US 
Presidents resort to Executive Orders when they are breaking new ground, and wish to 
‘initiate significant government policies.’ Presidents are also said to engage in this type 
of unilateral action where they are unable to pass legislative measures, and are faced 
with ‘legislative gridlock.’1177Mayer and Price agree, and write that Presidents use’ their 
repository of power to achieve political and policy objectives that otherwise face ‘grim 
prospects.’1178Deering and Maltzman add the observation that Executive Orders are used 
by presidents to move the ‘status quo closer to a president’s preferred policy 
outcome.’1179To these arguments, the author adds the observation that gender  
mainstreaming legislation may have been unattractive to President Obama, not only 
because of the hurdles which a divided Congress create, but because legislative 
enactment is a particularly slow and contested process in the US. This certainly was the 
case with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which took ten years, and crossed 
several Presidencies before its passage was finally achieved.1180  
All of which serves to suggest several very good reasons why an Executive 
Order would be the preferred vehicle for the adoption of such a potentially 
transformative domestic equality strategy in the US. These reasons are highlighted by 
the fact that at the time of its issuance (2009), President Obama had already signed the 
ground-breaking Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which protects women against pay 
discrimination by employers, and was seeking passage of his monumental healthcare 
legislation (the Patient and Affordable Care Act).1181Consequently, he may have felt that 
he lacked the political support necessary to achieve passage of additional equality 
legislation. 
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b Executive Order No. 13506. 
 To restate, there is no overarching statutory measure adopting gender 
mainstreaming nationally in the US. Gender mainstreaming does not form part of Title 
VII, or the PDA. Rather, this research has found that it has been adopted via a ‘soft law’ 
Executive Order issued by President Obama in 2009. With Executive Order No. 13506, 
‘Establishing a Whitehouse Council on Women and Girls,’ President Obama stated that 
the Council’s purpose was ensuring: 
That each of the agencies in which they’re charged takes into account the 
needs of women and girls in the policies they draft, the programs they 
create, the legislation they support.1182  
The preceding discussion illustrates the vast array of literature addressing the 
power of Presidents to issue Executive Orders. In contrast, very little has been written 
about Executive Order No. 13506. Frank Deale and Rita Cant briefly reference the 
Order in the context of their analysis of the public interest law movement.1183They note 
that ‘the status of women has received significant attention from the [Obama] 
Administration;’ and observe the Administration ‘willingness’ to collaborate with 
women’s rights organizations, consulting with them on issues of health care and labour 
policy.1184Rona Kaufman Kitchen references Executive Order No. 13506 within a 
detailed analysis of President Obama’s efforts to strengthen work-family balance during 
his first term in office. Kaufman describes the Order as,’ an important public gesture in 
support of women, ‘but she does not analyse its provisions.1185Additionally, Tara J. 
Mellish, in her discussion of the US’s domestic application of international human rights 
treaty norms, references the Order in a footnote, and only in the context of its 
‘interagency’ structure.1186Similarly, Marcia McCormick considers the Order in the 
context of a lack of legislative workplace reforms during President Obama’s first term in 
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office, noting only that Executive Order No. 13506 is one of several ‘presidential 
actions seemed designed to lead to future programs or regulations related to workplace 
reform.’1187 
As a detailed exploration of Executive Order No. 13506 has not been undertaken 
to date, it is important to do so. In the ensuing subsections, the Order is explored against 
a background of the lessons drawn from EU experience with the strategy. The results of 
this exploration will suggest that while the Order has certain limitations, beyond its 
fragility as a vehicle for the adoption of such a transformative equality strategy, it also 
offers great promise. This is to say that as with its counterpart in the EU, US gender 
mainstreaming is intended to complement existing national equality measures. As such, 
it has the potential to reboot national efforts for advancing equality beyond the quagmire 
of the equal treatment versus special treatment debate that crystallizes in Congressional 
legislation.1188  
c Executive Order No. 13506—its limitations 
The Order has three limitations, any of which may act to curtail the 
transformative potential of the strategy. This section addresses those limitations and 
suggests ways in which they may be overcome. 
The first and most obvious limitation of the Order is its failure to expressly 
reference the gender-mainstreaming concept. One could argue that this lack of 
reference, accompanied by a lack of academic interest in the substantive provisions of 
the Order counters any claim that the Order signifies the adoption of this particular 
equality strategy. In my view, academic interest in the US strategy will increase as its 
implementation efforts increase. Compared to mainstreaming in Canada and the 
Netherlands, where the strategy was first to adopted in the 1970s, US efforts are in their 
initial stages.1189As for a specific reference to gender mainstreaming, while preferable, 
this is not a necessary requirement of the strategy. Instead, an essential element of 
                                                 
1187 McCormick. M., ‘Workplace Reform In A Jobless Recovery’ (2012-2013) 81 UMKC Law Review 
347, 351. 
1188 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
1189 See: Verloo, ‘Another velvet revolution? Gender mainstreaming and the politics of implementation’ 
(n 11) 4. 
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gender mainstreaming is a change in policy processes, based upon the assumption that 
most policies are gendered, in the sense that they are either gender blind or gender 
biased towards the male norm, thereby reproducing gender inequality. The change 
gender mainstreaming seeks is for policy-makers to incorporate a gender equality 
perspective in all of their policies, considering the differences between women and men. 
The language of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 13506 leaves no doubt that this is 
what the Order seeks to achieve, stating that: 
The purpose of this order is to establish a coordinated Federal response 
to the issues that particularly impact the lives of women and girls and to 
ensure that Federal programs and policies address and take into account 
the distinctive concerns of women and girls, including women of color 
and those with disabilities.1190 
This assertion is not intended to ignore the lessons from EU experience with the 
strategy, as discussed above and in Chapter 3, which made clear that conceptual 
confusion could arise in the face of a definitional void.1191In light of which, the 
Council’s foremost challenge will be to ensure a common understanding and 
coordination of its broad efforts. The Whitehouse Council could of course, select post 
facto one of the two conventional definitions of gender mainstreaming to aid its efforts. 
That is, either the definition of the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) 
agreed conclusions 1997/2: 
The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any 
planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all 
areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as 
men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes 
in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men 
benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve gender equality,1192 
                                                 
1190 Executive Order No. 13506 (n 12). 
1191 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of competing definitions of ‘gender mainstreaming’ and the 
surrounding debate. 
1192 UN, Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (2002) 1. 
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Alternatively, the definition of the Group of Specialists of the Council of Europe, 
that: 
Gender mainstreaming is the organization, improvement, development 
and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective 
is incorporated in all policies, at all levels and at all stages by the actors 
normally involved in policy-making.1193 
But, definitions, in and of themselves, do not resolve confusion. This is to say 
that the definitions themselves may not be clear. Considering the Council of Europe 
definition of gender mainstreaming, the question arises as to what is meant by the 
‘gender equality perspective.’ Indeed, in the absence of clarity, it is difficult to disagree 
with Lombardo and Meier that the Council’s definition is ‘an empty signifier.’1194This is 
to say that:  
It focuses on the procedural changes gender mainstreaming involves but 
does not address what we should understand by a gender equality 
perspective.1195 
The fact is, as Rees’s observes, gender mainstreaming is ‘hard to define.’1196 
Beveridge’s observations add that gender mainstreaming is an idea that is ‘rather 
amorphous and fuzzy.’1197It also seems that having a definition has not prevented the 
EU from having problems implementing the strategy on both the supranational and 
national levels. Therefore, rather than the adoption of a specific definition, it may be 
preferable for the Council to actively ensure that federal policies and programmes do 
represent the concerns of all women. The Council is assisted in this regard by the 
Order’s Section 5 mandate, regarding the creation of a ‘ Federal Interagency Plan,’ 
(FIP), which: 
                                                 
1193 Council of Europe, Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation 
of Good Practice, EG-S-MS (98) 2. Strasbourg. Council of Europe (1998) (n 101). For a discussion of the 
differences between the two definitions, see: Verloo, ‘Another velvet revolution? Gender mainstreaming 
and the politics of implementation’ (n 11) 2. 
1194 Lombardo and Meier (n 1140) 152.  
1195 ibid. 
1196 Rees (n 11) 570. 
1197 Beveridge, ‘Building against the past: The impact of mainstreaming on EU gender law and policy’ (n 
11) 193. 
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Shall include an assessment by each member executive department, 
agency, or office of the status and scope of its efforts to further the 
progress and advancement of women and girls. Such an assessment shall 
include a report on the status of any offices or programs that have been 
created to develop, implement, or monitor targeted initiatives concerning 
women or girls. The Federal interagency plan shall also include 
recommendations for issues, programs, or initiatives that should be 
further evaluated or studied by the Council. 
The FIP has the potential to limit confusion and misunderstanding for those 
individuals tasked with implementation. That being said, the public unavailability of this 
plan renders it impossible to judge the extent to which its potential has been achieved. In 
fact, although the Order mandates accountability through reports and meetings of the 
Council, the extent to which accountability is to be made public is unclear. Efforts to 
obtain a copy of the FIP and Council meeting minutes have been unsuccessful to date. 
This suggests they are only produced for internal use, and that greater public dialogue is 
not intended, which is unfortunate. 
A second limitation is the ambit of the Order. The Order only applies to the 
national executive branch of government. It does not expressly apply to state 
government, or to the private sector. This suggests that a large segment of US policy-
makers are excluded from implementing gender mainstreaming in the US, at least in the 
absence of any state, or local mandate. However, because the US executive branch of 
government is the largest employer in the US, with approximately 2.7 million civilian 
employees and 15 departments, the Order’s ambit may not be as limited as it first 
appears.1198The fact that the Order applies not only to the policies of the Executive 
Branch, but also to the programmes, it provides, also suggests a greater potential for 
transformation than would otherwise be expected. This is especially true when one 
considers the breadth of US governmental programmes, as illustrated by the data from a 
2008 national survey conducted by the Cornell University Survey Research Institute, 
indicating that 96% of Americans rely on at least one of 21 government programs to 
assist them.1199All of which suggests that the Order may have a far greater reach, beyond 
                                                 
1198 OPM, Data, Analysis & Documentation: Federal Employment Reports (2012) 
1199 Ann Carrns, ‘How Many Government Programmes Have You Benefitted From?’ The New York Times 
(New York, September 25, 2012) <http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/how-many-government-
programs-have-you-benefited-from/> accessed 2/4/2013. 
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federal government. A reach that is undoubtedly enhanced by the fact that the Council 
consist of twenty-eight senior level people from all Cabinet level and other agencies, 
and is chaired by a close advisor to the President.1200Not only does this high-level 
commitment, combined with the overall support of the President lend strength and 
gravitas to the work of the Council, it is in keeping with lessons from the EU, regarding 
the need for high-level support for implementation, and the ‘participation of women at 
senior levels in the decision-making process.’1201This high-level participation in the US 
has been supported by a modest increase in the number of women in senior positions 
within the Federal government, from 24% in 2001 to 29% in 2010.1202 
The third and arguably greatest limitation of the Executive Order is that the 
Council has an ‘advisory’ role only. This is to say that while the Council may suggest 
legislative and/or policy redesign to the President, it has no power to unilaterally 
require, or to effectuate change. However, because the Order mandates a combinational 
participatory-democratic and expert-bureaucratic approach to mainstreaming, which 
requires the inclusion of external experts and other stakeholders in the work of the 
Council, there is the potential for the Council’s recommendations to be more persuasive. 
Ultimately, the extent to which this approach will be successful depends largely upon 
the impact of the power differences between those involved in aiding the Council in any 
self-critical review. Notably, self-critical review has been absent from the 
documentation posted by the Council, Departments and Agencies to date, as discussed 
in Part IV below. While available documentation clearly highlights existing inequalities 
and the steps being taken by the Council members to address them, there is no Council 
documentation indicating regular monitoring, or critical review. 
In summary, there are three clear limitations Executive Order No. 13506. While 
the discussion revealed that the first two limitations are not insurmountable, the third 
                                                 
1200 Valerie Jarrett, See: Whitehouse, ‘Council on Women and Girls.’ The Chair is listed as a ‘Senior 
Advisor and Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Engagement.’  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cwg> accessed 26/04/11.  
1201 S. Mazey, ‘Gender mainstreaming strategies in the EU: Delivering on an agenda?’ (2002) 10 Fem L S 
227, 234. 
1202 EEOC, Annual Report on the Federal Work Force Part II: Work Force Statistics (2010) 24. 
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limitation presents a somewhat greater challenge to the success of the US strategy, as 
discussed further in Part IV below. 
d  Executive Order No. 13506—its transformative promise. 
Despite its limitations, the express provisions of the Order suggest that that it 
holds great transformative promise. Specifically, Section 1, establishing the Council, 
requires that it provide a coordinated federal response to issues that have a direct impact 
on the lives of women and girls. Stating that: 
Federal programmes and policies address and take into account the 
distinctive concerns of women and girls, including women of color and 
those with disabilities. 
 Although Section 1 does not explicitly refer to pregnancy, maternity, or 
breastfeeding, it is offered that they are implicitly ‘distinctive’ concerns of women and 
girls. It is also suggested that the Order’s inclusion of the concerns of ‘women of color 
and those with disabilities’ is in keeping with lessons from the EU, wherein a broader 
focus for mainstreaming, beyond gender, has been adopted. This broader approach is 
considered a more ‘joined up’ way for gender mainstreaming to be used to tackle 
discrimination.1203Thus, the inclusion of broader concerns in the Order effectively 
acknowledges the limitations of considering ‘disadvantage occurring along a single 
categorical axis.’1204The understanding being that one group’s effect is not the same as 
another. It is an understanding that was discussed in earlier Chapters, and in Part II 
above, and anticipates the cumulative or stacking effect with each addition; whether that 
addition is race, disability, sex, age, and so forth. Consequently, it is asserted that the 
clear breadth of the Order suggests a desire for greater transformative change in the US, 
because inclusivity demands consideration of the concerns of all women. This 
inclusivity is essential to women generally and pregnant workers specifically, as they 
                                                 
1203 See: Judith Squires, ‘The Challenge of Diversity: The Evolution of Women’s Policy Agencies in 
Britain’ (2007) 3 Pol & Gender 513, for a discussion of the shift in approach in Britain. 
1204 Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (n 1165) 140. See Chapters 1, 2, 
and 4 for a discussion of what the EU terms ‘multiple discrimination.’ 
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have distinctive concerns, both related to their own individuality, and more broadly, 
related to the lack of workplace accommodations and job-protected paid leave.  
In order to achieve this inclusivity, Section 4 of the Order requires the Council to 
engage in outreach efforts with representatives of non-profit organizations, state, and 
local government agencies, elected officials, and other interested persons who will assist 
with the Council’s development of a detailed set of recommendations. This mandate is 
crucial. Lessons from the EU’s experience with mainstreaming, as discussed above, 
suggest that outreach efforts help to achieve a broader understanding of gender impacts. 
Arguably, they will also facilitate the necessary expertise, knowledge, and skills needed 
for the creation of the Council’s recommendations, particularly if the Council has 
limited human and/or financial resources. What is more, they will enable a level of 
public accountability that the discursive analysis of EU efforts reveals is important for 
successful implementation. In this regard, the most recent example of the Council’s 
outreach efforts is promising. The 2015 ‘Working Group on Challenges and 
Opportunities for Women of Color’ (Working Group) brings together: 
Policy staff from the White House and across the federal agencies—as 
well as experts, leaders, and advocates from outside government—to 
focus on issues including education, economic security, health, criminal 
and juvenile justice, violence, and research and data collection.1205 
This Working Group is a direct result of a report issued by the Council in 
November 2014, on ‘Women and Girls of Color: Addressing Challenges and Expanding 
Opportunity.’1206The report highlights the progress made and challenges faced by this 
particular group of women and girls in five areas: education, employment, health, 
violence against women, criminal and juvenile justice. In employment, the report 
observes that some states ‘are leading the charge’ in protecting pregnant workers’ rights, 
and restates the need for Congress to pass the ‘Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,’ which 
would: 
Require employers to make reasonable accommodations to workers who 
have limitations from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
                                                 
1205 Office of the Press Secretary, ‘White House Report: Women and Girls of Colour: Addressing 
Challenges and Expanding Opportunity’ (White House, 12/11/14) accessed 16/1/2015. 
1206 CWG, Women and Girls of Colour: Addressing Challenges and Expanding Opportunity (2014) 2 
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conditions (unless it would impose an undue hardship on the employer). 
The legislation would also prohibit employers from forcing pregnant 
employees to take paid or unpaid leave if a reasonable accommodation 
would allow them to work.1207 
These efforts clearly suggest that by consistently addressing issues of concern to 
women, and including a broad array of stakeholders in their discussions, the Council has 
adopted a combination of the ‘expert-bureaucratic’ and ‘participatory-democratic’ 
approaches to mainstreaming that were discussed in Part II, above.1208There is, however, 
a potential drawback to the Order’s requirement of inclusivity; in that, there is no 
express provision for reimbursement of the financial costs to stakeholders participants. 
This raises concerns, as cost burdens have been found to negatively impact stakeholder 
participation in the EU’s gender mainstreaming efforts.1209However, the absence of any 
specific funding appropriation to cover the costs of the work of the Council may make 
this a difficult issue to address. Instead, the Order mandates that the Department of 
Commerce provide funding and administrative support to the Council. While the results 
of this study suggest that funding is not a problem at this time, the pressures of 
competing priorities and limited resources within the US executive branch should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, lessons from EU efforts suggest that significant challenges are 
posed to implementation efforts when resources, both human and financial, are 
inadequately allocated.1210While it is not clear what exactly constitutes ‘adequate’ 
resources or how they are quantified, foresight of this potential challenge can make a 
decisive difference in the successful implementation of the US strategy.  
The second and arguably greatest transformative promise comes from the actual 
focus of the Order’s mainstreaming efforts, which are required to be both general and 
specific. Generally, they apply to all policies and programmes of the Executive Branch. 
Specifically, they are focused on ‘assisting women-owned businesses to compete 
                                                 
1207 ibid 25-26. 
1208 See also Commission, Manual for Gender Mainstreaming: employment, social inclusion and social 
protection policies (n 641). The manual makes multiple references (8) to the need to include ‘ all the 
relevant stakeholders’ in carrying out mainstreaming policies. 
1209 Donaghy (n 1147) 56. 
1210 Research into mainstreaming by large UK NGO’s indicated that the lack of resources was a ‘major 
constraint’ to implementation. See: Helen ’Derbyshire, ‘Gender mainstreaming: recognising and building 
on progress. Views from the UK Gender and Development Network’ (2012) 20 Gen & Dev 405, 415.  
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internationally and working to increase the participation of women in the science, 
engineering, and technology workforce.’1211It is suggested that such a focus requires the 
redesign of governmental policies, in order to address the special needs that pregnancy, 
maternity, and breastfeeding create. Especially, as research has indicated that in STEM 
academia, family responsibilities, the lack of work-life balance, and inadequate child-
care provision are among several factors that lead women to leave higher 
education.1212In this regard, gender mainstreaming can be useful for securing the 
redesign of policies that serve to create and/or perpetuate the disadvantage, inequality, 
and exclusion of women from academia. For instance, the reports and data collected 
pursuant to the strategy could lead to the redesign of ‘stop clock’ policies, providing that 
leave for childbirth, maternity and/or breastfeeding would no longer negatively impact 
the path to tenure for many women. As Barres observes, ‘a few small changes can make 
a significant difference in outcome.’1213 
Having presented the Order, and considered its strengths and weaknesses as 
vehicle for adopting the strategy of gender mainstreaming, the next section explores the 
actual implementation of the strategy in the US, and considers the extent to which the 
Order’s transformative promise has been realized.  
IV  US implementation efforts in review. 
Before the results of this study of US implementation efforts are discussed, it is 
important to offer a caveat, which is to caution that it is not possible to make a definitive 
assessment regarding the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the US. The 
reasons for this are two-fold. First, the implementation of the strategy is only five years 
old, and as gender mainstreaming is a long-term strategy, it is fair to conclude that US 
efforts are in their infancy. At least when compared to the EU, which, as a 2008 Report 
to the EU Commission noted, despite having more than 20 years of experience, 
implementation in the EU is ‘still at an initial stage.’1214 
                                                 
1211 ‘STEM.’ 
1212 AAUW, Why So Few? Women in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (ISBN: 978-1-
879922-40-2, 2010) 71. 
1213 BA Barres, ‘Does gender matter?’ (2006) 442 Nature 133. 
1214 Commission, Manual for Gender Mainstreaming: employment, social inclusion, and social protection 
policies. (n 641) 9. 
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A second reason this assessment must be qualified is incomplete documentation. 
Research requests for additional information from the Council have been unsuccessful. 
This has limited the author’s analysis to documents that are publically available, in print, 
and electronically, through the websites of the Council on Women and Girls, and those 
of the Executive Departments and Agencies. Without access to additional 
documentation, if it exists, or a response to communication requests, it is unclear 
whether some policies have been implemented, or are merely in the planning phase, and 
also whether there is adequate monitoring and review of implementation. Nevertheless, 
it is fair to say that the Council’s website, those of the Executive Departments and 
Agencies, and the public records of the National Archives and the US Library of 
Congress contain valuable information relating to the varied implementation efforts to 
date. Thus, against a background of the lessons that EU experience offers the US in its 
implementation of the strategy, an exploration of US implementation efforts follows. 
a US reports and data. 
 In 2011, an essential baseline report was prepared for the Council, outlining the 
indicators of social and economic well-being of American women (Report).1215The 
Report provided the Council with detailed information, including demographics, health, 
education, employment, and the problem of violence against women. Supplemented by 
two other reports, ‘Women, Minorities and Persons with Disabilities in Science and 
Engineering,’ and ‘Science and Engineering Indicators 2010,’ the gender-specific data 
and statistics contained in all three reports clearly highlighted inequalities for women in 
the US, and provided critical information upon which to base the Council’s initial 
implementation efforts. Notably, the Council’s analysis of this data underpinned 
President Obama’s own concerns, revolving around the gender pay gap between women 
and men (81%), the lack of paid leave, the lack of equal educational opportunities, the 
lack of affordable childcare, and the persistence of violence against women.1216These 
shared concerns then became the focus of Councils implementation efforts. 
                                                 
1215 Commerce, Women in America: Indicator of Economic and Social Well-being (n 789). 
1216 The gender pay gap is defined as the difference between male and female median earnings divided by 
male median earnings. Maternity leave is offered as one among other reasons for the pay gap. The 84% 
 306 
It is important to note here that the use and analysis of gender data and statistics 
suggests that the Council is utilizing an approach to gender mainstreaming that is in 
keeping with the EU approach, and more importantly, with the objectives of the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the 4th World Conference on Women in 
1995, which prioritized mainstreaming for advancing gender equality.1217Specifically, 
Strategic Objective H3 of the Platform promotes efforts to ‘Generate and disseminate 
gender disaggregated data and information for planning and evaluation.’1218 
Undoubtedly, this approach has been strengthened by a Presidential Memorandum, 
issued in 2011, and directed to the heads of the executive departments and agencies. 
‘The ‘Enhanced Collection of Relevant Data and Statistics Relating to Women’ 
Memorandum urges the collection of additional data in the areas of maternal mortality 
and women in leadership, beyond the executive branch and to include public service and 
corporations. This expansion in data collection is important, as it suggests that 
implementation of the US strategy is intended to occur beyond the confines of the 
federal public sector.   
However, while it is anticipated that the data collected will be utilized by the 
Council to inform its recommendations to the President, a problem will occur if the 
focus of the Council is ‘inputs, rather than outputs.’ That is, if their focus is gathering 
information, rather than making specific proposals for change. Such a focus will likely 
cause the Council’s mainstreaming efforts to be inadequate, or as McGuaran explains, 
‘more incremental than transformative.’1219To illustrate by example—the collection of 
data indicating that the continued participation in the labour force by pregnant women 
and women who have recently given birth is limited by the lack of workplace 
accommodations, paid leave and affordable childcare, is merely informative, if the 
Council does not use this data to suggest policy changes to the President. 1220Arguably, 
such data should lead the Council to recommend changes in government policy relating 
                                                 
gap is between men and women, who worked fulltime in 2012, see: BLS, Women in the Labor Force: A 
Databook (2014). 
1217 Platform for Action (n 452). 
1218 UN, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (1995).  
1219 McGuaran (n 484) 228. 
1220 See: National Science Board, Science, and Engineering Indicators (2012); NSF, Women, Minorities, 
and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: Data Tables 2012 (2012). 
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to gender pay reviews, work place accommodations, greater working time flexibility, 
adequate and affordable care provisions, and job-protected paid leave arrangements. 
However, in the absence of public access to the Council’s specific recommendations to 
the President, it is difficult to assess the Council’s actual ‘outputs.’ While this research 
did find a multitude of gender equality initiatives emanating from the various 
Departments and Agencies, without access to the FIP and to the Council’s 
recommendations to the President, it cannot be said conclusively that all of these 
initiatives are the result of the Council’s work. Although some Departmental and 
Agency reports and initiatives do refer directly to the Council and Presidential policy, 
some do not. Therefore, it is not possible to know just how many Council 
recommendations have been made, adopted, implemented, or rejected. 
b US focus—science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). 
What is known is that the Council’s focus, specifically with regard to STEM 
education and careers for women, is in keeping with the ‘Agreed Conclusions’ of the 
UN Commission on the Status of Women on the critical areas of concern from the 
Beijing Platform for Action, from the 56th Session in 2011. Those Conclusions seek 
greater ‘Access and Participation of women and girls in education, training, science and 
technology...’1221Notably, this focus has already resulted in changes being taken by the 
US Census Bureau in its collection of data relating to STEM education for women and 
girls.1222In turn, this data has been used to underpin the gender equality plans of the 
various Departments and Agencies coordinating with the Council. These plans are 
intended to meet the challenges posed to increased female representation in engineering 
and scientific fields, including the specific challenges created by pregnancy and 
childcare responsibilities. These plans include the 10-year plan by the National Science 
Foundation to adopt family-friendly practices. Similarly, at National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), the: 
                                                 
1221 CSW, Agreed conclusions on access and participation of women and girls in education, training and 
science and technology, including for the promotion of women’s equal access to full employment and 
decent work. 55th session (22 February-4 March and 14 March 2011) (2011). 
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 NASA Family Friendly initiatives include flexible work and leave 
schedules; leave sharing, flexi-place programs..Many  NASA 
installations also offer onsite or nearby childcare facilities.1223 
NASA has also created the WISH outreach programme as part of its ‘Women 
and Girls Initiative,’ to encourage female high school students to consider STEM 
careers,1224‘For its part, The Women’s Bureau’ of the Department of Labo[u]r (DOL) 
lists its priorities as equal pay, workplace flexibility and higher paid jobs for women. It 
seeks to achieve this goal via the use of roundtable discussions, teleconferencing with 
workforce practitioners, the dissemination of a guide to high growth and emerging 
industry occupations, and by offering job training in green industries.1225In contrast, the 
Department of Energy plan includes advertising STEM internship and scholarship 
opportunities for women, offering links to reports and publications on women in STEM, 
and a showcase of its female employees, who offer suggestions for getting 
underrepresented groups interested in STEM.1226  
Arguably, the Council’s efforts have received impetus from the ‘Equal Futures 
Partnership,’ (Partnership), which was launched in 2012 by Secretary of State Clinton. 
Along with twenty-six partners, including Australia, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, 
Croatia, Latvia, and the EU, the US has committed: 
To policy, legal, and regulatory reforms to promote two mutually 
reinforcing goals: to expanded economic opportunity for women and 
increased political and civic participation by women at local, state, and 
national level. 1227 
The Partnership, along with external stakeholders, identified four areas for 
implementation and reporting on its commitment, many of which are identical to the 
areas identified for the Council’s mainstreaming efforts. They are STEM education and 
                                                 
1223 NASA, ‘NASA People: A Quick Look at NASA Employee Benefits’ (US.gov).  
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1224 NASA, ‘Women and Girls Initiative: http://women.nasa.gov’ (NASA, 23/8/2013)  
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13/4/2013) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/19/fact-sheet-equal-futures-partnership-
promise-progress> accessed 16/1/2015. 
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careers, civic education and public leadership, domestic violence, and women 
entrepreneurs. Arguably, with this external commitment to improving the economic and 
social wellbeing of US women, and the obligation to report and meet regularly to 
discuss national progress, the Council has been given the green light to move ahead on 
its implementation efforts.1228 
c US focus—flexible working 
The results of this research suggests that flexible working is an area in which 
President Obama is clearly concerned to implement one aspect of his gender 
mainstreaming strategy beyond the boundaries of the Executive Branch, potentially 
positively impacting a larger segment of US society. There is no doubt that he has been 
assisted in this regard by the passage of the Telework Enhancement Act, 2010. This Act 
requires federal agencies promote the use of telework in achieving workplace flexibility. 
While an undeniable limitation of the Act is its lack of application to either state 
government, or the private sector, it serves to set the standard, suggesting ‘best 
practices’ for employers, and forms part of what the Council emphasizes is a goal of 
making all workplaces a safe, fair, and flexible place for women.1229This goal has been 
actively championed by the current Administration. Utilizing a report by the Council of 
Economic Advisors (COEA) on ‘Work-life Balance and the Economics of Workplace 
Flexibility,’ the President and the First Lady have hosted a forum on these issues, called 
‘The White House Summit on Working Families.’1230The DOL has followed by 
launching a national dialogue in ten cities across the nation in order to discuss best 
practices and solutions.1231Also aiding the summit, the COEA released a report on the 
‘Economics of Paid and Unpaid Leave’, which has formed the basis for four new 
proposals.1232While these proposals do not expressly call for maternity leave, they seek 
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paid leave generally, which helps pregnant workers and the families they support. The 
proposals involve: 
 Calling upon Congress and State and local legislatures to enact 
legislation providing up to 7 days paid sick time per annum; 
 Proposing $2 billion in funding for States to develop family and 
medical leave programmes—$1 million of which is to be used to 
fund feasibility studies; 
 Signing a Presidential Memorandum directing federal agencies to 
advance up to 6 weeks of paid leave for parents of a new child; 
and 
 Calling on Congress to pass legislation giving federal employees 
six additional weeks of paid parental leave.1233 
These proposals and the national dialogue surrounding them reveal concerns 
similar to those found in the EU, relating to demographic, economic, and social changes, 
as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. As in the EU, women have entered the US labour 
market in increasing numbers. Indeed, the US labour force participation rate of women 
ages 25-54 was 55.1% in 1970, increasing to 73.7% in 2012.1234Added to this, 63% of 
all children are living in a family where both parents work.1235Despite these changes, the 
US is the only developed country in the world that does not proved paid maternity leave. 
Nor does it provide paid sick leave or a right to request flexible working. With all 
Americans living longer, the number of elderly family members has also increased. 
Nevertheless, 43 million private sector workers in the US are without access to paid sick 
leave, to enable them to care for themselves, their children, or their elderly family 
members.1236The impact of these policies is revealed in the research of Hegewisch and 
Gornick, which shows that the US labour participation of prime working-age women 
                                                 
1233 OPS, ‘Fact Sheet: White House Unveils New Steps to Strengthen Working Families Across America,’ 
(n 1084). 
1234 DOL, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey (2014), A. Moslsa and S. Hipple, 
Trends in labor force participation in the United States (DOL, 2006). 
1235 COEA, The Economics of Paid and Unpaid Leave (n 897) 5. 
1236 Whitehouse, Eleven Facts About American Families And Work (2014); Lyles (n 114) 
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(age 25 to 54) has ‘stalled,’ that half of all full-time employees believe that they would 
not be able to work part-time in the same position, and that: 
The lack of workplace flexibility, together with the lack of public support 
for child care, pushes many mothers temporarily out of the workplace or 
into inferior jobs—with highly adverse long-term effects on earnings, 
family income and retirement security,’1237 
However, notwithstanding strong executive branch support for flexible working 
and paid leave, Congress has failed to act. In particular, it failed to enact the ‘Flexibility 
for Working Families Act,’ which would have provided a statutory right to request 
flexible work terms and conditions. Instead, US private sector employees are reliant 
upon state and local measures, and the voluntary employer policies discussed in Chapter 
6, and emphasized by the Council.1238This voluntary approach stands that in stark 
contrast to the broader statutory support for flexible working found in the EU, where 
France, Germany and the Netherlands have ‘a general open-ended right to reduced 
hours,’and the United Kingdom has statutorily provided employees with a right to 
request flexible working since 2003.1239Likewise, Congressional failure to pass the 
‘Healthy Families Act,’ requiring employers with 15 or more employees, to provide up 
to 7 paid sick days per annum, means that 40% of US private sector employees have to 
decide between taking care of their health, or keeping their job.1240 
d Implementation efforts—broad and deep. 
 Arguably, in the area of education, by tying state grant awards to demonstrated 
efforts to close the STEM gap for underrepresented groups, the President has actually 
been able to implement gender mainstreaming beyond the boundaries of the Executive 
branch.1241This is to say that with the Race to the Top programme, and its total budget of 
                                                 
1237 A. Hegewisch and J.C. Gornick, Statutory Routes to Workplace Flexibility in Cross-National 
Perspective (IPWR, 2007) 3. 
1238 U.S. [Senate/House].113th Congress, S.1248.IS/H.R.2559.I.H. Flexibility for Working Families Act. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013. 
1239 Hegewisch and Gornick (n 1259) 19. 
1240 The Healthy Families Act (H.R. 1286/ S. 631).  
1241 The Whitehouse supports the CEO led organization: ‘Change the Equation: Improving learning in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics’ (2013) <http://changetheequation.org/> accessed 
2/7/2013. 
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$4.35 billion, the President has been able to support educational innovation and gender 
reform at the state level, through competitive grant awards.1242This programme is 
important as it seeks broad collaboration with state and nongovernmental stakeholders, 
to not only improve STEM education and training, but also to take a more 
comprehensive effort intended to get more girls interested in STEM studies, and to 
provide support for increased representation of women in academic faculty. This is an 
encouraging sign that US efforts at gender mainstreaming are intended to be both broad 
and deep. 
  A closer review of the Council’s work also reveals that its areas of interest is 
not limited to STEM studies and careers, flexible working, or paid leave. Instead, it is 
also concerned to address the problems faced by women in business, the persistence of 
the gender pay gap, and the need to end violence against women. This broad interest is 
illustrated by the fact that in 2010, at the request of the Council, the Department of 
Commerce prepared a report on women-owned businesses and the Treasury Department 
prepared a report on women in finance leadership. Both reports contained valuable 
suggestions regarding the supports necessary to increase the number of women in both 
fields, including financial education, assistance, healthcare, flexible working and safe, 
adequate childcare.1243The importance of these reports and suggestions cannot be 
overstated, as they give clear direction to Congress and to the private sector as to the 
policy of the President’s Council regarding the specific needs of women, and urging 
them to follow suit.  
In another encouraging sign, where Congress has been unable or unwilling to act 
on his redirected policies, the President has been able to achieve a measure of change 
through federal rulemaking. This was the case when Congress failed to pass the 
‘Fairness in Women-Owned Small Business Contracting Act of 2012,’ which sought to 
provide not only special contractual preference to women-owned businesses, but also to 
study any US industry where women are underrepresented. The Small Business 
Administration responded to this failure with the issuance regulations requiring that 5% 
                                                 
1242 Dept. Ed, ‘Race to the Top District’ <http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop-district/index.html> 
accessed 5/9/2013. 
1243 DOC, Women-Owned Businesses in the 21st Century (2010); Dept. of Treasury, White House Council 
on Women and Girls Report (2010). 
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of federal contracting dollars go to women-owned businesses.1244While these regulations 
are not as expansive as the defeated Act, they are already achieving the same result—
increased substantive equality, as is illustrated by the fact that although the regulations 
only came into effect on May 7, 2013, to date, more than 9,000 firms have registered in 
the programme repository.1245 
It is also notable that several Departments and agencies that are members of the 
Council have created bodies tasked with addressing specific issues relating to women 
and girls, increasing public awareness, and ensuring greater enforcement of federal 
equality laws.1246This horizontal approach to implementation of the gender 
mainstreaming strategy was bolstered by the President’s creation of ‘The National Equal 
Pay Enforcement Task Force’ in 2010.1247Designed to increase enforcement actions, it 
combined professionals from across the Executive Branch, including the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice, the DOL, 
and the Office of Personnel Management. The Task Force’s 2012 report offers a rare 
example of monitoring and review, with the caveat that the report listed only its 
accomplishments and lacked any analysis of failed efforts or underperformance. Despite 
its failure to constitute a truly adequate measure of monitoring and review, the report did 
indicate that the Task Force secured more than $381 million in relief for victims of 
discrimination. These efforts should be applauded. Nevertheless, it is suggested that a 
better example of gender mainstreaming is the President’s call to statutorily increase in 
the federal minimum wage, to $10.10, for not only is it a gender-neutral measure, but as 
Rubery observes, it is a policy that is more ‘likely to close the gender wage gap.’1248  
                                                 
1244 U.S. Senate 112th Congress, S. 2172.IS Fairness in Women-Owned Small Business Contracting Act 
of 2012 (March 7, 2012); Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Programme 78 Fed.Reg. 88, 
26504 (May 7, 2013), 13 CFR Part 127 RIN 3245-AG55. 
1245 CWG, Keeping America’s Women Moving Forward (n 760) iv. 
1246 For example, see: DOJ, Sexual Violence in the United States: Summary of the Roundtable 
Proceedings (2010). 
1247 Whitehouse, ‘National Equal Pay Enforcement Taskforce.’   
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/equal_pay_task_force.pdf> accessed 2/28/2013 
1248 Rubery, ‘Gender mainstreaming and gender equality in the EU: the impact of the EU employment 
strategy’ (n 11) 515. It is noted that the author was referring to the minimum wage in the UK. Any change 
in the federal minimum wage would require US Congressional approval. For current Congressional 
proposals seeking an increase in the minimum wage, see: ‘current legislation: minimum wage’ (Library of 
Congress, January 2014).  
<http://beta.congress.gov/search?q=%7B%22source%22%3A%22legislation%22%2C%22search%22%3
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e Criticisms and observations. 
The results of this exploration into the Council’s implementation efforts to date, 
suggest the strongest criticism should be levied at its reporting and monitoring. It is 
evident that the departments and agencies made reports to the Council in 2009 and 2010, 
referring to programmes and policy changes to be implemented in response to 
inequalities highlighted. However, there is no clear evidence that the Council has 
subjected those efforts to careful monitoring or critical review. Further, although, a 2012 
Report from the Council offered a long list of policies, programmes and legislative 
initiatives to date, it did not assess its failures with respect to any of them.1249This is 
unfortunate, as the discussion in Part II revealed that an essential lesson from EU 
experience with the strategy of gender mainstreaming is the necessity of monitoring and 
review of implementation efforts. This is to say that to be effective, review must be 
openly critical, with specific recommendations where underperformance is found. Only 
through the mechanism of open review can gender mainstreaming hope to challenge 
what Benschop and Verloo describe as ‘existing-fossilized-gender norms,’ rather than 
merely operating as an administrative or check box exercise.1250This suggests that 
‘accountability’ may well be one of the most important lessons for the US to take from 
EU experience with implementation. This is to say that in the absence of careful 
monitoring and open review, on a long-term and annual basis, it is unlikely that the US 
strategy will be effective in tackling structural discrimination against women generally, 
and pregnant workers specifically.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is offered that US implementation efforts to 
date offer great promise, coupled with some concerns. Furthermore, these concerns arise 
more from limitations in the strategy itself, rather than from the lack of effort by the 
Council. Great promise is contained in the varied efforts undertaken by Council 
members, suggesting a transformative, broad, and inclusive approach beyond gender; as 
well as evident expertise with gender mainstreaming tools. The Council’s outreach 
                                                 
A%22minimum+wage%22%2C%22congress%22%3A113%7D> accessed 27/1/2014. For State action on 
the issue, see: NEC and others, A Year of Action: Progress Report on Raising the Minimum Wage (2014) 
1249 CWG, Keeping America’s Women Moving Forward (n 760). 
1250 Benschop and Verloo (n 1118) 29. 
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efforts and horizontal approach to implementation are important, as the opinions and 
research they seek to garner can help inform its recommendations, create greater buy-in 
to the strategy, and widen the strategy’s impact beyond the federal workplace.  
Additionally, the high level political commitment to increasing substantive 
equality by President Obama, as illustrated by his declarations of April 17th, as Equal 
Pay Day, March as National Women’s History Month and January as National Stalking 
Awareness Month,1251and his public support of legislation intended to offset the 
disadvantages of pregnant and breastfeeding workers, provides impetus to the Council’s 
efforts. This impetus has been furthered by passage of the ‘Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,’ in 2010, which expanded the availability and affordability of 
health care for pregnant women, and required some employers to provide reasonable 
break times and private spaces for nursing mothers to pump breast milk during the work 
day, for up to one year after the child’s birth.1252  
In conclusion, it is suggested that it is premature to judge whether US emergent 
efforts at gender mainstreaming are merely ameliorative, or will result in real structural 
change. But, even as a fragile and embryonic start to a long-term strategy, the Order 
offers an exciting and promising next stage for gender equality in the US. The 
importance of this next stage lies in the ability of the Council to continue to formulate 
suggestions for policy change, and to expand its implementation efforts, beyond the 
confines of the Executive Branch and into the private sector. 
V Gender mainstreaming—shifting the trajectory 
This final Part seeks to present evidence that gender mainstreaming operates as a 
complement to existing equality measures and offers a holistic and less controversial 
means by which to shift the trajectory of the US antidiscrimination law.1253This is to say 
that in a nation where the enactment of ‘special treatment’ laws and affirmative action 
measures benefitting particular groups of people are particularly controversial, the 
                                                 
1251 Whitehouse, ‘Presidential Actions-Proclamations’ (whitehouse.gov, 2013).  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actionhuss> accessed 19/10/2013 
1252 See: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (n 119). Note: This Act is otherwise referred to 
in the national press as ‘Obamacare.’ 
1253 See Chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion of the feminist theoretical arguments surrounding equality 
measures. 
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strategy of gender mainstreaming is less likely to create the same degree of malcontent. 
This is because, as Verloo observes, gender-mainstreaming policies ‘are hybridized, as 
they interact with different local conditions.’1254 
a Gender mainstreaming is complementary. 
 The discussion in Part II above and in previous Chapters highlighted the 
complementary role that gender mainstreaming plays in the EU. The results of this study 
suggest that the soft law strategy can play an equally complementary role in the US, 
where the national enactment of antidiscrimination law has been a particularly slow and 
difficult project, as well as one in which initial proposals did not expressly intend to 
benefit women. Instead, as the scholarly review of the 1964 debate surrounding Title 
VII suggests the inclusion of ‘sex’ as a protected category may have been an attempt to 
derail the entire Bill, rather than any legitimate proposal to expand the Bill’s 
parameters.1255But, Title VII is not the only national equality measure that has had a 
difficult history. Academic review of the debate surrounding the passage of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 reveals a similar divisiveness. Indeed, the 
record clearly shows that the FMLA was initially intended to be a paid maternity leave 
law, but the jostling of stakeholder interests, including those of liberal feminists, shaped 
it into a far narrower gender-neutral measure.1256A measure that Wright, Gornick, and 
Meyers accurately refer to as a ‘weak national leave law.’1257Any doubt that this was the 
result should be dispelled by the majority ruling of the US Supreme Court in the 2012 
case of Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, which emphasizes not only the 
overall weakness of the FMLA as an equality measure, but the consequences of 
Congress’s failure to expressly address leave discrimination against pregnant 
employees, and those who have just given birth.1258In Coleman, the Court held that the 
self-care provisions of the FMLA are not applicable to state employees. The majority 
                                                 
1254 Verloo, ‘Another velvet revolution? Gender mainstreaming and the politics of implementation’ (n 11) 
98. 
1255 For a discussion of this conventional view and the argument that it is wrong, see: Gold (n 724). 
1256 Daniel Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland et al. (n 162)1342. 
1257 Erik Olin Wright, Janet C Gornick and Marcia Meyers, Gender equality: Transforming family 
divisions of labour, vol 6 (Verso Books 2009) 41. 
1258 Daniel Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland et al. (n 162). 
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took the view that the self-care leave provision of the statute was not ‘necessary to make 
the family-care provisions effective,’ and that ‘to the extent that the provision helped 
single parents retain their jobs and therefore addressed neutral leave policies with a 
disparate impact on women, it was not directed at a pattern of constitutional violations’ 
by the states.1259The Court stated that: 
At the time the FMLA was enacted, there was no evidence of... 
discrimination or stereotyping in sick-leave policies. Congress was 
concerned about the economic burdens imposed by illness-related job 
loss on employees and their families and about discrimination based on 
illness, not sex.’1260  
The minority dissenting opinion countered the majority view with a careful 
examination of the history of the legislative measure, arguing that ‘Congress had 
evidence of a well-documented pattern of discrimination against women.’1261The 
minority also observed that ‘it would make scant sense to provide job-protected leave 
for a woman to care for a new-born, but not for her recovery from delivery, a 
miscarriage, or the birth of a stillborn baby.’ 1262Ultimately, however, the overemphasis 
on gender neutrality by Congressional lawmakers permitted the majority in Coleman to 
reach its conclusion.  
More recently, the difficulties faced by Congressional representatives seeking to 
advance substantive equality are highlighted by the battles surrounding proposals for 
paid leave and breastfeeding accommodations. In both cases, the Bills’ proponents have 
been required to re-propose them over multiple sessions of Congress, while also 
accepting limitations on their mandates, all in an ongoing effort to obtain the necessary 
number of votes to secure their passage. In the case of legislation for paid sick days (The 
Healthy Families Act), this Act was proposed as far back as 2004, and a proposal to 
amend Title VII, to add breastfeeding as a protected status, has been offered in multiple 
                                                 
1259 ibid 1337. 
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1261 ibid 1342. 
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sessions of Congress since 1998. Both have yet to pass, notwithstanding the strong 
Presidential support they receive.1263 
It could be argued that the relatively prompt enactment of the PDA in 1978, two 
years after the Supreme Court judgment in Gilbert that it reversed, contradicts any 
suggestion that the enactment of gender equality measures has been slow and 
contentious project in the US. A response to this argument is that the PDA was not an 
equality measure per se, as much as it was a limited law clarifying original 
Congressional intent that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII. 
As observed in Newport News v. EEOC, in enacting the PDA, Congress, 
‘unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the judgment and the reasoning of the 
Court in the Gilbert decision,’ and instead took the view that it was ‘the dissenting 
Justices [who] correctly interpreted the Act.’1264  
b Gender mainstreaming is holistic and less controversial. 
Recalling from Chapter 1, it was suggested that soft law strategies form one part 
of four essential elements to a holistic approach to addressing the problem pregnancy 
discrimination. The results of this research suggests that gender mainstreaming, while 
not without some limitations, is an essential soft law strategy in a holistic approach that 
seeks to achieve the structural changes that will lead to greater substantive equality 
between women and men. The importance of this soft law strategy for the US is its 
ability to transcend the divide between civil and political rights, and social and 
economic rights, as well as the public/private sphere divide that epitomizes US 
antidiscrimination measures for pregnant workers. Its importance also lies in the fact 
that no one legal measure can ever hope to completely eradicate discrimination and 
achieve equality for pregnant workers. As noted by Congress during the 1963 debates 
surrounding the enactment of Title VII: 
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and 
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against 
minorities. There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership 
                                                 
1263 See: Healthy Families Act (S.2520.IS; H.R. 4575.IH), and 105th Congress 2d Session, H.R. 3531 IH: 
New Mother’s Breastfeeding Promotion and Protection Act of 1998. See Chapter 6. 
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provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most 
troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary 
or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.1265  
This observation was prescient. As the discussion in previous Chapters revealed, 
the US Constitution and federal statutes have given women access to the labour market, 
but they have not been a universal remedy for discrimination. This is to say that while 
workplace doors are no longer closed to women, structural barriers continue to exist that 
operate to keep women at the bottom of the ladder to advancement.1266The fact is, 
Constitutional and statutory rights and remedies can never be a complete panacea to 
gender discrimination. Furthermore, as the discussion in Chapter 4 has shown, the US is 
not alone in this regard. As Sandra Fredman has observed in the context of UK law, 
‘three decades of anti-discrimination legislation have not been able to address deep-
seated discriminatory structures.’1267Similarly, Epstein argues, ‘The problem is no 
longer one of entry, but of promotion and inclusion into the informal networks leading 
to the top.’1268 Her observation is strengthened by Roth’s research, in which it is noted 
that ‘opportunity is institutionally structured,’1269and by Sterba’s, who observes that 
women hold ‘only 10% of management positions.’1270 
The discussion in previous Chapters also revealed that pregnancy in the 
workplace holds its own unique challenges for antidiscrimination legislation.  
Challenges that neither US ‘equal treatment’ measures nor EU ‘special treatment ‘ 
measures have been able to fully resolve. With the adoption of gender mainstreaming by 
the US, it is hoped that these challenges may be more carefully targeted, as policy-
makers will no longer be constrained to utilizing individual rights and affirmative action 
measures to address a seemingly intractable problem.  
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VI Conclusion 
This Chapter set out to do two things. First, to critically consider EU experience 
with the strategy of gender mainstreaming, and the lessons it offers US nascent efforts. 
Secondly, against a background of these lessons, this Chapter sought to present 
compelling evidence that with the issuance of Executive Order No. 13506, gender 
mainstreaming has become a US domestic equality strategy.  
It was argued above, that EU experience with gender mainstreaming reveals five 
important lessons for the US: (1) The need to adopt a ‘transformative’ approach to 
gender mainstreaming, one that is designed to integrate gender into all systems, 
structures, policies, processes, procedure, organization and culture. (2) The need to 
anticipate challenges to mainstreaming efforts, including a lack of commitment by those 
charged with implementing the strategy, a lack of financial and human resources, or 
institutional capacity. (3)The need to include a broad array of external experts and 
stakeholders in research, data collection, and policy discussions, in an effort to offset the 
challenges listed above, and to increase ‘buy in’ for the strategy. (4) The need for a 
broad approach to mainstreaming; one that reflects an understanding of 
intersectionalities and involves a move from gender mainstreaming to ‘diversity’ or 
‘equality’ mainstreaming. (5) The understanding that gender mainstreaming offers a 
distinct and complementary policy approach to addressing inequality, as against ‘equal 
treatment,’ which seeks to treat women the same as men and ‘special treatment,’ which 
seeks to treat women differently from men.  
The discussion above also revealed that while the use of an Executive Order 
renders the US strategy somewhat fragile and reliant upon ongoing political good will, 
this ‘soft law’ measure is often a precursor to legislation, and has been a historically 
successful vehicle for advancing civil rights. A closer review of US implementation 
efforts also revealed that many of the steps taken by the Whitehouse Council and the US 
Departments and Agencies resonate closely with the focus of gender mainstreaming in 
the EU. For instance, gender mainstreaming in employment and educational policies 
seeks to encourage women and girls to consider STEM careers, recognizes the need for 
workplace flexibility and paid leave, and emphasizes strong cooperation between 
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internal policy-makers and external experts and stakeholders. While it was 
acknowledged that the lack of critical monitoring or review of US efforts may ultimately 
serve to limit the strategy’s transformative effect, it was also safely argued that the 
strategy’s ability to be complementary, holistic, and a less controversial tool for 
achieving greater substantive equality is a promising development in the trajectory of 
US antidiscrimination law.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
I Introduction 
The antidiscrimination laws of the European Union (EU) and the United States 
of America (US) seek to prohibit pregnancy discrimination in the workplace, but their 
approach to the problem has historically differed. US law has been defined by an ‘equal 
treatment’ formal equality approach to the problem. The contrasting EU laws seek 
substantive equality by combining equal treatment with ‘special treatment’ measures, 
complemented by the strategy of gender mainstreaming.  
The Introductory Chapter of this thesis defined the central question that this 
research sought to address: Is the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law shifting away 
from a purely formal equality approach to addressing pregnancy discrimination, towards 
a more holistic approach that seeks greater substantive equality, and imposes a duty to 
promote or achieve equality? This question inherently raised a number of important 
ancillary research questions. In particular, what is the historical, legal, and conceptual 
background against which EU and US antidiscrimination law has been enacted? How 
does this affect the equality measures they adopt to address pregnancy discrimination, 
and their possibilities for future development?  
This discussion begins with a summary of findings, before addressing the 
specific conclusions that these findings suggest. 
II Summary of Findings 
a Historical differences. 
An exploration of EU and US antidiscrimination law was prefaced by an analysis 
of the historical differences between the two jurisdictions. The evidence presented in 
Chapters 3 and 5 revealed that whereas the EU is a creature of international treaty and 
the power to make law is conferred by the twenty-eight members of its economic and 
social union, the US is a sovereign nation defined by its federal system of government, 
in which power is divided between the fifty individual states and the federal 
government. Under this division, national legislative power is vested in Congress, with 
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the states having power under the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution to make 
geographically limited laws. 
 In addition to a difference in conferral of legislative authority, the EU has at its 
disposal a variety of forms for its laws that have no comparable in the US. At one end of 
the spectrum is the primary legislation of the Treaties and secondary legislation in the 
form of Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. At the other end of the spectrum are the 
communications, notices, guidelines, recommendations, strategies, and the opinions of 
the EU Commission and Parliament. Juxtaposed to this, the US Congress and the state 
legislatures may only enact Bills and Resolutions, and the President may issue 
Executive Orders, designed to manage the federal government.  
However, finding differences in legislative authority and form does not take us 
far. They do not explain the substantive differences in EU and US antidiscrimination 
laws. These differences are attributable to the historical, political, social, economic, and 
cultural events that affect these two legal systems and the laws they produce. As the 
discussion in Chapter 3 revealed, there is an economic and social basis to EU sex 
discrimination law. The foundation of this dual basis is Article 119 in the original 
constitutional Treaty, providing for equal pay for equal work between men and women. 
The point of which was to avoid ‘competitive disadvantage in intra-community 
competition.’1271Article 119 also emphasized that the union is not merely an economic 
one, but one that ensured social progress. This notion that there is a ‘double aim’ in the 
EU, that it is at once both economic and social in its aims, has since been solidified by 
the provisions of the amending Treaties, and is most clearly highlighted in the adoption 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was made legally binding by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.1272  
In contrast, as the evidence presented in Chapter 5 indicated, US gender 
discrimination law has at its roots racism, not market competition. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution providing that no state shall, ‘deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ was not initially construed by the US 
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Supreme Court to mean equality between women and men.1273Instead, it was construed 
to end racism. The desire to combat racism likewise underpinned the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Title VII), the nation’s benchmark antidiscrimination legislation, where the debate 
surrounding its enactment suggests the inclusion of a prohibition of sex discrimination 
may have been an attempt to derail the entire Bill, rather than a desire to advance 
equality between women and men.1274  
b Legal differences. 
Historical differences aside, Chapter 3 revealed that the only limit upon the 
substantive provisions of EU antidiscrimination law is the ability of its member states to 
agree. In contrast, the US Constitutional mandate of formal equality places specific 
parameters on the adoption of all national and state legislation. Applying these 
parameters to the PWD in Chapter 6 revealed that the US Supreme Court would subject 
the Directive to an ‘intermediate level’ of judicial scrutiny. To be constitutionally valid, 
its provisions of job protected paid leave, and workplace accommodations would have 
to be found to ‘serve important governmental objectives’ and ‘the discriminatory means 
employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’1275 
From the ensuing discussion it was determined that while job protected paid leave and 
workplace accommodations may pass a constitutional challenge, mandatory maternity 
leave would not. 
c Conceptual differences. 
The Introductory Chapter examined the multiple meanings of ‘equality,’ 
observing from the intense academic debate surrounding the concept that there is no 
single legal or theoretical definition of equality in the EU or the US. Instead, it found 
that legal concepts of equality are informed by three distinct ‘visions.’ These visions are 
formal equality, substantive equality, and equality as diversity, or dignity and inclusion. 
In summary, formal equality is the narrowest vision, reducing equality to equal 
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1274 Title VII. (n 171). 
1275 United States v Virginia (n 807) 533.  
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treatment, and requiring employers to ignore the sex-based differences between women 
and men in the decision-making process. When applied to pregnancy, formal equality 
requires ‘pregnancy blindness,’ meaning that employers are required to treat a pregnant 
employee the same as other employees-equally well, or equally badly. In contrast, 
substantive equality seeks to recognize difference in order to eliminate workplace 
disadvantages. The question arises, however, as to what differences should be 
recognized and how they should be taken into account. Should legislation seek ‘equality 
of opportunity’ in the removal of workplace barriers, or should it seek ‘equality of 
results,’ via the proportional representation of the sexes, minorities, and other 
traditionally excluded groups? It is the more radical ‘equality of results’ vision of 
substantive equality that informs the third vision of equality, which focuses on the 
dignity, autonomy, and worth of individuals. This vision requires the removal of socio-
economic and political barriers that contribute to inequality. It rejects the narrowly 
defined concepts of formal and substantive equality, and antidiscrimination legislation 
that contains only negative duties, in favour of imposing positive duties and obligations 
to promote equality and inclusion. 
The influences of all three visions were found within EU and US 
antidiscrimination law, to varying degrees. Formal equality exercised a strong influence 
in the original Treaty, as an isolated provision with regard to equal pay.1276 It was then 
expanded during the 1970s by three Directives regarding equal pay, equal treatment as 
regards access to employment, vocational training, promotion, and working conditions, 
and equal treatment in matters of social security.1277While these primary and secondary 
laws have since been amended, the central prohibition of discrimination ‘on grounds of 
sex’ remains. Likewise, formal equality has been cemented into the US rights-based 
approach to equality, as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution 
and Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on a number of specifically enumerated 
grounds, including ‘because of,’ or ‘on the grounds of sex.’1278  
                                                 
1276 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
1277 Equal Treatment Directive (n 122); Equal Treatment in matters of social security (n 174); Equal Pay 
Directive (n 172). 
1278 Title VII (n 171). 
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With the adoption of the Pregnant Workers Directive (PWD) in the EU, and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in the US, there was a discernible shift towards 
substantive equality.1279This shift has been strongest in the EU as the PWD expressly 
affords women special protection against dismissal from the beginning of pregnancy 
until the end of maternity leave, save in exceptional circumstances. The PDA only 
implicitly permits some preferential treatment of pregnancy, so long as it is consistent 
with the goal of achieving equality of employment opportunities.1280This shift to 
substantive equality has been bolstered by a derogation from formal equality that exists 
in both EU and US antidiscrimination law, which permits gender-based measures to 
address sex segregation in employment. However, the fact that quotas and targets are 
impermissible positive action measures, or affirmative action measures as they are 
called in the US, reveals an overriding preference for a substantive vision of ‘equality of 
opportunity,’ not ‘of results.’ This can be attributed to a desire in the EU to address 
existing inequalities and not to make new ones, and the fact that affirmative action 
measures are extremely controversial in the US, where they are ‘painted as a policy of 
institutionalized discrimination against white men.’1281 
There is only limited evidence that the dignity vision of equality permeates EU 
antidiscrimination law and policy, and even less in the US. An illustration can be found 
in the adoption of the strategy of gender mainstreaming, which requires governmental 
policy-makers and implementers not to accept that existing policy or the policy being 
advanced or considered is in effect gender-neutral, or free of bias towards the male 
norm. As observed in Chapter 3, in the EU, Articles 8 and 10 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) impose a positive obligation to alter 
practices and structures that serve to perpetuate inequality, disadvantage, and exclusion, 
providing that the EU ‘shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality 
between men and women, in all its activities.’ Consideration 2 in the preamble to the 
Recast Directive 2006/54/EC, expressly references the ‘positive obligation to promote 
equality between women and men’ at the national level. But, as potentially 
                                                 
1279 Pregnant Workers Directive (n 112); PDA (n 117). 
1280 See: Guerra (n 693). 
1281 Leonard (n 817) 61.  
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transformative as this strategy is, the discussion in Chapter 7 revealed that it has fallen 
short of its potential to date. 
The evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 indicated a subtle shift in the US 
towards the imposition of positive duties at the federal, state, and local levels of 
government, most notably with the adoption of gender mainstreaming as a domestic 
equality strategy. At the federal level, Executive Order No. 13506 established a 
‘Whitehouse Council on Women and Girls,’ with a stated purpose of ensuring: 
That each of the agencies in which they’re charged takes into account the 
needs of women and girls in the policies they draft, the programmes they 
create, the legislations they support.1282  
Additionally, sixteen US states, eighteen counties, and forty-four US Cities were 
found to have legislatively implemented the standards of the Convention to Eliminate 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women within their boundaries.1283These 
international standards require the adoption of gender mainstreaming, as well as positive 
action, as ‘temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality...’ and 
‘special measures aimed at protecting maternity.’ While this use of ‘soft’ law to impose 
positive obligations has its drawbacks, including vagueness and lack of sanction for 
non-compliance, the evidence presented in Chapters 1 and 7 revealed that soft law is a 
useful tool for advancing equality where there is significant opposition to the expansion 
of public policy objectives.   
III Conclusions 
The findings of this research, which have been discussed in previous Chapters, 
support a number of specific conclusions: 
                                                 
1282 Executive Order No. 13506 (n 12). 
1283 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 19 I.L.M.33 (1980).  
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a  The mandate of formal equality has been successful in tackling the problem 
of overt sex discrimination, but has been unable to adequately address 
pregnancy discrimination. 
Chapter 2 used the experiences of five employees at two hypothetical companies, 
one located in the US, and one located in the EU, to catalogue some of the real or 
potential disadvantages faced by women who are either pregnant, seeking to become 
pregnant, or who wish to continue to breastfeed their child upon a return to work. These 
examples and the case law examined in Chapter 5, served to clarify the limitations of a 
mandate of formal equality, which requires employers treat pregnant employees the 
same as non-pregnant employees who are similarly situated with respect to their ability 
to work. It also clarified the failure of the concept of indirect discrimination to address 
employer policies that disproportionately impact pregnant workers. These workplace 
policies generally pertain to the provision of sick leave, light duty assignments, flexible 
work, and part-time work. These disadvantages do not exist in the EU, as the equality 
Directives entitle pregnant workers to an accommodation, or paid leave, and the right to 
request flexible working arrangements upon a return to work. Instead, the evidence in 
Chapter 4 revealed that the EU variant of the US paradigm of disparate impact 
discrimination is used to address other areas of discrimination where workplace policies 
are based upon unexamined assumptions and stereotypes that disproportionately affect 
women, especially those who work part-time.   
b  Derogations from equal treatment can have unintended negative 
consequences for the wider canvas of equality. 
By treating pregnancy as sui generis and permitting measures that give ‘special 
advantages’ to women, antidiscrimination law can address the lacuna in protection that a 
requirement of formal equality creates. At the same time, a potential for conflict arises 
where legislation provides for formal equality and requires treatment that respects 
difference. Where these conflicts are sought to be resolved through litigation, there is 
the risk that judicial interpretation will tend to overemphasize women’s childbearing 
capacity, thereby reinforcing gender stereotypes, and/or emphasize other competing 
interests. This research revealed that this is the case in the EU, where the economic 
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underpinning of the union has necessitated gender equality measures emphasize the 
labour market participation of pregnant women and the idea of economic maximization, 
rather than equality per se. However, while the research conducted by Masselot and di 
Torella into the case law of the CJEU up until 2001, concluded that the manner in which 
the Court has treated pregnant workers and workers on maternity leave reflects the male 
norm, social stereotypes, and the concept of a ‘productive worker,’ the results of this 
research serve to suggest that the Court’s decisions more properly reflect the EU’s 
economic underpinning and the limitations of the EU measures themselves, rather than 
the failings of the Court.1284 
The limitations of  ‘special treatment’ measures in addressing pregnancy 
discrimination and their role in continuing gender stereotypes form part of a large body 
of feminist legal theory discussed in Chapter 2, and throughout this thesis. These 
theorists play a key role in highlighting how anti-discrimination measures help 
overcome, or contribute to the disadvantage of women. Their concerns suggest that a 
key challenge in addressing pregnancy discrimination in the EU and the US is finding 
the right balance between protection and equality in their antidiscrimination laws. 
  
c  Gender mainstreaming can help policy-makers find the right balance 
between protection and equality in their antidiscrimination laws. 
 
The results of this research suggest that gender mainstreaming offers policy-
makers an additional tool through which they can find the right balance to address the 
seemingly intractable problem of pregnancy discrimination. And, in contrast to formal 
equality and special treatment, which focus upon the rights and needs of individuals, 
gender mainstreaming focuses on the institutional structures that give rise to inequality, 
disadvantage, and exclusion. This conclusion does not ignore the fact that as with all 
concepts used to address equality issues, gender mainstreaming is a contested concept 
that has strengths and weaknesses, as well as its supporters and critics. Notwithstanding 
its weaknesses, the findings in Chapters 3 and 7 revealed that the strategy has great 
transformative promise, because it applies to all polices-economic, social, and political, 
                                                 
1284 Masselot and di Torella (n 395) 
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and enables equality measures to be more carefully targeted. Overall, the results of this 
research suggested three clear reasons EU and US policy-makers are embracing this 
long-term equality strategy. They are: (1) The strategy operates to complement existing 
antidiscrimination law. (2) It is forward looking, rather than focused on past events, and 
(3) It is a less controversial means of achieving gender equality than the adoption of 
positive/affirmative action measures, while being similarly focused on group 
based/collective disadvantage. 
d  The EU is redirecting its gender equality policy approach to be more 
holistic. 
The evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4 revealed that the EU approach to 
pregnancy discrimination is informed by an understanding that as the workplace does 
not exist in a vacuum, addressing discrimination in one forum, without considering the 
impact of other issues, including the household division of labour, the costs and 
availability of child and dependent care, and the need to balance the competing demands 
of work and family life, will render inadequate any single response to the problem. 
Instead, what is required is a holistic approach, as defined in Chapter 1. This approach 
consists of four essential elements. 1. Considering the problem of pregnancy 
discrimination within the wider context of gender equality. 2. Collaboration between  
government and non-government stakeholders, with the purpose of informing policy and 
creating greater support for governmental initiatives. 3. Using a combination of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law initiatives specifically designed to advance substantive equality for 
pregnant workers that go beyond the individual prohibition of discrimination, to include 
measures designed to actively advance substantive equality and impose a duty to 
promote equality of opportunity. 4. Reconsideration and redirection of policy efforts 
where evaluations, reports, and studies suggest that tweaking is necessary to achieve 
greater substantive quality for pregnant, breastfeeding workers, and women on maternity 
leave. In Chapter 4, EU redirection was highlighted by the EU Commission’s proposal 
for two new equality Directives and its renewed focus upon gender neutrality in national 
reconciliation measures, which actively seek to de-couple care from motherhood, to 
mutualise the costs of maternity and paternity leave, and be responsive to the challenge 
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that pregnancy discrimination poses in a changed environment. In particular, the 2008 
Proposal for a new PWD, which was withdrawn in July 2015, and is to be re-proposed 
in 2016, holds considerable promise for advancing substantive equality and the holistic 
approach of the EU, as it is anticipated that the new Proposal will address shortcomings 
in the original PWD that were not anticipated when the 2008 Proposal was drafted, and 
were only revealed by recent CJEU judgments declaring that men and surrogate mothers 
do not have a right to maternity leave.1285An express inclusion of men in the Proposal 
will help to deconstruct gender stereotypes and shift the focus from the biological and 
productive role of women to a broader and more balanced right to care. 
 Added to this, if adopted, a Proposed Directive for improving the gender 
balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on the stock exchange will 
do much to remove structural inequalities in the workplace, as it sets a minimum 
objective of 40% women as non-executive directors of public listed companies.  
These Proposals, the redirection of reconciliation measures, and the 
establishment by the Commission of a High-Level Group on Non-Discrimination, 
Equality, and Diversity for the development of common objectives for equality and non-
discrimination, reveal an EU approach to gender discrimination generally, and 
pregnancy discrimination specifically, that is proactive, holistic, and ever evolving.  
e  US antidiscrimination law is shifting towards a more holistic approach that 
seeks greater substantive equality, and imposes a duty to promote or 
achieve equality. 
This research revealed that there are several surprising and important 
developments on the national, state, and local level of the US that indicate the trajectory 
of its antidiscrimination law is slowly shifting from a purely ‘equal treatment’ approach 
to tackling the problem of pregnancy discrimination in the workplace, towards one that 
seeks greater substantive equality. On the national level, this includes the adoption of 
two national laws, the provisions of which help to address the lack of workplace 
accommodations that have often resulted in the lawful dismissal of pregnant and 
breastfeeding workers. First, the 2008 Act designed to amend the American’s with 
                                                 
1285 Montull (n 385); Z v A Government department (n 395); C.D. (n 395). 
 332 
Disability Act, suggests that certain impairments resulting from pregnancy may be 
considered disabilities requiring employers to provide a ‘reasonable’ accommodation to 
an employee. Secondly, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, 
requires some employers to provide unpaid reasonable break time and a place for 
employees to express breast milk for one year after a child’s birth.1286There are also an 
increasing number of proposals for national legislation designed to provide workplace 
accommodations for pregnant and breastfeeding workers, and paid leave. While the 
evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 7 revealed that these proposals are unlikely to 
become law anytime soon, they indicate an acknowledgement of the failure of formal 
equality to adequately address the problem of pregnancy discrimination.   
The discussion in Chapter 5 also revealed that by virtue of the Tenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, all state legislatures are free to adopt broader 
antidiscrimination laws than those provided by Congress, as long as they do not conflict 
with Constitutional guarantees, and are not pre-empted by federal law, under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2).1287In Chapter 6, a 
systematic and in-depth review of equality measures of the fifty US states and 
Washington D.C., revealed that although these measures are ad hoc and cannot offer the 
broad protection afforded by national law, they play a vital role in addressing the 
problem of pregnancy discrimination in the US and filling the lacuna left by 
Congressional adherence to formal equality. 
The final and most promising development in US antidiscrimination law is the 
adoption of gender mainstreaming as domestic equality strategy. Considered against a 
background of the lessons from the EU’s experience with the strategy, the discussion in 
Chapter 7 revealed that in the five years since it was first adopted in the US, the 
disaggregated statistics and reports it has spurred have provided the foundation for the 
gender equality plans of a number of federal departments and agencies that benefit 
pregnant workers; as well as forming the basis for legislative proposals designed to 
                                                 
1286
An Act to restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. (PL 110-
325 (S 3406) (2008). Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 207). NB: The Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148, Section 4207, as of March 23, 2010 amended section 7. 
1287 For a discussion of Congressional pre-emption of state law, see: Guerra (n 693) 280-281. 
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address the lack of paid leave, workplace flexibility, public support for child care, and 
the need for a higher minimum wage.  
Notwithstanding the well-documented limitations of gender mainstreaming and 
evidence presented in Chapter 7 indicating that the US adoption of the strategy via soft 
law renders it fragile and subject to ongoing political goodwill, the strategy offers great 
transformative promise for US antidiscrimination law; enabling it to move beyond the 
confines of formal equality. And, while it would be premature to say that adoption of the 
strategy represents a complete turning point in the trajectory of US antidiscrimination 
law, it is the clearest political recognition to date of the need to transcend the divide 
between civil and political rights, and social and economic rights; as well as the 
public/private sphere divide that epitomizes US antidiscrimination measures for 
pregnant workers.  
f  US antidiscrimination law will never completely converge with EU 
antidiscrimination law. 
While these research findings suggest that US antidiscrimination law is shifting 
perceptibly towards a substantive equality approach to addressing the problem of 
pregnancy discrimination, they also reveal three reasons why it will never completely 
converge with EU antidiscrimination law, even if it were desired. These are: (1) A 
Directive is not a legal measure that is available to Congress; meaning that the form of 
US antidiscrimination law can never be identical to that of the EU. (2) As the US 
Constitution prohibits the adoption of a mandatory maternity leave law, the substance of 
US antidiscrimination law can never be the identical to that of the EU. (3) Finally, there 
is a significant conceptual barrier to complete convergence with EU law, as ‘special 
treatment’ restrictions upon women’s employment are not acceptable to US liberal 
feminists, who have strong support in the US Congress. Notwithstanding this, it can be 
appreciated that the trajectory of US antidiscrimination law is not as dismal as it once 
was.
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Appendix 1: EU Member State Pregnancy and Maternity Measures 
 
 
 
EU minimum Emees Risk Assess. Pregnancy Leave Pregnancy Pay Maternity Pay Maternity Leave Prohibition against Dismissal Night Work Breastfeeding
PWD 92/85/EEC All Yes Yes- if no accom. Adequate Adequate 14/2 wks Pregnancy & Leave Duration Can't require Yes
EU Member State Provisions LEGEND
* Coverage for female employees, workers and apprentices
Austria All*#^ Yes Same Wages Wages/€8.65 ** 16/16 or 20 wks Same Same>16 wks Yes # Modified for: Female homeworkers
Belgium All< Yes Same Wage x 1wk/60% 82%salary 30 days/75%-max €98.70 pd** 15 or 17/1 wks Same Same Yes Housemaids/mother's helps
Bulgaria All Yes Same 90% salary 90% salary 410/45 days Same Same Yes Contracts agents and civil servants
Croatia All Yes Same 100% salary 100% AWW. 6mos/98 days Same Same & underground etc. Yes Federal state and municipal civil servants
Cyprus All Yes Same 100% salary 75% salary 18wks/11 Same Same Yes Female teachers employed by a federal state
Czech Rep. All Yes Same 70% of a reference amount 70% of reference amount. 28-37 weeks/14 days Same Same Yes ^ Not applicable to self employed.
Denmark All Yes Same 7th day max €124.80 pw 26 wks x€230 42/2 weeks Same Same Yes / mandatory leave period.
Estonia All Yes Same 100% avg inc pd. 100% AWW. 140 /30 days Same Same Yes >Work restrictions, including lifting or standing, after birth.
Finland All Yes Same 30-90% salary if not transfer, or earnings based sickness allwc. 30-90% salary 105/30 days Same Same Yes ** Rate for marginally employed.
France All Yes Same 100% ADW 100% ADW max €81.27 16-26***/8 wks Same Yes *** Weeks are increased in circumstances of complications/multiple birth/3rd child at home. by 
Germany All Yes Same 100% ADW max €13 per day/Emplyer balance 100% ADW max €13 per day/Emplyer balance 14/6 weeks Same Ltd 8.5 hours Yes
Greece All Yes Same 100% salary x17wks/€683.76 pm x 6mos 100% pay 10mos/17 wks Same Same Yes ADD:AVERAGE DAILY WAGE =ADW
Hungary All Yes Same 70%DGEx15 days, 60% max year 70%ADW 24/4 wks Same same Yes AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE =AWW
Ireland All Yes Same 7th day €80.09-€124.80 €230 pwx 26 wks 42/6 wks Same Same Yes Daily Gross Earnings =DGE
Italy All Yes Same 50% ADW x20 days/66.6% thereafter 80%salary 5mos/30% 6 mos 11/5mos Same same Yes AV ins wage
Latvia All Yes Same 80%AIW 80%AIW 112-136 days Same Same Yes
Lithuania All Yes Same 80-100% salary x 2 days, 40% to day 6,80% after. 100% salary 126 -140 days Same same Yes
Luxembourg All Yes Same 100% salary emplyoyer paid 100% salary max €9,007.43 per month 16-20/16 wks Same Same Yes
Malta All Yes Same 100% ADW x3 days, €12.01 or €18.57 pd 100% salary by emperx14 wks/€160pwx4 weeks 18/6 wks Same same Yes
Netherlands All Yes Same 100% salary max €174.64 pd 100% salary max €174.64 pd 14-18/4-6 Same Same Yes
Poland All Yes Same 100% salary 100% salary 26-45/2 wks Same same Yes
Portugal All Yes Same 75%salary 100%x 5mos, 80% x6 mos, 25%x 3mos 4-9mos/6 wks Same Same Yes
Romania All Yes Same 75% AMW 85% salary min€135-€899 126/42 days Same Same Yes
Slovakia All Yes Same 25% and 55%, after 3 days 55% ADW 34-43/14 wks Same same Yes
Slovenia All Yes Same 90% salary 90%-100% salary 105/28 days Same Same Yes
Spain All Yes Same 60-75% salary 100% salary 16-18/10 wks
Sweden All Yes Same 80% ADW max 910 SEK pd 80% ADW x 420 days, max 910 SEK pd,  60 days 180 SEK pd 480-660 days
UK All Yes Same 100% salary if no accommodation/ £86.70 stat sick payx 28 wks 90%AWW x6wks, max £136.78x 36 wks. 52/2 -4wks
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Appendix 3: US State and Washington D.C. Breastfeeding Accommodation Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
State  Accommodation?Employee min.Ma dated BreaksBeyond 1 yr.?Paid? Mandated place.Privately enforceableStatut Legend
Alabama No No No No No No No No * States mandating employers make 'reasonable effort' only to provide a private place for expressing milk.
Alaska No No No No No No No No ** States mandating mediation prior to litigation.
Arizona No No No No No No No No *** Statute uses 'may' rather than 'shall' or 'must' in setting forth employer obligations.
Arkansas Yes 1 Yes Not stated No Yes* No A.C.A. § 11-5-116  (2012)
California Yes 1 Yes No No Yes* No Cal Lab Code § 1030-33 (2013)
Colorado Yes 1 Yes 2 years No Yes* Yes** C.R.S. 8-13.5-102 et seq. (2012)"Workplace Accommodations for Nursing Mothers Act."
Connecticut Yes 1 No Not stated No Yes* Yes Conn.Gen. Stat. §. 31-40w Employer not reqd to provide breaks, but may breastfeed during meal/break period.
Delaware No No No No No No No No
D.C. Yes 1 Yes Not stated No Yes* Yes D.C. Code § 2-1402.82  (2013)and D.C. Code § 2-1402.81  (2013)
Florida No No No No No No No No
Georgia Yes 1 No*** No No No*** No O.C.G.A. § 33-24-58  (2013)
Hawaii Yes 1 No Infant No No Yes HRS § 378-2(7), HRS § 378-10 (2013)Emer not have to provide breaks.Emee may breastfeed during meal/break period. 
Idaho No No No No No No No No
Illinois Yes 5 Yes Infant No Yes* No 820 ILCS 260/10  (2013) et seq.'Nursing Mothers in the Workplace Act.'
Indiana No No No No No No No No
Iowa No No No No No No No No
Kansas No No No No No No No No
Kentucky No No No No No No No No
Louisiana No No No No No No No No
Maine Yes 1 Yes 3 years No Yes* No 26 M.R.S. § 604 (2013)
Maryland No No No No No No No No
Massachusetts No No No No No No No No
Michigan No No No No No No No No
Minnesota Yes 1 Yes 1 year No Yes* No Minn. Stat. § 181.939 (2013)
Mississippi Yes No No No No No No Miss. Code Ann. § 71-1-55  (2013) prohibits discrimination against nursing mothers.
Missouri No No No No No No No No
Montana No No No No No No No No
Nebraska No No No No No No No No
Nevada No No No No No No No No
New Hampshire No No No No No No No No
New Jersey No No No No No No No No
New Mexico Yes 4 Yes None statedNo Yes Yes N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-20-2  (2013) Contained in Human Rights law.
New York Yes 1 Yes 3 years No Yes* No NY CLS Labor § 206-c (2013)
North Carolina No No No No No No No No
North Dakota Yes None statedNo*** Infant No No*** No N.D. Cent. Code, § 23-12-17  (2013)
Ohio No No No No No No No No
Oklahoma Yes 1 No*** None statedNo No*** No 40 Okl. St. § 435 (2013)(Occupational Health and Standards Act of 1970(OSHA))ref to 'child' suggests beyond 1yr.
Oregon Yes 25 Yes 18months No Yes* No ORS § 653.077 (2012)
Pennsylvania No No No No No No No No
Rhode Island Yes 1 No*** Infant No Yes* No R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-13.2-1  (2012)
South Carolina No No No No No No No No
South Dakota No No No No No No No No
Tennessee Yes 1 Yes infant No Yes Yes Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-305  (2013)
Texas Yes None statedNo*** None statedNo No*** No Tex. Health & Safety Code § 165.003  (2013)
Utah No No No No No No No No
Vermont Yes 1 Yes 3 years No Yes Yes 21 V.S.A. § 305 (2013)
Virginia No No No No No No No No
Washington No No No No No No No No
Wisconsin No No No No No No No No
Wyoming No No No No No No No No
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Appendix 4: US State and Washington D.C. Pregnancy, Disability, Family, Medical and/or Maternity Leave 
Measures 
US State and Washington D.C. Pregnancy Disability, Family, Medical and, or Maternity Leave Measures Applicable to Private Employers
State Measure? Employer Size  Eligibility Weeks? Paid? Job-Protected? Statute LEGEND
* States w/both leave provisions & temporary disability insurance (TDI).
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 ** References a monetary benefit only, not leave entitlement.
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 *** References States w/legislative measures pending.
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 # Reference to leave measures delayed in implementation to 2015
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0
California Yes* 5/5. 12/1250 16/12** Yes/No Yes/No CGC§ 12900 (2013);CGC§ 12945.2 (2013);Cal Unemp Ins Code § 3300 (2013) 6 of 12 weeks paid.
Colorado 0 0 0 0 0 0
ConnecticutYes* 75/4 12/1000 16/'Reasonable leave'No*** Yes C.G.S. § 31-51kk -§ 31-51qq ; § 46a-51 (17). No paid leave,§ 31-57r-w. (2013),Sick Leave for Service wrkrs 1 hr per 40 wkd.
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0
D.C. Yes* 20 12/1000 32/7or 5 days No/Yes** Yes D.C. Code § 32-501 (16 weeks birth/ self care) D.C. Code § 32-131.02 **(emplyrs w/100 empees paid sick leave, max 7 days
Florida 0 0 0 0 0 0
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii Yes* 1/100 6/no min Reasonable period/26**Yes Yes HRS § 378-1; HER 4,§12-46-106-108 ;§ 398-1; HRS § 392-21, pd if eligible for TDI, 14 wks employ, 20 hrs/ $400/52 wks
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iowa Yes 4 None stated 8 No Yes Iowa Code § 216.6(2) Temp disabled by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condition.
Kansas 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 0 0
Louisiana Yes 25 All pregnant employees-no hours stated16 No Yes La. REST 23:342(2)(b)
Maine Yes 15 limos 10 No Yes 26 MRS. § 843- § 849
Maryland 0*** 0 0 0 0 0 (Legislation pending HOB 1334)
MassachusettsYes*** 6 12 weeks 8 No Yes Mass. Maternity Leave Act, ALMA GL chi. 149, § 105D (Legislation pending - Bil l  H.79)
Michigan 0*** 0 0 0 0 0 (Legislation pending HB 4706(2013))
MinnesotaYes 21 12/half time 6 No Yes Minn. Stat. § 181.940 et seq. (2013) (parenting leave for birth of child.)
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0
Montana Yes 1 All pregnant employeesReasonable periodN Yes Mont. Code Anno., § 49-2-310-311. (2012)
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0
New HampshireYes 6 All pregnant employeesUnstated No Yes RSA 354-A:VI,(b) (2013)
New JerseyYes* 50 12/1000 12/26. No/Yes Yes/No**  § 34:11B-1, care for newborn, not own condition; § 43:21-29 *monetary benefit, not leave(26 wks. 6-8 normal preg.)
New Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0
New York 0*** 1 4 26 Yes** 0 NY CLS Work Comp § 200. Cash only, no medical benefits. (Legislation pending-AO363)
North Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon Yes 25 180 days/25 hours pw 24 No*** Yes ORS § 659A.153. 12 wks parental leave/ pregnancy disability leave.(Legislation pending: SB 801,HB 2645, HB 3390.)
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 0*** 0 (Legislation pending-The General Assembly of Pennsylvania Senate Bil l  No. 962, Session of 2013.)
Rhode IslandYes* 50/4 12/30 hours pw 13/30** No/Yes Yes/No R.I. G.L. § 28-48-1 (2012); § 28-41-8 (Disability due to pregnancy & childbirth entitled to unempl benefits.)
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tennessee Yes 100 12/Fulltime 16 No Yes Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-408  (2013)
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 0
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vermont Yes 10 or 15 12/30 hours pw 12 No*** Yes 21 V.S.A. § 471 et seq. (2012) ( Legislation pending:S36)
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0
WashingtonYes# 50/8 12/1250 12/8 or as long as MD deems appropriate.No/No Ye /Yes  (ARCW) § 49.60.030;   49.78.220; § 49.78.390  (2013); 162.30.020.(State FMLA is not concurrent w/FMLA for pregnancy)
Wisconsin Yes 50 12/1000 8 total No Yes Wis. Stat. § 103.10 (2012)6 weeks for birth of child. 2 weeks for medical leave.
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Abbreviations 
ACA                    Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
ACLU    American Civil Liberties Union 
ADA              American’s with Disabilities Act. 
ADAAA                                 ADA Amendments Act 
ADEA    Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
AG                                         Advocate General 
AWE      Average weekly earnings. 
BFOQ                                     Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
BLS                                        Bureau of Labour Standards 
CEDAW   Convention to Eliminate All Forms of  
     Discrimination Against Women 
CFR                                        Charter of Fundamental Rights 
CFRA    California Family Rights Act 
CRA                                        Civil Rights Act of 1991  
CJEU                                      Court of Justice of the European Communities 
COEA    Council of Economic Advisors 
DOL    Department of Labour 
EA    Equality Act 2010     
ECJ                                         European Court of Justice 
ECOSOC   Economic and Social Council of the UN 
EEC                                        European Economic Community 
EEOC                                    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
EES    European Employment Strategy 
EHRC                                     Equality and Human Rights Commission 
EIGE                                       European Institute for Gender Equality 
EPA    Equal Pay Act  
EPC                                         Equal Protection Clause 
EPD                                         Equal Pay Directive 
ERA                                        Equal Rights Amendment 
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ESA    European Social Agenda 
ETD                                         Equal Treatment Directive 
EU                                           European Union 
EO                                           Executive Order 
FEHA                                      Fair Employment and Housing Act- California 
FIP    Federal Interagency Plan 
FLSA                                       Fair Labo[u]r Standards Act 
FLT                                         Feminist legal theory 
FMLA                                     Family and Medical Leave Act 
GED    Gender Equality Duty 
GINA    Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act 
GPD    Gross Domestic Product 
HB                                           House Bill 
ILO    International Labour Organisation 
IVF                                          In Vitro Fertilisation 
MHRA                                    Missouri Human Rights Act 
NAACP   National Association for the Advancement of 
                Colored People 
NAP                                        National Action Plans 
NASA                                     National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NRP    National Reform Programme 
NYC                                       New York City 
OECD                                     Organization for Cooperation and Economic 
                Development 
OFCCP                                   Office of Federal Contract Compliance  
     Programmes 
OMC                                       Open Method of Coordination 
PDA                                        Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
PDLL                                      Pregnancy Disability Leave Law 
PLD                                        Parental Leave Directive 
PFL                                         Paid Family Leave-California 
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Platform                                 1995 Beijing Platform for Action  
PSED                                      Public Sector Equality Duty 
PWD                                       Pregnant Workers Directive 
QMV               Qualified Majority Voting         
SB                                           Senate Bill 
STEM                                     Science, Technology, Engineering,   
     Mathematics 
TEU                                        Treaty on European Union (Maastricht)       
TFEU                                      Treaty on the Functioning of the European  
     Union 
Title VII                                  Civil Rights Act 1964 
UK                                          United Kingdom                                     
UN                                          United Nations 
UN ECOSOC                          United Nations Economic and Social Council  
US                                           United States of America 
USSC    United States Supreme Court 
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